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THE  PROBLEM 

OF 

HUMAN  PEACE 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 


CATHOLICISM  AND  THE  MODERN  MIND 


A Contribution  to  Religious  Unity 
and  Progress. 

London  : EDWARD  ARNOLD. 

" We  commend  a perusal  of  this  book  to  all  thoughtful 
Catholics.” — Catholic  Herald, 

“ This  book  is  a system  of  theology.  Theological 
students  of  all  sorts  might  well  be  advised  to  study  it.”— 
Church  Timet. 

“ In  a masterly  fashion  the  needs  of  the  age  are 
revealed,  the  claims  of  Catholicism  analysed,  criticized 
and  justified,  and  the  Catholic  faith  restated  in  the  light 
of  modern  thought — restated  without  giving  up  a single 
essential.” — The  Christian  Commonwealth. 

“ One  who  studies  this  singular  pronouncement  as  a 
whole,  whether  from  the  point  of  view  of  a devout 
Catholic  or  of  a scientific  agnostic,  may  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  is  the  most  drastic — certainly  the  most 
intelligible — and  perhaps  the  most  rational  form  of  that 
‘ Modernism,’  the  task  of  which  is  to  show  how  current 
Christianity  can  be  brought  into  a line  with  modern 
thought.” — Frederic  Harrison  in  the  English  Review. 


HUMAN  PEACE 


STUDIED  FROM  THE  STANDPOINT 
OF  A SCIENTIFIC  CATHOLICISM 


BY 


MALCOLM  ''QUIN 


Author  of  **  Catholicism  and  the  Modern  Mind,” 
“ Aids  to  Worship,”  etc. 


" Agnus  Dei,  qui  iollis  peccala  mundi,  dona 
nobis  pacem.”— Canon  of  the  Mass. 

" Agir  par  affection,  el  penser  pour  agir.” — 


Auguste  Comte. 


NEW  YORK 


E.  P.  DUTTON  AND  COMPANY 
681  FIFTH  AVENUE 
1917 


Printed  i; 


Great  Britain 


[All  rights  reserved] 


PREFACE 


It  may  prevent  misapprehension  with  regard  to  the 
following  work  if  I say  at  once  that  it  is  not  concerned 
with  any  merely  special  and  temporary  questions, 
commanding  and  urgent  as  they  may  seem  in  them- 
selves, arising  out  of  the  present  European  war^ — as, 
for  instance,  the  causes  which  may  be  held  to  have 
immediately  led  to  it,  or  the  conditions  of  peace  by 
which  it  ought  to  be  followed.  Before  this  treatise 
appears  in  print  the  war  may  conceivably  be  ended, 
and  these  particular  questions  will  have  lost  their 
importance.  But  questions  still  greater  will  remain — 
the  question  of  how  far  it  may  be  possible  to  prevent 
the  recurrence  of  such  a war,  and  maintain  the 
lasting  peace  of  the  world ; the  question  of  the  bearing 
of  so  stupendous  an  event  upon  man’s  conception  of 
himself  and  his  destiny,  under  the  conditions  of 
modern  thought  and  life.  These  questions  are  not  a 
mere  problem  of  politics,  or  statesmanship,  in  the 
ordinary  view  of  them.  They  are  not  questions  only 
for  a particular  country,  or  a particular  class,  or  a 
particular  party — questions  to  be  decided  by  the  vic- 
tories of  the  soldier,  or  by  the  resolutions  of  a Par- 
liament or  Congress,  or  by  exercises  in  journalism,  or 
by  increasing  the  number  of  voters,  or  by  strengthen- 
ing what  is  vaguely  called  the  ‘‘  democracy.”  They 
are  fundamental  and  universal  questions— in  every 
sense  of  the  word,  catholic  questions^ — of  man’s  mind 
and  fate.  As  such,  they  are  questions  for  the  scien- 
tific thinker  and  teacher,  extending  the  scope  and 
processes  of  science,  as  they  must  now  be  extended— 
and  as  since  the  time  of  Comte  it  has  been  possible  to 
extend  them — to  the  spheres  of  man’s  social  and 
religious  life. 


VI 


PREFACE 


It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  I have  endeavoured 
here  to  treat  them,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  I have 
studied  the  Problem  of  Peace  as  the  problem  of  a 
“ Scientific  Catholicism.”  This  world-wide  and  appal- 
ling war  hashad  among  its  other  great  consequences  this 
— that  it  has  caused  a large  number  of  serious  minds 
to  ask  themselves  what  must  be  the  effect  of  such  a 
catastrophe  on  our  ordinary  conceptions  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  what  ought  naturally  to  be  the  part  of  a 
religion  of  vision  and  prevision  in  the  promotion  of 
peace.  Some  have  answered  this  question  in  one 
way,  and  some  in  another.  Some  have  professed  to 
believe  that  the  war  would  revive  and  deepen  men’s 
religious  convictions,  according  to  our  traditional 
Christianity ; others  have  openly  and  frankly  said 
“ this  war  has  made  us  atheists.”  My  own  answer 
to  this  question  will  be  found  in  the  following  pages. 
I am  sure  that  a religion  which  cannot  show  man, 
with  the  certainty  and  breadth  of  science,  his  real 
place  and  needs  in  the  universe,  and  which,  as  a 
consequence,  is  powerless  to  give  him  a right  inspira- 
tion and  practical  direction  in  his  life  on  earth — I am 
sure  that  such  a religion,  whatever  its  claims  for 
itself,  will  eventually  be  dismissed  from  the  human 
mind.  I am  sure,  too,  that  Christianity,  in  all  its 
forms,  has,  throughout  the  nineteen  hundred  years 
of  its  existence,  exhibited  this  intellectual  and  social 
incapacity,  and  never  more  signally  than  in  regard 
to  the  present  war.  But  I am  equally  sure  that  in 
Catholicism — the  religion  of  man  in  his  highest  spheres 
of  development,  following  after  his  noblest  ideals— 
there  is  a positive  and  permanent  content  of  goodness, 
beauty  and  truth,  which,  scientifically  understood  and 
completed,  may  carry  him  on  in  his  pursuit  of  his  own 
perfection,  and,  as  a consequence,  towards  the  attain- 
ment of  a Human  Peace. 

That  is  the  subject  of  the  present  work.  It  is 
naturally  a two-fold  subject.  It  calls,  first,  for  an 
exposition — so  far  as  the  limits  of  this  work  allow,  and 


PREFACE 


Vll 


relatively  to  the  question  of  peace — of  those  religious 
conceptions  which  I here  denote  by  the  expression 
“ a Scientific  Catholicism.”  Secondly,  it  involves  a 
statement  of  the  principles  of  international  policy 
derived  from  this  Catholicism,  which  would,  as  I 
hold,  in  their  complete,  continuous  application,  estab- 
hsh  a Human  Peace.  Many  of  those  who  cherish  the 
ideal  of  such  a peace  will  probably  say  that  to  make 
it  dependent,  as  I have  done,  on  the  scientific  trans- 
formation and  completion  of  Catholicism,  is  to  indefi- 
nitely postpone  its  reahzation.  They  do  not  believe 
in  the  possibility  of  such  a change.  And  in  the 
absence  of  it  they  consider  it  useless  to  appeal  to 
CathoHcism  or  to  Christianity  in  any  form  for  the 
purposes  of  peace. 

If,  however,  we  are  not  to  look  to  “ the  Church,” 
in  any  conception  of  it,  for  a Human  Peace,  from 
what  are  we  to  expect  it  ? Some  look  for  it  to  some 
international  understanding,  or  to  the  increased  power 
of  what  they  call  “ the  democracy,”  or  to  the  spread 
of  Socialism,  or  perhaps  even  to  some  form  of  “ inter- 
national Government.”  Now,  these  various  expec- 
tations rest  on  one  of  two  assumptions — either,  first, 
that  from  the  unchanged  human  mind,  which,  during 
three  thousand  years,  has  continually  given  forth  the 
forces  of  war,  the  force  of  a universal  peace  is  now 
somehow  suddenly  to  proceed ; or,  secondly,  that  a 
change  has  actually  been  wrought  in  it  which  at  last 
makes  such  a peace  possible. 

The  first  of  these  assumptions  we  need  not  discuss. 
Is  there,  in  the  history  of  mankind  as  a whole,  or  in  ■ 
the  special  history  of  the  last  hundred  years,  anything 
which  warrants  the  second  ? That  period  is  the  period 
which  separates  us  from  the  Battle  of  Waterloo.  It 
has  been  the  age — if  there  has  ever  been  such  an  age 
— of  the  democracy.  It  has  seen  the  extension  of 
universal  suffrage  in  almost  every  country  of  Europe. 
It  has  been  a time  of  widespread  education,  lower  and 
higher.  It  has  witnessed  an  unexampled  develop- 


PREFACE 


viii 

ment  of  international  trade,  and  a growth  of  human 
intercourse  such  as  never  before  existed.  It  has,  too, 
seen  the  spread  of  Socialism  throughout  the  world. 
Yet  it  has  also  seen  almost  every  civilized  nation, 
European  and  American,  repeatedly  at  war,  and  it 
has  ended  with  a war  vaster  in  its  range,  and  more 
monstrous  in  its  processes  and  carnage,  than  any  that 
has  ever  been  waged. 

We  are  driven  back,  then,  to  this — that  the  estab- 
lishment of  a Human  Peace  demands  a profound  and 
lasting  change  in  the  mind  of  man.  A change  so 
great  requires  a power  of  corresponding  greatness  to 
bring  it  about — not  a short-sighted  and  shifting  states- 
manship, subject  to  the  conflicts  and  oscillations  of  an 
anarchic  public  opinion,  and  concerned  at  most  for  the 
exclusive  interests  of  competing  nationalities,  but  an 
international  Spiritual  Providence,  the  voice  and  guar- 
dian of  an  undivided  Humanity,  capable  of  giving 
counsels  of  inspiration  and  guidance  throughout  the 
world,  and  of  breathing  forth  influences  of  reconcilia- 
tion and  co-operation  in  every  country,  and  in  every 
sphere  of  the  life  of  man.  Such  a work  cannot  be  the 
work  of  the  politician  ; it  is  the  natural  task  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  with  the  Pope  at  its  head,  risen  out  of 
a sectarian  exclusiveness  into  a right  realization  of 
its  own  universahty,  boldly  freeing  itself  from  the 
trammels  of  nationality,  class  and  party,  and  under- 
standing its  doctrines  and  its  human  mission  in  the 
light  of  science  and  the  fully-developed  Modern  Mind. 


Malcolm  Quin. 


CONTENTS 


Preface  

Religious  Introduction 

CHAP. 

I.  Science  and  the  Problem  of  Peace 

II.  The  Meaning  of  a Human  Peace 

III.  The  Good  of  a Human  Peace 

IV.  Catholicism  and  a Human  Peace 

V.  War  and  the  Spiritual  Life 

VI.  War  and  Political  Life 
VH.  Industrial  Imperialism  . 

VIH.  Catholicism  and  Imperialism 
IX.  A Catholic  Policy  of  Peace 
X.  The  Republic  of  Peace  . 


V 

II 

64 

79 

lOI 

125 

154 

172 

190 

209 

226 

252 


THE  PROBLEM  OF 
HUMAN  PEACE 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 
I 

One  consequence  of  the  stupendous  and  awful  war 
through  which  the  world  is  passing  is  that  it  has 
inspired  a deeper  and  wider  interest  in  what  may 
be  called,  broadly  and  generally,  the  Problem  of 
Peace.  When  the  word  “ peace  ” is  used  in  this 
absolute  way  it  means,  we  may  suppose,  what  through- 
out the  following  pages  is  called  a Human  Peace — the 
universal  and  permanent  peace  of  mankind.  It  is 
peace  in  this  sense,  however  vaguely  conceived,  that 
has  long  been,  for  a certain  number  of  serious  minds, 
an  ideal,  a great  cause  and  hope,  to  which  patiently 
and  faithfully  they  have  dedicated  themselves. 
Commonly,  indeed,  when  men  speak  of  peace  as  a 
good,  and  war  as  an  evil,  they  are  understood  to 
imply  that  peace  is  a permanent  good,  and  war  is  an 
evil,  for  humanity  as  a whole,  and  not  merely  for 
some  particular  portion  of  it. 

By  “ peace,”  therefore,  in  this  treatise,  I mean  not 
a temporary  or  partial  peace,  such  as,  in  all  experience 
hitherto,  has  followed  after  every  war,  but  a Human 
Peace,  world-wide  and  continuous.  It  is  the  Problem 
of  Peace  in  this  sense  that  I have  proposed  to  myself 


12  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


to  study.  In  studying  such  a problem  we  are  called 
upon  to  do  something  more  than  rest  in  a state  of 
sentimental  enthusiasm.  Sentimental  enthusiasm  in 
regard  to  any  good,  or  supposed  good,  of  man  does  not 
carry  us  very  far,  although,  as  a preliminary  state  of 
mind,  it  may  be  indispensable  and  beneficent.  It  is 
not  enough  for  us,  as  individuals,  to  say  simply  that 
we  “ love  peace,”  or  that  peace,  a human  and  enduring 
peace,  is  a beautiful  and  inspiring  ideal,  to  which  the 
energies  of  mankind  should  be  directed.  We  have, 
in  relation  to  a Human  Peace,  to  show,  first,  what  it 
is  that  we  precisely  and  practically  mean  by  it.  We 
have,  in  the  second  place,  to  show  that  it  is  possible. 
We  have,  in  the  third  place,  to  show  that  it  is  desir- 
able— desirable,  that  is  to  say,  in  reference  to  some 
fundamental  interest  of  man,  which,  as  a civilized 
and  developed  being,  and  in  a full  conception  of 
himself  and  his  destiny,  he  cannot  disavow.  We 
have,  in  the  fourth  place,  to  show  that,  being  desir- 
able, it  is  also  possible.  We  have,  lastly,  assuming, 
or  proving,  its  possibility,  to  indicate  the  means 
necessary  for  its  attainment. 

I have,  in  the  following  pages,  discussed  these 
various  aspects  of  a Human  Peace.  In  this  Intro- 
duction I propose  to  myself  to  make  somewhat  clearer 
than  I have  there  done  the  standpoint  from  which  I 
approach  it.  I here  assume,  that  is  to  say,  what  I 
afterwards  make  some  attempt  to  prove — that  a 
Human  Peace,  in  that  general  view  of  it  which  I have 
now  indicated,  is  a high  common  good  of  mankind.  I 
assume,  too,  its  possibility — that  man  is  not,  by  some 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


13 


insuperable  power  acting  upon  him  or  within  him, 
prevented  from  pursuing  and  attaining  it,  any  more, 
for  example,  than  we  suppose  him  to  be  prevented,  by 
such  a power,  from  pursuing  and  attaining  an  ideal 
chastity  or  sobriety,  or  from  following  after  and 
realizing  health  and  beauty.  Assuming  these  two 
things  in  regard  to  a Human  Peace,  I limit  myself 
now  to  considering  the  means  at  our  disposal  for 
bringing  it  about. 

This  is  a question  of  science — using  the  word 
“ science  ” here  to  represent  the  spirit  and  methods 
which  men  have  successfully  employed — in  so  far  as 
they  have  mastered  the  truths  of  system  and  action — 
in  the  interpretation  of  experience  in  Nature  and  life. 
Science,  so  understood,  is,  so  far  as  ordered  explana- 
tion is  concerned,  our  supreme  resource  in  the  fields  of 
social  and  moral  conduct,  as  it  is  in  the  fields  of 
physics,  chemistry,  and  biology ; for  science,  so 
understood,  means  the  developed  mind  of  man,  dis- 
passionately and  faithfully  examining  his  situation 
and  himself,  and  bringing  all  orders  of  positive  know- 
ledge and  all  the  powers  of  human  reason  to  bear  on 
the  construction  of  a stable  synthesis.  It  is  for 
science  in  this  complete  sense,  and  for  nothing  else,  to 
determine  what  it  is  that  we  mean  by  a Human 
Peace,  how  far  such  a peace  is  a great  good  of  man, 
to  be  followed  after  and  attained,  as  health  or  chastity 
is,  and  what  are  the  right  means  to  be  adopted  for 
its  attainment.  Science,  in  this  conception  of  it, 
speaks  as  a master.  Against  its  judgments,  when  they 
have  once  been  surely  delivered,  neither  ecclesiastical 


14  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

authority,  nor  national  prejudice,  nor  political  par- 
tizanship,  nor  the  claims  of  class,  can  be  pleaded.  The 
sphere  of  science  is  universal  truth,  and  the  good  to 
which,  in  its  universality,  it  points  us — if  it  points  us 
to  a good  at  all — is  the  good  of  humanity. 

II 

Considering  the  Problem  of  Human  Peace  in  the 
temper  and  from  the  standpoint  of  science,  I come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  great  natural  instrument  for 
its  attainment  and  maintenance  is  the  Catholic 
Church,  bringing  to  bear  on  the  organization  and 
direction  of  human  life  a Scientific  Catholicism.  It 
is  necessary  that  these  important  terms  should  be 
precisely  and  clearly  understood.  By  the  expression 
“ the  Catholic  Church  ” I mean,  to  begin  with,  the 
Church  of  Rome — its  doctrine,  its  worship,  its  insti- 
tutions, including,  of  course,  the  Papacy.  These 
things  constitute  Catholicism.  I mean  by  it  also, 
however,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  work,  all 
other  Christian  Churches,  in  proportion  as  they 
actually  contain  within  themselves  Catholicism  and 
wield  its  force.  All  of  them  contain  something  of  it — 
some  of  them  much,  some  little.  All  of  them,  in 
principle  at  least,  exist  to  bring  that  ideal,  or  Divine, 
Humanity  which  was  given  to  the  world  by  Christ 
into  the  life  of  man  ; all  of  them,  in  degree,  and  in 
whatever  form,  employ  in  doing  this  a system  of 
teaching,  a system  of  worship,  a system  of  discipline, 
or  life.  The  non-Catholic  Churches  are  in  this  sense 
Catholic,  The  true  Catholic,  or  Roman,  Church  is 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


15 


the  whole  of  which  the  different  non-Catholic  bodies — 
Anglican,  Lutheran,  Presbyterian,  and  other — are 
separated  and  unrelated  parts,  holding  varying  por- 
tions of  the  total  truth  of  Catholicism.  It  may  be 
considered  that  it  would  be  better,  instead  of  “ Catholic 
Church  ” and  “ Catholicism,”  to  use  the  words 
“ Christian  Church  ” and  “ Christianity.”  That, 
however,  is  not  so.  In  a strict  scientific  sense  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  “ the  Christian  Church,”  considered 
as  an  organic,  unified  religious  society.  In  the  same 
way,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  “ Christianity,”  con- 
sidered as  a definite,  uniform  system  of  belief,  repre- 
senting all  who  call  themselves  Christian.  We  cannot 
reason  scientifically  with  such  terms,  which  con- 
stantly change  their  meaning  according  to  changing 
points  of  view.  We  can  reason  scientifically  with  the 
term  “ Catholic  Church,”  understood  as  representing 
the  Church  of  Rome,  and  we  can  reason  scientifically 
with  the  word  “ Catholicism,”  understood  as  denoting 
the  doctrine,  worship,  and  discipline  of  that  Church. 
Further,  having  before  us  in  Catholicism  this  definite 
type,  or  order,  of  religious  theory  and  practice,  we  can 
see  how  far  the  non-Catholic  bodies  are  in  relation 
with  it  and  represent  it.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity 
and  convenience,  therefore,  I shall  generally  through- 
out this  treatise  use  the  words  “ Catholic  Church  ” 
and  “ Catholicism  ” as  indicating  the  Church  of  Rome, 
considered,  not  exclusively,  but  as  representing  the 
non-Catholic  Churches,  in  proportion  to  their  actual 
correspondence  with  it.  It  follows  that  what  I have 
to  say  of  the  Catholic  Church,  in  its  strength  and 


1 6 THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


weakness,  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  the  non- 
Catholic  Christian  bodies. 

The  explanation  which  I have  given  of  my  use  of 
the  word  “ Catholicism  ” sheds  a natural  light  upon 
the  expression  “ a Scientific  Catholicism.”  Accord- 
ing to  a conception  which  I have  elsewhere  more 
fully  unfolded,*  the  religious  synthesis  which  is  to 
direct  the  future  of  mankind  will  be  formed  by  the 
transforming  operation  of  the  Modern  Mind  upon  the 
whole  content  of  Catholicism — its  theology,  its 
liturgy,  its  morals  and  social  policy,  its  ecclesiastical 
order.  That  transforming  operation  will  be,  in 
a positive  sense,  at  once  critical,  preservative,  and 
developmental.  It  will  demand  an  effort  of  both 
analysis  and  construction.  It  is,  as  I hold,  to 
this  transformed,  developed,  and  completed  Catholi- 
cism that  we  must  look  as  the  great  instrument  for 
bringing  in  and  maintaining  a Human  Peace.  Such  a 
Catholicism  I shall,  for  purposes  of  simplicity  and 
convenience,  here  call  a Scientific  Catholicism.  This 
expression,  however,  standing  alone,  might  be  mis- 
leading. It  might  suggest  some  wholly  new  Catholi- 
cism— supposing  such  a thing  to  be  possible — sud- 
denly springing  into  existence,  and  consciously  and 
deliberately  systematic  throughout  its  entire  range. 
It  is  necessary  to  guard  against  such  a misapprehen- 
sion. By  science,  in  one  view  of  it,  we  mean  a precise 
and  orderly  interpretation  of  experience,  in  its  various 
categories,  expressing  itself  in  verifiable  statements, 

* “ Catholicism  and  the  Modern  Mind  ” : London,  Edward 
Arnold. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


17 


and  subserving,  in  the  field  of  action,  the  ends  of 
practice.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  experience — 
man’s  observant  and  discriminating  relation  to  the 
order  of  Nature,  including  the  facts  of  his  own  sensi- 
bility and  consciousness — precedes  the  formal  scien- 
tific interpretation  of  it,  and  expresses  itself  intuitively, 
empirically  and  symbolically  before  it  can  express 
itself  analytically  and  systematically.  An  unculti- 
vated mother,  nursing  her  children,  has  no  formal 
theory  of  love,  or  of  parental  duty,  or  of  the  various 
physical  processes  which  she  employs,  but  her  experi- 
ences, outer  and  inner,  are,  within  their  range,  real, 
and  her  intuitive  and  empirical  expressions  of  them 
have  the  value  of  aU  spontaneous  utterance  concerning 
the  known  facts  of  life.  The  biologist  and  the  moralist, 
dealing  afterwards  with  such  expressions  analytically 
and  systematically,  determine  how  far  they  are  an 
accurate  representation  of  real  experiences,  and,  for 
their  own  purposes,  substitute  for  them  their  own  forms 
of  statement.  Science,  as  Huxley  said,  and  as  Comte 
had  said  before  him,  is  only  systematized  common  sense. 

By  the  expression  “ a Scientific  Catholicism,” 
therefore,  I do  not  mean  a whoUy  new  Catholicism  ; 
I mean  the  persisting  positive  contents  of  historic 
Catholicism — the  actual  experiences  of  Nature  and 
human  nature  which  it  has  intuitively,  empirically, 
and  symbolically  expressed — discerned,  and  incor- 
porated for  practical  purposes  into  a full  synthesis  of 
human  knowledge,  according  to  the  developed  powers 
of  the  Modern  Mind  and  the  systematic  methods  of 
science.  It  is  for  science,  become  mature  and  com- 


1 8 THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


plete — embracing  the  total  experiences  of  man’s 
social  and  moral  life,  as  well  as  the  phenomena  of  the 
external  world — to  determine  how  far  Catholicism 
represents  real  experience,  and  to  correct  and  supple- 
ment it  where  it  fails  to  do  so.  In  this  special  rela- 
tion, and  for  the  practical  purposes  of  human  life, 
science — the  ordered  manifestation  of  the  Modern 
Mind — is,  as  I have  elsewhere  said,  sovereign,  and 
Catholicism  is  subordinate.  We  may  express  this 
canonically  by  saying  that  Catholicism,  throughout 
its  whole  extent, — in  doctrine,  worship,  and  discipline 
— must  live  or  die  according  to  its  ratification  by 
modern  science.  If  we  were  to  assume  that  the 
verdict  of  science — the  tested  experience  and  mind 
of  man — would  be  ultimately  against  Catholicism, 
then  we  should  have  to  conclude  that  Catholicism, 
including  aU  forms  of  Christianity,  would  disappear, 
as  ancient  European  “ Paganism  ” disappeared.  It 
is,  however,  upon  the  contrary  supposition  that  I am 
now  proceeding.  I hold  that  there  is,  by  reasonable 
presumption,  a universal  positive  content  in  Catholi- 
cism, spontaneously  expressed  in  empirical  and  sym- 
bolic forms.  Upon  this  content — an  order  of  mind — 
science,  in  its  completeness,  can  operate,  precisely  as 
it  operates  upon  the  order  of  Nature  ; and  in  the  one 
case,  as  in  the  other,  it  will  accept  in  order  to  operate, 
and  operate  to  interpret  and  supplement. 

Ill 

It  is,  then,  neither  to  Catholicism,  as  it  exists  in 
contemporary  life,  or  as  it  has  shown  itself  in  history. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


19 


nor  to  some  wholly  new  Catholicism,  that  we  must 
look  as  the  great  instrument  of  a Human  Peace,  but, 
once  more,  to  a Scientific  Catholicism,  both  con- 
tinuous and  progressive.  As  this  principle  is  funda- 
mental and  governing  in  the  following  pages,  it  is 
necessary  to  set  it  in  a clear  light,  and  to  consider  not 
only  what  may  be  said  for  it,  but  what  may  be  said 
against  it. 

And,  first,  as  to  historic  or  unscientific  Catholicism 
— using  the  word  “ unscientific  ” to  denote,  not  some- 
thing in  which  there  is  no  content  of  experience  and 
reason,  but  something  in  which  that  content  has  not 
been  verified  and  systematized,  according  to  the  pro- 
cesses of  the  Modern  Mind.  What  is  it  that  we  mean 
by  this  Catholicism,  in  a positive  and  practical  con- 
ception of  it — such  a conception  of  it  as  admits  of 
being  demonstrated  and  rationally  discussed,  as  we 
demonstrate  and  discuss  any  proposition  of  astronomy 
or  biology  ? We  mean  by  Catholicism,  in  this  posi- 
tive conception  of  it,  a continuous  and  organized 
attempt,  individual  and  social,  to  realize  in  the  life 
of  man  an  ideal,  or  type,  of  Perfection,  considered 
as  being  given  and  symbolized  in  Christ,  either  as  He 
is  represented  in  the  New  Testament  poems,  or  as  He 
had  established  Himself,  a fixed  yet  developing 
Image,  in  the  early  Christian  minds  which  produced 
those  poems.  Such  an  attempt  demanded — ^what 
religion  for  its  purposes  always  demands — -a  system 
of  doctrine,  a system  of  worship,  a system  of  conduct, 
or  life.  The  threefold  system  which  we  call  Catholi- 
cism— and  which  was  called  Catholicism  for  no  other 


20  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


reason  than  because  it  eventually  won  for  itself  a 
certain  relative  “ universality  ” — was  a slow  and  pro- 
gressive construction  of  the  human  mind,  operating 
with  a limited  knowledge  of  the  world  and  man,  with 
imperfect  and  untested  methods  of  investigation  and 
proof,  and  in  accordance  with  the  then  existing  state 
of  intelligence. 

It  is  to  the  constructive  human  mind,  occupied 
with  the  thought  of  Christ — a “ human  mind  ” con- 
stituted by  a co-operation,  conscious  and  unconscious, 
of  men  and  women  of  every  degree  of  capacity  and 
incapacity,  of  knowledge  and  ignorance — that  we 
owe,  first,  the  Christian  Scriptures,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  their  relation  with  the  Jewish  Scriptures  ; 
secondly,  the  conception  of  Christ  as  God,  and  the 
consequent  development  of  the  idea  of  the  Trinity ; 
thirdly,  the  creeds,  the  elaboration  of  Christian 
theology,  the  exaltation  of  the  Blessed  Virgin,  the 
doctrine  of  Heaven,  Hell,  and  Purgatory,  the  venera- 
tion of  the  Saints,  the  Mass,  the  Sacraments,  the 
growth  of  the  Christian  life,  the  organization  of  the 
Church,  and  the  order  of  the  Catholic  Hierarchy, 
under  the  supremacy  of  the  Pope. 

The  foundation  of  this  great  construction — a con- 
struction of  various  minds,  of  various  countries,  of 
various  ages — was,  of  course,  the  conception  of 
Christ  as  God.  The  word  “ God,”  as  is  obvious,  does 
not  represent  an  outward  constant  physical  fact,  such 
as  we  may  see  with  our  eyes,  or  hear  with  our  ears.  It 
immediately  represents  an  inner  image  of  man’s  social 
mind — an  image  which  feeling,  reason,  imagination, 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


21 


and  will,  in  relation  to  human  experience,  external 
and  internal,  all  co-operate  in  creating.  This  image 
varies  with  varying  stages  of  culture  and  mental 
development.  The  Jews  had  one  such  image ; the 
Greeks,  Romans,  and  other  “ Gentile  ” nations  a 
number  of  different  ones.  The  immediate  outward 
foundation  of  it  may  be  a river,  or  a tree,  or  the  sun 
and  moon,  or  an  animal,  or  a human  being,  or  the 
infinite  universe,  including  man  as  at  once  a con- 
stituent and  interpreter  of  it.  Whatever  the  nature 
of  its  foundation,  that  foundation  is  a fact  of  experi- 
ence, external  or  internal,  transformed  by  the  shaping 
mind  of  man,  according  to  its  progressive  knowledge 
and  development,  anthropomorphically  conceived  of 
as  a being  of  intelligence,  feeling,  and  power,  and 
invested  with  the  name,  or  symbol,  “ God.”  Man, 
who  is  the  lord  of  language,  calls  things  what  he  will, 
and  thinks  of  them  in  virtue  of  such  capacity  of  thought 
as  he  possesses,  in  the  different  stages  of  his  mental 
evolution.  Catholicism,  scientifically  and  historically 
speaking,  owes  its  existence  to  the  fact  that  at  a 
given  point  in  time  man,  who  had  called  many  things 
and  many  beings  “ gods,”  named  with  the  name  of 
God,  and  invested  with  the  attributes  of  a God,  the 
image  of  the  Man  Jesus  Christ  which  had  progressively 
and  in  different  ways  established  itself  in  his  mind. 
From  this  root  sprang  the  living,  widespread  tree 
which  we  call  ChristendonL 

Christ,  who  is  God  according  to  Catholicism,  is,  as 
we  say,  an  Image  of  Perfection — of  a perfect  man,  and, 
as  a consequence,  of  a perfect  human  society.  Man, 


22  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


who  gives  to  words  their  meanings,  gives  its  meaning 
to  the  word  “ perfection,”  as  to  the  word  “ God.” 
It  means  what  he  decides  that  it  shall  mean,  and  what 
he  decides  that  it  shall  mean  depends  upon  his  own 
variations  in  experience  and  culture.  It  certainly 
lies  within  his  capacity  to  form  a conception — a 
progressive  conception — of  a perfect  human  being, 
transcendently  complete  and  beautiful  in  physical 
form,  in  love,  in  intelligence,  in  will,  and  in  the 
capacity  to  accomplish  his  ends,  external  and  internal. 
He  may  if  he  pleases — and  he  frequently  does — take 
any  one  constituent  of  this  many-sided  Perfection  and 
concentrate  special  attention  upon  it,  to  the  tem- 
porary exclusion,  or  subordination,  of  the  others. 
He  may,  in  this  way — and  he  frequently  does — thus 
concentrate  attention  upon  moral,  or  intellectual,  or 
practical  perfection,  and  yield  to  it  a predominant 
homage.  For  a complete  perfection  of  personal 
humanity,  however — and,  therefore,  for  a complete 
social  perfection — what  is  necessary  is  the  due  develop- 
ment of  all  the  distinctive  sides  of  human  nature  in  an 
active  co-operation  and  harmony,  determined  by  the 
subordination  of  the  lower  to  the  higher.  This  ideal 
harmony,  or  unity,  is  never  actually  and  absolutely 
realized  by  man,  but  it  is  always  pursued  by  him.  It 
is  the  character  of  the  Divine,  or  God-like.  It  rests 
on  a synthesis  of  feeling,  knowledge,  and  action.  In 
other  words,  it  rests  on  religion,  in  which  man  proposes 
to  himself  an  ideal  Perfection,  and  follows  after  it — 
more  or  less  consciously  and  with  more  or  less  fidelity 
and  power — in  worship,  doctrine,  and  discipline. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


23 


Now  Christ  is,  in  Catholicism,  God.  That  is  to 
say.  He  is  an  Image  and  Symbol  of  Divine,  or  com- 
plete, Perfection — a coalescent,  transcendent  per- 
fection of  Love,  Wisdom,  Will,  and  Power — ^held  in 
the  mind  of  man  to  establish  a corresponding  type  of 
humanity,  individual  and  social.  The  chief  external 
presentation  of  this  Image  is  contained  in  the  New 
Testament  poems,  and  Catholicism,  in  its  historic 
working,  is  the  continuous  and  developing  attempt, 
individual  and  social,  to  convert  this  Image  into  an 
order  of  mind  and  life.  In  relation  to  this  Image,  in 
relation  to  the  representation  of  it  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment poems,  and  in  relation  to  Catholicism,  as  an 
attempt  to  bring  man  into  correspondence  with  it, 
the  Modern  Mind — -let  us  say  the  mind  of  Western 
humanity  in  the  twentieth  century,  complete  in 
experience  and  culture — occupies  a position  of  sove- 
reign authority.  It  can,  if  it  pleases,  decide  not  to 
have  a “ religion  ” at  all — that  is,  not  to  follow  after 
an  ideal  Perfection  by  the  way  of  a systematic  doc- 
trine, worship,  and  discipline.  A very  large  number 
of  men  and  women  in  the  modern  world  have,  as  we 
know,  in  this  sense,  ceased  to  be  “ religious.”  A stiU 
larger  number  may  conceivably  follow  their  example. 
Again,  the  Modern  Mind  may  decide  that  it  will  still 
follow  after  Perfection,  and,  therefore,  remain  “ reli- 
gious,” but  that  it  can  no  longer  accept  Christ  as  its 
God,  or  as  the  Image  and  Symbol  of  Perfection.  It 
is  as  free  to  do  this  as  were  the  Jews,  Greeks,  and 
Romans  of  primitive  Catholicism  to  turn  from  the 
ancient  conceptions  of  the  Divine,  and  embrace  a 


24  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


new  conception.  As  a matter  of  fact,  a considerable 
number  of  persons  at  the  present  time  occupy  exactly 
this  position.  They  are  “ religious  ” ; they  follow, 
in  their  own  way,  after  an  ideal  Perfection  ; but  they 
say  that  Christ  no  longer  represents  it.  In  other 
words.  He  has,  for  them,  ceased  to  be  “ God.” 

But,  again,  the  Modern  Mind  may  hold  that  Christ 
still  remains  for  it  an  eternal  Image  and  Symbol  of 
transcendent  and  complete  Perfection — that  He  is 
still  its  “ God  ” — but  that  the  historic  conception  and 
realization  of  that  Image  are  defective,  and  that  a 
new  conception  and  realization  are  called  for.  Such 
a view  may  find  expression  in  the  rejection,  or  sup- 
posed rejection,  of  Catholicism,  and  the  adoption  of 
some  form,  or  modification,  of  “ Protestantism,”  or 
in  the  acceptance  of  Catholicism  itself,  subject  to  its 
scientific  interpretation  and  development,  throughout 
its  whole  domain,  by  the  Modern  Mind.  Another 
view,  again,  rejecting  all  the  doctrinal  principles  of 
all  historic  religions,  may  find,  or  endeavour  to  find, 
for  itself  expression  in  entirely  new  symbols — such, 
for  example,  as  Comte  constructed  in  his  “ Religion 
of  Humanity.”  What  is  of  fundamental  importance, 
in  connection  with  these  and  other  similar  alternatives, 
is  to  recognize  that  the  Modern  Mind,  in  the  fulness  of 
its  experience  and  culture,  has  a natural  freedom  and 
sovereignty.  It  summons  all  the  religions  of  mankind 
to  its  judgment  seat.  It  sees  in  all  of  them  modes  of 
representing  and  pursuing  an  ideal  of  human  per- 
fection, personal  and  social.  It  compares  one  with 
another,  just  as  it  compares  creations  in  poetry  and 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


25 


art,  schools  of  philosophy,  national  literatures,  or 
methods  of  industrial  production.  It  has  its  own 
indefeasible  power  of  deciding  for  itself  which  of 
them  is  in  most  complete  relation  to  the  ideal  of  per- 
fection which  it  is  the  business  of  religion  to  pursue, 
and  how  far  each  has  failed  in  pursuing  it.  It  can, 
in  principle,  dismiss  them  one  and  all  much  more 
completely  than  ancient  Paganism  was  dismissed 
from  the  mind  of  Christianity,  for  it  has  a fuller  and 
surer  knowledge  of  itself,  a wider  social  and  historic 
outlook,  and  more  accurate  instruments  of  rejection 
and  selection  than  the  early  Christians  possessed. 
But  it  can  also  decide  that  one  or  other  out  of  the 
various  religions  of  mankind  has,  by  its  conceptions, 
doctrines,  modes  of  worship,  and  practical  institutions, 
made  the  greatest  contribution  to  human  perfection, 
and  that  progress  towards  a fuller  perfection  wiU 
best  be  accomplished  by  correcting  that  religion  where 
it  needs  correction,  and  completing  it  where  it  needs 
completion. 

It  may  be  said  that  in  this  view  of  the  relation  of 
the  Modern  Mind  to  the  different  systems  of  religion 
there  is  an  implication  that  man  has  a natural  power 
to  choose  his  God,  or  to  choose  whether  he  shall  have 
a God  at  all.  Undoubtedly  there  is,  and  undoubtedly 
he  has.  As  a matter  of  fact,  in  this  region  of  ideas, 
men,  from  the  beginning  of  recorded  history  to  the 
present  time,  have  done  little  else  than  choose  their 
gods.  There  are  many  things  that  they  do  not  and 
cannot  choose.  They  do  not  choose  their  own 
earth,  or  their  own  sun  and  moon,  or  the  sea  and  sky. 


26  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


or  whether  fire  shall  burn,  or  water  wet,  or  whether 
they  shall  eat  and  drink  and  propagate  their  species — 
supposing  they  decide,  what  they  certainly  have  the 
power  to  decide,  that  they  shall  live  rather  than  die. 
But  there  are  also  many  things  which  they  can 
choose.  Amongst  them  is  whether  they  will  have  a 
God,  and  if  so,  what  kind  of  a God  it  shall  be.  The 
early  Christians  exercised  this  power  when  they 
passed  from  “ Paganism  ” or  Judaism  and  chose 
Christ  as  their  God.  Christian  missions  at  the  present 
day  depend  on  no  other  principle  than  the  power  of  a 
Hindu,  or  Buddhist,  or  Confucianist,  or  Mohammedan 
to  choose  one  God  rather  than  another.  The  creeds 
of  Catholicism  are,  in  one  view  of  them,  formulas  of 
religious  choice.  When  we  say  “ I believe  ” we  say 
“ I choose.”  Further,  for  the  individual  mind,  in 
relation  to  the  social  mind— or  the  mind  of  the 
Church — such  a declaration  means,  to  begin  with,  not 
the  construction  of  an  Image  of  God  for  itself,  but 
the  acceptance  of  an  Image  proposed  to  it.  Simi- 
larly, the  recital  of  a historic  creed  in  any  one  age 
means  that  that  age  continues  to  accept  the  Image 
proposed  to  it  by  the  past.  The  early  Christians,  as 
is  well  known,  had  to  defend  themselves  against  a 
charge  of  “ atheism,”  and  this  because  “ belief  in 
God  ” then  practically  meant,  as  it  always  means, 
acceptance  of  some  dominant  social  Image  of  God, 
and  “ unbelief  ” rejection  of  that  Image. 

We  come  back,  then,  to  this  obvious  principle — 
that  the  mind  which  says  “ I believe  ” can  also  say 
“ I do  not  believe,”  or  that  the  mind  which  says  “ I 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


27 


choose  ” can  also  say  “ I refuse.”  The  Modern  Mind 
— the  mind  of  Western  man  in  the  twentieth  century — 
is  no  more  bound  to  continue  to  worship  Christ  than 
the  mind  of  the  first  century  was  bound  to  continue 
to  worship  Jehovah  or  Apollo.  That  Mind,  moreover, 
unlike  the  mind  of  antiquity,  is  free  to  decide  whether 
it  will  worship  a God  or  not,  and  what  kind  of  a God — 
that  is,  to  say  what  kind  of  an  Image  of  Perfection — 
if  any,  it  shall  choose  for  itself.  The  modern  “ Theist,” 
or  Unitarian,  dismisses,  or  supposes  himself  to  dismiss, 
the  Divinity  of  Christ,  but  he  clothes  Divinity  in 
some  way  with  an  image  of  his  own.  The  religious 
Positivist  similarly  shapes  a new  symbol  for  Per- 
fection, and  calls  it,  not  “ God,”  but  “ Humanity.” 

I proceed  here,  however,  upon  the  assumption  that 
the  Modern  Mind,  in  the  exercise  of  this  its  indefeasible 
power  and  freedom,  will  continue  to  choose  Christ 
as  its  God,  and  Catholicism — the  doctrine,  worship, 
and  discipline  of  the  Roman  Church — as  the  indi- 
vidual and  social  fulfilment  of  Christ.  But  it  will  do 
this  according  to  its  own  development  and  culture, 
and  for  its  own  practical  ends.  The  Modern  Mind,  as 
I here  conceive  it,  is,  in  a complete  sense,  scientific. 
It  is  consciously  and  systematically  synthetic.  While, 
therefore,  it  has  the  same  freedom  as  was  possessed 
by  the  ancient  world  when  it  rejected  Apollo  and 
accepted  Christ,  it  will  not  make  the  same  use  of  its 
freedom.  The  rise  of  Christianity  was  a revolution. 
It  was,  in  principle — although,  of  course,  not  in 
practice — the  subversion  of  the  existing  religious 
order.  The  Modern  Mind — according  to  the  view 


28  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  it  which  I am  endeavouring  to  establish — does  not 
aim  at  a revolution  but  at  an  evolution.  It  sees  in 
Catholicism  an  order  not  to  be  subverted,  but  to  be 
developed.  It  brings  to  bear  on  it  principles  of 
criticism  and  comparison,  of  rejection  and  acceptance, 
as  it  brings  them  to  bear  on  any  other  religion,  or  on 
any  other  product  of  culture.  It  sees  it  in  its  relation 
to  the  total  mind  and  life  of  man,  and,  finding  in  it 
truth  amidst  error,  goodness  amidst  evil,  weakness 
amidst  strength,  ugliness  amidst  beauty,  and  acquisi- 
tion of  real  experience  and  reason  expressed  spon- 
taneously and  symbolically,  it  exercises  its  own 
analytic  and  constructive  power  to  discern,  to  pre- 
serve, and  to  complete.  In  other  words,  it  “ chooses  ” 
to  retain  Catholicism,  but  chooses  also  to  make  it 
scientific. 


IV 

We  come  now  to  consider  the  bearing  of  such  a 
Catholicism  upon  a Human  Peace.  By  a Human 
Peace,  once  more,  we  mean  a peace  universal  and 
continuous — not  such  a temporary  cessation  of  strife 
as  comes  at  the  end  of  every  war,  and  as  is  due  to 
victory  in  arms,  or  to  the  common  exhaustion  of  all 
the  combatants,  or  to  mere  weariness  of  bloodshed. 
By  a Human  Peace  we  mean  a peace  deliberately 
chosen  and  planned,  as  a common  good  of  mankind, 
and  maintained  through  policy  and  co-operation  by 
the  predominant  nations  of  the  world.  Now,  assum- 
ing such  a Peace  to  be  possible  at  all — possible,  that 
is,  in  view  of  man’s  situation  and  continuous  nature — 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


29 


what  reason,  it  may  be  asked,  have  we  to  suppose 
that  it  can  be  brought  in  and  upheld  by  the  Catholic 
Church,  in  any  conception  of  it  ? An  answer  to  this 
question  must  be  found,  and  it  must  be  given  not 
according  to  the  methods  of  ecclesiastics  and  theo- 
logians— ^who  commonly  limit  themselves  to  affirming 
propositions  which  they  cannot  prove  and  denouncing 
evils  which  they  cannot  prevent — but  according  to  the 
methods  of  science,  which  at  least  confesses  its  ignor- 
ance when  it  does  not  know,  and  acknowledges  its 
incapacity  when  it  is  powerless  to  act. 

First,  if  a Human  Peace — defined  as  I have  defined 
it — is,  as  we  assume,  a great  human  good,  it  is  a good 
which  does  not  stand  by  itself,  out  of  relation  with 
the  various  other  ends  which  man,  as  a being  of 
affection,  reason,  and  will,  living  in  the  social  state, 
proposes  to  himself.  It  is  plain,  for  example,  that  so 
long  as  we  have  nations  following  after  what  they 
consider  some  good  of  the  “ State  ” — such  as  indus- 
trial ascendency,  or  territorial  expansion,  or  dynastic 
aggrandizement,  or  political  overlordship — ^we  cannot 
have  a Human  Peace.  It  is  plain,  too,  that  these 
common  causes  of  war  are  in  close  connection  with 
the  ordinary  needs  and  desires  of  men  and  women  in 
their  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  life.  Stating 
the  same  truth  more  generally,  but  not  less  obviously, 
man  is  a complex  whole,  and  the  various  parts  of  his 
nature  act  and  react  one  upon  another.  If,  then,  we 
are  to  consider  a Human  Peace  as  a good,  and  as  a 
good  to  be  brought  about  and  maintained  by  choice 
and  policy,  it  is  a good  which  enters  into  that  con- 


30  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


tinuous  but  developing  ideal  of  Perfection,  individual 
and  social,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  the  business  of 
religion — or  of  man  as  a religious  being — to  pursue. 

Secondly,  Catholicism,  scientifically  considered,  is 
a continuous  organized  effort,  individual  and  social, 
to  realize  in  the  life  of  man  the  Divinity,  or  Perfection, 
of  Christ.  But  Catholicism  is  not  an  accomplished 
Perfection.  It  is  the  pursuit  of  an  ideal ; it  is  not  its 
fulfilment.  By  “ Catholicism,”  practically  under- 
stood, we  simply  mean  a continuous  company  of 
human  beings,  a succession  of  generations,  following 
after  a certain  end,  according  to  their  conception  of 
it,  and  with  such  instruments  and  methods  as,  at 
given  stages  of  their  progress,  they  have  thrown  up. 
But  of  the  end  itself  which  they  pursued — Perfection 
in  Christ — Catholics,  being  ordinary  men  and  women, 
have  had  only  an  imperfect  conception.  This  was 
inevitable.  Catholicism — the  acknowledgment  of 
Christ  as  “ God,”  the  confession  of  His  Perfection  as 
a rule  of  life — arose  in  an  age  when  it  was  not  possible 
for  men  to  have  an  orderly  and  complete  view  of  the 
universe  in  which  man  lives,  and  of  man  in  relation 
to  that  universe.  They  had,  some  of  them,  great 
gifts — intuitions  of  genius,  imagination,  poetic  sensi- 
bility and  power,  an  instinct  for  moral  beauty,  a 
right  feeling  for  what  was  noble  in  man  and  woman, 
a sense  of  the  greatness  and  mystery  of  human 
life,  moments  of  profundity,  moments  of  spiritual 
ardour,  moments  of  ecstasy,  a capacity  for  subtle 
dialectic  and  metaphysical  refinement,  and  also  a 
power  of  heroic  self-sacrifice  and  religious  effort. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


31 


They  had,  however,  along  with  these  high  qualities, 
ignorance  of  many  things  that  are  now  commonly 
known— of  the  earth,  of  its  inhabitants,  of  its  history, 
of  the  solar  system  into  which  it  enters,  of  the  physical 
and  vital  forces  which  surround  man,  and  of  man 
himself,  in  his  nature,  powers,  limitations,  and  destiny. 
Further,  an  immense  proportion  of  the  men  who 
became  “ Catholics  ” — ^who  in  some  sense  and  degree 
received  into  their  minds  the  Image  of  Christ — were 
rude,  barbaric,  violent,  superstitious,  sensual,  and 
selfish — or  perhaps  raised  only  a little  above  mere 
animal  torpor  ; and  this  great  persisting  social  body 
constituted  a predominant  force,  which  told  not  only 
upon  the  practical  fulfilment  of  the  Divine  Perfection, 
but  also  upon  the  conception  of  that  Perfection. 

This  is  all  elementary.  Catholicism — either  as  we 
see  it  in  history,  or  as  it  shows  itself  in  contemporary 
life — does  not  represent  a perfection  perfectly  realized, 
or  even  a perfection  perfectly  understood.  Intel- 
lectually considered^ — allowing  for  individual  intuition 
and  genius— it  represents  something  infantile,  imma- 
ture, empiric,  incomplete^ — a vague  and  limited  view 
of  man  and  his  universe,  and  therefore  of  “ God,”  or 
Perfection ; practically  considered,  it  represents,  along 
with  a partial  empirical  success,  both  the  failure 
necessarily  resulting  from  the  want  of  science  and  the 
failure  due  to  the  pressure  of  passions  and  inclina- 
tions antagonistic  to  the  Perfection  confessed.  With 
this  latter  kind  of  failure  we  are  not  here  immediately 
concerned.  It  is,  in  varying  degree,  inevitable,  and 
would,  in  a certain  measure,  remain  inevitable  even 


32  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


if  Catholicism  became,  what  it  is  necessary  for  it  to 
become,  scientific.  Men  who  are  dishonest  or  drunken 
or  unchaste  commonly  sin  in  this  way,  not  because  of 
their  want  of  “ science  ” — because  they  are  unaware, 
for  example,  that  drunkenness  and  dishonesty  are 
evils,  and  carry  with  them  certain  evil  consequences — 
but  because  of  the  strength  of  their  lower  inclinations, 
and  the  absence,  or  relative  weakness,  of  the  higher. 
This  ordinary  failure  of  men  to  come  into  correspond- 
ence with  an  ideal,  or  law,  which  they  yet  acknow- 
ledge must  be  allowed  for  in  any  just  historic  estimate 
of  Catholicism,  on  its  practical  side. 

What  we  are  now  concerned  with,  however,  is  not 
the  failure  of  Catholicism  to  realize  its  own  vision  of 
Perfection,  such  as  it  has  been,  but  its  failure  in 
vision  itself — its  failure,  in  other  words,  in  science  and 
motive,  in  the  capacity  to  represent  to  man  the  true 
nature  of  the  order  of  things  in  which  he  is  placed, 
and  his  own  nature,  as  an  active,  modifying  con- 
stituent of  that  order.  This  failure  in  science  and 
motive  of  course  has  in  part  been  compensated  for 
by  intuition,  genius,  common  sense,  and  empirical 
wisdom,  learning  from  its  actual  discharge  of  the 
tasks  of  life.  Nevertheless,  it  has  been  a failure,  and 
one  of  a fundamental  character,  the  effect  of  which 
has  been  necessarily  felt  not  only  in  the  region  of 
theory,  but  in  the  region  of  practice  also.  This  is 
what  the  Modern  Mind — the  mind  of  a fuller  experi- 
ence, of  a complete  development,  constituted  by  the 
religions,  the  sciences,  the  arts,  the  industry,  the 
social  expansion  of  the  whole  of  humanity — is  now 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


33 


able  to  see.  It  recognizes  that  in  its  conception  of 
Perfection — that  is  to  say,  of  God  in  Christ,  and  conse- 
quently in  its  scriptures,  doctrines,  creeds,  sacraments, 
system  of  worship,  and  system  of  conduct — Catholi- 
cism has  largely  been  the  expression  of  a human 
nature  ignorant,  immature,  untrained,  misconceiving 
itself,  and  its  world  in  relation  to  itself.  By 
Catholicism  we  here  mean  the  whole  order  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  theoretic  and  practical,  from  the 
earliest  apostolic  age  to  the  Council  of  Trent  and  the 
subsequent  definitions  of  the  Vatican  Council.  This 
whole  order,  we  say,  rests  on  spiritual  intuition,  on 
religious  genius,  on  empirical  wisdom,  on  a partial 
experience,  inner  and  outer.  It  represents,  spon- 
taneously and  symbolically,  a provisional  and  incom- 
plete synthesis — the  synthesis  of  undeveloped  but 
developing  man.  It  must  be  converted  into  a com- 
plete synthesis — the  conscious  and  systematic  syn- 
thesis of  developed  man.  Once  more,  it  must 
become,  what  it  may  become,  scientific.  It  must  no 
longer  remain  the  religion  merely  of  the  ancient  mind, 
or  of  the  medieval  mind,  but  must  become  the  religion 
of  the  Modern  Mind,  entering  into  the  ancient  and 
medieval  minds,  understanding  them,  interpreting 
them,  and  making  all  their  positive  acquisitions  its 
own.  It  is  not  for  the  less  developed  to  impose  its 
law  on  the  more  developed ; it  is  for  the  more 
developed  to  follow  its  own  law  and  impose  it  on  the 
less  developed. 

The  central  point  of  Catholicism,  scientifically  con- 
sidered, is,  of  course,  its  conception  of  God — that  is 

H.P» 


C 


34  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

to  say,  of  ideal  or  transcendent  Perfection — in  Christ. 
In  simpler  terms,  it  is  its  conception  of  the  Divinity  of 
Christ.  By  the  Divinity  of  Christ,  positively  under- 
stood, we  mean  a Perfect  Humanity,  personal  and 
social.  Man  has  it  in  his  capacity  to  form  an  image  of 
himself  as  a complete  Humanity — complete,  and  com- 
pletely unified,  in  feeling,  knowledge,  and  power.  For 
the  realization  of  this  Perfect  Humanity  what  is  needed 
is  a synthesis — not  only  full  and  right  knowledge,  or 
science,  but  love  and  will  working  in  accordance  with 
science.  Catholicism,  as  it  has  existed  in  history,  has 
not  constituted  such  a synthesis.  It  has  not  even  con- 
ceived it.  It  has  been  an  intuitive,  partial,  tentative, 
and  empirical  movement  towards  it.  It  is  for  the 
Modern  Mind,  in  its  natural,  indefeasible  freedom  and 
sovereignty,  to  dismiss  Catholicism,  as  Catholicism 
itself  dismissed  “ Paganism,”  or  to  convert  it  into  a 
real  synthesis.  I here  assume  that  it  will  do  the  latter. 


V 

There  are  five  cardinal  and  connected  points  in 
Catholicism — and,  of  course,  in  all  other  forms  of 
Christianity  in  proportion  as  they  are  “Catholic” — on 
which  the  modern  interpretation  of  it,  and  therefore 
the  modern  transformation  of  it,  must  turn.  They  are, 
first,  the  conception  of  Christ  as  Divine,  or  as  a 
norm  of  human  Perfection  ; second,  the  consequent 
conception  of  “ this  world  ” in  relation  to  the  “ next  ” ; 
third,  the  conception  of  miracle  ; fourth,  the  con- 
ception of  sin ; fifth,  the  conception  of  prayer. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


35 

These  connected  points  are  all  of  fundamental 
importance  in  relation  to  a Human  Peace. 

If  Christ  is  to  remain,  for  the  Modern  Mind,  a type, 
or  ideal,  of  Perfection — in  other  words,  if  He  is  to 
remain  its  God — then  His  Perfection  must  be  under- 
stood as  the  perfect  nature  and  state  of  man,  indi- 
vidual and  social,  living  under  the  demonstrable  con- 
ditions, or  laws,  of  the  world  which  we  know.  It  must 
be  the  Perfection  of  Humanity  as  science  sees  it,  in 
relation  to  a Universal  Order  of  which  science, 
according  to  its  progressive  capacity,  unfolds  the 
constitution  and  forces.  The  word  “ God  ” has  always 
represented  an  Image  of  the  constructive  and  trans- 
forming mind  of  man,  operating  upon  its  experiences, 
either  of  external  nature,  or  of  its  own  inner  nature,  in 
relation  to  the  external  world.  In  other  terms,  it  has 
symbolized  the  whole  Order  of  things,  cosmic,  vital, 
and  human,  visible  and  invisible,  in  so  far  as  that 
Order  was  apprehended  and  understood.  It  will,  to 
the  Modern  Mind,  as  I conceive  it,  continue  to  repre- 
sent this  Order,  according  as  it  is  apprehended  and 
understood  by  science  in  its  maturity  and  complete- 
ness. God  in  Christ,  however,  or  Christ  as  God,  con- 
denses and  symbolizes  this  Universal  Order  as  an 
Order  of  Human  Perfection,  personal  and  social ; and 
just  as  man’s  conception  of  the  cosmic  order  has 
become  more  complete  and  exact  in  the  degree  in 
which  his  powers,  intellectual  and  practical,  have 
expanded,  so  his  conception  of  the  human  order, 
personal  and  social,  symbolized  by  Christ,  has  de- 
veloped also.  The  doctrine,  or  science,  of  this  twofold 

C 2 


36  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


order,  of  the  world  and  man,  is  ever  becoming  a 
larger  body  of  ascertained  truth,  a fuller  synthesis — 
in  other  words,  a Greater  Catholicism ; but  its 
symbols — God,  Christ,  His  Holy  Spirit,  the  Trinity, 
the  Blessed  Virgin,  the  Creeds,  the  Sacraments — 
remain,  by  the  choice  and  will  of  the  Modern  Mind, 
the  same. 

By  the  Perfection,  or  Divinity,  of  Christ,  therefore 
— which  is  painted  for  us  in  the  poems  of  the  New 
Testament  as  it  was  conceived,  according  to  their 
varying  capacity,  by  its  various  writers — a Scientific 
Catholicism  understands  a Perfect  Humanity,  per- 
sonal and  social.  It  means  by  it  man  with  his 
characteristic  nature  and  powers — physical,  moral, 
ntellectual,  practical — fully  developed  and  har- 
moniously ordered  by  the  continuous  predominance 
of  what  is  higher  in  him  over  what  is  lower.  It  means 
man,  with  his  capacity  for  bodily  order  and  health, 
with  his  capacity  for  unselfish  love,  with  his  sense  of 
goodness,  his  sense  of  beauty,  his  sense  and  pursuit 
of  truth,  his  genius  for  social  organization,  his  indus- 
trial mastery,  and  his  command  over  the  forces  of 
Nature — it  means  man,  so  considered,  in  the  com- 
plete expansion  and  many-sided  unity  of  his  total 
being,  ever  fulfilling  himself  and  fulfilling  himself  more 
completely,  individually  and  socially,  throughout  the 
ages.  It  means,  too,  as  one  condition  sine  qua  non  of 
the  pursuit  and  attainment  of  this  Perfection 
— the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  a Human 
Peace. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


37 


VI 

This  modern  Catholic  conception  of  God  in  Christ — 
a conception  in  which  the  Divinity  of  Christ  sym- 
bolizes a Perfect  Humanity,  personal  and  social,  sum- 
ming up  in  its  own  order  the  Universal  Order,  visible 
and  invisible— this  conception,  in  proportion  as  it  is 
attained,  serves  as  a natural  criticism  of  what,  for 
purposes  of  distinction,  we  may  call  the  traditional 
and  unscientific  idea  of  God  in  Catholicism.  I use 
the  word  “ criticism,”  of  course,  not  as  equivalent  to 
mere  hostility  or  disparagement,  but  as  representing 
the  reasoned  judgment  of  a mature  intelligence  upon 
the  ideas  of  an  intelligence  immature. 

The  Modern  Mind  which  I am  here  supposing  to 
consciously  and  deliberately  hold  within  itself  the 
ancient  and  medieval  minds,  for  the  purposes  of  a 
religious  synthesis — the  Modern  Mind,  so  constituted, 
looks  at  the  whole  humanity  of  the  past  precisely  as 
it  looks  at  the  solar  system,  or  at  the  phenomena  of 
physics  and  chemistry,  with  a dispassionate  recog- 
nition, informed  by  the  aims  of  practice.  It  sees 
that  when  the  traditional  conception  of  Christ’s 
Divinity  was  shaped  the  sciences  were  not  formed  ; 
history,  as  we  now  understand  it,  was  almost  non- 
existent ; industry  was  in  an  infant  condition  ; our 
European  social  order  had  not  yet  come  into  being  ; 
vast  parts  of  the  earth  and  a vast  part  of  mankind 
were  unknown  ; and  the  immense  majority  of  men 
and  women  were  steeped  in  barbaric  ignorance  and 
superstition. 


38  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


These  conditions,  in  their  fundamental  character, 
governed  the  minds  not  merely  of  what  we  should 
now  call  the  “ common  people,”  but  of  the  various 
founders  and  thinkers  of  Catholicism — including,  of 
course,  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament.  To  them 
God — like  the  Jehovah  of  the  Jews,  the  Zeus  of  the 
Greeks,  the  Jupiter  of  the  Romans — was  “ a magnified 
and  non-natural  man,”*  “ the  Father,”  seated  on  a 
throne  in  the  sky.  With  this  image  Catholicism 
associated  “ the  Son,”  sitting  at  the  right  hand  of  the 
Father,  the  “ Holy  Spirit,”  “ proceeding  ” from  the 
Father  and  the  Son,  and  the  Mother  of  God,  exalted 
and  glorified.  Along  with  these  images  there  grew 
up  the  conceptions  of  Heaven,  Purgatory,  and  Hell — 
“ the  next  world,”  taking  the  place  of  similar  Pagan 
ideas.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  too,  that  to  the  early 
Christians  “ this  world  ” was  a region  soon  to  dis- 
appear, and  “ the  next  ” was  a “ place  ” or  “ state  ” 
soon  to  come.  Such  ideas  and  expectations  are 
stamped  visibly  upon  the  New  Testament  writings, 
and  whatever  these  writings  are,  or  are  not,  they  are 
certainly  a witness  to  the  state  of  mind  of  those  who 
composed  them,  and  to  the  social  and  intellectual  con- 
ditions under  which  they  arose.  Those  who  founded 
Catholicism — considered  as  a vast,  persisting  system 
of  doctrine,  worship,  and  policy — founded  it  uncon- 
sciously, and  because  they  were  forced,  by  the  nature 
of  man’s  life  upon  earth,  to  convert  their  apocalyptic 
visions,  their  fanciful  eschatology,  their  moral  ideal- 
ism, their  spiritual  ecstasy,  and  their  metaphysical 
* Matthew  Arnold  : “ Literature  and  Dogma.” 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


39 


bewilderment  into  something  that  might  serve  as  a 
rule  of  action,  wide  enough  for  the  needs  of  man.  The 
“ Kingdom  of  Heaven,”  they  learned,  was  not  to  be 
in  the  sky,  and  to  proceed  from  a sudden  catastrophe, 
but  was  to  be — if  ever  it  was  to  be — a slow  creation  of 
man’s  mind  and  will,  painfully,  reluctantly  working 
upon  Nature  and  human  nature,  and  inspired  by  a 
progressive  sense  of  Perfection. 

VII 

A scientific  and  historic  estimate  of  Catholicism 
cannot,  of  course,  be  drawn  from  any  one  of  its  ages 
exclusively,  or  from  its  popular  mind  alone,  without 
taking  account  of  its  learned  mind,  or  from  one  school 
of  theology  by  itself,  without  taking  account  of  others. 
We  are  on  sure  ground,  however,  when  we  say  that 
Catholicism,  throughout  all  its  ages,  and  in  all  its 
schools — at  any  rate,  since  its  development  into  a 
dogmatic  and  organic  system — ^has  rested  on  the 
conceptions  and  instruments  which  I have  just 
enumerated — its  conceptions  of  God  in  Christ,  of  the 
New  Testament  as  an  “ inspired  Revelation,”  of  the 
Trinity,  of  the  Blessed  Virgin,  of  Heaven,  Hell,  and 
Purgatory,  and  of  “ this  world  ” and  “ the  next.” 
It  is,  of  course,  true  that  these  terms  are  not,  in 
themselves,  positive  and  definite,  and  that  while 
there  has  been  a common  agreement,  within  the 
Church,  to  accept  and  use  them,  it  has  never  been 
possible  to  exactly  measure  the  state  of  mind  which 
corresponded  with  them.  It  is,  for  example,  of  the 
essence  of  such  a symbol  as  the  Nicene  Creed  that 


40  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


it  is  built  up  of  a number  of  statements  to  which  any 
individual  mind  may  pledge  itself,  and  which  a number 
of  persons  may  consent  to  rehearse  in  common,  but 
to  which  none  of  those  who  repeat  them  may  be  able 
to  attach  any  precise  and  practical  significance.  A 
whole  society  of  men  and  women  may  go  on  saying  “ I 
believe  in  God  the  Father,  Maker  of  Heaven  and 
Earth  ” without  in  the  least  knowing  what  they  mean 
by  “ belief,”  or  by  “ God,”  or  by  God  as  “ the 
Father,”  or,  in  such  a connection,  by  “ Maker,”  or  by 
“ Heaven.”  The  one  word  in  this  sentence  which  they 
can  so  use  as  to  understand  it  themselves,  and  to  com- 
municate their  understanding  of  it  to  others,  is  the 
word  “ Earth,”  and  this  they  can  thus  use  because  a 
positive  and  common  experience  enlightens  them,  and 
because  this  common  experience  has  been  invested  by 
science  with  the  authority  of  exactness  and  proof. 

Now,  we  may  say,  quite  simply  and  broadly,  that 
the  general  principle  which  the  Modern  Mind  applies 
to  Catholicism,  in  its  pursuit  of  religious  continuity 
and  development  is  this — that  just  as  it  is  possible  to 
attach  a demonstrable  and  practical  meaning  to 
such  a word  as  the  word  “ Earth  ” in  the  Nicene 
Creed,  and  in  other  theological  statements,  so  it  must 
become  possible,  in  degree,  to  attach  a similar  meaning 
to  such  terms  as  “ God,”  the  “ Trinity,”  “ Heaven,” 
“ Hell,”  “ Purgatory,”  “ the  future  life,”  “ the  Scrip- 
tures,” the  “ Sacraments,”  and  “ the  Church.”  In 
so  far  as  no  such  meaning — a meaning  of  proof  and 
use — can  be  attached  to  these  terms,  they  will  pass 
from  the  speech  of  man,  as  the  verbal  symbols  of 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


41 


“ Paganism,”  except  for  historic  and  literary  pur- 
poses, have  passed  from  it,  and  Catholicism  or 
Christianity  will,  therefore,  cease  to  have  a social 
importance.  This  cardinal  principle  of  a Catholic 
“ modernism  ” — if  we  are  to  use  a somewhat  objec- 
tionable word — is,  of  course,  one  which  ordinary 
ecclesiastics  and  theologians,  affirming  propositions 
which  they  cannot  prove,  and  denouncing  evils  which 
they  cannot  prevent,  may,  at  first,  dislike  and  reject. 
But  they  must  end  by  accepting  it.  They  cannot 
help  themselves.  The  movement  of  the  human  mind, 
continuous,  unified,  and  universal,  is  not  to  be 
arrested.  The  modern  man  is  not  the  medieval  man, 
or  the  ancient  man.  He  is  himself.  He  is  the  heir 
of  the  Past ; he  is  not  its  slave.  If  he  elects  to  remain 
Catholic  he  will  remain  Catholic  in  his  own  way — 
according  to  his  new  vision,  his  new  needs,  his  new 
powers — and  any  Catholicism,  or  “ Christianity,” 
representing  simply  the  vision,  needs,  and  powers  of  a 
former  age  will  necessarily  become  a lapsed  creed. 

In  the  light  of  this  controlling  principle  of  a 
Scientific  Catholicism — not  a negative  principle,  which 
simply  disallows  and  rejects,  but  a positive  principle, 
which  transforms  and  uses — it  is  easy  to  determine  its 
attitude  towards  such  fundamental  conceptions  as 
those  of  “ the  other  world,”  “ miracle,”  “ sin,”  and 
“ prayer.”  All  of  these  related  conceptions,  as  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  say,  have  a bearing  upon  the 
problem  of  a Human  Peace,  for  this  problem  cannot 
rightly  be  dissociated  from  man’s  view  of  himself  and 
his  life.  According  to  the  official  doctrine  of  Catholi- 


42  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


cism,  or  “ Christianity,”  in  any  of  its  organic  forms, 
“ this  world  ” is,  in  principle,  of  importance  only  as 
a prelude  to  “ the  next.”  It  is  a vale  of  tears.  It  is  a 
state  of  trial  and  probation.  In  itself  it  is  worthless 
and  contemptible,  whether  we  consider  it  in  its 
character,  or  in  its  duration.  For  the  human  species 
as  a whole  it  means  an  indefinite  period  of  misery  and 
disappointment,  to  be  ended  by  a general  confla- 
gration, in  which  the  whole  of  the  visible  universe 
will,  somehow,  be  resolved  into  nothing.  For  the 
individual  man  or  woman  it  means  a brief  season  of 
life  on  earth — varying  from  a few  seconds  to,  perhaps, 
a hundred  years — followed  by  “ eternal  life  ” in  a 
place  of  torment  called  “ Hell,”  or  in  a place  of 
felicity  called  “ Heaven,”  to  be  reached,  as  a rule, 
after  a longer  or  shorter  sojourn  in  another  place  of 
torment  called  “ Purgatory.”  During  this  life  of 
man  on  earth — the  continued,  indefinite  Hfe  of  the 
human  species,  the  limited  life  of  individual  men  and 
women — God,  the  “ magnified  and  non-natural  Man,” 
sits  as  a spectator  on  His  throne  in  “ Heaven,”  with 
“ the  Son  ” and  the  ‘‘  Holy  Spirit  ” and  the  Blessed 
Virgin  in  indissoluble  association  with  Him,  for  ever 
watching  the  play  of  human  affairs,  listening  to  the 
prayers  of  men,  for  ever  judging  individual  “ souls  ” 
as  they  “ ascend  ” to  Him  at  death,  and  waiting  for 
that  indefinite  time  when  He  shall  cause  a trumpet  to 
be  sounded  for  the  general  judgment,  and  the  total 
annihilation  of  the  universe. 

Now,  first,  we  may  say  that,  assuming  such  a con- 
ception of  a future  Hfe,”  or  of  the  “ next  world,”  to 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


43 


be  in  any  sense  thinkable,  it  has  no  necessary  relation 
to  that  end  which  Catholicism,  according  to  the 
Modern  Mind,  proposes  to  itself.  That  end  is  a many- 
sided,  positive,  human  Perfection,  individual  and 
social,  symbolized,  inspired  by  the  transcendent  Per- 
fection, or  Divinity,  of  Christ.  The  traditional  con- 
ception of  a future  life  has  a relation  to  merely  one 
side  of  perfection — its  moral  side — and  this  only  in  an 
exclusive  and  limited  sense.  Certainly,  moral  per- 
fection is  the  most  important  of  all,  and,  rightly 
understood,  is  the  basis  and  condition  of  all  others. 
It  is  for  this  reason  especially  that  Christ  is  confessed 
as  God.  In  Him  we  see  the  whole  order  of  things 
summed  up  and  typified  in  a human  and  personal 
order,  constituted  by  the  ascendency  of  a spiritual  and 
self-sacrificing  love.  From  this  point  of  view  moral 
perfection  may  be  said  to  contain  within  itself  the 
total  perfection  of  man,  for  it  means  his  highest 
nature — what  is  Divine  in  him — ruling  and  ordering 
throughout  the  complex  unity  of  his  being,  emotional, 
intellectual,  practical,  and  this  not  merely  by  a 
suppression  of  the  bad,  but  by  an  expression  of  the 
good.  For  practical  purposes,  however,  we  have  to 
recognize  a distinction  between  moral  perfection  and 
intellectual  and  practical  perfection,  and  to  say  that 
the  ideal,  or  perfect,  man  is  the  man  whose  many-sided 
nature  is  full-flowering,  unified,  and  consummate  in 
the  social  state. 

With  this  positive  conception  of  perfection  the 
conception  of  a future  life,  as  it  is  contained  in  our 
traditional  Catholicism,  has  no  assignable  relation. 


44  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


According  to  that  conception,  man  is  a “ sinner.”  He 
is  a sinner  as  soon  as  he  is  born — before  even  he  can 
shape  a thought  or  perform  an  action.  He  is  “ saved  ” 
from  this  congenital  sin — or,  rather,  from  the  penal- 
ties due  to  it — by  the  magic  of  the  baptismal  rite,  in 
the  absence  of  which  he  will  be  punished  by  being 
excluded  eternally  from  “ Heaven.”  When  he  grows 
up  he  is  a sinner  by  his  own  conscious  will  and  act. 
By  “ sin  ” is  meant  the  contravention  of  certain 
elementary  moral  commands,  or  the  neglect  of  certain 
ecclesiastical  ordinances — as,  for  example,  the  obliga- 
tion to  hear  Mass.  Man  is  inevitably  throughout 
life,  in  varying  degree,  in  this  sense  a sinner,  and, 
therefore,  deserving  of  punishment  in  a future  life. 
However  much  and  however  long  he  may  sin,  never- 
theless, he  can  escape  the  eternal  punishment,  and 
limit  the  temporal  punishment,  due  to  him  in  a future 
life  by  repentance,  confession,  and  absolution,  and  by 
virtue  of  the  principle  of  indulgences.  The  wickedest 
of  human  beings,  in  fact,  being  contrite,  is,  by  means 
of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance  and  a Plenary  Indul- 
gence completely  exempted  from  the  consequence  of 
all  sin,  both  original  and  personal,  and,  if  he  dies  in 
this  “ state  of  grace,”  goes  straight  to  Heaven,  and 
becomes  immediately  the  associate  of  saints  and 
angels. 

Such  a conception  of  a future  life  has,  as  is  evident, 
no  connection  with  a positive  idea  of  perfection — the 
pursuit  and  realization  of  a beautiful  humanity, 
individual  and  social — even  if  we  think  only  of  moral 
perfection,  in  a distinctive  and  exclusive  sense.  Still 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


45 


less  has  it  any  bearing  upon  Perfection  in  its  total 
significance — the  harmonious  manifestation  of  a full- 
fiowering  humanity,  physical,  moral,  intellectual, 
practical,  individual,  and  social.  The  “ salvation  of 
the  sinner  ” — that  is  to  say,  escape  from  the  just 
punishment  of  sin,  and  the  attainment,  in  spite  of  it, 
of  eternal  felicity  in  “ another  world  ” — is  not  the 
same  thing  as  the  Divine  spirit  of  man,  ruling  itself, 
and  realizing  itself  in  every  sphere  of  his  being.  The 
“ sinner  ” who  is  “ saved  ” and  goes  to  Heaven  may 
be,  in  everything  except  contrition,  utterly  worth- 
less— in  morals  depraved,  in  intelligence  stupid  and 
ignorant,  in  his  social  and  civic  conduct  incapable 
or  inefficient.  He  may  be  ugly,  deformed,  brutal, 
drunken,  profligate,  useless  in  the  family,  useless  in 
the  State,  useless  in  the  workshop,  useless  in  the 
school,  with  no  feeling  for  the  arts  or  sciences,  with 
no  sentiment  of  worship,  with  no  power  of  practical 
service — and  yet  in  “ Heaven  ” he  is  at  once  magically 
transformed  and  becomes  a friend  and  companion  of 
God.  From  such  a point  of  view  what  we  call  the 
evils  or  imperfections  of  human  life  are  of  no  import- 
ance— disease,  ugliness,  ignorance,  poverty,  crime, 
war  ; and  even  sin,  in  principle  the  greatest  of  evils, 
is  not  so  much  an  evil  in  itself  as  in  its  personal 
chastisement,  from  which  escape  is  easily  possible 
by  a moment  of  sufficient  contrition  and  the  perform- 
ance of  a ritual  act. 

But  while  this  traditional  conception  of  a “ future 
life  ” is  thus  out  of  relation  with  any  positive  ideal 
of  perfection,  the  greater  consideration  remains.  The 


46  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


conception  itself,  in  any  merely  objective  and  external 
interpretation  of  it,  has  ceased  to  have  meaning  and 
validity  for  the  Modern  Mind — except  such  a historic 
and  relative  meaning  as  attaches,  for  example,  to  the 
Elysium  of  the  ancient  Greeks,  or  to  the  Valhalla  of 
the  Scandinavians.  Upon  this  subject,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  science,  discussion  is  both  impossible 
and  useless.  It  is,  from  this  point  of  view,  impossible 
and  useless  because  we  know  nothing  whatever  of  the 
Catholic  “ future  life  ” — Heaven,  Hell,  and  Purgatory 
— and,  in  the  total  absence  of  knowledge  with  regard 
to  it,  are  not  even  able  to  assign  a rational  objective 
meaning  to  these  three  terms.  They  are  symbolic 
terms  of  the  human  mind  ; they  are  not  terms  of  the 
external  and  visible  cosmos.  They  are  terms  of  inner 
experience  ; they  are  not  terms  of  outer  experience. 
This  is  acknowledged,  quite  plainly  and  unequivocally, 
by  Catholicism  itself.  It  does  not  profess  to  “ know  ” 
anything  of  Heaven,  Hell,  and  Purgatory — “ what  ” 
they  are,  or  “ where  ” they  are.  These  ideas,  it 
admits,  do  not  lie  within  the  region  of  reason  or 
demonstration.  They  are  “ of  faith.”  They  are 
not  to  be  understood  ; they  are  to  be  received,  and 
received  on  no  other  ground  than  that  “ the  Church  ” 
affirms  them. 

To  the  Modern  Mind,  however,  faith  and  reason  are 
not  antithetic.  Faith  to  it  is  not  a mystic  process  of 
apprehending  occult  truths  which  lie  wholly  outside 
the  sphere  of  experience  and  demonstration  ; it  is 
an  attitude  of  mind  and  will — one  of  extreme  value 
and  importance — ^which  is  as  much  capable  of  a 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


47 


positive  explanation  and  designation  as  any  other, 
and  which  has  an  assignable  relation  to  knowledge  and 
life.  The  Modern  Mind,  therefore,  does  not  recognize 
a fundamental  and  perpetual  distinction  between  the 
things  of  “ faith  ” and  the  things  of  experience  and 
reason.  Its  Catholicism — the  only  Catholicism  which 
it  will  accept — is  in  doctrine  scientific,  and  its  terms 
or  statements  must,  therefore,  in  a last  resort,  be 
subject  to  the  ordeal  of  proof  and  use.  This  does  not, 
of  course,  necessarily  mean  that  the  Catholic  concep- 
tion of  Heaven,  Hell,  and  Purgatory  is  to  be  dismissed 
from  the  Modern  Mind,  although  that  mind,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  natural,  indefeasible  sovereignty,  has 
undoubtedly  the  power  to  dismiss  it ; it  means  that 
the  sense  and  use  of  these  expressions,  as  of  all  Catholic 
ideas  and  terms,  are  to  be  determined  by  the  Modern 
Mind  itself  and  not  by  the  medieval  mind.  It  means, 
too,  that  the  value  assigned  to  them  must  be  such  as 
is  capable  of  entering  into  a synthesis  of  positive  and 
demonstrable  truths,  and  of  visibly  contributing  to 
the  ideal  and  pursuit  of  human  perfection. 

What  is  true  of  the  traditional  Catholic  conception 
of  a future  life  is,  of  course,  true  also  of  the  traditional 
ideas  of  miracle  and  prayer.  In  a modern  scientific 
Catholicism — occupied  with  the  pursuit  of  a positive 
human  perfection,  individual  and  social,  symbolized 
by  Christ — miracle  has  no  place.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  discuss  it,  any  more  than  it  is  necessary  to  discuss 
the  Elixir  of  Life,  or  the  processes  of  witchcraft, 
except  in  connection  with  the  history  of  the  human 
mind.  It  does  not,  in  fact,  lie  within  the  region  of 


48  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


rational  discussion.  Perfection,  positively  understood, 
means  man  ruling  himself  and  fulfilling  himself,  in- 
dividually and  socially.  It  means  love,  goodness, 
health,  beauty,  wisdom,  power,  a mastery  of  natural 
forces,  a right  distribution  of  material  wealth,  a 
prescient  and  high  direction  of  human  life  towards 
universal  peace  and  concord.  In  relation  to  these 
ends  religion  in  the  modern  world  must  declare  itself 
and  test  itself.  The  only  Catholicism  that  can 
now  live  is  a Catholicism  consciously  and  intention- 
ally directed  towards  them,  and  judging  all  its  con- 
ceptions and  instruments  by  their  capacity  to  con- 
tribute to  their  fulfilment. 

Now  perfection,  in  all  its  spheres — in  love,  good- 
ness, health,  beauty,  knowledge,  power,  in  social  order, 
in  industry,  in  art,  in  science — is  the  result  of  a con- 
tinuous effort,  individual  and  social.  This  effort 
entails  sacrifice  of  certain  things  and  the  pursuit  of 
others.  It  requires  prescience,  will,  and  courage.  It 
is  maintained  from  age  to  age  of  human  life.  It 
demands  the  co-operation  of  successive  generations. 
It  is  subject  to  hindrances.  It  meets  with  dis- 
couragement. It  is  apparently  often  interrupted  and 
frustrated.  It  has  its  heroes  and  martyrs.  It  has 
its  seasons  of  sorrow  and  despair,  as  of  joy  and  hope. 
This  effort,  in  fact,  is  the  life  of  man,  as  we  see  it  in 
history.  In  that  life,  according  to  the  conception  of 
a Scientific  Catholicism,  miracle  has  no  place.  Miracle 
does  not  till  the  fields,  or  procure  for  men  warmth, 
clothing  and  housing,  or  compose  a poem,  or  paint  a 
picture,  or  build  a church,  or  construct  a science,  or 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


49 


promote  education,  or  maintain  the  family  life,  or 
organize  and  direct  a nation.  It  adds  nothing  to  the 
force  of  love  ; it  gives  no  new  power  or  range  to 
reason.  It  removes  no  difficulty  from  the  path  of 
man.  It  does  not  exalt  his  inner  nature  ; it  does  not 
enlarge  his  outer  capacity.  If  he  is  wretched,  dis- 
eased, poor,  ignorant,  and  helpless,  miracle  brings  him 
no  permanent  resource,  and  in  a world  of  war  miracle, 
in  its  evident  impotence,  is  incapable  of  pronouncing 
the  word  of  peace. 

Those,  therefore,  who  in  the  modern  world,  invoke 
the  power  of  miracle  in  reference  to  any  of  the  con- 
tinuous aims  of  human  life — physical,  moral,  intel- 
lectual, industrial,  or  social — are  as  much  out  of 
relation  with  the  sanity  of  their  age  as  was  Don 
Quixote  when  he  donned  the  helmet  of  Mambrino,  or 
attempted  the  restoration  of  chivalry  by  an  encounter 
with  a windmill.  They  are,  in  this  respect,  as  a 
consequence,  in  proportion  to  their  influence  upon 
the  minds  of  men,  an  actual  hindrance  to  social  order 
and  development,  since — allowing  for  their  value  and 
excellence  in  other  respects — they  tend  to  confuse  and 
misdirect  the  human  spirit,  and  prevent  it  from  under- 
standing itself,  the  nature  of  its  fundamental  aims, 
and  the  right  means  of  their  attainment.  The 
greatest  single  instrument  of  perfection  is  prayer,  for 
in  prayer,  according  to  a scientific  and  ideal  conception 
of  it,  man  consciously  renews  in  his  mind  an  Image 
of  Perfection,  a Divine  Ideal,  acknowledges  its  beauty 
and  lordship,  measures  himself  in  relation  to  it,  con- 
fesses his  shortcomings,  invokes,  by  a process  of 


HtP. 


50  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


spiritual  imagination  and  will,  the  power  necessary 
for  its  realization,  and  prepares  himself,  in  feeling,  in- 
telligence, and  action,  to  come  into  practical  corre- 
spondence with  it.  Prayer,  therefore,  is  a first  form 
of  spiritual  effort.  It  is  an  exercise  in  religious  life. 
It  is  an  act  of  vivifying  and  renovating  communion 
with  the  Supreme  Good,  comparable  with  the  act  by 
which  we  deliberately  place  ourselves  in  relation  with 
some  spectacle  of  beauty  in  Nature,  or  some  visible 
nobleness  in  humanity,  or  some  great  creation  in  art, 
and  undergo  its  influence  of  inspiration  and  renewal. 
But  in  prayer,  according  to  this  scientific  conception 
of  it,  miracle — the  suspension  or  subversion  of  the 
natural  order,  cosmic  or  human — ^has  no  place. 
Prayer,  therefore,  in  all  its  forms — ^whether  in  private 
or  public  worship,  in  the  baptismal  rite,  in  the  conse- 
crations of  the  Holy  Eucharist,  in  the  ordination  of 
priests,  in  the  marriage  service,  or  in  any  other  sacra- 
ment— has  no  magical  force.  It  is  the  acknowledg- 
ment and  instrument  of  an  ideal  Humanity,  and  it 
has  a value  proportioned  to  the  rational  apprehension 
of  that  ideal,  and  to  the  degree  in  which  it  actually 
calls  forth  in  men  the  forces  of  feeling,  intelligence, 
and  active  will  essential  to  its  realization. 

VIII 

We  are  now — sufficiently  for  our  present  purpose — 
in  a position  to  understand  what  it  is  that  we  mean 
by  a Scientific  Catholicism.  We  do  not  mean  by  it 
a new  sect,  or  a “ new  religion,”  or  some  arbitrary 
construction  of  an  individual  thinker.  We  mean  by 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


51 


it,  first,  that  the  Modern  Mind,  being  synthetic — 
holding  within  itself  the  powers,  experiences,  and 
acquisitions  of  a total  humanity,  past  and  present — 
is  of  sovereign  authority,  and  that  to  this  mind  it 
now  falls  to  determine  the  sense  of  such  words  as 
“ God,”  Christ,  the  Trinity,  sin,  the  Scriptures,  the 
“ future  life,”  the  creeds,  prayer,  the  sacraments,  and 
the  Church.  We  mean  by  it,  secondly,  that  to  the 
Modern  Mind  Catholicism,  throughout  its  entire  range, 
is  the  confession  and  pursuit  of  an  ideal  perfection, 
individual  and  social — a perfection  continuously 
centred  and  symbolized  in  Christ  as  God,  but  not  to  be 
limited  by  the  conception  of  His  Divinity  proper  to 
any  one  age  or  stage  of  Catholic  development. 

It  is  to  Catholicism  in  this  sense  that  we  are  to 
look  for  the  installation  and  maintenance  of  a Human 
Peace.  To  a merely  traditional  or  unscientific 
Catholicism — to  a Catholicism  representing  an  imma- 
ture condition  of  the  human  mind — ^we  cannot  so 
look.  The  reasons  for  this  may  be  simply  assigned. 
They  follow  from  all  that  we  have  now  said.  Catholi- 
cism has  never,  in  fact,  been  able  to  give  to  man  a 
right  representation  of  himself  and  of  the  universe  in 
relation  to  himself.  It  has  given  him  a representation 
intuitive,  conjectural,  imaginative,  incomplete,  ex- 
pressing itself  in  metaphysical  statements  lying  beyond 
the  region  of  proof  or  disproof,  and  having  no  direct 
application  to  life  and  conduct.  This  provisional 
synthesis  of  things  has  not  been,  by  its  own  nature — 
considered  as  a theory  or  theology — practical  and 
social,  but  has  been  rendered,  in  some  degree,  prac- 


52  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


tical  and  social  by  the  active  mind  of  man,  pursuing 
his  destiny  in  presence  of  the  actual  conditions  and 
needs  of  his  nature.  In  proportion  as  he  has  done 
this — in  proportion  as  he  has  gained  the  experiences 
and  acquisitions  characteristic  of  a developed  and 
complete  humanity — he  has  tended  to  outgrow  the 
CathoHc  synthesis,  in  what  we  may  call  the  unscientific 
or  infantile  conception  of  it.  It  is  now,  in  this  con- 
ception of  it,  the  synthesis  of  children,  or  of  ignorant 
and  incapable  minds.  No  rational  being  now  believes 
— if  any  rational  being  ever  really  believed — that 
there  is  “ a God,”  in  the  sense  of  a “ magnified  and 
non-natural  man,”  sitting  somewhere  on  “ a throne  ” 
in  the  sky,  or  “ beyond  ” the  infinite  visible  universe^ 
and  eternally  occupied,  in  this  infinite  universe,  in 
watching  the  affairs  of  our  little  planet,  and  “ judg- 
ing ” the  “ souls  ” of  its  inhabitants  as  they  indi- 
vidually “ ascend  ” to  Him  at  death.  No  rational 
being  believes — if  any  rational  being  ever  really 
believed — in  any  objective  and  literal  sense,  in  the 
Catholic  Heaven,  Hell,  and  Purgatory  as  places  or 
“ states  ” “ somewhere  ” and  “ sometime  ” to  be 
discovered.  These,  we  now  see,  are  symbolic,  or 
poetic,  conceptions  and  terms,  representing  a spiritual 
reality.  They  have  exactly  the  value  which  the 
human  mind,  in  its  progressive  capacity  and  know- 
ledge, chooses  to  assign  to  them  ; and  the  mind  which 
now  gives  them  their  meaning — disallows  them  alto- 
gether, or  uses  them  in  its  own  way,  and  for  its  own 
purposes — is  the  synthetic,  sovereign  Modern  Mind, 
self-conscious,  self-scrutinizing,  analytic,  practical. 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


53 


The  place  of  a merely  traditional,  or  immature, 
Catholicism,  relatively  to  the  mind  and  life  of  man 
— and  relatively,  therefore,  to  the  problem  of  Human 
Peace — is  shown  by  its  actual  position  in  our  con- 
temporary world.  That  position  is  at  once  a fulfil- 
ment and  representation  of  historic  Catholicism,  con- 
sidered on  its  practical  and  social  side.  Catholicism 
in  itself — as  a “ supernatural  ” doctrine,  and  apart 
from  the  practical  construction  and  use  of  it  upon 
which  man  has  been  forced  by  his  continuous  needs — 
has  never  shown  man  how  to  do  the  things  which, 
for  the  purposes  of  his  life  on  earth,  he  has  been 
compelled  to  do.  It  is  science — ^including  that  com- 
mon-sense empiricism  which  precedes  and  supple- 
ments formal  science — which  has  done  this.  One 
consequence  of  this  has  been  that  men  have  more 
and  more  ceased  to  appeal  to  Catholicism  as  such,  or 
to  Christianity  in  any  shape,  in  relation  either  to  the 
acquisition  and  communication  of  knowledge,  or  to 
the  practical  conduct  of  human  life.  At  the  present 
time  no  responsible  man  ever  thinks  of  turning  to 
CathoHcism  or  Christianity — in  other  words,  to  pro- 
fessed Christian  teachers,  as  such — for  guidance  either 
in  international  relations,  or  in  domestic  national 
policy,  or  in  industrial  concerns,  or  in  the  arts  and 
sciences,  or  in  education.  All  these  great  fields  of 
human  effort  have  passed  from  the  control  of  “ the 
Church  ” as  such,  in  so  far  as  they  were  ever  under  it, 
to  the  control  of  “ the  State  ” — the  secular  mind  of 
man,  working  in  a neutral  sphere  of  social  need,  and 
according  to  the  dictates  of  practical  reason.  Even 


54  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

in  the  domain  of  personal  morals — the  special  and 
supreme  domain,  as  was  once  supposed,  of  “ the 
Church  ” — it  is  now  the  State,  the  organ  of  “ believer  ” 
and  “ unbeliever  ” alike,  which  decides  and  shapes 
things.  It  regulates,  or  attempts  to  regulate,  the 
drinking  habits  of  society.  It  legislates  on  questions 
of  sex.  It  deals  with  the  smoking  mania.  It  modi- 
fies, or  abrogates,  the  law  of  the  Church  as  regards 
marriage  and  divorce.  It  controls,  or  tries  to  control, 
industrial  morality.  In  France  it  has  ostentatiously 
dismissed  religion  from  public  life,  and  where  it  has 
not  been  thus  openly  and  systematically  dismissed,  it 
is  dismissed  by  implication  and  indifference. 

Catholicism,  therefore, — and  once  more,  in  such  a 
connection,  I mean  Christianity  in  all  its  forms — has 
come,  actually  and  practically,  to  occupy  the  position 
which  Comte  contemptuously  proposed  to  it  more 
than  sixty  years  ago.  It  has  become  exclusively  the 
religion  of  the  “ next  world  ” ; it  has  ceased  to  be  the 
religion  of  “ this.”  It  has,  in  fact,  worked  out  its 
own  metaphysic.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
“ next  world,”  which  is  Eternity,  it  does  not,  as  we 
have  seen,  much  matter  whether  in  “ this  world,” 
which  is  Time,  man  is  diseased  or  healthy,  ugly  or 
beautiful,  sane  or  insane,  ignorant  or  instructed, 
stupid  or  wise,  steeped  in  abject  poverty,  or  a master 
of  material  resources,  versed  in  the  arts  and  sciences 
or  utterly  illiterate,  a lord  of  industry  and  civil 
policy  or  a helpless  barbarian,  in  a state  of  social 
peace,  or  perpetually  involved  in  a bloody  and  waste- 
ful war.  It  does  not,  from  this  standpoint,  even 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


55 


matter  whether  man  is  or  is  not  a “ sinner,”  provided 
only  that  he  makes  use  of  the  means  which  the  Church 
holds  out  to  him  for  escaping  the  eternal  punishment 
of  sin  and  securing  “ salvation.”  The  “ next  world  ” 
will  put  everything  right  that  is  wrong  in  “ this 
world,”  and,  in  fact,  it  is  only  “ the  world  ” which 
we  do  not  know  that  is  “ real,”  while  the  world  which 
we  know  is  “ unreal.”  This  “ next  world  ” is  a fairy- 
land of  supernatural  enchantments,  to  come  somehow 
into  “ existence  ” when  the  infinite  universe  has  been 
resolved  into  nothing,  but  which  somehow,  neverthe- 
less, “ exists  ” already ; and  in  it  the  vilest  or  most 
abject  of  men,  being  “ penitent,”  is  at  once  magically 
transformed  into  an  inconceivable  something  incon- 
ceivably noble  and  beautiful. 

A second  consequence  of  the  scientific  incapacity  of 
Catholicism,  or  Christianity — its  inability  to  rightly 
represent  to  man  himself  and  the  universe  in  relation 
to  himself — is  that  in  our  modern  world  it  has  been 
deliberately  and  openly  rejected  as  a synthesis  of 
things  by  an  immense  number  of  thinking  minds. 
They  are  confessedly  agnostics  or  atheists.  A third 
consequence  is  that  Catholicism  has  never  been  really 
Catholic,  in  the  sense  of  being  a universal  religion  of 
mankind.  It  is  now  certain  that,  in  the  traditional 
conception  of  it,  it  will  never  become  this.  The  non- 
Christian  religions  of  the  world,  doctrinally  considered, 
rest,  in  principle,  as  Catholicism  itself  rests,  on  a 
number  of  metaphysical  conceptions  and  statements 
lying  beyond  the  region  of  proof  or  disproof.  They 
are,  as  our  traditional  Catholicism  is,  unscientific. 


56  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


Catholicism,  as  a metaphysical  theology,  has  nothing 
to  offer  the  adherents  of  these  non-Christian  religions 
but  its  own  indemonstrable  affirmations  in  exchange 
for  theirs.  It  can  no  longer  claim  for  these  affirmations 
that  they  have  the  authority  of  the  mind  and  life  of 
civilized  Christendom.  Civilized  Christendom,  as  we 
see,  not  only  rejects  or  neglects  them,  in  practice,  in 
its  own  social  life,  but,  in  an  ever-increasing  degree, 
deliberately  dismisses  them  from  its  mind.  The 
missionaries  of  the  Western  world  are  now  proposing 
to  the  East  a religion  which  has  ceased  to  be  the 
religion  of  the  Western  world. 

IX 

From  what  I have  called  a traditional  or  unscientific 
Catholicism,  therefore,  we  have  no  grounds  for  expect- 
ing a Human  Peace.  It  is,  as  a religion  of  social  order 
and  progress,  now  practically  disregarded  or  theoreti- 
cally rejected  in  the  chief  theatre  of  its  own  develop- 
ment. This  is  so  true  that  to  most  independent 
thinkers  it  will  doubtless  seem  absurd  to  connect  an 
argument  for  the  peace  of  the  world  with  Catholicism, 
or  Christianity,  in  any  conception  of  it.  The  prac- 
tical mind,  occupied  with  the  living  interests  and 
causes  of  man,  looks  to  “ the  State,”  or  the  Govern- 
ment, as  its  expression  and  instrument,  or  to  some 
special  social  agencies  acting  outside  the  sphere  of 
“ the  Church.”  The  priest — here  using  this  word  to 
embrace  the  Protestant  minister  as  well  as  the 
Catholic — -is  now,  speaking  generally,  a Sunday  officer 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


57 


only.  That  is  the  day  of  the  “ next  world.”  It  is  on 
that  day  especially  that  he  works  his  miracles,  or 
offers  up  his  prayers,  or  sets  forth  his  metaphysical 
doctrine  of  “ sin  ” — the  only  doctrine  that  in  any 
sense  belongs  to  him.  On  the  other  days  of  the  week 
— the  days  in  which  men  labour,  or  learn,  or  teach, 
or  heal  disease,  or  occupy  themselves  with  the  arts 
and  sciences,  or  live  their  social  life,  or  engage  in  the 
great  affairs  of  citizenship  and  policy — on  these  other 
days,  the  priest,  as  such,  has  no  place  or  function, 
allowing  for  what  may  be  called  his  ceremonial  and 
philanthropic  activities. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  many  minds — especially 
among  those  who  have  actually  to  bear  the  burdens 
and  do  the  work  of  the  world — are  beginning  to  ask 
themselves  whether  the  priest,  or  religious  minister, 
is  not  now  a mere  incubus  or  parasite,  maintained 
by  the  active  life  of  man,  but  contributing  nothing 
whatever  to  its  nourishment  or  guidance.  The 
Catholic  priest  is,  of  course,  the  representative  priest 
of  the  world.  He  works  miracles — the  sacramental 
miracles,  for  example,  of  baptism,  transubstantiation, 
ordination,  absolution.  The  practical,  honest  minds 
of  the  present  day,  however,  comparing  one  thing 
with  another,  do  not  see  that  the  Catholic  priest,  who 
is  miraculously  “ ordained  ” to  work  miracles,  is  in 
any  way  intellectually  superior  to  the  men  who  have 
not  been  so  ordained.  They  know,  in  fact,  that  he  is 
frequently  inferior  to  them.  They  see,  too,  that 
even  in  the  priest  himself  a certain  secular  education 
and,  perhaps,  a university  degree  are  of  more  prac- 


58  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


tical  importance  than  that  “ gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  ” 
which  is  the  priest’s  special  distinction — that  in  the 
absence  of  such  an  education,  indeed,  this  magical 
gift,  even  in  the  estimation  of  the  Church  which 
makes  an  exclusive  claim  to  it — counts  for  just 
nothing  at  all.  In  the  same  way  the  practical, 
honest  minds  of  the  present  day,  using  their  eyes,  and 
seeing  things  as  they  are,  do  not  find  that  the  average 
man  or  woman  who  attends  mass  in  the  Catholic 
Church,  or  who  receives  the  Blessed  Sacrament,  or 
who  goes  to  confession  is — judged  by  any  recognized 
moral,  intellectual,  or  practical  test — in  any  way 
superior,  for  example,  to  the  average  Quaker,  who 
does  none  of  these  things.  So,  too,  these  honest, 
practical  minds  recognize  that  in  the  Catholic  Church, 
which  insists  that  matrimony  is  a “ sacrament,”  and 
which  condemns  a formal  divorce,  the  marriage  tie 
has  not,  in  fact,  been  more  sacred  than  in  non- 
Catholic  bodies,  and  the  realities  of  divorce  are  as 
common  as  elsewhere. 

To  the  honest,  practical  mind,  therefore,  the 
Catholic  priest,  or  Protestant  minister,  in  the  tra- 
ditional or  unscientific  conception  of  his  office — 
working  miracles  that  do  not  matter,  or  affirming 
propositions  which  he  cannot  prove,  or  offering  up 
prayers  which  have  no  assignable  relation  to  the 
knowledge  and  life  of  man,  or  denouncing  evils  which 
he  does  not  prevent — makes  a smaller  contribution 
to  the  real  good  of  the  world  than  the  humblest 
labourer  in  the  fields,  actually  facing  the  forces  of 
Nature,  and  bringing  to  bear  on  them  the  transform- 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


59 


ing  power  of  a human  mind  and  will.  From  such  a 
point  of  view  it  may  seem  useless,  and  even  fantastic, 
to  invoke  Catholicism,  or  Christianity,  as  the  instru- 
ment of  a Human  Peace.  Catholicism,  or  Chris- 
tianity, has  not,  in  fact,  from  the  age  of  Constantine 
to  the  present  time,  been  a power  of  peace.  It  has 
not  even  aimed  at  the  prevention  of  war.  It  has 
sanctioned  and  blessed  all  wars  as  they  arose — even 
the  wickedest  and  most  stupid.  It  has  frequently 
been  a cause  of  war  itself.  The  priest,  with  rare 
exceptions,  has  been,  and  is,  the  subservient  apologist 
of  the  soldier  or  the  ruler.  He  has  been  wanting 
in  spiritual  courage,  as  he  has  been  destitute  of 
social  insight  and  prevision.  Throughout  its  sixteen 
centuries  of  official  ascendency  Catholicism,  or  Chris- 
tianity— meaning  by  this  especially  its  theological  doc- 
trine and  directing  hierarchy — ^has  complacently  pre- 
sided over  a long  succession  of  wars  ; and  to-day,  in 
presence  of  the  bloodiest  catastrophe  in  the  life  of 
man,  the  “ Christian  Church  ” exhibits  itself  to  the 
world  as  a discredited  company  of  helpless  and 
wrangling  sects,  excluded,  by  common  consent,  from 
every  real  sphere  of  thought  and  action,  and  impo- 
tently  occupied  in  disputing  about  conceptions  and 
terms  to  which  they  are  wholly  unable  to  assign  a 
practical  meaning.  This,  as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say,  is  not  due  to  any  merely  personal  defects  of 
priests  and  ministers,  many  of  whom  are  devoted 
social  servants,  of  a noble  spiritual  seriousness  and 
high  intellectual  quality.  It  is  the  inevitable  effect 
of  a theological  doctrine  which,  in  the  traditional 


6o  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


interpretation  of  it,  has  ceased  to  be  in  practical 
correspondence  with  the  mind  and  life  of  man,  and 
which,  therefore,  among  those  who  are  called  upon 
to  profess  it,  gives  to  the  capable  an  effect  of 
incapacity,  and  to  the  honest  an  appearance  of  dis- 
honesty, while  largely  nullifying  the  positive  beauty 
and  truth  of  Catholicism  itself. 

X 

In  face  of  these  conclusions — conclusions  which 
find  their  proof  in  the  social  history  of  Christianity, 
and  in  its  visible  position  in  our  contemporary  world — 
it  may  appear  useless  to  appeal  to  Catholicism,  or 
“ Christianity,”  as  the  inspiration  and  directing  mind 
of  a Human  Peace.  To  many,  indeed,  it  will  seem 
that  the  Catholic  Church — embracing  under  this 
expression,  for  our  immediate  purpose,  all  Christian 
Churches — is  now,  in  degree,  an  atheistic  Church.  The 
earliest  Christian  apologist,  as  we  have  seen,  had  to 
defend  his  co-religionists  against  a charge  of  atheism. 
That  was  natural.  What  we  call  “ belief  in  God  ” 
means  simply  the  acceptance  of  some  particular  con- 
ception of  Divinity,  or  connotation  of  the  word 
“ God,”  which  happens,  at  a given  time,  to  be  nomin- 
ally and  officially  ascendant  in  the  world.  Our  Lord 
Himself  was,  to  the  Scribes  and  Pharisees  who  cruci- 
fied Him,  an  atheist,  or  blasphemer.  In  the  same  way 
Justin  Martyr’s  Christian  contemporaries  were,  to  the 
Pagan  mind,  atheists,  for  the  obvious  and  sufficient 
reason  that  they  rejected  conceptions  of  the  Divine 
which  were,  in  substance,  practically  universal  in  the 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


6i 


ancient  world.  The  early  Christians  had,  as  we  now 
see,  a good  answer  to  this  charge.  They  were,  it  is 
true,  subverting — or  they  had  the  intention  to  subvert 
— all  the  religious  beliefs  of  antiquity,  but  they  were 
bringing  in  a new  and  nobler  belief.  They  were 
actually  “ atheists  ” relatively  to  the  Pagan  concep- 
tions of  the  Divine,  but  they  were  setting  forth  a 
higher  and  more  beautiful  conception,  and,  in  presence 
of  this  conception,  it  was  the  Pagan  world  itself, 
resting  in  lower  views  of  Divinity,  and  denying  the 
higher,  which  was  atheistic. 

In  exactly  the  same  way  we  may  say  that  at  the 
present  day  it  is  the  Catholic  Church — with  all 
Christian  Churches  in  proportion  as  they  are  Catholic 
— ^which  is  in  danger  of  becoming  atheistic.  The 
word  “ God,”  in  its  abstract  and  continuous  meaning, 
stands  for  the  Infinite  Controlling  Order,  or  Reality, 
visible  and  invisible — including  the  Order  of  Humanity 
— ^with  which  man  is  in  progressive  relation,  according 
as  that  Order  is  conceived  and  interpreted  by 
his  developing  mind.  In  the  modern  world  it  is 
the  Modern  Mind — not  a mind  disruptive  or  revo- 
lutionary, but  a mind  evolved  and  synthetic — ^which 
gives  its  meaning  to  the  word  “ God.”  That  meaning 
is  a meaning  of  science.  The  rejection  of  this  meaning 
is  as  much,  'pro  tanto,  atheism  as  was  the  rejection  of 
Christ’s  Divinity  by  ancient  Paganism.  In  other 
words,  it  is  the  assertion  of  a lower  and  lapsed  con- 
ception in  presence  of  a higher  and  living  conception. 
It  is  the  denial  of  Truth,  which  can  never  mean  any- 
thing else  than  the  continuous,  progressive,  and 


62  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


tested  affirmations  of  man’s  social  mind  concerning 
the  sum  of  his  real  experiences,  outer  and  inner — 
affirmations  which  are  subject,  in  the  last  resort,  to 
the  criterion  of  practice  and  use.  The  denial  of 
science,  the  denial  of  the  conception  of  God  following 
upon  the  development  of  science,  is,  therefore,  in  our 
modern  world,  atheism. 

We  come  back,  then,  to  the  principle — the  funda- 
mental principle  governing  the  following  pages — that 
for  the  installation  and  maintenance  of  a Human 
Peace  what  is  needed  is  a Scientific  Catholicism.  A 
Scientific  Catholicism,  once  more,  will  not  be  a 
wholly  “ new  ” Catholicism.  It  will  not  maintain 
the  relation  to  our  historic  and  traditional  Catholicism 
which  that  Catholicism,  in  principle,  maintained  to 
the  faiths  of  the  ancient  world.  We  can  see  now  that 
our  common  Christian  criticism  of  those  faiths  is  as 
absurd  and  ungrateful  as  it  is  devoid  of  historic 
truth — that  the  essential  foundations  of  religion  were 
broadly  and  deeply  laid,  whether  by  Judaism  or 
Paganism,  long  before  Christianity  arose,  and  that 
what  we  call  “ Paganism  ” — to  say  nothing  of 
Judaism — was  a thing  of  noble  spiritual  seriousness, 
of  a many-sided  intellectual  vitality,  of  a spacious 
artistic  beauty,  and  of  a vast  social  and  practical 
power,  which  has  continued  to  govern  the  mind  and 
life  of  Humanity  down  to  the  present  hour.  We  see 
that  a later  age  in  the  progressive  life  of  man  rests 
upon  its  earlier  ages.  The  Modern  Mind  brings  this 
principle  to  bear  on  our  traditional  Catholicism  itself. 
It  is  not  the  first  nor  the  last.  In  so  far  as  it  claims 


RELIGIOUS  INTRODUCTION 


63 


to  be  this  it  is  a denial  of  science  ; it  is  atheistic.  The 
Modern  Mind  builds  upon  it  consciously,  intention- 
ally, and  systematically,  as  a primitive  Christianity 
built  unintentionally  and  spontaneously  upon  the 
religions  of  the  ancient  world.  The  Modern  Mind 
enters  into  the  whole  positive  truth  of  Catholicism — in 
scripture,  doctrine,  creed,  worship,  sacrament,  and 
institutions — and  reinforces  it  with  truths  which  an 
atheistic  Catholicism  has  denied,  or  neglected,  or  been 
incapable  of  incorporating  in  its  own  synthesis.  The 
old,  continuous  purpose  of  Catholicism  remains — Per- 
fection, according  to  the  Divinity  of  Christ,  the  King- 
dom of  Heaven.  Heaven  to  the  Modern  Mind  is  not 
“ a place  ” of  magic  and  enchantment  in  the  sky,  or 
beyond  the  visible  universe,  with  “ God,”  as  a magni- 
fied and  non-natural  man,  seated  on  a throne,  and 
looking  “ out  ” or  “ down  ” upon  the  life  of  mankind 
on  earth,  and  upon  illimitable  hosts  of  men  and 
women,  suffering  the  pangs  of  Hell  and  Purgatory. 
The  Kingdom  of  Heaven  to  the  Modern  Mind,  as  to  a 
Mind  which  we  are  not  accustomed  to  consider  modern, 
is  within  us,  and,  being  within  us,  it  will  flow  out  upon 
the  whole  life  of  Humanity,  individual  and  social,  as 
a concord  of  goodness,  beauty,  truth,  and  power,  of 
which  a Human  Peace  is  a first  and  indispensable 
condition. 


CHAPTER  I 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

The  question  which  we  are  to  consider  in  this 
essay  is  not  the  question — important  as  that,  at  a 
given  time,  may  be  in  itself — of  the  special  settle- 
ment, or  “ terms  of  peace,”  which  may  follow  from 
a particular  war  : it  is  the  question,  far-reaching  and 
fundamental,  of  the  maintenance  of  a permanent 
peace  among  all  the  nations  of  mankind.  Such  a 
peace  we  may  call  a “ Human  Peace  ” — a peace 
embracing  in  its  continuing  concord  the  whole 
external  life  of  humanity,  from  one  age  to  another. 
After  every  war  there  is  a peace  of  some  sort — longer 
or  shorter,  and  involving,  frequently,  certain  terri- 
torial rearrangements.  This  we  may  describe  as  a 
politician’s  or  diplomatist’s  peace.  It  is  more  or  less 
satisfactory  to  those  concerned  in  it.  It  is  imposed 
by  the  victors  upon  the  vanquished,  or,  where  there 
is  something  like  a balance  of  forces,  is  the  result  of  a 
compromise  ; and,  in  all  human  experience  hitherto, 
it  has  been  followed  after  a time  by  another  war,  to 
be  succeeded  in  its  turn  by  a similar  peace.  Speaking 
broadly,  it  may  be  said  that  such  an  ebb  and  flow  of 
peace  and  war  has  characterized  the  life  of  mankind 
for  three  thousand  years.  It  may  seem,  therefore, 
that,  given  the  essential  continuity  of  human  nature, 
we  may  reasonably  expect  the  same  state  of  things 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  65 


to  continue  indefinitely  in  the  future,  and  that, 
consequently,  it  is  useless  to  discuss  such  a problem 
as  that  of  a permanent  Human  Peace.  Nevertheless, 
as  men,  differing  though  they  do,  in  their  conception 
of  “ goodness,”  still,  in  some  sort,  continue  to  pursue 
it,  notwithstanding  their  failures  to  realize  it,  and  as 
they  do  not  cease  to  follow  after  beauty  and  truth, 
although,  throughout  aU  history,  man  has  been  con- 
tinuously involved  in  ugliness  and  error,  so  we  may 
say  that  the  peace  of  the  world,  the  continuous  Human 
Peace,  is  an  ideal — ^if  an  ideal  we  are  to  consider  it — 
which,  after  all,  and  in  spite  of  all,  we  must  ever  put 
before  ourselves,  as  a Paradise,  or  a heaven  upon 
earth,  still  somehow,  and  at  some  time,  to  be  gained. 

For  the  Modern  Mind — a mind  conscious  of  itself, 
and  resting,  in  its  full  development,  upon  the  accumu- 
lated experience  of  mankind — the  question  of  a 
Human  Peace  is  a question  of  science,  to  be  studied 
and  discussed  just  as  any  problem  of  mathematics, 
physics,  and  biology  is  studied  and  discussed.  The 
Modern  Mind,  so  understood,  may,  of  course,  deceive 
itself  and  be  deceived,  but  its  wish  is  to  see  things 
as  they  are — to  know  what  the  universe  actually  is, 
in  so  far  as  this  admits  of  being  known,  and  what  are 
man’s  place  and  power  in  it.  To  see  things  as  they 
are,  to  know  what  is  to  be  known,  to  recognize  what 
is  unknown  and  unknowable,  to  act  where  action  is 
possible,  to  resign  ourselves  where  it  can  be  shown 
to  be  impossible,  to  investigate  with  patience  and 
exactness,  to  infer  with  sobriety  and  care,  to  com- 
pare and  verify,  and  to  bring  all  conclusions 


66  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


eventually  to  the  test  of  experience  and  practice — this 
in  its  essential  spirit  and  methods,  is  science  ; and  as 
it  is  science  in  this  sense  that  has  given  us  all  the  sure 
knowledge  of  external  nature  which  we  actually 
possess  and  use,  so  it  will  give  us  such  sure  knowledge 
as  is  possible  of  man,  as  an  individual  and  social 
being,  in  relation  to  the  universe.  If  there  is  any  way 
to  a Human  Peace,  it  is  the  way  of  science — showing 
us  what  we  are,  where  we  are,  what  we  can  do,  and 
how  to  do  it. 

To  this  truth — a truth  sovereign  and  unassailable 
amidst  all  the  distractions  and  uncertainties  of  the 
Modern  Mind~-it  is,  however,  necessary  to  add  certain 
others.  First,  we  must  recognize  that  science — ^in 
other  words,  the  developed  reason  of  man,  resting  on 
the  sum  of  human  experience,  outer  and  inner,  and 
interpreting  that  experience  by  definite  methods — 
can,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  only  solve  the  prob- 
lem of  peace,  in  one  way  or  another,  when  it  is  itself 
complete.  Science  must  become  the  Science  of 
Humanity,  in  a full  sense-— the  science  of  man  as  a 
social  and  moral  being,  Hving  in  dependence  upon 
the  Universal  Order — before  it  can  exhibit  to  us  the 
real  nature  of  that  problem  and  open  to  us  the  way 
of  its  solution.  To  the  lower  sciences  of  inorganic  and 
organic  nature  we  must  add  the  higher  sciences  of 
human  nature — the  sciences  of  sociology  and  morals 
— if  we  are  to  bring  into  a right  relation  aU  the 
elements  that  enter  into  the  question  of  peace,  and 
decide  whether  such  a thing  as  a Human  Peace  is 
possible.  This  was  conclusively  shown  more  than 


lENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  67 


half  a century  ago  by  Auguste  Comte,  who,  in  spite 
of  his  inevitable  failures  and  mistakes,  remains  to-day, 
what  he  was  then,  the  greatest  of  social  thinkers,  and 
who  more  than  any  other  man  has  brought  to  bear 
on  our  perplexed  modern  world  that  full  synthetic 
survey  which  is  indispensable  to  its  right  apprehension 
and  direction. 

In  the  second  place  we  must  recognize — ^what  also 
Comte  ought  to  have  the  credit  of  having  shown — 
that  science  alone,  however  much  we  may  elevate  and 
complete  it — is,  while  it  is  indispensable,  insufficient 
to  solve  the  problem  of  a Human  Peace.  Science  is, 
in  one  view  of  it,  tested  and  ordered  knowledge,  and, 
in  another  view  of  it,  the  temper  and  method  by 
which  we  reach  such  knowledge.  On  any  view  of  it, 
however,  it  is  merely  an  intellectual  exercise  or 
acquisition.  It  represents,  by  itself,  only  one  of  the 
three  constituents  of  human  nature — feeling,  intelli- 
gence, and  will.  It  enables  man  to  understand — in  so 
far  as  they  admit  of  being  understood — his  nature, 
his  situation,  his  powers,  his  duties,  but  it  does  not, 
by  itself,  decide  whether  he  is  to  follow  one  or  another 
of  the  various  conflicting  purposes  of  human  life.  It 
exhibits  to  him  the  character  and  antagonism  of  his 
different  desires,  but  it  does  not,  in  doing  so,  deter- 
mine whether  he  is  to  live  his  life  under  the  domina- 
tion of  a high  desire  or  a low.  The  drunkard  has  at 
least  so  much  “ science  ” as  to  know  that  drunkenness 
involves  him  in  physical  and  moral  degradation,  and 
imperils  his  social  life ; but  his  mere  knowledge  of 
this  does  not,  by  itself,  cause  him  to  remain  sober, 


68  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


although  it  may  be  a powerful  inducement  to  him  to 
become  so.  The  profligate  is  “ scientific  ” to  the 
extent  of  understanding  that  his  vices  are  a dissi- 
pation of  his  best  forces  and  an  injury  to  other  human 
beings,  but  this  does  not  suffice  to  make  him  moral. 
The  thief  is  commonly  aware  that  he  is  breaking  a 
social  law,  and  exposing  himself  to  punishment,  but 
this  does  not  cause  him  to  become  honest,  either  in 
intention  or  in  fact.  The  Christian  knows,  or  believes, 
that  a certain  line  of  conduct  will  procure  him 
“ eternal  felicity,”  and  a certain  other  line  “ eternal 
damnation,”  but  this  does  not  prevent  him  from 
following  the  latter.  Theology  is,  as  has  been  con- 
sidered to  be,  a science.  It  is  the  Science,  or  Doc- 
trine, of  God — unfolding  to  men  the  nature,  the 
laws,  the  will  of  the  Supreme  Being,  in  relation  to 
man — according  to  such  conceptions  of  Him  as  have 
established  themselves  in  the  human  mind  at  given 
stages  of  its  development.  But  this  science,  by 
itself,  is  far  from  having  brought  men  into  conformity 
with  what  they  have  supposed  to  be  the  Divine  Will, 
and  has,  indeed,  failed  to  do  so,  even  when  associated 
with  all  the  powers  of  worship  and  discipline. 

While,  therefore,  it  is  true  that  science — science 
become  complete  enough  to  embrace  the  social  and 
individual  life  of  man — must  open  up  to  us  the  way 
of  peace,  it  is  also  true  that  it  can,  by  itself,  do  no 
more  than  this.  It  cannot  cause  men  to  pursue  that 
way,  any  more  than  a mere  knowledge  of  the  laws,  or 
conditions,  of  physical  health  can  cause  a glutton  or 
a drunkard,  or  a sensualist  to  abandon  an  immediate 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  69 


and  easy  gratification,  and  follow  after  a difficult  and 
distant  good.  Up  to  the  present,  indeed,  it  may  be 
said  that  science — at  any  rate  the  science  of  inorganic 
nature — ^has  been  the  handmaid  of  war  rather  than 
of  peace.  From  the  date  of  the  invention  of  gun- 
powder to  the  date  of  the  invention  of  the  machine- 
gun  and  the  submarine,  the  genius  of  science  has  been 
dedicated  more  to  the  construction  and  perfection  of 
instruments  of  slaughter  than  to  the  promotion  of 
pacific  aims,  as  such.  Even  such  scientific  creations 
as  might,  in  themselves,  have  seemed  favourable  to 
human  concord^ — the  art  of  printing,  the  mariner’s 
compass,  the  steamship  and  locomotive,  the  electric 
telegraph — are  far  from  having  brought  peace  to 
mankind,  and  it  is  in  an  age  of  the  greatest  scientific 
development  that  the  world  has  seen  the  greatest 
and  most  awful  of  wars.  Science  in  itself,  in  fact, 
is  like  a mercenary  soldier.  It  is  the  servant  of  any 
cause.  It  is  man’s  reason,  wrought  into  an  instru- 
ment of  high  efficiency,  but  ministering  with  equal 
readiness  and  effect  to  what  is  low  in  him  and  what 
is  high.  It  may  be  the  sword  of  Justice,  but  it  may 
also  be  the  dagger  of  the  assassin.  It  nails  the  thief 
to  the  Cross,  but  side  by  side  with  him  it  places  the 
Saviour. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  by  the  power  of  science — the 
developed  and  disciplined  reason  of  man,  resting  upon 
the  sum  of  human  experience,  knowing  himself,  and 
therefore  knowing  the  world  with  which  he  is  in 
relation — that  a Human  Peace,  if  there  is  ever  to  be  a 
Human  Peace,  is  to  be  brought  about.  Our  reason 


70  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


for  saying  this  is  plain.  It  is  true  that  science,  by 
itself,  is  not  necessarily  a force  of  good.  It  may  be, 
and  often  is,  a force  of  evil.  But  whether  it  is  a force 
of  good  or  of  evil,  it  is  a force.  It  is  as  the  sun  shining 
on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust,  but  it  is  still  a sun. 
Science,  whether  it  ministers  to  a good  purpose  or  a 
bad,  yet,  in  proportion  to  its  sureness  and  develop- 
ment, accomplishes  the  aims  to  which  it  is  directed. 
If  our  object  is  to  measure  the  planets  and  determine 
their  course,  it  enables  us  to  do  this.  The  physicist 
puts  steam  and  electricity  into  our  hands  and  shows 
us  how  to  command  them.  The  chemist  does  not 
merely  indulge  in  vague  speculations  about  causes 
and  effects,  but  gives  us  the  hands  of  Briareus,  with 
which  we  can  work  upon  the  forces  of  Nature  and 
make  them  subservient  to  human  arts.  The  biologist 
opens  up  the  world  of  life  to  us,  as  far  as  it  can  ever  be 
opened  up,  and  enables  us  to  see  the  structure  and 
activities  of  living  beings,  from  those  of  the  humblest 
of  microscopic  organisms  to  those  of  man  himself.  In 
a word,  in  science  there  is  hope,  because  in  science 
there  is  light  and  power.  Science  knows  things  and 
does  things.  It  is,  of  course,  incomplete.  Its  last 
word  is  not  yet  spoken.  It  has  left  problems  unsolved 
and  insoluble.  It  is  still  face  to  face  with  tasks  unat- 
tempted or  impossible.  But  what  we  actually  know 
we  know  because  of  science  ; what  we  have  actually 
done  we  have  done  through  the  power  of  science  ; and 
what  is  still  unknown  and  undone  we  may  hope  to 
know  and  to  do  through  the  instrumentality  of  science 
— the  developed,  disciplined  reason  of  man,  resting  on 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  71 


the  sum  of  his  experiences  and  achievements — -in  so 
far  as  human  capacity  extends,  The  means  by 
which  he  has  unveiled  the  laws  and  mastered  the  forces 
of  what  we  call  “ Nature  ” — the  world  of  inorganic 
matter  and  of  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms — 
are  the  means  by  which  he  may  reasonably  expect  to 
gain  understanding  and  lordship  in  the  world  of  his 
own  nature  as  an  individual  and  social  being.  The 
power  and  methods  of  mind  which  have  built  up  the 
positive  sciences  from  mathematics  to  biology  will 
also  build  up  the  positive  sciences  of  sociology  and 
morals  ; the  science  which,  serving  the  impulses  of 
destruction  and  slaughter,  has  given  new  arms  and  a 
new  force  to  war  will  also,  serving  the  purposes  of 
construction  and  concord,  prepare  the  way  for  the 
victories  of  peace. 

There  are  two  main  means  by  which  it  will  do  this  : 
First,  science,  become  completely  human,  will,  in  its 
application  to  the  question  of  peace,  deliver  us  from 
the  confusion  of  mind  resulting  from  the  clash  of 
national  passions,  and  from  the  struggles  of  classes, 
sects,  and  parties  within  the  nation.  Science,  as 
such,  is  international,  and  it  lifts  us  out  of  the  nar- 
rowness of  any  exclusive  social  interest.  Its  concern 
is  to  discover  forces  and  laws — the  real  relations  of 
things,  in  their  constancy  and  recurrence.  It  is 
international  alike  in  its  temper,  its  processes,  and 
its  results.  It  is  not  English,  French,  German,  or 
Russian.  It  is  human  and  universal.  If,  therefore, 
we  study  the  problem  of  peace — of  a peace  world- 
wide and  enduring — according  to  the  disposition  and 


72  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


methods  of  science,  we  are,  by  that  very  fact,  placed 
at  a point  of  view  which  is  common  to  men  of  every 
country — in  so  far  as  they  are  scientific  ; and  any 
conclusions  at  which  we  arrive  will  have  as  much  an 
international  validity  as  those  of  physics  and  biology. 
We  may  put  the  same  truth  in  a different  way  by 
saying  that  science  is  essentially  Catholic — that  it 
brings  to  bear  on  the  mind  and  life  of  man  exactly 
the  same  breadth  and  dispassionateness,  the  same 
capacity  to  lift  men  out  of  what  is  partial  and  tem- 
porary into  what  is  universal  and  eternal,  as  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  would  exhibit,  if  it  were 
completely  in  fact  what  it  is  in  principle,  a living 
international  spiritual  authority.  Upon  this  natural 
affinity  between  science  and  Catholicism  we  have 
elsewhere  commented.*  It  is  of  high  importance, 
and  it  is  nowhere  of  greater  importance  than  in 
relation  to  the  problem  of  peace  which  we  are  now 
discussing. 

In  exactly  the  same  way,  science,  as  such — always 
understanding  by  this  word  not  merely  the  pro- 
visional sciences  of  external  nature,  but  also  the  final 
sciences  of  human  nature,  dominating  and  co-ordinat- 
ing all  others — delivers  us  from  the  standpoint  of 
party,  sect,  and  class  in  the  national  economy.  It  is 
neither  “ Conservative  ” nor  “ Liberal,”  neither  aris- 
tocratic nor  democratic,  neither  monarchical  nor 
republican.  Its  object  is  to  discover — assuming  it 
to  be  possible  to  discover — some  way  of  ordering  the 
life  of  the  nation  which  may  bring  to  bear  on  it  the 
* “ Catholicism  and  the  Modern  Mind,”  p.  205. 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  73 


whole  high  experience  of  mankind,  with  a view  to  its 
pacific  and  harmonious  advance  in  future.  In  the 
pursuit  of  this  inquiry  it  does  not  assume  that  either 
what  is  called  “ aristocracy  ” or  what  is  called 
“ democracy  ” is,  absolutely  and  exclusively,  a right 
word  of  social  order  and  progress,  or  that  it  represents 
some  final  form  of  national  organization.  One  of  its 
tasks,  indeed,  is  to  clarify  these  terms  themselves — to 
give  to  them  a definite  and  fixed  significance,  so  that 
they  may  become  serviceable  in  scientific  reasoning. 
When  this  has  been  done  it  may  be  possible  to  deter- 
mine how  far,  for  example,  what  we  vaguely  call 
“ democracy  ” is  in  consonance  with  a sound  science 
of  political  organization,  and  how  far  it  may  be  neces- 
sary to  bring  in  some  other  term  and  a different  con- 
ception of  a rightly-directed  State. 

The  second  important  service  which  science  will 
render  in  relation  to  the  question  of  peace  will  be  in 
exhibiting  its  connection  with  other  great  questions 
of  man’s  mind  and  life.  If  we  suppose  it  to  be  suc- 
cessfully carried  into  the  regions  of  man’s  social  and 
moral  nature — if,  in  other  words,  we  place  ourselves 
at  the  point  of  view  of  what  may  be  broadly  called  a 
Science  of  Humanity — then  it  is  clear  that  we  shall 
survey  the  whole  life  of  man  in  the  light  of  a complete 
synthesis.  This  synthesis  will  exhibit  to  us  man,  or 
humanity,  as  a conscious  and  self-conscious  being, 
placed  in  a Universal  Order  of  which  he  is  both  a con- 
stituent and  an  interpreter,  which  is  external  to  him 
and  yet  contained  in  him,  and  which  he  is  able,  with- 
out him  and  within  him,  to  modify  while  yet  he  is 


74  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

dependent  upon  it.  It  is  clear  that  from  the  point 
of  view  of  this  synthesis  such  a question  as  the 
question  of  peace  is  in  inseparable  connection,  imme- 
diate or  remote,  with  a number  of  other  questions 
presenting  themselves  for  solution.  It  is  evidently 
in  such  a connection,  for  example,  with  questions  of 
morals  or  religion,  with  questions  of  education,  with 
questions  of  industry,  with  questions  of  class  con- 
flict, with  questions  of  general  domestic  politics.  No 
fundamental  treatment  of  the  problem  of  peace  is, 
therefore,  possible  which  sets  aside  and  disregards  the 
other  great  problems  of  humanity,  and  treats  it  as 
a sort  of  isolated  political  problem,  to  be  solved  by 
itself. 

We  may  say  generally,  in  short,  that  the  question 
of  peace  is  a part  of  the  supreme,  eternal  question  of 
the  aim  of  man’s  life  upon  earth.  That  question, 
once  more,  is,  intellectually  considered,  a question  of 
science,  but  of  science  in  a complete  sense,  as  repre- 
senting the  ordered,  ordering  reason  of  man,  looking 
out  upon  his  world,  looking  in  upon  himself,  and 
bringing  to  bear  upon  humanity  the  whole  of  human 
experience,  tested  and  interpreted  according  to  those 
methods  which  have  given  to  us  our  inheritance  of 
sure  and  exact  truth.  It  is  for  science,  in  this  sense,  to 
determine  for  man  his  conception  of  himself,  and  of 
the  governing  aim  of  his  life  upon  earth.  Stating  the 
same  truth  in  other  words,  we  may  say  that  it  is  for 
the  Modern  Mind — the  Modern  Mind,  at  any  given 
time,  being  simply  man  in  his  highest  and  fullest 
development — to  determine  what  is  the  nature,  place, 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  75 


and  destiny  of  humanity,  and  to  order  all  human 
activities  with  a view  to  its  fulfilment.  What,  by 
contradistinction,  we  may  call  the  ancient  mind  and 
the  medieval  mind  could  not,  and  cannot,  do  this, 
great  as  have  been  their  contributions  to  the  sum  of 
truth.  Man’s  conception  of  himself  is  necessarily 
determined  by  the  totality  of  his  experiences,  outer 
and  inner.  He  cannot  dispossess  himself  of  his  pos- 
sessions, or  nullify  his  acquisitions,  or  unthink  his 
developed  thoughts,  any  more  than  he  can  abrogate 
the  sun  and  moon.  His  view  of  the  heavens  cannot 
now  be  what  it  was  in  the  pre-Copernican  period  ; his 
view  of  the  earth  cannot  be  what  it  was  before  the 
discovery  of  America  and  Australia ; his  indus- 
trial processes  and  his  modes  of  locomotion  cannot 
be  the  same  as  before  his  mastery  of  steam  and  elec- 
tricity. 

What  is  true  of  the  mind  of  man  in  relation  to  what 
we  may  call  the  Natural  Order  is  necessarily  true 
of  it  also  in  relation  to  the  Human  Order — the 
order  of  man’s  mind  itself  and  of  his  social  and  moral 
life.  Here  also  his  thinking  is  conditioned  by  the 
sum  of  his  experiences.  It  is  conditioned  by  these 
great  commanding  facts,  among  others — first,  that 
there  has  grown  up,  in  the  ages,  a vast  body  of  positive 
science,  inclusive  of  the  whole  history  of  humanity, 
which  helps  to  determine  both  the  actual  contents  of 
the  human  spirit  and  its  modes  of  investigating  and 
ascertaining  truth  ; second,  that  human  industry  has 
developed  on  an  immense  scale,  both  in  its  processes 
and  in  its  results,  and  has  come  to  depend  on  a world- 


76  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


wide  and  complex  co-operation ; third,  that  as  a con- 
sequence of  this  industrial  development  the  mass  of 
the  workers — what  we  now  call  the  proletariat — is 
becoming  the  predominant  class  in  the  social  con- 
sensus, ever  rising  high  and  higher  in  its  consciousness 
and  in  its  aims  ; fourth,  that  all  the  various  nations 
and  races  of  mankind — Western  and  Eastern,  black, 
yellow,  and  white,  Christian,  Mohammedan,  Hindu, 
Buddhist,  Confucian — have  at  last  been  brought  into 
a close  companionship,  so  that  just  as  man  now  looks 
out  and  measures  the  solar  system,  with  its  central, 
unifying  force,  and  looks  out  and  measures  the  whole 
of  his  earth,  so  he  also  looks  out  and  measures  a 
single  undivided  humanity,  the  various  constituents 
of  which,  by  processes  of  mind  and  matter — by  science, 
religion,  industry,  politics — are  ever  being  brought 
into  a more  intimate  and  organic  relationship. 

The  mind  which  enters  completely,  and  with  a right 
power  of  observation  and  inference,  into  all  these 
orders  of  experience,  seeing  them  in  their  distinctness 
and  as  a whole,  and  in  their  organic  dependence  upon 
one  another — such  a mind  is  a Modern  Mind,  developed 
and  mature  ; the  mind  which  is  unable  to  do  this — 
whether  it  is  the  mind  of  an  individual  man  or  of  a 
statesman  shaping  the  policy  of  a nation,  or  of  an 
ecclesiastic,  giving  forth  the  oracles  of  a Church — is  a 
mind  incomplete  and  undeveloped,  which  may  repre- 
sent the  view  of  an  exclusive  individualism  or  of  an 
exclusive  sect,  or  of  an  exclusive  class  or  party,  or  of 
an  exclusive  people,  or  of  an  age  that  is  past,  but  which 
cannot  represent  the  reason  and  the  needs  of  a modern 


SCIENCE  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  77 

humanity,  pressing  forward,  consciously  and  delibe- 
rately, to  the  fulfilment  of  a foreseen  destiny.  To 
such  a mind,  therefore,  we  cannot  go  for  a conception 
of  the  aim  of  man’s  life  on  earth — that  conception 
which  sheds  an  indispensable  light  on  the  problem  of 
Human  Peace.  That  problem  would  have  presented 
itself  in  one  way,  if  present  at  all,  to  the  ancient  mind  ; 
it  would  have  presented  itself  in  another  to  the 
medieval  mind  ; it  necessarily  presents  itself  in  still 
another  to  the  Modern  Mind.  The  Modern  Mind, 
holding  within  itself  all  the  experiences,  all  the 
acquisitions,  all  the  culture  of  mankind,  is  face  to  face 
with  a known  universe,  with  a known  earth,  with  a 
known  humanity.  It  is  in  reference  to  these  that  it 
shapes,  and  must  shape,  its  conception  of  the  end  of 
life.  It  is  in  reference  to  these  that  it  determines  the 
meaning  of  a Human  Peace,  its  desirability,  and  its 
possibility ; and  it  is  in  virtue  of  a synthesis  of 
truths  and  an  assemblage  of  powers  which  never 
before  existed  in  the  world  that  it  looks  to  the  solution 
of  a problem  which  has  never  yet  been  solved.  There 
is  no  sure  ground  of  hope  in  relation  to  this  old 
problem  except  in  the  possession  of  a new  power. 
This  new  power  now  exists,  and  it  is  exactly  the 
power  which  was  needed  for  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem. It  is  the  power  of  completeness — the  power  of 
science  become  synthetic,  the  power  which  man  has 
gained  from  having  measured  the  solar  system  and 
measured  his  earth,  and  measured  humanity,  and 
from  having  brought  these  great  contents  of  his 
experience  into  a unity.  The  peace  of  the  earth 


78  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


must  come,  if  it  is  ever  to  come,  from  the  peace  of 
the  directing  human  soul,  illumined  by  its  conception 
of  the  Perfect  Good  ; and  this  peace  of  the  soul — its 
right  survey  of  its  world  and  of  itself — ^has  been  pre- 
pared by  thirty  centuries  of  moral  expansion,  of 
intellectual  development,  and  of  practical  sacrifice 
and  achievement. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE 

By  a “ Human  Peace,”  as  we  have  seen,  we  here 
understand,  in  general  terms,  a peace  universal  and 
continuous,  conceived  of  as  ultimately  embracing  all 
the  nations  of  mankind.  The  office  of  science  in  rela- 
tion to  such  a peace,  is,  first,  to  determine,  exactly  and 
practically,  what  it  is  that  we  mean  by  it ; secondly,  to 
consider  how  far  it  may  be  held  to  be  desirable  ; 
thirdly,  to  discuss  its  possibility  ; and,  lastly,  having 
assumed  or  shown  that  it  is  both  desirable  and  pos- 
sible, to  examine  our  means  for  bringing  it  about  and 
maintaining  it. 

The  word  “ peace  ” is,  as  we  all  know,  used  in 
different  senses.  To  the  statesman  or  diplomatist 
it  has  one  meaning  and  to  the  moralist  or  religious 
thinker  another ; while  it  is  also  a term  of  industry, 
of  the  relations  of  social  classes  within  the  nation, 
and  of  the  family  life.  What  we  are  immediately, 
and  in  the  first  instance,  concerned  with  is  peace 
according  to  the  conception  of  it  common  among 
statesmen  and  diplomatists,  although  it  will  after- 
wards be  necessary  to  consider  how  far  any  one  of  its 
meanings,  in  a fundamental  discussion  of  the  Human 
Peace,  can  rightly  be  separated  from  others — how  far 
the  peace  of  the  individual  human  soul,  or  of  the 
various  social  classes,  or  of  industrial  life,  inevitably 


8o  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


enters  into  the  question  of  what,  for  the  purposes  of 
distinction,  may  be  called  a diplomatic,  or  inter- 
national peace. 

By  a diplomatic  peace  we  do  not  here  mean,  how- 
ever, as  has  already  been  said,  such  a peace,  good  or 
bad,  shorter  or  longer,  as  necessarily  follows  after 
every  war.  We  mean  a permanent  peace,  in  the 
widest  political  sense  of  the  word,  brought  about  and 
maintained  by  the  deliberate  policy  and  co-operation 
of  the  various  countries  of  the  world.  Such  a peace 
would  be  a Human  Peace.  We  may,  on  a full  con- 
sideration of  it,  decide  that  it  is  undesirable  or 
impossible,  but  before  we  can  accept  it  or  reject  it  we 
must  understand,  exactly  and  practically,  what  it  is. 
A state  of  peace — such  a peace  as  statesmen  and 
diplomatists  have  in  view— may  be  defined,  to  begin 
with,  in  negative  terms.  It  may  be  said  to  be  con- 
stituted simply  by  the  absence  of  war.  A state  of 
peace,  in  this  sense,  existed  in  Europe,  for  example, 
from  1871  to  1914.  With  a peace  of  this  kind,  how- 
ever, whatever  its  character  and  advantages,  we  are 
not  now  concerned,  and  this  for  two  reasons  : First, 
this  was  a peace — like  all  others  which  have  hitherto 
existed — following  upon  a war,  and  due,  not  to  the 
avowed  intention  or  policy  of  a Human  Peace,  but 
to  the  absence  of  some  sufficient  immediate  cause 
of  conflict ; secondly,  it  was  what  is  commonly  called 
an  “ armed  peace  ” — a state  of  things  in  which  almost 
all  the  nations  of  Europe  live  in  the  expectation  and 
apprehension  of  war,  and  are  burdened  with  the 
weight  of  vast  naval  and  military  preparations.  In 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  8i 


such  a situation  there  is,  of  course,  peace  in  the  sense 
of  the  mere  absence  of  war.  It  must  be  allowed,  too, 
that  something  at  least  of  the  good  of  peace  it  secures, 
and  some  of  the  evils  of  war  it  avoids. 

But  by  a Human  Peace  we  do  not,  once  more,  mean 
a peace  following,  as  a sort  of  unavoidable  and  tem- 
porary consequence,  upon  war,  or  a peace  due  merely 
to  the  absence  of  any  immediate  cause  of  conflict,  or 
an  armed  peace,  securing,  perhaps,  something  of  the 
good  of  peace,  but  characterized  also  by  some  of  the 
disadvantages  of  war ; we  mean  a peace  brought 
about  and  upheld  by  the  foresight  and  consent  of  the 
chief  nations  of  mankind — a peace  inspired  by  the 
common  conviction  that  international  concord  is  a 
human  good,  and  a good  so  universal  and  commanding 
that  its  pursuit  and  maintenance  ought  properly  to 
control  all  other  objects  of  policy.  From  the  presence 
of  this  common  conviction,  passing  into  and  directing 
national  action,  certain  great  practical  results  would 
necessarily  follow.  First,  it  would  involve  the  accept- 
ance of  a given  international  status  quo,  such  as  it 
might  be,  as  one  not  to  be  subject  to  possible  dis- 
turbance ; secondly,  it  would  bring  about  a general 
disarmament ; thirdly,  it  would  carry  with  it  the 
determination,  on  the  part  of  the  various  nations 
concerned  in  it,  not  for  themselves,  or  in  their  own 
supposed  interest,  to  prosecute  purposes  contrary,  in 
their  inevitable  consequences,  to  the  international 
good  of  peace. 

Whether  a Human  Peace,  in  this  conception  of  it, 
is  possible  we  cannot  at  present  determine,  but  we  are 


B.F. 


82  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


entitled  to  say,  scientifically  speaking,  that  it  is 
impossible  for  it  ever  to  be  established  unless  these 
specific  conditions  are  realized,  and  realized  in  their 
right  combination.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  such  a 
realization  of  them  presents  difficulties  so  stupendous 
that  they  may  naturally  seem  to  be  insuperable.  Let 
us  take  the  first  of  them  first.  What  we  are  funda- 
mentally concerned  with,  of  course,  is  the  state  of 
the  human  mind  as  it  expresses  itself  in  national 
action.  If  we  are  believers  in  a world-wide  peace,  in 
that  general  conception  of  it  which  we  have  now 
elucidated,  and  are  desirous  of  furthering  it,  we  have, 
to  begin  with,  to  bring  in  such  a state  of  the  human 
mind  that  the  promotion  and  maintenance  of  that 
peace  may  become  the  great  controlling  motive  of 
national  policy — a motive  so  evidently  and  incon- 
testably supreme  that  in  comparison  with  it  all  other 
motives,  valid  and  high  as  they  may  seem  in  them- 
selves, ought  to  be  held  subordinate  to  it.  This 
disposition  of  the  human  mind  must  be  brought  in, 
not  in  one  country  alone,  but  in  all — or  at  any  rate  in 
all  the  great,  predominant  nations.  It  must  be 
brought  in,  too,  not  merely  as  a beautiful  and  attrac- 
tive ideal — a platonic  confession  of  peace  as  an 
ultimate  good  which  somehow  and  at  some  time  is  to 
come  to  mankind.  It  must  be  brought  in  as  a con- 
tinuing, prevailing  condition  of  thought  and  will,  of 
such  inherent  and  persisting  strength  as  to  be  capable 
of  giving  a steady  direction  to  national  policy,  amidst 
all  the  disturbing  and  resisting  forces  to  which  it  may 
be^subject. 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  83 


Such  a state  of  the  human  mind  has,  as  we  say,  to 
be  “ brought  in  ” or  created.  We  cannot  assume  that 
it  already  exists.  We  must,  from  a scientific  point 
of  view,  assume  the  contrary.  We  are,  in  fact,  not  left 
to  any  mere  conjecture  or  hypothesis  in  the  matter. 
What  the  state  of  the  human  mind  is  in  regard  to 
peace  and  war  we  know  from  experience — the  experi- 
ence of  three  thousand  years,  given  in  history.  Those 
three  thousand  years  have  seen  peace  following  upon 
war,  and  war  following  upon  peace,  in  every  age,  in 
every  country,  savage  and  civilized,  under  all  religious 
beliefs — Christian  and  non-Christian,  under  all  con- 
ditions of  culture  and  education,  amongst  all  the 
races  of  mankind,  white,  yellow,  black,  and  red,  in 
every  state  of  industry,  under  every  form  of  military 
organization,  and  under  every  mode  of  government, 
imperial,  monarchical,  republican,  aristocratic,  and 
democratic.  War  has,  in  fact,  been  one  of  the  most 
persistent,  or  persistently  recurrent,  of  all  social 
phenomena.  It  has  changed  in  its  methods  and 
instruments,  but  it  has  remained  essentially  the  same 
in  its  processes  and  results,  from  the  age  of  bows  and 
arrows — to  go  no  further  back — to  the  age  of  the 
machine  gun  and  the  submarine.  Poets,  from  the 
time  of  Homer  to  the  time  of  the  versifiers  of  the 
twentieth  century,  have  sung  its  praises.  The  priests 
of  almost  every  faith  have  given  it  sanction  and 
consecration,  even  when  they  have  not  actually 
caused  it.  Rulers  and  peoples  alike  have  applauded 
it.  It  has  opened  up  to  men  the  shortest  way  to 
honour  and  ascendency ; and  down  to  the  present 


84  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


moment  those  nations  which  are  universally  styled 
the  “ Great  Powers  ” of  the  world  are  great  precisely 
because,  actually  or  potentially,  they  are  held  to  be 
masters  in  war. 

It  is  plain,  then,  that  so  far  as  the  life  of  mankind 
has  proceeded  up  to  the  present,  there  is  nothing  in 
human  experience  to  warrant  the  supposition  that 
the  desire  for  peace,  as  such — considered  simply  as 
the  absence  of  war — is  in  itself  of  such  a nature  and 
inherent  strength  in  the  human  mind  as  to  be  capable 
of  mastering  the  motives  of  war.  On  the  contrary,  all 
history — ancient,  medieval,  and  modern — shows  that 
nothing  has  ever  been  so  easy  as  for  a Government, 
whatever  its  character  or  purposes,  to  carry  a people 
into  war  ; and  while  there  have  often  been  insurrec- 
tions and  revolutions,  from  one  cause  or  another, 
there  is,  perhaps,  not  a single  instance  of  a nation’s 
having  refused  to  participate  in  a war,  or  even  of  its 
having  successfully  opposed  a policy  on  the  part  of  its 
rulers  which  was  visibly  carrying  it  towards  war.  If, 
therefore,  the  coming  of  a Human  Peace  is  dependent, 
as  it  is,  upon  the  existence  of  a deliberate  and  con- 
tinuing choice  of  it,  as  a supreme,  indisputable  good, 
in  the  mind  of  man,  it  is  clear  that  this  choice,  this 
controlling  disposition  and  policy  of  peace,  has  yet  to 
be  created  and  maintained.  Upon  this  point  it  is — 
if  we  are  believers  in  a Human  Peace — of  the  first 
importance  that  we  should  not  deceive  ourselves.  Our 
study  of  the  problem  to  be  solved  must  be,  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  word,  scientific.  We  must  see 
things  as  they  have  been,  and  as  they  are,  if  we  wish 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  85 


to  see  them  as  they  are  to  be,  or  may  be.  If  we  are 
ever  to  bring  in — supposing  it  to  be  desirable  and 
possible  to  bring  in — a state  of  enduring  international 
concord,  we  must  dismiss,  as  an  illusion  of  meta 
physical  sentiment,  the  assumption  that  there  is  i 
the  human  mind  some  instinctive  horror  of  war,  some 
inherent  love  of  peace,  as  peace,  which  in  itself  is 
sufficiently  strong  and  constant  to  preserve  us  from 
bloodshed. 

What,  in  relation  to  peace  and  war,  history  shows 
us — as  it  shows  us  in  relation  to  all  the  other  high 
interests  of  man — is  that  in  the  human  mind  there  is 
a constant  conflict  of  motives.  Just  as,  in  the  moral 
and  social  spheres,  men  alternate  between  selfishness 
and  unselfishness,  between  love  and  hatred,  between 
passion  and  purity,  between  temperance  and  excess, 
between  energy  and  indolence,  between  the  desire  for 
knowledge  and  the  disinclination  to  sustained  mental 
effort,  so  in  the  sphere  of  international  policy — ^in  so 
far  as  this  can  be  separated  from  the  other  spheres 
of  man’s  reason  and  will — they  alternate  between  the 
motives  which  carry  them  into  war  and  the  motives 
which  would  maintain  them  in  peace.  If  history 
shows  us  war  as  a persistent  or  persistently  recurrent 
phenomenon,  it  shows  us  also  that — from  the  ages  ' 
of  the  Old  Testament,  Homer,  and  Virgil,  down  to  the 
present  time — peace,  considered  simply  as  external 
concord,  as  the  absence  of  strife  and  bloodshed,  has 
always  been  a human  ideal.  The  spiritual  problem 
of  man — as  a conscious  and  self-conscious  being, 
exercising  his  mind  and  will  upon  himself,  and 


86  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


deliberately  shaping  his  action,  amidst  the  play  of 
external  and  internal  forces,  for  the  attainment  of 
certain  foreseen  ends — consists  precisely  in  this  con- 
flict of  motives.  In  its  absence  there  would  be  no 
such  problem.  It  is  for  this  reason  that,  as  we  have 
seen,  there  can  be  no  fundamental  discussion  of  a 
Human  Peace — as  distinguished  from  the  merely 
diplomatic  peace  that  inevitably  follows  after  every 
war — which  does  not  connect  it  with  the  problem  of 
the  commanding,  co-ordinating  aims  of  man’s  life 
upon  earth.  What  we  have  to  determine  is  whether 
it  is  possible  to  so  change  the  human  mind  as  it 
enters  into  national  policy — or  to  so  alter  the  balance 
of  its  characteristic  forces — that  peace,  which  has 
always  been  one  of  its  ideals,  may  become  a command- 
ing, practical  purpose,  strong  and  constant  enough  to 
impose  a uniform  direction  upon  international  action. 

This  problem,  once  more,  is  a scientific  problem. 
It  is  for  science,  in  the  high  and  complete  sense — the 
right  reason  of  developed  man,  resting  upon  the  sum 
of  his  experiences  and  exactly  representing  to  himself 
the  forces  of  Nature  and  human  nature — to  unfold 
to  us  its  true  character,  and  to  point  us  to  such  a 
solution  of  it  as  is  possible.  Now,  the  disposition  of 
human  nature,  in  relation  to  peace  and  war,  being 
given  in  history,  it  is,  as  we  have  seen,  scientifically 
certain  that  a universal  peace  will  never  be  estab- 
lished unless  we  can  secure  either  a new  and  more 
efficacious  action  of  the  forces  which  have  hitherto 
made  for  peace,  or  bring  in  the  operation  of  some  new 
force,  surer  and  more  potent  than  any  which  has 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  87 


worked  in  the  past.  If  we  are  to  have  a new  hope, 
grounded  on  reason,  it  must  be  based  on  our  posses- 
sion of  a new  power — either  the  surer  exercise  of  one 
which  has  always  existed  or  the  fresh  controlling 
energy  of  a new  one.  On  the  more  effective  action 
of  an  old  force,  just  as  it  was  or  is,  we  cannot,  scien- 
tifically speaking,  count.  What  has  constantly  failed 
before  we  may  reasonably  expect  to  fail  again.  On 
the  other  hand,  what  has  succeeded  before  we  may 
expect  to  succeed  again.  The  thing  which  has,  in 
human  experience,  succeeded  is  science,  in  its  various 
degrees.  It  hits  the  mark.  It  accomplishes  its  aims, 
whether  they  are,  morally  considered,  good  or  bad. 
It  is,  therefore,  science  that  must  open  up  to  us  the 
way  of  peace,  if  such  a way  there  is.  Science,  of 
course,  is  not  a wholly  new  thing.  It  is  a thing  of 
slow  growth  and  development.  It  is,  however,  in 
this  sense  new,  that,  in  its  full  synthetic,  modern 
form,  it  gives  to  us  a measure  of  man,  and  of  the 
universe  in  relation  to  man,  such  as  belongs  properly 
to  our  own  age  and  has  belonged  to  no  other.  It  is 
from  science,  in  this  complete  conception  of  it,  that 
we  may  gain  the  power  of  a Human  Peace. 

Now  the  question  of  peace  is,  once  more,  a question 
of  the  mind  of  man  as  it  passes  into  national  and 
international  action.  A nation  is  made  up  of  cities 
and  families,  and,  from  another  point  of  view,  it  is 
composed  of  different  social  classes,  and  sometimes 
of  different  races.  When,  for  our  present  purposes, 
we  use  the  word  “ nation  ” we  must  be  understood  as 
employing  it  to  denote  a distinct  political  aggregate. 


88  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


a sovereign  State,  occupying  its  own  territory,  and 
possessing  an  independent  co-ordinating  Government. 
We  do  not  use  it,  as  it  is  often  sentimentally  and 
inaccurately  used,  to  describe,  for  example,  such 
lapsed  or  subordinate  nationalities  as  Scotland, 
Ireland,  and  Wales,  which,  for  political  purposes, 
and  especially  for  international  purposes,  have  long 
been  absorbed  into  the  dominant  nationality,  “ Eng- 
land,” or  into  the  composite  nationality,  “ United 
Kingdom.” 

The  question  with  which  we  are  occupied  is  the 
question  of  bringing  in  such  a state  of  the  human 
mind,  as  it  passes  into  national  action,  that  the 
predominant  countries  of  the  world  may  concur  in 
promoting  and  maintaining  a Human  Peace  as  a 
supreme  good  for  mankind,  and  concur  in  it,  first,  by 
accepting  a definite  international  status  quo  as  one 
not  to  be  subject  to  forcible  disturbance ; secondly, 
by  a common  disarmament ; thirdly,  by  refraining 
from  the  adoption  of  such  national  action,  whatever 
its  apparent  justification,  as  would  tend  to  bring 
about  war,  and  by  the  consistent  adoption  of  a policy 
of  peace.  It  is,  however,  not  by  the  fulfilment  of 
any  one  of  these  conditions  alone,  but  by  the  fulfil- 
ment of  them  all,  in  a right  combination,  that  the 
Human  Peace  can  be  constituted.  Even  if  we 
suppose  such  a change  in  the  mind  of  man  to  have 
been  wrought  that  the  desire  for  peace — the  dis- 
inclination to  conflict  and  bloodshed — has  become 
stronger  than  the  desire  for  war,  still  it  will  be  neces- 
sary for  such  a change  to  take  practical  effect  at  some 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  89 


given  moment,  and  in  some  given  international 
situation.  By  a Human  Peace  we  do  not  mean  an 
ideal  peace,  in  the  sense  of  such  territorial  and  political 
arrangements  among  the  various  nations  of  the 
world  as  would  be  absolutely  and  finally  satisfactory 
to  them  aU.  For  the  purposes  of  a Human  Peace 
we  must,  to  begin  with,  if  the  paradox  is  permissible, 
be  satisfied  with  something  unsatisfactory.  We  must 
move  towards  a higher  state  by  way  of  a lower.  The 
Human  Peace,  in  other  words,  must  be  based  on  the 
common  acceptance  of  the  principle  that  the  main- 
tenance of  a given  status  quo,  evil  as  in  certain 
respects  it  may  be,  is  not  so  great  an  evil  as  would 
be  its  disturbance  by  war — or,  stating  the  same 
principle  differently,  that  the  general  good  to  be 
derived  from  the  preservation  of  international  peace 
is  greater  than  any  particular  good  to  be  gained  by 
war.  It  may  conceivably  be  impossible  to  bring 
about  an  international  acceptance  of  this  principle, 
and  the  adoption  of  the  practical  measures  and 
policy  involved  in  it.  What  is  certain,  however,  is 
that  so  long  as  this  is  impossible  a Human  Peace  is 
impossible,  and  that  we  can  have  at  best  such  a 
peace,  longer  or  shorter,  as  inevitably  follows  upon 
a war,  and  is  due,  not  to  the  rise  of  a new  foresight 
and  will  in  the  human  mind,  but  to  the  old,  recurrent 
processes  of  victory  and  defeat. 

The  acceptance  of  this  principle — the  decision  to 
base  the  Human  Peace  on  some  specific  status  quo — 
would  be,  in  certain  respects,  as  is  obvious,  only  an 
application  to  the  international  order  of  mankind  of 


90  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

opinions  which  have  long  been  acknowledged  and 
operative  within  the  limits  of  the  national  order. 
There  is,  throughout  the  civilized  world,  a general 
agreement  that  the  continuous  preservation  of  domes- 
tic peace — in  the  limited  sense  of  the  mere  avoidance 
of  physical  strife  and  bloodshed — is  a great  good. 
We  all  hold  it  to  be  for  the  common  advantage  that 
causes  of  personal  dispute  should  be  decided  by  courts 
of  justice  rather  than  by  private  encounters,  and  that 
our  political  and  industrial  conflicts  should  take  the 
form  of  continual  controversy  and  of  appeals  to  the 
electors  rather  than  of  civil  war.  This  does  not  mean 
that  we  necessarily  consider  that  the  national  order, 
as  it  exists  at  any  given  moment,  is  a perfect  order. 
It  does  not  mean,  even,  that  we  believe  that  absolute 
justice  is  always  represented  by  the  decisions  of  a 
judge,  or  that  the  struggle  of  classes,  sects,  and 
parties  in  the  national  economy  is  the  wisest  con- 
ceivable way  of  bringing  about  political  changes.  As 
a matter  of  fact,  we  know  that,  within  what  may  be 
called  the  national  peace,  there  exists  every  evil  which 
afflicts  mankind,  except  the  one  evil  of  war  itself, 
considered  simply  as  a process  of  physical  conflict  and 
bloodshed.  Peace,  as  it  prevails  within  the  nation, 
does  not  represent  a high  ideal.  It  stands  merely  for 
a certain  ordered  outward  calm — for  the  absence  of 
such  a chronic  unsettlement  and  violent  disturbance 
as  would  make  the  conduct  of  life  impossible.  Duelling 
in  England  and  some  other  countries  has  now  fallen 
into  desuetude,  and  its  discontinuance  has  always 
been  considered  to  be  a social  good.  No  one  would 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  91 


say,  however,  that  the  causes  which  once  provoked 
duelling — ill-temper,  quarrels,  slanders,  jealousy,  per- 
sonal affront,  and  the  like — are  no  longer  operative, 
or  even  that  they  are  necessarily  less  operative  than 
before.  All  that  has  happened,  in  this  particular 
connection,  is  that  men  have  ceased  to  seek  satis- 
faction for  wounded  honour  or  reputation  in  a 
physical  encounter,  and  that  in  the  case  of  serious 
injuries  they  now  look  for  redress  to  the  law  courts. 

When,  however,  we  say  that  the  establishment  of  a 
Human  Peace  would  involve  the  application  to  the 
international  order  of  principles  which  are  already 
operative  within  the  national  order,  it  is  necessary  to 
bear  in  mind  two  important  considerations.  In  the 
first  place,  we  must  recognize  that  the  preservation 
of  domestic  peace  itself — in  so  far  as  it  is  maintained 
by  the  temporal  power  of  government,  as  distinguished 
from  the  spiritual  power  of  feeling  and  opinion — is 
dependent,  in  the  last  resort,  upon  the  use  of  exactly 
the  same  means  as  are  employed  in  a war  of  nations. 
It  is  dependent  upon  the  use  of  the  police  and,  in 
certain  cases,  of  the  military.  Behind  the  statutes  of 
a Parliament,  or  the  decisions  of  a judge,  there  is 
always  the  armed  force  of  the  State,  and  to  this 
force,  as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  an  appeal  has 
often  to  be  made — as,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of 
criminals  resisting  capture.  Again,  it  sometimes 
happens  that  the  conflict  of  classes  and  parties  within 
the  nation  becomes  so  intense  as  to  break  down  the 
whole  system  of  domestic  order  and  to  take  the  form 
of  civil  war.  Even  in  a country  like  England,  which 


92  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


has  a longer  experience  of  “ constitutional  ” and 
“ democratic  ” methods  than  any  other,  there  has 
recently,  as  we  all  know,  on  more  than  one  occasion 
been  a near  approach  to  this  state  of  things.  Under 
such  circumstances  a Government — ^which  is  not  only, 
within  the  political  sphere,  a co-ordinating  authority, 
organizing  the  national  consensus,  but  also  an  enforc- 
ing authority,  concerned  to  make  the  will  of  the 
social  whole  prevail  against  the  will  of  its  resistant 
parts — is  bound  to  act,  within  the  national  sphere,  in 
proportion  as  the  need  arises,  precisely  as  it  would 
have  to  act  in  a war  against  a hostile  nation.  In 
other  words,  the  internal  peace  of  the  nation — in  so 
far  as  it  rests  on  a purely  governmental  or  temporal 
foundation — depends  ultimately  upon  processes  of 
war,  potential  or  actual,  ranging  from  those  by  which 
an  ordinary  criminal  is  arrested  and  made  amenable 
to  the  law  to  those  needed  for  the  suppression  of  some 
dangerous  industrial  disorder,  or  for  victory  in  some 
actual  civil  strife.  When  a given  Government  ceases 
to  be  capable  of  discharging  these  functions — ^when  it 
no  longer  represents  the  national  consensus  and  wields 
the  predominant  national  force — it  has  to  give  way 
to  a new  Government,  and  there  is,  in  one  form  or 
another,  a revolution. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind, 
what  by  advocates  of  peace  is  often  forgotten,  that 
the  international  order — the  permanent  pacific  rela- 
tions of  the  various  countries  of  the  world — is,  by  its 
inherent  character,  different  from  the  national  order, 
and  that  this  difference  between  them  cannot,  by  the 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  93 

nature  of  things,  be  abrogated.  A nation,  as  we  have 
here  defined  it,  is  an  independent  social  unity,  with 
its  own  territorial  situation,  and  its  own  Government, 
acting,  within  the  sphere  of  practical  politics,  as  the 
organ  of  a consensus  and  as  a co-ordinating  and 
enforcing  authority.  It  is  free  and  sovereign.  To 
use  a single,  simple  word,  the  nation  is  an  order 
dependent  internally  upon  law — upon  a body  of  per- 
manent social  agreements,  implicit  and  explicit,  with 
recognized  instruments  of  interpretation  and  applica- 
tion. The  international  order,  in  so  far  as  it  exists, 
rests  on  a different  foundation.  It  is  true  that  we 
are  accustomed  to  use  the  expression  “ international 
law,”  and  that  many  elaborate  treatises  have  been 
written  upon  the  subject.  There  is,  however,  in 
reality,  no  such  thing.  It  is  a metaphysical  figment. 
Where  there  is  no  Government,  no  recognized  co- 
ordinating and  enforcing  authority,  there  is,  for 
practical  purposes,  no  law.  We  could  only  have  inter- 
national law  if  we  had  an  international  Government ; 
and  international  government— to  say  nothing  of 
its  practical  impossibility — is  incompatible  with  the 
principle  of  nationality  itself.  It  is  a contradiction 
in  terms. 

In  the  absence  of  law,  in  the  strict  sense,  inter- 
national relations  rest  on  custom,  usage,  human  good- 
will, intellectual  community,  reciprocal  convenience, 
industrial  advantage,  and  a number  of  specific  con- 
ventions and  treaties,  more  or  less  permanent.  These 
conventions  and  treaties,  however,  have,  for  practical 
purposes,  exactly  the  validity  and  duration  which 


94  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

are  voluntarily  given  to  them  by  the  various  countries 
entering  into  them.  A nation  is,  within  the  limits  of 
its  actual  force,  a law  unto  itself.  It  may  refuse  to 
have  any  relations  whatever  with  other  countries.  It 
may  decline  to  admit  within  its  own  borders  either 
their  inhabitants  or  their  commodities,  or  to  admit 
them  except  under  certain  specific  conditions  and 
restrictions.  This,  as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  is 
a right  which  is  actually  at  the  present  time  main- 
tained and  exercised,  in  varying  degree,  by  every 
civilized  nation  in  the  world.  In  many  of  them  it 
has,  of  late  years,  been  exercised  in  an  increasing 
degree.  A nation,  so  long  as  it  preserves  a real 
independence  and  is  free  and  sovereign,  may  have  its 
own  language,  its  own  religion,  its  own  moral  code, 
its  own  political  institutions,  its  own  social  customs, 
just  as  it  has  its  own  territory  and  its  own  physical 
characteristics.  If  it  ceases,  in  whatever  degree,  to 
maintain  its  freedom,  it  may,  of  course,  have  the 
ideas  and  customs  of  some  other  country — within 
certain  limits  at  least— imposed  upon  it ; but  this 
simply  means  that  it  has  then  lost,  to  that  extent,  its 
independence,  and  become  subject  to  an  enforcing 
authority  other  than  its  own.  In  other  words,  it  is 
no  longer  a nation. 

These,  undoubtedly,  are  elementary  considerations, 
but  it  is  none  the  less  indispensable  to  recall  them  for 
the  purposes  of  anything  that  may  deserve  to  be 
called  a scientific  study  of  the  Human  Peace.  It  is 
the  more  necessary  to  do  this  because  some  advocates 
of  peace  at  the  present  time  overlook  this  funda- 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  95 


mental  distinction  between  the  national  order  and  the 
international  order,  and  speak  as  if  peace  could 
somehow  be  brought  about  by  an  indefinite  exten- 
sion of  law  and  government,  in  the  true  senses  of 
these  words,  throughout  the  world,  or  as  if  the 
expression  “ international  law  ” represented  a prac- 
tical, administrative  reality,  instead  of  being,  what  it 
is,  an  illusory  phrase  of  metaphysic.  Even  within 
the  national  order — the  sphere  of  law,  in  the  strict 
sense — the  power  of  government,  its  capacity  to  act 
as  an  enforcing  authority,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  depen- 
dent upon  its  continuing  to  represent  an  active  and 
predominant  consensus  ; and  at  a given  moment,  in 
given  states  of  the  public  mind,  it  may  lose  that 
power.  In  such  circumstances  law,  which  is  a sort 
of  indirect,  pacific,  and  symbolic  expression  of  force, 
ceases  to  be  operative,  and  there  is  a direct  appeal  to 
the  arbitrament  of  war.  In  the  international  order, 
where  the  range  and  variety  of  conditions  and  in- 
terests is  vastly  greater  than  in  any  single  country — 
where  numberless  differences  of  climate,  situation, 
proximity,  race,  language,  religion,  morals,  political 
traditions  and  institutions,  social  customs,  and  indus- 
trial development  have  all  to  be  taken  into  account — - 
it  is  clear  that  the  difficulty  of  securing  anything  like 
a permanent,  active  consensus,  with  a common  co- 
ordinating and  enforcing  authority,  is  so  great  as  to 
be  insuperable. 

The  problem  of  the  Human  Peace,  then,  is,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  an  international  problem. 
It  is  the  problem  of  securing  continuous  agreement 


96  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


and  co-operation  in  the  absence  of  an  enforcing 
authority,  among  a number  of  independent  nation- 
alities, each  remaining  free  and  sovereign,  this  agree- 
ment and  co-operation  being  directed  to  specific  and 
limited  practical  ends.  It  is,  in  other  terms,  the 
problem  of  maintaining  a certain  state  of  the  human 
mind,  in  feeling,  opinion,  intention,  and  will,  as  that 
mind  enters  into  national  action  and  governs  inter- 
national relations.  Further,  the  purpose  of  peace, 
taking  shape  as  an  ordering  policy,  must,  as  we  have 
seen,  proceed  by  the  acceptance  of  a given  status  quo, 
good  or  bad,  just  as  the  maintenance  of  domestic 
peace  rests  on  the  acceptance  of  an  internal  status  quo, 
not  because  it  is  in  itself  considered  to  be  ideally 
good,  but  because  its  evils  are  less  than  would  be  the 
evil  of  its  forcible  disruption,  or  are  evils  which 
would  not  be  remedied  by  such  a disruption.  But, 
for  the  installation  of  the  Human  Peace,  this  accept- 
ance must  carry  with  it  a consequence  of  common  and 
voluntary  disarmament,  by  land  and  sea.  In  the 
absence  of  such  an  agreement  this  disarmament 
would,  of  course,  be  inconceivable,  but,  conversely, 
in  the  absence  of  the  disarmament  the  agreement 
would  be  unreal  and  have  no  effect.  The  disarmament 
must,  in  fact,  be  regarded  both  as  an  indispensable 
sign  and  proof  of  the  agreement,  and  as  a consequence 
following  from  it  of  almost  infinite  practical  import- 
ance. This  is  self-evident,  but  it  becomes  increas- 
ingly clear  in  proportion  as  we  consider  the  question 
of  the  good  of  peace — the  motives  and  aims  which 
may  conceivably,  in  the  present  stage  of  human 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  97 

development,  lead  to  its  international  establishment 
and  maintenance. 

But  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  a 
Human  Peace  demands  something  more  even  than 
the  conditions  which  we  have  already  specified — 
first,  a change  in  the  human  mind  by  which  the 
motives  of  peace  dispossess  the  motives  of  war  ; and, 
secondly,  such  a consequent  acceptance  of  a given 
status  quo  that  disarmament  may  follow  from  it : 
it  demands  also  that  national  policy  be  brought  per- 
manently under  the  control  of  these  conceptions — 
that  the  predominant  nations  of  mankind,  especially, 
concur  in  so  ordering  their  action  as  to  make  it  sub- 
servient to  the  common  concord.  It  is  not,  perhaps, 
impossible  to  conceive  of  the  chief  European  and  non- 
European  States  as  coming,  at  a given  moment,  under 
the  impulse  of  a high  and  disinterested  choice  of 
peace,  to  some  understanding  favourable  to  its  pro- 
motion, and  as  adopting  certain  consequent  measures 
of  disarmament.  Even,  however,  so  great  a change 
as  this  in  disposition  and  policy  would  not  by  itself 
suffice  to  maintain  peace,  although  it  might  be  sup- 
posed sufficient  to  institute  it.  So  long  as  what  we 
now  call  nationality  exists  in  the  world — a number 
of  independent  sovereign  States,  living  and  expanding 
— it  will  be  necessary  for  those  States,  if  peace  is  to 
be  preserved,  to  make  its  preservation  a deter- 
mining purpose  of  policy,  rather  than  the  satisfaction 
of  their  own  exclusive  aims.  It  is  obvious  that 
relations  between  human  beings,  few  or  many,  which 
proceed  from  the  growth  of  a certain  reciprocal  state  of 


98  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


mind,  are  dependent  for  their  continuance  on  the  con- 
tinuance of  that  state  of  mind.  A man  and  woman 
entering  into  marriage  commonly  carry  into  it  a dis- 
position of  community  and  co-operation,  but  it  is  a 
matter  of  ordinary  experience  that  this  disposition 
sometimes  breaks  down,  and  gives  place  to  fatal 
estrangement  and  antagonism.  In  the  same  way,  the 
various  races,  classes,  parties,  and  sects  composing 
the  peace  of  a nation  may  for  hundreds  of  years  live 
and  work  together  in  an  orderly  citizenship,  and  yet 
at  the  end  of  that  time  they  may  be  involved  in  civil 
war. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  even  international  dis- 
armament, brought  about  by  the  common  adoption 
of  a policy  of  peace,  and  following  upon  the  acceptance 
of  a given  status  quo,  would  not,  by  itself,  be  a 
guarantee  of  a Human  Peace,  a peace  universal  and 
continuous.  War,  as  we  all  know,  existed  before  the 
rise  of  standing  armies  and  conscription,  and  might 
conceivably  break  out  again  even  if  all  the  military 
and  naval  establishments  of  the  world  were  abolished 
to-morrow.  A nation  does  not  cease  to  be,  in  a 
military  sense,  “ great  ” simply  because  it  is  unarmed. 
It  is  great,  in  this  sense,  by  its  numbers,  its  territory, 
its  natural  resources,  its  physical  situation  and  inde- 
pendence, its  industry,  its  temper  and  intelligence, 
its  place  in  the  scale  of  civilization.  If  all  the  coun- 
tries of  the  world  were  suddenly  placed,  in  regard  to 
arms,  on  a footing  of  equality,  this  would  neither 
make  them  equal  in  power,  nor  would  it  necessarily 
prevent  a powerful  country  from  entertaining  and 


THE  MEANING  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  99 

prosecuting  hostile  designs  against  its  neighbours. 
Nothing  is  so  easy  as  for  a strong  man  or  a strong 
people  to  procure  weapons,  of  whatever  kind,  with 
which  to  prosecute  a quarrel.  We  cannot  have  a 
greater  security  for  international  peace  than  we 
already  have  for  peace  within  the  internal  economy 
of  a nation  ; and,  as  we  have  already  said,  and  as  a 
quite  recent  experience  in  England  has  shown,  such 
a peace  itself  may,  in  the  clash  of  social  classes  or 
political  interests,  be  in  danger  of  giving  way  to 
civil  war. 

We  come,  then,  to  this  conclusion,  that  a Human 
Peace,  such  as  we  are  here  considering,  can,  if  it  is 
ever  to  be  possible,  only  become  possible  under 
certain  conditions.  It  demands,  first,  that  at  a 
given  moment  the  purposes  of  such  a peace  should, 
in  the  predominant  nations  of  mankind,  displace  and 
supersede  the  motives  of  war  ; secondly,  that  their 
common  adoption  of  a policy  of  peace  should  take 
effect  by  the  acceptance  of  a given  international 
status  quo,  whatever  its  character,  as  one  not  to  be 
subject  to  a forcible  disturbance  ; thirdly,  that  this 
acceptance  should,  as  a necessary  practical  conse- 
quence, carry  with  it  a general  disarmament ; lastly, 
that  the  state  of  the  human  mind,  relatively  to 
national  action,  which  has  led  to  the  establishment 
of  the  Human  Peace  should  be  afterwards  main- 
tained, so  that  every  nation  may  continue  to  order  its 
own  life,  external  and  internal,  with  a view  to  securing 
the  persistence  of  international  concord.  A Human 
Peace,  so  conceived,  may  seem  to  us  a thing  impos- 


100  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


sible,  or  a thing  so  remote  and  contingent,  that  we 
ought,  for  the  present  at  least,  to  dismiss  it  from  our 
minds  as  a dream  or  Utopian  ideal.  In  that  case  we 
must  content  ourselves  for  an  indefinite  future  with 
what  we  have  had  throughout  the  past — a given 
peace,  shorter  or  longer,  following  after  a given  war, 
and  due,  not  to  any  high  intention  and  prescience  of 
international  concord,  but  to  processes  of  victory  and 
defeat  in  the  conflict  of  arms.  We  are  here,  however, 
proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  a Human  Peace, 
difficult  as  it  may  be  of  attainment,  is  yet  not  impos- 
sible ; and  we  are  proceeding  upon  this  assumption 
because,  in  our  modern  world,  man  has  at  last  gained  a 
new  power  and  a new  hope — the  power  and  the  hope 
of  science  become  developed  and  complete,  showing 
him  himself,  his  situation,  his  strength,  his  limitations, 
the  nature  and  greatness  of  his  aims  upon  earth,  and 
the  capacity  which  he  naturally  possesses  to  so  con- 
sciously order  and  direct  himself  as  to  give  to  these 
aims  unity  and  persistence.  Whether  this  assumption 
will  prove  to  be  justifiable,  not  prophecy,  but  experi- 
ence alone,  can  determine. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE 

The  problem  of  bringing  about  and  maintaining  a 
Human  Peace  turns,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  first 
instance,  on  the  fundamental  question  of  whether  it  is 
possible  to  so  change  the  mind  of  man,  as  it  enters  into 
national  action,  that  such  a peace  may  seem  to  it,  and 
continue  to  seem,  a supreme  good  which  ought,  by  its 
own  nature,  to  control  and  direct  that  action.  Now, 
this  question  is  one  which  is  evidently  in  a high  degree 
intricate  and  far-reaching.  Whether  a Human  Peace 
would  be  a human  good — so  great  a good  as  to  be 
entitled  to  give  order  and  purpose  to  the  life  of  man- 
kind— this,  of  course,  cannot  be  determined  by  any 
individual  mind,  occupied  with  a vision,  or  ideal,  of 
social  perfection  ; it  must  be  determined  by  the  mind 
of  humanity,  in  its  fullest  extent.  An  individual 
mind  may  be,  or  may  suppose  itself  to  be,  prophetic. 
It  may  be  the  mind  of  a dreamer  of  dreams.  What 
we  are  now  concerned  with,  however,  is  the  science 
of  things  ; and  although  the  science  of  things — the 
science  especially  of  the  mind  and  life  of  humanity — 
must  certainly  take  account  of  dreams  and  prophecies, 
it  recognizes  that  they  only  acquire  a practical 
importance  in  proportion  as  they  pass  into  the  life 
of  man  and  keep  their  place  there. 

Consequently,  the  problem  to  be  solved  is  not 


102  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


whether  the  conception  of  peace  as  a supreme  good  can 
be  made  the  conception  of  a particular  religious  sect  or 
a school  of  thought,  but  whether  it  can  be  so  fixed  in 
the  mind  of  man  as  to  become  an  overmastering 
motive  of  national  policy.  This  question,  we  say, 
calls  for  a certain  limitation.  It  is,  in  its  full  extent, 
too  complex,  too  vast,  for  treatment  here.  By  the 
mind  of  man,”  in  this  connection,  we  mean  the 
mind  of  humanity,  since  it  is  all  the  nations  of  the 
world — Western  and  Eastern,  Christian  and  non- 
Christian,  civilized  and  uncivilized — that  are  ulti- 
mately concerned  in  a Human  Peace,  and  since, 
indeed,  unless  they  are  all  in  some  way  brought  into 
it,  it  cannot  exist  at  all.  We  may,  however,  for 
both  scientific  and  practical  purposes,  simplify  the 
problem,  to  begin  with,  by  drawing  the  obvious  dis- 
tinction between  those  nations  which  constitute  what 
we  call  “ The  West  ” and  those  which  lie  outside  it. 
This  distinction,  broadly  speaking,  is  equivalent  to 
the  distinction  between  Christendom  and  non-Christen- 
dom. It  is  true  that  Russia  and  some  other  Christian 
countries  are  not,  properly  considered.  Western,  and 
this  is  a fact  of  great  social  and  political  importance, 
since  into  many  of  the  dominant  interests  and  tra- 
ditions of  Western  Europe  Russia,  for  example,  has 
scarcely  entered.  Allowing,  however,  as  it  is  essen- 
tial to  allow,  for  this  fact,  we  may,  for  the  sake  of 
scientific  precision  and  convenience,  use  the  term 
“ The  West  ” as  if  it  were  equivalent  to  Christendom. 
The  amount  of  correction  which  such  an  assumption 
needs  it  will  not  be  difficult  afterwards  to  supply.  It 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  103 


might  conceivably  be  such  an  amount  as  would  make 
it  necessary,  for  certain  specific  practical  purposes, 
to  consider  Russia  as  lying  wholly  outside  the 
Western  order. 

Our  problem,  then,  is,  in  the  first  place,  to  bring 
into  the  “ mind  of  man  ” — that  is,  into  the  mind  of  the 
West,  or  Christendom,  including  Russia — a concep- 
tion of  peace,  as  a supreme  international  good,  such 
that  all  external  national  action  must  be  considered 
subservient  to  its  promotion  and  maintenance.  If 
this  is  possible,  a Human  Peace  is  possible  ; if  it  is 
not,  then  the  attainment  of  such  a peace,  if  it  is  ever 
to  be  attained,  must  be  held  to  belong  to  some  remote, 
indefinite  future,  for  which,  in  the  present,  we  can 
only  prepare.  Our  reason  for  saying  this  is  a reason 
of  science — a plain  reason  of  history  and  experience. 
If  we  place  ourselves  at  the  point  of  view  of  military 
force  and  ascendency — and  where  questions  of  peace 
and  war  are  concerned  such  a standpoint  is  naturally 
predominant — it  is  clear  that,  in  the  relations  of 
West  and  East,  the  West,  or  Christendom,  has  pre- 
vailed, and  the  East,  or  non-Christendom,  has  suc- 
cumbed. In  Asia,  in  Africa,  in  America,  in  Aus- 
tralasia, Christendom — using  this  expression  for  the 
moment  rather  as  an  expression  of  political  or  social 
than  of  religious  distinction — has,  in  its  encounter 
with  non-Christendom,  conquered.  In  other  terms, 
the  higher  civilization  has  prevailed  against  the 
lower,  or  against  barbarism.  We  are  not  now,  of, 
course,  discussing  the  ethics,  or  wisdom,  which  has 
entered  into  the  action  of  the  developed  nations  of 


104  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


the  world— of  the  West,  or  Christendom — upon  the 
undeveloped.  That  is  an  independent  question.  We 
are  simply  ascertaining  the  facts  of  history ; and 
history  shows  us  that  the  fuller  and  higher  develop- 
ment has,  in  the  field  of  force,  mastered  the  lower. 
The  most  conspicuous  example  of  this,  as  is  obvious, 
■is  the  rule  of  the  English  in  India,  where  three  hundred 
millions  of  persons,  in  a vast  continent,  are  held 
subject  by  a small  number  of  aliens,  coming  from 
an  island  in  the  West.  The  result  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  may  be  said  to  be  an  example  to  the 
contrary.  First,  however,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
it  is  too  soon  to  base  any  permanent  conclusions  on 
what  may  have  been  an  exceptional  event ; secondly, 
Russia,  although,  from  a certain  point  of  view,  we 
have  to  include  her  in  the  West,  is  yet  not,  in  any 
high  sense.  Western.  The  final  issue  of  the  Crusades, 
again,  may  be  said  to  represent  a failure  of  the  West 
as  against  the  East,  but  the  Crusades  were  the  action 
of  a Europe  still  only  incompletely  developed,  and 
certainly  not  completely  united. 

If,  further,  we  place  ourselves  at  the  point  of  view 
of  culture  and  progress — a point  of  view  which  is 
also  essential  in  our  argument—it  is  not  less  clear 
that  the  West,  in  the  broad  sense,  as  compared  with 
the  East,  is  the  power  predominant  and  victorious  in 
the  sphere  of  mind,  as  in  the  sphere  of  arms.  In 
religion,  in  art,  in  literature,  in  science,  in  industry, 
in  social  and  civic  organization,  the  West,  Christen- 
dom— allowing  for  unimportant  exceptions — teaches 
and  leads ; the  East  follows  and  learns.  The  West 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  105 


is  in  fact,  developed  humanity,  carrying  the  East 
itself  in  its  expanding  consciousness  and  vitality ; 
the  East,  the  non-European,  the  non-Christian,  is 
humanity  in  an  arrested  development,  waiting  for 
some  quickening,  directing,  co-ordinating  force  from 
without  to  lift  it  into  the  high  plane  of  the  world’s 
movement. 

Whether,  therefore,  we  place  ourselves  at  the  point 
of  view  of  the  temporal  power  or  the  spiritual — at  the 
point  of  view  of  military  force,  or  at  that  of  the  force 
of  mind  which  ultimately  governs  and  directs  it — ^we 
come  to  the  same  conclusion  : the  peace  of  the  world, 
the  Human  Peace,  if  there  is  ever  to  be  such  a peace, 
must  proceed,  in  the  first  instance,  from  the  concord 
of  the  West — from  the  order  of  nations  constituting 
Christendom,  or  Christian  civilization.  It  is  there 
that  that  change  in  the  mind  of  man  is  first  to  be 
wrought — assuming  it  to  be  possible  to  effect  it — 
which  is  the  essential  condition  precedent  of  this 
peace.  If  we  assume  it  to  be  so  wrought — if  we 
assume  the  predominant  Powers  of  the  West  to  have 
reached  a static  concurrence  and  co-operation  in 
regard  to  a Human  Peace,  then  they  will  have  no 
serious  difficulty  in  permanently  imposing  peace  on 
the  world,  supposing  it  to  be  ever  challenged,  beyond 
the  sphere  of  their  governing  authority.  They  can 
impose  it  and  maintain  it  both  by  the  force  of  arms 
and  the  force  of  mind.  The  problem  of  a Human 
Peace,  then,  is  essentially  a problem  of  Christendom, 
or  the  West. 

We  are,  consequently,  in  the  first  instance,  con- 


io6  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


cerned  with  the  mind  of  man  as  it  passes  into  national 
action  within  the  limits  of  the  West.  Within  those 
limits  themselves,  however,  it  is  obvious  that  we  are 
only  called  upon — at  any  rate  to  begin  with — to 
consider  the  case  of  those  countries  which  we  call 
the  Great  Powers.  They  represent  both  the  mind 
of  the  West  and  its  predominant  force.  If  they  were 
actually,  in  intention  and  practice,  concordant  in 
regard  to  peace — concordant,  that  is  to  say,  in  recog- 
nizing and  accepting  those  essential  conditions  of 
peace  which  we  have  specified — then  the  peace  of  the 
West,  and  therefore  the  peace  of  the  world,  would  be 
secured.  Now,  the  mind  of  man,  as  it  passes  into 
national  action  in  Western  Europe — and  in  the 
Great  Powers  of  Western  Europe  especially — is  not, 
of  course,  a mind  wholly  separate  and  different 
from  what  we  find  it  to  be  elsewhere.  It  is  in 
West  and  East,  in  Christendom  and  non-Christen- 
dom, fundamentally  the  same  mind,  only  differing  in 
situation,  in  power,  in  the  range  and  complexity  of 
its  interests,  in  development.  In  the  West,  as  in  the 
East,  for  example,  man  is  moved  by  certain  primary 
persisting  instincts — amongst  others,  the  instinct  of 
nutrition,  the  instinct  of  sex,  the  instincts  of  destruc- 
tion and  combat.  These  instincts,  indeed,  are  not 
human  only — they  are  animal ; but  they  are  found 
at  work  in  the  lowest  barbarism  as  in  the  highest 
civilization,  in  the  most  ignorant  and  undeveloped 
man  as  in  the  master  of  religion  and  science.  They 
are  part  of  the  common  stock  of  a universal  human 
nature. 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  107 


When  we  are  considering  the  possibility  of  bringing 
in  not  a politician’s  peace,  wrought  as  a temporary 
interlude,  in  war  and  confusion,  but  a Human  Peace, 
accomplished  by  the  concurrent  powers  of  the  mind 
of  man  in  the  exercise  of  its  lordship  over  itself, 
then  we  are  bound  to  take  these  primary  governing 
instincts  into  account.  Whether  such  a peace  will 
seem  desirable  and  possible  will  depend  partly — 
although  certainly  not  exclusively — upon  the  opera- 
tion of  these  instincts,  and  upon  the  degree  in  which 
they  can  be  brought  under  the  control  of  other  forces 
of  human  nature.  We  cannot,  scientifically,  discuss 
the  “ good  of  peace  ” as  if  peace — the  mere  absence  of 
physical  conflict  and  bloodshed — were  an  absolute 
and  unrelated  thing.  We  must,  from  the  standpoint 
of  science,  seeing  things  as  they  are,  when  we  speak 
of  the  good  of  peace,  recognize  that  in  a given  temper 
or  in  a given  situation,  or  from  a given  point  of  view, 
war  may  seem  the  greater  good.  That  there  is  in 
human  nature  an  instinct  for  destruction  and  a joy 
in  combat  hardly  needs  to  be  demonstrated.  All 
history  shows  these  forces  at  work.  They  are  such 
that  when  men  have  not  actually  been  at  war  their 
greatest  delight  has  been  in  the  shows  and  pastimes  of 
war.  Games  of  war,  poems  of  war,  the  music  of  war, 
pictures  of  war,  romances  of  war,  have  been  the  joy  of 
every  age  of  man  and  every  order  of  society,  from  the 
time  of  Homer,  or  of  the  Roman  gladiatorial  en- 
counters, or  of  the  medieval  tournament,  down  to  the 
time  of  the  Spanish  bull-fight  or  the  modern  English 
boxing  arena.  At  the  present  day,  after  nineteen 


io8  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


centuries  of  Christianity,  quite  the  easiest  thing  a 
statesman  can  do  is  either  to  plunge  a nation  into 
war,  or  to  prevail  upon  it  to  load  itself  with  a vast 
and  continuous  preparation  for  war.  A change  in 
domestic  policy  commonly  requires  many  years  of 
controversy  and  agitation  to  bring  it  about ; a war 
between  two  great  countries,  whatever  its  immediate 
pretexts  may  be,  is  resolved  upon  almost  without 
consideration  or  discussion.  Conscription — under 
which  every  man  becomes  liable  to  lose  his  life  for  a 
cause  of  which  few  are  able  to  judge,  and  to  which 
he  commonly  gives  less  attention  than  he  would 
bestow  upon  the  purchase  of  a suit  of  clothes — belongs 
to  the  age  of  the  “ democracy,”  the  last  hundred 
years,  and  was  the  immediate  outcome  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

In  so  far,  then,  as  men  are  mastered  by  this  in- 
stinct for  destruction  and  this  joy  in  combat,  latent 
or  vigorously  active,  war,  as  war — an  occasion  or 
theatre  of  military  glory — will  seem  to  them  the 
greater  good,  and  peace,  which  demands  the  sup- 
pression of  these  propensities,  the  smaller  good,  even 
if  a good  at  all.  There  is,  in  fact,  nothing  to  which 
religion  has  always  been  so  ready  to  give  its  conse- 
cration, and  which  the  civic  spirit  has  been  so  eager 
to  applaud,  as  mastery  in  war,  and  this  quite  irre- 
spectively of  the  causes  for  which  it  has  been  waged. 
The  mind  of  man,  however,  although  it  contains  these 
military  instincts,  as  they  may  perhaps  be  called,  is 
also  worked  upon  by  other  forces.  It  is,  for  example, 
moved  by  the  instincts  of  nutrition  and  sex,  and  by 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  109 


the  nged  for  clothing,  habitation,  heat,  and  light,  as 
well  as  by  those  higher  needs  which  enter  into  our 
Western  civilization — the  needs  of  religion,  affection, 
domestic  and  civic  life,  art,  literature,  and  science. 
The  question  of  whether  peace  or  war  is  the  greater 
good  is  not,  once  more,  an  absolute  question  ; it  is 
a question  relative  to  the  greater  or  less  ascendency 
of  any  of  these  motives,  or  interests,  in  the  complex, 
continuous  human  mind,  as  that  mind  enters  into 
national  action.  If  war  is,  or  is  supposed  to  be,  sub- 
servient to  some  need  which,  in  a given  situation, 
is  predominant,  then  war  becomes  the  chief  good 
and  peace  a hindrance.  On  the  other  hand,  if  peace 
appears  to  promise  satisfaction  to  some  controlling 
purpose,  peace,  in  its  turn,  becomes  the  good. 

We  are  not  now,  of  course,  occupied  with  a merely 
historic  or  archaeological  problem.  History  is,  for 
our  present  purpose,  only  important  because  it  is  the 
book  of  human  nature,  exhibiting  it  to  us  in  its 
persistent,  developing  forces.  We  need  not,  there- 
fore, consider  how  far  the  various  wars  of  the  world, 
ancient  and  modern,  have,  each  in  its  turn,  sprung 
from  the  operation  of  particular  instincts.  What  we 
are  concerned  with  is  the  present  and  the  future — 
the  possibility,  in  the  first  place,  of  bringing  the  policy 
of  the  chief  Western  nations,  they  being  what  they 
are,  under  the  control  of  motives  making  for  peace. 
Now,  the  social  composition,  or  structure,  of  all 
these  nations — including,  for  our  present  purpose  and 
for  the  time  being  Russia — is  essentially  similar.  It 
is  a composition  which  represents,  in  varying  degrees, 


no  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


the  governing  propensities  and  aims  of  the  human 
mind,  lower  and  higher,  from  the  instincts  of  nutri- 
tion, sex,  and  combat  to  the  noblest  purposes  of 
social,  civic,  intellectual,  and  religious  life.  The 
working  classes  and  employees  of  whatever  kind  ; 
the  capitalist  classes  — landowners,  agriculturists, 
manufacturers,  merchants,  shopkeepers,  bankers,  ship- 
owners, and  railway  proprietors  ; the  military  class, 
including  the  police  ; the  intellectual  classes — artists, 
men  of  letters,  scientists,  teachers,  lawyers,  doctors, 
and  religious  ministers — these,  being  agents  and 
functionaries  of  the  social  economy,  are  also  instru- 
ments of  the  human  mind,  as  it  aims  at  the  satis- 
faction of  its  own  distinctive  needs,  or  the  needs  of 
the  body.  It  is  out  of  these  co-operating  classes  and 
functionaries,  with  women  as  the  chief  organs  of 
domestic  life,  that  the  national  order  is  built  up  as  a 
developing  vitality.  In  the  political  sphere  its  co- 
ordinating and  regulating  authority  is  the  Govern- 
ment, strictly  so-called  ; in  the  industrial  sphere  it 
is,  at  present,  the  capitalist  ” ; in  the  spiritual 
sphere  it  is  the  Church.  As  need  hardly  be  pointed 
out,  however,  each  of  these  main  authorities  is,  in 
practice,  supplemented  by  other  agencies. 

Beneath  them  all,  and  in  them  all,  works  what  we 
have  called  the  “ mind  of  man  ” — our  common  intel- 
lectual nature.  There  is,  of  course,  not  one  nature 
of  the  capitalist  classes  and  another  of  the  working 
classes,  or  one  nature  of  “ the  Church  ” and  another 
of  “ the  State.”  This  is  a truth  elementary  to  the 
point  of  being  a truism,  but  as  it  is  commonly  over- 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  in 


looked  in  religious  and  political  discussion  it  is  neces- 
sary to  reaffirm  it.  The  difference  between  one  social 
class  and  another  is  a difference  of  situation,  interest, 
function,  degree,  and  development ; it  is  not  a funda- 
mental difference  of  human  nature.  This  principle 
is  for  our  present  purpose  important ; because  our 
present  purpose  is  to  consider  whether,  among  the 
various  motives  working  in  human  nature  as  it  passes 
into  national  action,  it  is  possible  for  the  motives 
which  make  for  peace  to  gain,  and  maintain,  pre- 
dominance. That  this  is  not  a mere  question  of 
classes  it  is  easy  to  show,  although  the  question  of 
classes  may  be,  on  other  grounds,  one  which  it  is 
necessary  to  take  into  account.  There  is,  for  example, 
in  all  the  nations  of  Western  Europe,  among  other 
classes,  a permanent  military  class — a body  of  men 
whose  special  business  it  is  to  protect  the  country 
against  its  foes,  and  to  wage  war  when  this  becomes 
desirable  or  inevitable.  We  may,  if  we  please,  say 
that  this  class  represents  the  military  instincts — to 
say  nothing,  for  the  moment,  of  other  things  which  it 
may  represent — in  the  social  economy.  This  is 
true,  but  it  is  only  true  because  the  military  instincts 
are  not  peculiar  to  the  military  class.  The  soldier  is 
a vicar,  or  delegate.  He  is  a representative  man, 
chosen  and  trained  to  fight,  in  our  modern  specializa- 
tion of  functions,  because  others  must  be  occupied 
with  other  offices.  He  is,  in  fact,  doubly  represen- 
tative— first,  because  he  is  a social  voice  and  func- 
tionary ; secondly,  because  the  army  is  formed  from 
all  classes  of  the  community.  If,  therefore,  there  is 


1 12  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


such  a thing  as  “ militarism,”  it  is  not  confined  to  the 
military.  It  is  found,  in  varying  degrees  of  activity 
and  manifestation,  in  the  intellectual  and  industrial 
classes,  and  amongst  workmen  as  amongst  capitalists, 
as  well  as  amongst  soldiers.  It  is  found,  too,  as  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  say,  among  women,  who,  if  they 
have  not  been  actually  fighters,  have  been  the  first 
to  give  honour  and  applause  to  soldiers,  and  who,  in 
their  own  way  and  according  to  their  own  methods, 
often  exhibit  the  same  instincts  and  temper  of  combat 
as  constitute  the  military  mind. 

What  is  true  of  the  military  class  and  its  relation 
to  the  general  social  mass  is,  as  is  obvious,  true  of 
other  special  classes.  There  would,  for  example,  be 
no  priesthood — in  the  broad  sense  of  this  term — if 
there  were  not,  in  the  great  body  of  society,  the 
instincts  and  needs  which  we  call  religious.  The 
priest  has  sometimes  been  spoken  of,  by  fantastic, 
shallow  commentators  upon  human  life,  as  if  he  in 
some  miraculous  way  sprang  into  existence  and  im- 
posed himself  upon  men,  irrespectively  of  their 
nature  and  needs.  He  is,  of  course,  what  he  is 
because  of  their  nature  and  needs.  He  is,  as  is  the 
poet,  the  musician,  the  painter,  the  architect,  the 
physician,  or  the  lawyer,  a minister  of  man,  dependent 
absolutely  for  his  existence  upon  the  extent  to  which 
his  office  corresponds  to  some  felt  and  continuous  need 
of  the  human  spirit.  All  our  special  social  classes 
are,  in  fact,  organic  expressions,  bodyings  forth,  of 
the  common  mind  of  man.  The  soldier,  as  such — the 
fighting  man — exists  as  an  articulate,  distinctive 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  113 


order,  because  the  soldier  is  in  the  soul ; and  he  is 
as  much  in  the  soul  of  a workman  as  of  a capitalist, 
and  of  an  Englishman  or  Frenchman  as  of  a German. 

An  even  more  important  instinct  than  the  military 
instinct,  in  the  permanent  order  and  activities  of 
human  society,  is,  of  course,  the  nutritive  instinct, 
and  it  is  important  also  in  its  bearing  upon  the  causes 
and  motives  of  war.  As  this  primary  instinct  works 
in  man  it  gives  rise  to  the  desire  for  material  wealth, 
although  it  is  evidently  by  no  means  the  only  force 
which  begets  that  desire.  Instead,  however,  of 
speaking  of  the  mere  nutritive  instinct  as  such,  we  may 
speak  broadly  of  that  desire  for  wealth  of  which 
this  instinct  is  only  the  first  and  most  potent  feeder. 
The  desire  for  wealth  finds  its  social  and  organic 
expression  in  all  Western  nations  in  what  we  call  the 
capitalist  class.  That  class  represents  this  desire  in 
two  ways — first,  because  it  is  especially  devoted  to 
directing  the  production  and  distribution  of  wealth  ; 
secondly,  because  it  is  itself,  as  a whole,  pre-eminently 
characterized  by  the  pursuit  and  possession  of  wealth. 
From  both  these  points  of  view,  however,  this  special 
class  of  capitaKsts,  like  the  military  or  priestly  class, 
stands  for  a common  and  continuous  mind.  It  is 
only  because  the  common  mind~the  mind  of  man — 
is  animated  by  the  same  desire  for  wealth,  and  con- 
sents to  a certain  mode  of  organizing  its  production 
and  distribution,  that  the  capitalist  class  exists. 
There  is,  in  regard  to  the  possession  of  wealth,  no 
essential  difference  between  the  richest  of  capitalists 
and  the  poorest  of  his  workmen  except  this — that 


1 14  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


the  capitalist  desires  it  and  possesses  it  while  the 
workman  desires  it  and  does  not  possess  it.  There 
are  other  differences  between  them  in  other  respects — 
differences  of  situation,  capacity,  power,  and  function 
— but  so  far  as  the  desire  for  wealth  is  concerned  they 
are  both  in  the  same  plane  of  human  nature.  What 
we  may  call  industrial  Socialism,  considered  strictly 
as  such,  proceeds  upon  a recognition  of  this  truth, 
and  aims  at  satisfying,  by  its  own  methods,  this 
common  desire  for  wealth  in  the  non-capitalist  classes. 
The  desire  for  wealth  is,  of  course,  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  use  of  wealth.  Two  capitalists,  or  two 
workmen,  may  be  animated  by  an  equal  desire  for 
wealth,  but  they  may  have  very  different  desires  in 
other  respects,  and,  therefore,  very  different  opinions 
as  to  the  uses  of  wealth.  Industrial  Socialism  is,  as 
such,  not  a doctrine  of  human  perfection.  It  is,  in 
itself,  only  an  economic  doctrine,  advocating  what  it 
conceives  to  be  a juster  distribution  of  material 
resources,  irrespective  of  the  uses  which  may  be 
made  of  them. 

What  is  true  of  the  three  special  social  classes  which 
we  have  now  considered — the  military  class,  the 
priestly  class,  and  the  capitalist  class — is  true  also 
of  what  we  may  call  the  governing  class.  We  cannot 
draw  a line  of  demarcation  between  these  special 
functional  classes  and  society  as  a whole,  as  if  there 
were,  on  one  side  of  this  line,  one  kind  of  human 
nature,  on  the  other  side  another.  These  special 
functional  classes  are  social  classes.  They  are  thrown 
up  and  maintained  by  the  working  of  certain  forces 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  115 


in  the  human  soul.  They  represent  its  different 
persisting  desires  or  propensities.  When  we  speak 
of  the  military  class  we  commonly,  no  doubt,  mean 
most  of  all  the  officers  of  an  army,  because  they  are  its 
directing  and  organizing  heads  ; but  an  army  is 
drawn  from  the  people,  and  is  maintained  out  of  the 
purse  of  a whole  nation.  A workman,  again,  is  only 
a capitalist  in  petto.  In  exactly  the  same  way,  the 
governing  classes  are,  on  a fundamental  view  of  them, 
representative,  and  this  whether  or  not  what  we  call 
a “ representative  government  ” exists  in  a given 
country.  By  the  governing  classes  we  mean  especially 
the  classes  which  possess  wealth  and  leisure.  They 
stand,  in  relation  to  the  nation  as  a whole,  as  the  officer 
stands  in  relation  to  the  army,  or  the  priest  in  relation 
to  the  Church,  or  the  capitalist  in  relation  to  the 
general  body  of  workers.  The  Government  of  a 
country  is  the  organ,  for  political  purposes,  of  the 
total  social  consensus.  It  is  the  co-ordinating 
authority  of  the  nation,  as  such.  It  is  the  voice  and 
instrument  of  its  patriotism.  By  patriotism,  as  is 
plain,  we  do  not  mean  the  temper  or  disposition  of  the 
Government,  or  governing  classes,  only.  It  is  a 
feeling  or  sentiment,  such  as  it  may  be,  animating,  in 
one  way  or  another,  the  whole  community.  Patriot- 
ism, we  commonly  say,  is  a love  of  one’s  country. 
Such  a love,  however,  may  show  itself  in  various  ways. 
It  may  give  rise  to  a heroic  defence  of  national 
freedom,  but  it  may  also  give  rise  to  a not  less  heroic 
attack  upon  the  freedom  of  some  other  nation.  It 
may  inspire  a policy  of  self-preservation,  or  a policy 


ii6  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  conquest  and  empire.  A man  may  be  said  to  love 
his  country  both  when  he  fights  to  prevent  it  from 
becoming  subject  to  a foreign  Power  and  when  he 
fights  to  enable  it,  as  a foreign  Power,  to  make  a 
weaker  people  subject  to  itself.  In  either  case  we 
call  him  a patriot,  and  should  commonly  pronounce 
him  unpatriotic  if,  while  willing  to  die  in  defence  of 
his  own  country,  he  were  not  also  willing  to  die  in  a 
war  of  aggression  and  usurpation  against  some  other 
nation.  Of  patriotism,  in  both  these  forms,  the 
Government  is  the  central  organ.  It  does  not  stand 
outside  the  national  life  and  impose  itself  upon  it 
from  above.  On  the  contrary,  it  springs  from  that 
life  and  is  sustained  by  it.  It  is  an  expression  and 
instrument  of  the  mind  of  man  as  it  passes  into 
national  action. 

We  see,  then,  that  whether  peace — and  above  all 
such  a Human  Peace  as  we  are  now  considering — is  a 
supreme  good  is  a question  of  its  relation  to  other 
motives  of  the  mind  of  man,  common  and  continuous, 
which  find  for  themselves  expression  and  organization 
in  great  distinctive  social  classes,  but  which  are 
nevertheless  not  peculiar  to  those  classes.  Amongst 
these  motives  we  have  considered,  as  most  important 
for  our  present  purpose,  four — the  military  instinct, 
the  religious  instinct,  the  desire  for  wealth,  and  the 
national  instinct,  or  patriotism,  whether  as  it  inspires 
the  defence  of  one’s  own  country  or,  in  its  impe- 
rialistic form,  as  it  dictates  its  aggrandizement  by  the 
subjugation  of  other  peoples.  As  it  is  hardly  neces- 
sary to  say,  among  the  innumerable  wars  which  the 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  117 


world  has  seen  each  of  these  four  instincts,  or  interests, 
has  played  a part.  They  have  been  the  chief  motives 
of  war  in  the  past,  and,  if  war  is  to  continue,  some  of 
them  at  least  will  be  its  chief  motives  in  the  future. 
They  are  the  more  potent  as  causes  of  war  because 
they  seldom  work  singly.  They  work,  in  fact,  in 
a greater  or  lesser  degree,  in  combination.  In  almost 
every  war  that  is  waged  the  military  instinct,  as  such 
— the  passion  for  destruction  and  combat — finds  itself 
in  a sort  of  natural  alliance  with  the  desire  for  wealth 
and  the  desire  for  national  preservation  and  aggran- 
dizement ; while  every  nation,  whatever  the  alleged 
cause  for  which  it  enters  into  war,  is  sure  of  the 
sanction  of  “ the  Church,”  the  Church — considered 
especially  as  a body  of  ecclesiastics — being  of  the 
same  essential  social  stock  as  that  out  of  which  the 
various  articulated  portions  of  the  community  are 
shaped.  It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that,  although  of 
a given  war  any  one  of  these  four  instincts  or  interests 
may  conceivably  be  the  immediate  or  predominant 
motive,  the  action  of  any  one  of  them  commonly 
brings  all  the  others  into  play. 

It  is,  however,  necessary  to  recognize  that  what 
is  at  one  time  a motive  of  war  may  at  others  be  a 
motive  of  peace.  Of  these  four  governing  instincts — 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  have  been  the  most 
important  causes  of  war— there  is  only  one  which 
of  necessity,  by  its  native  character  and  effect,  brings 
about  war,  and  this  only  when  it  undergoes  a special 
development,  or  transformation.  That  instinct  is  the 
instinct,  or  interest,  of  patriotism  or  nationalism,  con- 


ii8  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


sidered  in  its  imperialistic  form.  Patriotism,  under- 
stood simply  as  the  love  of  country,  may  of  course 
exist  and  work  in  a time  of  peace,  exhibiting  itself,  in 
a hundred  ways,  as  social  self-sacrifice  and  devoted- 
ness. Patriotism  and  imperialism,  however — not  the 
love  and  service  of  one’s  own  country,  but  the  desire 
for  its  indefinite  aggrandizement,  to  be  brought  about 
and  maintained  by  its  forcible  lordship  over  other 
peoples — this  is  by  its  own  nature  and  consequences 
inevitably  a cause  of  war.  It  brings  it  about  in  two 
ways — first,  because  war  is  needed  to  effect  the 
conquest  of  an  unwilling  people  ; secondly,  because 
the  imperialism  of  one  nation  almost  necessarily  pro- 
vokes the  imperialism  of  its  rivals,  and  produces  com- 
petition and  collision  amongst  them.  Such  an  im- 
perialism may,  of  course,  be  considered  to  be  a good. 
It  may  be  held  to  advance  the  interests  of  religion,  or 
civilization,  or  culture,  or  trade.  It  may  beheld,  too, 
that  although  a people  which  is  conquered  by  England, 
Germany,  or  Russia  loses  its  national  identity  and 
liberty  it  still  gains  the  advantage  of  coming  under 
the  government  of  that  Power,  and  that  within  the 
limits  of  a particular  empire  peace  at  least — so  long 
as  the  empire  holds  together — is  secured.  A nation 
being,  as  we  have  said,  a law  unto  itself,  may  hold 
that  it  is  entitled  to  impose  its  law  on  others.  We  are 
not,  however,  for  the  moment,  considering  either  the 
good  or  evil  of  empire.  We  are  considering  one 
inevitable  effect  of  imperialism  ; and  of  imperialism 
it  may  be  said  scientifically  that  so  long  as  it  con- 
tinues to  operate  as  a motive  and  policy  the  Human 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  119 


Peace  is  impossible.  That  is,  of  course,  not  neces- 
sarily a condemnation  of  imperialism.  It  may  be 
held  that  the  advantages  which  a Human  Peace 
would  bring  in  would  not  be  such  that  they  ought  to 
outweigh  the  good  following  from  imperialism.  It 
is  plain,  however,  that  we  cannot  have  both  the  good 
of  imperialism — if  it  is  a good — and  the  good  of  a 
Human  Peace. 

Of  the  other  instincts,  or  propensities,  which  we 
have  ranked  among  the  motives  of  war  it  may  be 
said  that  they  differ  from  imperialism  in  this  respect, 
that  they  do  not  necessarily  give  rise  to  war.  Even 
what  we  have  called  the  specific  military  instincts — 
the  passion  for  destruction  and  the  joy  of  combat — 
may  find  a large  and  beneficent  satisfaction  without 
actual  strife.  They  may  be  called  up  and  exercised 
in  a strenuous  encounter  with  the  “ enemies  of  man  ” 
— the  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  evils  which 
afflict  him.  They  may  be  transformed  into  a source  of 
generous  emulation  in  the  ways  of  peace.  They  may 
be  content,  as  in  fact  they  ordinarily  are,  with  the 
mere  shows  and  representations  of  conflict  in  pas- 
times or  in  the  arts.  Religion,  again,  which  almost 
always  blesses  war  when  it  is  actually  in  progress, 
and  commonly  does  nothing  to  prevent  it,  is  yet  often 
found  putting  forward  a certain  ideal,  or  conception, 
of  peace.  Lastly,  the  desire  for  wealth,  and  for  such 
advantages  as  depend  upon  its  possession,  while  it 
is  sometimes  a motive  of  war  may  also  be  a motive  of 
peace — peace,  of  course,  in  this  connection  being 
understood  simply  as  the  absence  of  destructive 


120  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


material  conflict  and  bloodshed.  If  we  suppose  men 
to  be  so  dominated  by  the  desire  for  wealth  that  other 
motives  of  action  become  for  them  of  subordinate 
importance,  then  they  will  naturally  choose  war  or 
peace  according  as  one  or  the  other  seems  most 
favourable  to  the  satisfaction  of  that  desire.  It  has 
frequently  been  said — as,  for  example,  by  some  recent 
English  political  and  industrial  authorities — that 
“ the  trade  follows  the  flag.”  This  principle  has  been 
by  others  condemned  as  unsound.  Those  who  hold 
it  to  be  valid  have,  however,  as  is  evident,  an  indus- 
trial ground  for  imperialism  and  war,  while  those  who 
reject  it  regard  commerce  as  one  at  least  of  the 
sanctions  of  peace.  We  may  repeat,  then,  that  while, 
as  all  experience  shows,  we  may  have  religion,  or  the 
pursuit  of  goodness,  without  war,  and  trade,  or  the 
pursuit  of  wealth,  without  war,  and  while  even  the 
instincts  of  destruction  and  combat  admit  of  a certain 
pacific  transformation  and  satisfaction,  we  cannot 
without  war  have  imperialism,  since  by  imperialism  we 
mean,  first,  the  forcible  predominance  of  one  country 
over  another,  brought  about  and  upheld  by  arms  ; 
secondly,  the  consequent  competition  and  conflict  of 
rival  States,  all  pursuing  a similar  policy.  Impe- 
rialism and  war,  in  other  words,  stand  necessarily  in 
a relation  of  cause  and  effect,  while  religion  and  war,  or 
industry  and  war,  do  not.  It  follows  that  if  in  the 
mind  of  man  the  motives  of  international  concord  are 
ever  to  gain  a lasting  supremacy,  bringing  it  in  and 
maintaining  it,  this  can  only  be,  on  the  one  hand,  by 
a total  elimination  of  the  motive  of  empire,  and,  on 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  12 1 


the  other,  by  the  ascendency  of  such  a conception  of 
the  aim  of  man’s  life  upon  earth  that  the  military 
instinct,  the  religious  instinct,  and  the  various  personal 
and  social  purposes  which  enter  into  the  acquisition  of 
wealth,  may  become  subservient  to  a Human  Peace. 

It  is  a corollary  from  this  conclusion,  and  from  the 
various  considerations  by  which  we  have  been  led  to  it, 
that  the  Human  Peace,  assuming  it  to  be  desirable, 
cannot  be  brought  about  simply  by  transferring 
political  power  fron  one  social  class  to  another,  even 
if  we  hold  that  this  is  in  other  respects  desirable.  It 
is  true  that  the  various  special  classes — the  official 
military  class,  the  capitalist  class,  the  ecclesiastical 
class,  and  the  governing  classes,  considered  as  such — 
have  their  own  distinctive  interests  to  promote,  as 
well  as  those  general  functional  interests  which  may 
be  said  to  be  the  concern  of  the  whole  community- 
A great  military  class,  for  example,  although  it  has 
been  thrown  up  as  a social  organ,  in  the  interests  of 
the  national  security  or  expansion,  may  naturally  find 
its  own  advantage  in  encouraging  the  temper  and 
poHcy  of  war,  and  in  promoting  expenditure  on  war. 
Such  a class,  too,  may,  in  given  circumstances,  be  in 
a sort  of  natural  alliance  with  the  other  special 
classes — capitalists,  ecclesiastics,  the  secular  pro- 
fessions, and  “ the  Government.”  They  form  together 
what  we  call  the  “ upper  classes  ” — the  classes  of 
wealth,  leisure,  education  and  ascendency — in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  “ lower.”  All  these  classes  are, 
in  certain  respects,  in  a relation  of  intimate  solidarity, 
and  they  have  therefore  a tendency  to  secure  and 


122  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


increase  such  advantages  as  they  possess  in  common 
even  at  the  expense  of  the  general  good. 

While  this  is  true,  however — and  is  a truth  of  great 
practical  importance — it  does  not  affect  the  principle 
that  these  distinct  and  separate  classes  are  classes  of 
social  organization  and  direction,  which,  so  long  as 
they  continue,  are  in  greater  or  less  correspondence 
with  the  social  mind — the  mind  of  man.  We  cannot, 
therefore,  for  example,  bring  in  a Human  Peace 
simply  by  substituting  what  we  call  a “ democracy  ” 
for  an  “ aristocracy  ” in  the  government  of  all  the 
Western  nations.  Such  a substitution  may  con- 
ceivably be  on  other  grounds  desirable,  but  it  would 
not,  of  itself,  put  an  end  to  war.  There  has  never 
been  a period  when  the  “ democracy  ” — if  by  the 
democracy  we  mean  the  “ lower  classes,”  the  great 
social  mass — had  so  much  apparent  power  in  Europe 
as  at  the  present  time,  and  yet  the  present  is  an  age 
of  almost  universal  conscription — a form  of  slavery — 
and  it  has  seen  the  vastest  and  bloodiest  war  in 
history.  Again,  the  mere  abolition  of  the  “ capi- 
talist class,”  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  a Socialist 
industrial  directorate,  would  not  bring  in  a Human 
Peace,  so  long  as  in  any  given  country  the  need  for 
wealth,  or  the  need  for  empire,  still  served  as  motives 
for  aggressive  action  against  other  countries.  There 
has  been  prosecuted  in  England  for  one  hundred  and 
fifty  years  at  least  a steady  and  progressive  pohcy 
of  imperialism — a policy  which  has  been  necessarily 
a cause  of  aggression  and  bloodshed.  During  the 
greater  part  of  that  time  the  power  of  the  English 


THE  GOOD  OF  A HUMAN  PEACE  123 


“ democracy,”  the  lower  classes,  has  continuously 
increased,  and  has  sufficed  to  win  from  the  upper 
classes,  one  after  the  other,  a number  of  important 
concessions  within  the  field  of  domestic  affairs. 
Against  the  policy  of  empire,  however — which  as 
we  have  seen,  is  inevitably  a policy  of  war  and  blood- 
shed— this  democracy  has  raised  no  protest.  It  has 
sanctioned  it,  applauded  it,  co-operated  in  it,  made 
it  possible,  and  indeed  helped  to  make  a contrary 
policy  impossible.  The  few  voices  which  have,  from 
time  to  time,  been  raised  against  it  have  been  silenced 
by  the  clamours  of  an  angry  people.  An  English 
Government  has  never  been  so  certain  of  the  con- 
currence of  the  great  body  of  the  nation — upper 
classes,  lower  classes,  capitalists  and  workmen,  priests 
and  people,  teachers  and  taught,  men  and  women — 
as  when  entering  into  war,  or  prosecuting  a policy 
involving  war.  And,  of  course,  what  is  true  of  the 
English  Government  is  true  of  all  the  principal 
Governments  of  Western  Europe. 

The  reason  for  this  we  have  seen.  The  great 
special  social  classes  are  expressions  and  organs  of 
the  mind  of  man.  They  are  man  in  his  social  mani- 
festation, as  he  is  moved  by  the  military  instincts,  the 
religious  instincts,  the  desire  for  wealth,  and  the 
things  which  wealth  procures,  the  desire  for  national 
expansion  and  domination.  Militarism  is  not  the 
creation  of  a military  class ; religion  is  not  the 
creation  of  a priestly  class  ; the  desire  for  wealth  is 
not  the  creation  of  a wealthy  class  ; the  desire  for 
national  expansion  and  domination  is  not  the  creation 


124  the  problem  of  human  peace 


of  a governing  class.  It  is  these  desires,  on  the 
contrary,  seated  in  the  social  mind,  which  have 
thrown  up  and  maintained  these  various  classes.  It 
is  not  the  soldier  who  produces  war  ; it  is  the  instincts, 
temper,  purposes,  and  policy  of  war  which  produce 
the  soldier.  If,  therefore,  there  is  ever  to  be  a Human 
Peace,  the  foundations  of  that  peace  must  be  laid, 
where  the  foundations  of  war  are  to  be  found,  in  the 
soul  of  man.  The  motives  of  peace  must,  by  some 
natural  and  effective  process,  be  so  developed  and 
strengthened  that  they  may  exercise  a continuous 
lordship  over  the  motives  of  war ; and  this,  in  the 
first  place,  among  those  predominant  Western  nations 
which,  in  international  policy,  decide  the  fate  of  the 
world.  In  the  absence  of  such  a change,  we  are  so 
far  from  having  a scientific  guarantee  against  inter- 
national conflict  that  we  have  not  even,  as  we  have 
seen,  a guarantee  against  civil  war.  A nation  is  only 
an  individual  soul  writ  large  ; and  just  as  for  an 
individual  soul — either  within  itself  or  in  its  relations 
with  others — peace  is  impossible  except  through  the 
harmonizing  ascendency  of  some  master  motive,  so 
for  a nation,  within  itself,  and  in  its  relations  with 
other  nations,  there  can  be  no  permanent  peace  unless 
the  purposes  which  make  for  it  become  supreme  and 
the  purposes  which  make  against  it  become  con- 
tinuously subordinate.  If  there  is  ever  to  be  a 
Human  Peace — even  in  the  limited  sense  of  the  mere 
absence  of  strife  and  bloodshed — it  must  be  recognized 
throughout  Europe  to  be  the  indispensable  condition 
of  a common  and  supreme  good. 


CHAPTER  IV 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE 

There  is,  as  we  have  seen,  only  one  sufficient  reason 
for  supposing  that  a Human  Peace,  which  has  never 
yet  existed  in  the  world,  can,  by  an  international 
exercise  of  forethought  and  co-operation,  be  brought 
in  and  secured.  That  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the 
growth  of  science,  science  being  understood  to  be  the 
mind  of  man  in  its  complete  development,  resting  on 
the  sum  of  human  experiences  and  acquisitions,  and 
so  become  capable  at  last  of  gaining  a true  measure 
of  itself,  and  of  the  universe  in  relation  to  itself.  The 
office  of  science,  in  regard  to  international  relations, 
is  to  make  known  the  forces  of  war  as  they  exist  and 
work  in  the  mind  of  man,  and  to  show  how  that 
mind,  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  spiritual  lordship  over 
itself,  may  so  master  those  forces  as  to  make  possible 
the  attainment  and  maintenance  of  a Human  Peace. 

The  mind  of  man  will  gain  this  power  of  self- 
command  and  self-direction — for  the  purpose  of  peace 
as  for  all  other  purposes — through  the  ascendency  of  a 
Scientific  Catholicism.  By  a Scientific  Catholicism 
we  mean  the  full  experience  and  powers  of  the  human 
past  brought  to  bear,  in  an  order  or  synthesis  of  con- 
ceptions, consciously  employed,  on  the  movement  of 
mankind  towards  the  future.  Neither  the  word 
“ Catholicism  ” by  itself,  out  of  relation  with  science 


126  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


or  in  opposition  to  science,  nor  the  word  “ science  ” 
by  itself,  and  out  of  relation  with  Catholicism,  repre- 
sents a sufficient  synthesis  of  human  ideas  and  forces. 
The  two  words  taken  together,  however — each  in  its 
fullest  extension  and  each  positively  understood — 
properly  stand  for  such  a synthesis.  If  it  can  ever 
establish  itself  in  the  human  spirit,  a peace  world- 
wide and  enduring — which,  up  to  the  present,  neither 
Catholicism  nor  science,  by  itself,  has  been  able  to 
give  to  us — may  at  last  become  possible. 

When,  however,  we  say  that  it  is  from  the  stand- 
point of  a scientific  Catholicism  alone  that  we  can 
gain  the  right  conception  and  power  of  a Human 
Peace,  it  is  necessary  to  employ  both  the  term 
“ Catholicism  ” and  the  term  “ science  ” in  a definite 
and  fixed  sense,  and  to  determine  the  relations  of  the 
conceptions  which  they  represent.  By  Catholicism 
we  here  mean  the  doctrine,  worship,  discipline,  and 
organization  of  the  Roman  Church,  including,  of 
course,  the  Papacy,  considered  in  principle,  or  in  their 
ideal  character — that  is,  apart  from  their  actual 
imperfections  or  abuses  in  practice  at  any  given  time, 
and  regarded  as  the  social  embodiment  and  fulfilment 
of  Christ.  When  we  so  use  the  word  “ Catholicism,” 
however,  we  do  not,  of  course,  mean  that  outside  the 
Roman  Church  none  of  the  religious  conceptions  and 
powers  are  to  be  found  which  this  word  represents. 
Many  of  them  are  to  be  found  in  the  Greek  Church 
and  in  the  various  Protestant  bodies,  including 
Anglicanism.  Some  of  them  are  to  be  found  in 
non-Christian  and  pre-Christian  communions.  It  is 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  127 


because  of  this  that  the  Roman  Church  is,  as  we 
have  tried  elsewhere  to  show,*  pre-eminently  the 
Catholic  Church,  carrying  in  its  life  the  whole  religious 
vitality  of  man,  representing,  directly  or  indirectly, 
the  religions  of  the  East  and  of  the  West,  of  the  past 
and  of  the  present,  and  standing  even — so  far  as  their 
positive  character  is  concerned — for  the  various  sects 
which  have  broken  away  from  it.  This  Church  is,  in 
fact,  the  spiritual  mistress  and  voice  of  the  world— 
never  to  be  dethroned  or  subverted  unless  religion 
itself,  in  every  conception  of  it  which  has  hitherto 
prevailed,  passes  from  the  being  of  humanity.  It 
follows  that  any  conclusions  which  we  may  reach  as 
to  the  nature  and  powers  of  a Scientific  Catholicism 
wiU  be  conclusions  which  will  apply,  with  varying 
degrees  of  force,  to  non-Catholic  religions,  and  espe- 
cially, of  course,  to  the  various  Christian  communions 
which  have  separated  from  Catholicism.  Where,  in 
an  intellectual  and  practical  sense,  the  Catholic  Church 
is  weak  the  other  Christian  Churches  are  weak  also, 
but  where  the  Catholic  Church  is  strong  its  strength 
is  largely  its  own.  Its  special  ground  of  strength,  of 
course,  is  its  possession  of  the  Papacy,  as  the  symbol 
and  organ  of  its  continuous  unity  and  its  inter- 
national life. 

But  if  we  say  that  Catholicism,  scientifically  under- 
stood and  completed,  is  to  be  the  great  power  of  a 
Human  Peace,  we  are  the  more  bound  to  take  account 
of  the  various  facts  which  seem  to  make  against  this 
view — to  take  account  of  them  and  set  them  in  a clear 
* “Catholicism  and  the  Modern  Mind,”  p,  282. 


128  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


light.  We  are  considering  the  problem  of  peace  from 
the  standpoint  of  science,  in  its  application  to  the 
mind  and  life  of  humanity.  From  this  standpoint, 
and  in  the  interests  of  the  very  problem  which  we  are 
concerned  to  solve,  it  is  indispensable  that  we  should 
see  things  as  they  are,  allowing  their  full  natural  force 
to  such  considerations  as  appear  to  go  counter  to  the 
principle  which  we  are  seeking  to  establish,  or  the 
end  which  we  desire  to  gain.  Now,  the  peace  which 
we  are  supposing  it  to  be  desirable  to  bring  in  is  the 
peace  of  mankind,  and  it  is  evident  that  if  such  a peace 
is  to  come  it  can  only  come  by  the  concurrence,  or 
acquiescence,  of  all  the  countries  of  the  world.  But 
Catholicism — although,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is,  directly 
and  indirectly,  the  representative  faith  of  humanity 
— is,  in  its  direct  confession  and  acknowledgment, 
actually  the  religion  of  merely  a minority  of  the  human 
race.  Judaism,  Mohammedanism,  Hinduism,  Bud- 
dhism, and  Confucianism — to  take  only  the  greatest 
of  the  world’s  religions — lie  beyond  its  jurisdiction. 
Further,  in  Christendom  itself,  Catholicism — the 
Catholicism  which  has,  as  its  chief  interpreter  and 
voice,  the  Pope — has  no  administrative  authority  over 
the  Greek  Church  and  the  various  Protestant  bodies. 
Lastly,  in  Christendom — throughout  all  those  pre- 
dominant nations  of  the  West  in  which,  as  we  have 
said,  the  controlling  mind  of  peace  must  first  be 
brought  in — there  have  now  for  hundreds  of  years 
been  manifest  two  great  increasing  movements  bear- 
ing upon  the  power  and  claims  of  Catholicism.  One 
of  these,  to  use  a single  significant  word,  is  a move- 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  129 


ment  of  conscious  and  avowed  atheism,  directed  not 
against  Catholicism  alone,  but  against  every  form  of 
Christianity ; the  other  has  been  a movement,  not 
of  open  and  explicit  unbelief,  but  of  what  may  be 
called  secularism— a movement  of  unbelief  latent 
and  implicit,  tending  to  take  all  the  great  concerns 
and  interests  of  human  life — education,  literature, 
history,  the  arts,  the  sciences,  the  marriage  laws, 
politics,  national  and  international,  and  industry — out 
of  the  hands  of  all  definite  and  organic  religion,  and  into 
the  hands  of  what,  for  want  of  a better  name,  we  may 
call  the  State.  Both  of  these  great  movements,  indeed, 
have  now  been  so  long  continued,  and  are  so  univer- 
sal, that  it  will  probably  seem  to  the  vast  majority  of 
thinkers  and  politicians  that  the  very  authority  which 
we  are  here  invoking  on  behalf  of  Catholicism— the 
authority  of  science — is  one  which  is  naturally  and 
decisively  against  it. 

But  it  is  not  enough  to  say  even  this.  It  is  to 
Catholicism,  become  completely  scientific,  that  we 
are  looking  to  give  to  the  mind  of  man  the  prescience 
and  the  will  of  peace.  When  we  go  back  upon  the 
history  of  the  world,  however,  we  see  that  Catholicism 
has  not,  up  to  the  present,  been  a power  of  peace.  If 
we  date  its  ofiicial  status  and  authority  from  the 
time  of  Constantine,  we  are  bound  to  recognize  not 
only  that  it  has  never,  in  fact,  prevented  war,  but 
that  it  has  not  even  attempted  to  do  so.  It  would 
hardly  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  it  has  been  on 
the  side  of  all  the  wars  that  have  ever  been  waged  in 
Christendom,  and  has  itself  caused  some  of  them  to 


H«P. 


1 


130  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


be  undertaken.  This  is  true,  of  course,  not  only  of 
medieval  Catholicism — the  Catholicism  of  the  undi- 
vided Western  Church — but  of  the  Catholicism  of 
the  Greek  Church  and  the  Protestant  bodies.  The 
Christian  Churches  have,  one  and  all,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Quakers,  been  Churches  of  war.  The 
reason  of  this  is,  as  we  have  already  said,  plain. 
Catholicism  does  not  stand,  as  an  unrelated  magical 
power,  outside  the  circle  of  human  nature,  compelling 
it  somehow,  and  in  varying  degree,  into  a passive 
conformity  to  itself.  It  lies,  in  what  it  is  or  in  what 
it  represents,  within  human  nature,  and  is  one,  but 
only  one,  of  its  working  forces.  If  we  say  that  it 
stands  for  a high  and  constant  instinct,  or  desire,  of 
man,  that  instinct  has  still  as  its  companions  others — 
among  them  the  instinct  of  destruction  and  the  joy 
of  combat,  the  desire  for  wealth,  the  desire  for  national 
expansion  and  predominance.  Assuming,  therefore, 
that  man,  as  he  has  hitherto  expressed  himself  in 
Catholicism,  has  had  a right  vision  and  conception  of 
a Human  Peace — which,  in  fact,  would  be  an  unwar- 
ranted assumption— it  would  still  remain  true  that 
in  the  practical  pursuit  of  this  ideal  he  has  been 
hindered  and  arrested  by  the  operation  of  other 
influences  within  him  which  have  been  antagonistic 
to  it. 

The  fact  that  Catholicism  has,  as  a power  of  peace, 
failed  is,  however,  in  itself,  no  right  reason  for  dis- 
missing it  absolutely  from  our  minds — assuming  that 
we  have  the  power  to  do  this — so  far  as  the  realization 
of  a Human  Peace  is  concerned.  We  are  trying,  once 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  131 


more,  to  consider  this  problem  as  a problem  of  science. 
Now,  from  the  standpoint  of  science  we  are  bound  to 
ask  ourselves  what  alternative  we  have  to  Catholicism, 
considered  as  a principle  of  peace,  supposing  we  dis- 
miss it  from  our  minds.  We  need  not  concern  our- 
selves with  the  non-Catholic  forms  of  Christianity — 
the  Greek  Church  and  the  various  Protestant  sects. 
They  live,  in  so  far  as  they  live  at  all,  with  the  life 
of  Catholicism,  and  if  Catholicism  dies  they  will  die 
also.  If,  therefore,  we  suppose  ourselves  called  upon 
to  dismiss  Catholicism  from  the  argument  of  peace, 
what  is  left  to  us  ? That  also  is  a question  of  science. 
We  are  not  entitled  to  assume  that  the  word 
“ science,”  by  its  own  natural  and  proper  force, 
necessarily  represents  the  antithesis  of  Catholicism. 
The  word  “ science  ” represents  the  mind  of  man  in  its 
full  development,  resting  upon  the  sum  of  human 
experiences  and  acquisitions,  consciously  scrutinizing 
things  external  and  internal,  and  possessing,  so  far 
as  its  faculties  allow,  a complete  measure  of  itself 
and  of  the  universe  in  relation  to  itself.  From  the 
standpoint  which  science  gives  to  us,  therefore,  we 
are  called  upon  to  examine  not  only  Catholicism,  but 
anti-Catholicism,  or  the  alternatives  to  Catholicism. 
Science  shows  to  us  our  world  and  ourselves  to  our- 
selves. This  being  so,  it  shows  us  how  we  should 
stand,  relatively  to  the  question  of  peace,  if  all  men 
were  to  do  what  many  have  actually  done — dismiss 
from  their  minds  Catholicism,  and  proceed  as  if  it 
were  a thing  extinct  or  dying. 

We  should  then  be  left  with  atheism — either  in  its 


132  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


open  and  avowed  forms,  or  in  its  implied  and  latent 
form  as  secularism — the  elimination  of  Catholicism, 
in  practice,  from  aU  the  great  concerns  of  human  life. 
Now,  atheism  has,  as  such,  no  necessary  bearing  upon 
peace  at  all,  any  more  than  upon  gluttony  or  licen- 
tiousness. As  it  is  quite  easy  to  show  from  experience, 
when  a war  breaks  out,  some  atheists  in  a given 
country  are  in  favour  of  it  and  some  are  against  it. 
In  this  respect  their  position  is  exactly  the  same  as 
that  of  Catholics.  Further,  when  it  is  a question 
not  so  much  of  whether  a particular  war  is  right  or 
wrong,  but  of  whether  peace,  in  itself,  is  an  ideal 
good,  which  may  be  pursued  and  realized  in  a definite 
way,  it  is  evident  that  atheism  as  such — the  dismissal 
or  neglect  of  Christ  and  Catholicism — has  no  view 
which  is  proper  to  it,  or  which  follows  from  it,  although 
individual  atheists  may  possibly  have  such  a view. 
Again,  what  we  have  called  secularism  finds  its  expres- 
sion and  organ  in  “ the  State,”  or  “ the  Government  ” 
— a power  not  creating  or  diffusing  opinion,  but 
giving  effect  to  it,  in  degree,  in  proportion  to  its  actual 
force,  by  certain  processes  of  co-ordination  and 
organization.  The  State  or  the  Government,  how- 
ever, has  not,  any  more  than  the  Church,  been  a 
power  of  peace.  It  is  the  voice  and  instrument  of  the 
passions  and  interests  which,  at  a given  time,  are 
dominant.  It  waged  war  before  it  was  Catholic ; 
it  waged  war  when  it  was,  or  was  supposed  to  be. 
Catholic  ; and  it  wages  war  now  that  it  is  increasingly 
secularist. 

If,  therefore,  we  suppose  ourselves  to  be  in  the 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  133 

position  to  make  a deliberate  choice  between  Catholi- 
cism and  atheism,  we  have  no  reason,  so  far  as  a 
Human  Peace  is  concerned,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  science,  to  choose  atheism.  It  is  plain  that 
atheism  as  such — the  rejection,  or  disallowance,  of 
Christ  and  Catholicism — does  not  change  the  basic 
contents  of  human  nature — its  instinct  of  nutrition, 
its  instinct  of  sex,  its  instinct  of  destruction,  the  joy 
of  combat,  the  desire  for  wealth,  the  desire  for  national 
expansion  and  domination.  If  there  are  in  man 
certain  continuing  passions  and  propensities  which 
tend  to  urge  him  into  war,  they  are,  in  themselves, 
after  the  substitution  of  atheism  for  Catholicism, 
exactly  what  they  were  before.  Our  recognition  of 
this,  of  course,  is,  in  a scientific  sense,  neither  a proof 
of  Catholicism  not  a disproof  of  atheism.  The 
instincts  and  passions  of  men  existed  before  Catholi- 
cism, as  such,  arose  in  the  world,  and  at  that  time, 
as  afterwards  throughout  the  history  of  Catholicism, 
sometimes  there  was  peace  and  sometimes  war.  In 
the  same  way,  if  we  suppose  Catholicism  to  die  out  as 
completely  as  the  “ Paganism  ” of  Greece  and  Rome 
has  done,  human  nature,  so  far  as  its  primary  con- 
stituents and  forces  are  concerned,  will  still  be  a 
persisting  identity.  Man,  then,  as  now — no  other 
change  in  him  having  been  effected — ^will  eat  and 
drink.  He  will  propagate  his  species.  He  will  be 
moved  by  the  instinct  of  destruction  and  the  joy 
of  combat.  He  will  strive  for  wealth  and  pre- 
dominance. He  will  sometimes  make  war  and  some- 
times peace.  He  cannot,  indeed,  whatever  his  view 


134  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  himself  and  his  world,  remain  perpetually  in  a 
state  of  conflict.  He  is  a subject  being,  under  the 
discipline  of  an  outer  and  inner  necessity.  He  must 
eat  and  drink,  nourish  and  protect  his  offspring, 
clothe  himself,  house  himself,  and  warm  himself ; 
and  in  the  stage  of  development  which  he  has  now 
reached,  although  he  may  conceivably  dismiss  from 
his  mind  Catholicism,  together  with  all  other  forms 
of  religion,  it  is  not  probable  that  he  will  be  able  to 
extirpate  all  those  needs  of  comfort  and  luxury, 
knowledge  and  art,  which  enter  into  an  advanced 
culture  and  civilization.  The  more  such  needs 
become  multiplied  and  common,  the  less  will  it  be 
possible  for  men  to  devote  themselves  to  the  merely 
destructive  operations  of  war.  Nevertheless,  in  so 
far  as  war  might  seem  a means  to  a desirable  end, 
man  after  Catholicism,  as  before  it,  and  during  its 
continuance,  would  tend  from  time  to  time  to  be 
carried  into  it.  Against  this  atheism,  in  itself, 
would  be  no  security. 

In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  failure  of  Catholicism, 
relatively  to  the  aim  of  peace,  we  have,  relatively  to 
that  aim,  no  ground,  in  science,  for  rejecting 
Catholicism  and  choosing  atheism.  Atheism,  in  itself, 
scientifically  considered,  is  no  more  a thing  of  illu- 
mination and  promise  relatively  to  the  aim  of  peace 
than  it  is,  for  example,  relatively  to  the  ideals  of  love 
and  purity,  if  these  things  are  still  to  continue  ideals. 
Our  hope  is  in  science,  illuminating  and  completing 
Catholicism — the  developed  mind  of  man,  resting  on 
the  sum  of  his  experiences  and  acquisitions,  and 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  135 

seeing  himself  and  things  in  relation  to  himself  as 
they  have  been  and  are.  The  mind  of  man,  thus 
developed,  is  able  to  look  at  Catholicism,  as  it  looks 
at  any  other  thing  or  thought — at  the  heavenly 
bodies,  at  the  air,  at  the  sea  and  earth,  with  their 
forms  of  vegetable  and  animal  life,  at  the  movement 
of  mankind  in  the  ages,  at  the  differing  types  of 
religion  and  civilization,  at  the  arts  and  sciences,  at  its 
own  consciousness,  emotions,  conceptions  and  ideals. 
There  is  a sense,  of  course,  in  which  man,  the  man  of 
any  given  generation,  is  inevitably  the  subject  of  his 
own  past,  with  a vitality  nourished  upon  it,  with  a 
mind  enlarged  by  it,  with  a wiU  and  power  penetrated 
and  confirmed  by  it.  But  there  is  also  a sense  in 
which,  because  of  his  development  and  his  possession 
of  a full  view  and  measure  of  things,  the  modern  man  is 
necessarily  the  master  of  his  past,  looking  back  upon 
it  and  summoning  it  before  his  judgment-seat.  It  is 
thus  that  he  looks  back  upon,  or  out  upon,  Catholi- 
cism. It  is  a part  of  himself — an  expression  of  his 
unchanged  but  developing  identity.  He  sees  the 
world  when  Catholicism  was  not,  and  he  sees  it 
when  Catholicism  came.  He  sees  how  Catholicism 
grew  and  developed — how  the  ancient  civilization, 
with  its  religions,  arts,  philosophies,  sciences,  and 
modes  of  life  entered  into  it ; how  the  order  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  in  mind  and  policy,  was  shaped  and 
maintained ; how,  in  the  six  centuries  of  modern 
history,  there  has,  in  the  Western  world,  been  a vast, 
many-sided  expansion  of  genius  and  power.  He  sees 
how  Catholicism  stands  to-day — its  relation  to  the 


136  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


non-Christian  religions,  its  relation  to  the  Greek 
Church,  Protestantism,  and  unbelief,  its  relation  to 
the  sum  total  of  human  culture,  its  relation  to  the 
social  and  practical  life  of  the  world,  including  inter- 
national action  and  the  problems  of  peace  and  war. 

Seeing  these  things,  science — ^the  developed  and 
synthetic  mind  of  the  modern  man- — recognizes  that 
what  atheism,  as  such,  does  not  do,  and  cannot  do, 
Catholicism,  as  such,  does  and  has  always  done. 
Catholicism,  as  such,  scientifically  and  positively 
considered,  proposes  to  man  a supreme  aim  in  life — 
an  aim  continuous  and  universal,  which,  in  its  essen- 
tial character,  is  not  of  one  age  alone,  but  of  all  ages, 
and  not  of  one  nation  alone,  but  of  all  nations,  and 
which  by  its  proper  nature  is  such  that  it  may  serve 
to  give  to  all  his  other  aims  meaning  and  unity.  This 
aim  is  an  aim  of  developing  personal  and  social  per- 
fection, according  to  the  Perfection,  or  Divinity,  of 
Christ.  We  may  characterize  this  aim  in  other 
terms,  and  call  it — as  it  has  been  called  by  one  of  the 
forlorn  and  distracted  spirits  of  the  modern  revo- 
lution— a “ slave  morality.”  This  is,  although  chosen 
with  an  intention  of  contempt  and  rejection,  a right 
and  happy  designation.  Catholicism  is,  indeed,  a 
slave  morality — a morality  which,  finding  man  a 
slave  either  to  his  own  inner  passions,  or  to  the  despot 
classes  which  have  risen  into  ascendency  from  their 
working,  offers  to  him  freedom  and  lordship.  This 
slave  morality  aims  at  making  the  slave  a master. 
It  pronounces  words  of  freedom  and  light.  Its 
purpose  is  not  to  take  from  the  few,  but  to  give  to 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  137 

the  many.  It  exists  not  to  bring  down  the  high  to 
the  low,  but  to  raise  the  low  to  the  high.  Where 
there  is  an  anarchy  of  animal  passion  it  would  bring 
in  a human  order  and  calm.  Where  there  is  ignor- 
ance it  would  bring  in  knowledge.  Where  there  is 
weakness  it  would  bring  in  strength.  Catholicism — 
which,  of  course,  is  only  man  at  a given  stage  of  his 
being,  and  in  a given  degree,  recognizing  himself,  and 
the  Order  to  which  he  is  subject,  expressing  himself, 
commanding  himself,  and  directing  himself,  according 
to  a Vision  which  has  come  to  him — ^has  been  a 
“ slave  morality  ” which  has  been  a morality  of 
masters  liberating  slaves,  and  of  slaves  risen  to  the 
dignity  of  masters.  It  has  been  the  morality  of 
apostles,  martyrs,  saints,  artists,  philosophers, 
thinkers,  heroes,  and  rulers,  as  well  as  of  the  obscure 
and  uninstructed,  during  almost  two  thousand 
years.  The  modern  developed  and  synthetic  mind, 
science,  sees  it  to  represent  within  its  own  sphere 
what  is  as  much  an  order  of  forces,  controlling  and 
beneficent,  as  is  the  solar  system  itself,  or  as  are  the 
recurrent  phenomena  of  the  vegetable  and  animal 
kingdoms,  or  the  accomplished  conquests  of  the  arts 
and  sciences.  In  the  presence  of  this  order,  as  in  the 
presence  of  any  other,  man  is  strong  when  he  submits 
and  uses,  but  weak  when  he  revolts  and  repudiates. 
In  denying  and  rejecting  what  is  positive  and  great 
in  Catholicism  he  denies  and  rejects  what  is  greatest 
in  himself.  He  disowns  the  Divinity  within  him,  and 
turns  his  back  upon  his  own  noblest  achievements. 

It  is  because  Catholicism,  considered  from  the  point 


138  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  view  of  science,  is  what  it  is — an  emanation  and 
expression  of  the  mind  of  man,  proposing  to  himself, 
and  pursuing,  a master  ideal — that  it  has  a natural 
bearing  on  the  question  of  peace,  while  atheism,  as 
such,  has  no  such  bearing.  Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  be 
delivered  from  war — assuming  it  to  be  possible  for 
us  to  be  so  delivered — ^we  cannot  turn  to  atheism  to 
deliver  us.  On  the  other  hand,  Catholicism,  just  as 
it  has  been  and  is,  cannot  deliver  man  from  war. 
This  history  shows  us.  Catholicism,  in  spite  of  its 
proclamation  of  an  ideal  of  perfection,  has,  in  fact, 
made  almost  no  direct  contribution  to  the  peace  of  the 
world,  and  has,  indeed,  almost  invariably  sanctioned 
and  blessed  its  wars,  whatever  they  were.  In  pre- 
cisely the  same  way  science — to  which  we  are  now 
making  our  appeal — has  not  brought  in  peace.  The 
age  greatest  in  applied  science  has  been  the  age  of  the 
greatest  of  wars.  It  may  seem,  therefore,  that  we 
are  helplessly  involved  in  a vicious  circle,  since, 
neither  Catholicism,  nor  atheism,  which  is  the  anti- 
thesis of  Catholicism,  nor  science,  which  pre-eminently 
stands  for  the  Modern  Mind,  has  apparently  in  it  any 
promise  of  peace.  Nevertheless,  it  is  to  the  union 
of  two  things  which,  relatively  to  war,  singly  have 
failed — Catholicism  and  science — that  we  look  for 
the  power  of  concord.  What  Catholicism  by  itself, 
apart  from  science,  and  science  by  itself,  apart  from 
Catholicism,  cannot  do,  the  two  together  may  do, 
for  the  two  together  represent  the  developed,  unified 
mind  of  man,  knowing  itself,  and  knowing  the  world 
in  relation  to  itself. 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  139 


It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to 
determine  the  full  meaning  of  a Scientific  Catholicism. 
The  sense  to  be  attached  to  this  expression  we  have, 
in  part,  attempted  elsewhere  to  elucidate.  We  are 
here  concerned  with  that  meaning  only  in  so  far  as  it 
bears  on  the  question  of  a Human  Peace.  Now,  that 
question  is  a great  question  of  practical  life.  As  such 
it  is  representative.  It  is,  moreover,  not  exclusive. 
It  does  not  stand  by  itself.  It  is  one  of  a vast 
number  of  interdependent  questions  of  man’s  mind 
and  life — questions  so  inseparably  and  closely  con- 
nected together  that  if  we  were  to  suppose  Catholi- 
cism, as  a system  of  thought  and  conduct,  to  really 
and  finally  fail  in  regard  to  any  one  of  them,  it  would 
fail  in  regard  to  them  all.  We  see,  in  fact,  as  we  go 
back  upon  the  history  of  Christendom,  that  Catholi- 
cism, which  has  failed  as  a power  of  international 
peace,  has  also  failed — failed  continuously,  and  on  a 
vast  scale — as  a power  of  personal  conduct  or  morals. 
We  may,  therefore,  properly  consider  the  question  of 
peace  as  a sort  of  test  question  in  relation  to  Catholi- 
cism— a question  bringing  it  naturally  to  the  judg- 
ment-seat of  the  Modern  Mind,  and  submitting  it, 
as  it  ought  properly  to  be  submitted,  to  the  ordeal 
of  practice,  or  life. 

It  is  not  from  Catholicism,  just  as  it  is,  nor  from 
science,  just  as  it  is,  but  from  a scientific  Catholicism, 
that  we  are  to  expect  such  a solution  of  this  question 
as  is  possible,  and  this,  as  we  have  said,  because  it  is 
a practical  question  of  man’s  life  upon  earth.  The 
general  effect  of  the  application  to  Catholicism  of 


HO  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


science — the  developed,  synthetic  mind  of  the  modern 
man — may  be  quite  simply  and  broadly  stated.  In 
so  far  as  Catholicism  enters  into  the  domain  of  explana- 
tion on  the  one  hand,  and  the  domain  of  practice  on  the 
other,  it  enters  into  the  sphere  of  science  and  becomes 
subject  to  its  jurisdiction.  There  may  be  things  in 
Catholicism  which  lie  wholly  outside  one  or  other  of 
these  two  domains — statements  to  which  no  scientific 
meaning  is  to  be  attached,  precepts  of  conduct  for 
which  no  scientific  reason  can  be  given.  As  to  this 
we  need  here  say  nothing.  What  we  are  at  present 
concerned  with  is  the  relation  of  Catholicism  to  man’s 
life,  inner  and  outer,  on  earth  ; and  in  relation  to 
this  Catholicism,  in  so  far  as  it  professes  to  explain 
things,  or  proposes  to  men  to  do  things,  comes  within 
the  province  of  science,  and  must  submit  to  its 
authority.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  whole  of 
Catholicism,  considered  as  an  explanatory  and  prac- 
tical system — its  terminology,  its  conceptions  of  God 
and  man,  of  earth  and  heaven,  of  the  human  soul, 
of  “ this  world  ” and  “ the  next,”  of  Our  Lord  and 
Our  Lady,  of  the  Scriptures  and  the  Church,  together 
with  its  principle  of  prayer,  its  creeds,  its  sacraments, 
and  its  organization — is  as  much  subject  to  science, 
the  ordered,  ordering  reason  of  developed  man,  as 
are  any  of  the  phenomena  of  external  nature,  or  any 
of  the  constructions  of  the  arts  and  sciences.  Science 
is  not,  as  some  have  supposed  it  to  be,  atheism. 
Science  is  explanation.  It  no  more  necessarily  rejects 
Catholicism  because,  in  the  degree  in  which  this  is 
possible,  it  explains  it,  than  it  rejects  the  solar  system, 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  141 


or  the  other  great  forces  of  inorganic  and  organic 
matter,  because,  in  the  investigation  and  interpreta- 
tion of  these  things,  it  has  thrown  up  astronomy, 
physics,  and  biology.  What  it  says,  however — and 
the  more  plainly  and  openly  this  can  be  said  the 
better — is  that  in  the  present  state  of  the  human 
mind,  and  relatively  to  the  practical  ends  of  life,  the 
statements  of  ecclesiastics  or  theologians  in  regard 
to  Catholicism  have  no  other  significance  and  value 
than  that  which  is  given  to  them  by  the  experience 
and  reason  of  a developed  humanity.  Catholicism, 
of  course,  may,  in  a sense,  be  accepted,  as  we  say, 
“ on  faith,”  without  question  or  reservation.  An 
individual  mind,  that  is,  may  be  moved,  by  its  con- 
ception of  its  own  good,  and  the  good  of  mankind, 
to  submit  itself  to  the  living,  authoritative  Catholic 
Church,  saying  simply  what  it  orders  to  be  said, 
doing  simply  what  it  orders  to  be  done,  and  entering, 
according  to  its  power,  into  the  inheritance  of  its 
spiritual  life.  This,  with  regard  to  the  Catholic 
Church,  is,  for  certain  men  and  for  certain  purposes,  a 
perfectly  natural  thing  to  do,  although  with  regard 
to  any  other  Church  in  the  world  it  would  be  impos- 
sible. What  we  are  now  concerned  with,  however,  is 
a Catholicism  which,  among  other  great  things,  is 
to  be  capable  of  giving  peace  to  mankind.  Such  a 
Catholicism  must  be  the  Catholicism  of  developed 
man.  It  must  be,  for  the  purposes  of  explanation 
and  action,  scientific. 

It  is  such  a Catholicism — no  other,  and  nothing 
else — that  can  now  give  to  man  that  conception  of  a 


142  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


supreme  end  of  life  the  pursuit  of  which  makes  a 
Human  Peace  not  only  desirable  but  indispensable. 
This  end  of  life  is  not  a new  end.  It  is  the  same  end 
as  Catholicism  has  always  proposed  to  the  world — 
Perfection  according  to  the  Perfection  of  Christ.  It 
is  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.  It  is  the  growth  and 
full-flowering  of  an  ideal  humanity.  A scientific 
Catholicism,  however,  conceives  Christ,  God  in  Man, 
and  therefore  man  himself,  as  an  unscientific  Catholi- 
cism could  not  do.  By  a Perfect  Humanity  we  mean 
man  with  all  the  characteristic  sides  of  his  nature 
developed,  fulfilled,  and  wrought  into  a unity  under 
the  presidency  of  a high  master  motive.  What  man 
is,  as  an  intellectual  and  social  being,  we  do  not  learn 
from  the  introspection  of  metaphysicians,  engaged 
in  a microscopic  analysis  of  themselves,  and  each 
pouring  contempt  upon  the  conclusions  of  all  the 
others,  while  claiming  certainty  and  authority  for 
his  own.  We  learn  what  man  is  from  his  manifesta- 
tion of  himself  in  history — from  language,  from 
religion,  from  the  arts,  from  philosophy,  from  science, 
from  social  manners  and  organization,  from  political 
institutions,  and  from  industry.  These  are  man’s 
witnesses  of  himself,  and  not  the  shifting  subtleties  of 
psychologists,  losing  themselves  in  interior  darkness 
while  the  sun  of  revelation  shines  without. 

From  these  witnesses  we  see  that  man — ^wherever 
and  whenever  we  behold  him — is  a continuous  and 
identical  being,  moved,  in  different  degrees,  by 
various  desires,  and  exercising  certain  powers.  In 
regard  to  our  capacity  for  naming  and  distinguishing 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  143 


these  desires  and  powers  we  are  dependent  upon  an 
order  of  language,  which  has  grown  up  in  the  ages, 
and  which  we  cannot  subvert.  We  are  not  beginning, 
and  are  powerless  to  begin,  the  process  of  human 
evolution  d,e  novo.  It  has  produced  us  ; we  cannot 
reproduce  it.  We  live,  feel,  think,  speak,  and  act 
by  entering  into  a Power  which  is  ourselves  and  yet 
not  ourselves.  Man,  therefore,  we  may  say,  is  a 
being  in  whom  there  are  instincts  of  nutrition  and 
sex,  instincts  of  destruction  and  construction,  a 
tendency  to  love  his  fellow-beings,  but  a tendency 
also  to  hate  them,  a sense  of  right  and  wrong,  a sense 
of  beauty  and  ugliness,  a power  of  imagination,  a 
discernment  of  truth  and  untruth,  a capacity  for 
observation  and  inference,  and  a genius  for  effecting 
great  and  difficult  constructions  in  art,  philosophy, 
science,  social  organization,  and  industry.  We  may, 
if  we  please,  name  all  these  things  differently,  and  we 
may  resolve  them  aU,  or  suppose  ourselves  to  resolve 
them,  into  some  ultimate  impalpable  material  pro- 
cesses, but  when  we  have  done  this  the  things  them- 
selves remain,  with  persisting  characteristics — uni- 
form relations  of  resemblance  and  difference — recog- 
nizable by  the  ordinary  sane  mind.  A human  being 
and  a pig,  a star  and  a tree,  a man  and  a woman,  are 
not,  outside  a lunatic  asylum,  the  same  thing,  any 
more  then  good  and  evil,  or  beauty  and  ugliness,  or 
disease  and  health,  or  sanity  and  insanity. 

Our  conception  of  the  End  of  life,  therefore,  must 
be  based  on  our  knowledge  of  man  as  he  has  been 
and  is,  a moral,  intellectual,  and  active  organism,  a 


144  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


conscious  and  self-conscious,  unified  whole,  living  in 
the  social  state,  and  in  a relation  of  action  and  reaction, 
on  every  side  of  his  nature,  with  what  presents  itself 
to  him  as  a Universal  Order,  at  once  external  and 
internal.  If,  consequently,  we  say  that  the  End  of 
Man  is  Perfection  in  Christ — perfection  according  to 
a Divine  Image,  or  Exemplar — this  statement  must 
be  understood  in  a sense  relative  to  man’s  many- 
sided  persisting  and  developing  nature,  and  to  the 
continuing  conditions  imposed  upon  his  mind  and 
life.  Man  has,  as  his  basic  needs,  air,  light,  heat, 
activity,  rest,  food,  health,  the  association  of  the 
sexes,  paternity,  clothing,  shelter  ; he  has  the  higher 
needs  of  love,  society,  self-control  and  self-direction, 
beauty,  knowledge,  imagination  and  worship,  and 
all  that  constitutes  what  we  call  culture  and  civiliza- 
tion. When  we  speak  of  what  “ man  ” needs  we  are 
not  entitled  to  take  as  our  type  the  lowest  of  men, 
or  the  least  developed.  We  ought,  on  the  contrary — 
and  this  especially  when  we  have  set  out  with  such 
an  expression  as  “ Perfection  in  Christ  ” — to  take 
the  highest  and  most  developed.  The  most  developed 
stands  where  the  least  developed  may  conceivably 
come  to  stand.  This  is  the  principle  of  what  we  have 
called  the  “ slave  morality.”  It  is  the  principle  of 
that  End  of  Life  which  we  are  supposing  a Scientific 
Catholicism  to  contain  within  itself  and  put  forward. 
If  it  is  true  that  Catholicism  has  proposed  to  men, 
and  must  continue  to  propose  to  them.  Perfection  in 
Christ,  this  Perfection  must  be  understood — and  is, 
in  fact,  by  Catholicism,  in  principle,  always  under- 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  145 


stood — as  a thing  not  for  a privileged  class,  or  a 
particular  nation,  but  for  all  men  and  aU  nations. 

The  first  task  of  a Scientific,  or  modern,  Catholicism 
is  to  give  to  this  expression  a meaning  relative  to  the 
actual  nature  and  needs  of  man,  under  the  con- 
tinuing conditions  of  his  life  upon  earth.  From  this 
point  of  view,  it  must  re-examine  and  test  its  tra- 
ditional statements  and  formulas.  It  is  not  sufficient 
simply  to  repeat  them.  In  simply  repeating  them, 
without  making  any  attempt  to  give  them  a practical 
meaning  and  effect,  we  only  exhibit  our  incapacity, 
or  perhaps  our  dishonesty.  In  the  Lord’s  Prayer 
we  say  “ Give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread.”  That 
is  a perfectly  intelligible  expression  of  need.  It  is 
unequivocal.  Bread  is  the  first  of  man’s  needs.  He 
needs  it  now,  he  needs  it  always.  But  all  his  other 
real  needs — needs,  that  is,  which  spring  from  his 
characteristic  and  continuous  nature,  developing  and 
fulfilling  itself — are  in  this  respect  precisely  similar 
to  this  basic  and  elementary  need  of  bread.  He  does 
not  live  by  bread  alone.  His  other  needs  are,  once 
more,  and  broadly  speaking,  the  association  of  the 
sexes,  love,  goodness,  paternity,  and  the  family  life, 
clothing,  habitation,  light,  heat,  health,  beauty, 
knowledge,  a right  social  order  and  companionship. 
These  needs,  like  the  need  for  bread,  are  needs  for 
“ this  day,”  this  hfe,  this  earth.  So  far  as  our 
present  capacity  extends,  we  are  not  in  the  least  able 
to  say  whether  a single  one  of  them  would  be  needs 
of  man  in  some  other  “ life  ” than  this,  “ lived  ” 
under  some  whoUy  inconceivable  conditions.  To 


146  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


the  word  “ Heaven,”  as  the  symbol  of  a perfect  state, 
according  to  the  only  conception  of  such  a state 
which  we  are  able  to  form,  it  is  quite  possible  to  attach 
a definite  meaning,  but  to  the  word  “ Heaven  ” as 
dependent  for  its  objective  significance  on  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  infinite  universe,  including  man  as  we 
know  him,  it  is  not  possible  to  attach  any  significance 
at  all.  It  is,  so  used,  as  Catholicism  teaches,  not  a 
word  of  knowledge,  but  a word  of  faith.  It  is  quite 
necessary  that  all  ecclesiastics,  theologians,  and  meta- 
physicians in  the  twentieth  century — all  men  claiming 
to  take  any  part  in  the  actual  direction  of  human 
affairs — should,  in  the  present  stage  of  the  world’s 
development,  deal  honestly  with  themselves  and  their 
fellow-beings  in  regard  to  this,  and  practise  a religious 
sincerity  in  their  statements.  The  time  is  past  for 
deception  and  self-deception  in  these  respects.  It  is 
above  all  indispensable  to  set  aside  all  evasions  and 
illusions,  all  verbal  subterfuges  and  mystification, 
when  we  are  considering  the  awful  tragedy  of  war  and 
the  good  of  peace  ; but  if  with  this  great  question, 
then  with  all  others  bearing  upon  the  actual  being 
and  fate  of  humanity.  Man  lives  in  a mystery  tem- 
pered by  knowledge,  but  the  recognition  of  mystery 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  possession  of  knowledge. 

A Catholic  conception  of  the  End  of  Life — that 
conception  in  the  light  of  which  it  becomes  possible 
to  prosecute  Peace  as  a Human  Good — must,  then, 
be  stated  in  positive  terms  of  man’s  nature  and 
situation.  It  is,  for  example,  not  enough  to  conceive 
of  man  as  an  inevitable  “ sinner  ” and  to  say  that 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  147 


Catholicism  exists  to  save  him,  not  from  sin,  but  from 
some  eternal,  unimaginable  “ punishment  ” of  sin 
in  a future  state  of  which  we  are  powerless  to  form 
any  idea.  It  is  not  enough,  again,  to  say  that  by 
Perfection  in  Christ  we  mean,  not  a terrestrial,  but  a 
“ celestial  ” perfection.  The  word  “ Heaven,”  if  it 
is  to  have  a place  in  a Rule  of  Life,  cannot  be 
suffered  to  remain  a merely  negative  expression, 
meaning  only  “ not  earth,”  “ not  man,”  “ not  ex- 
perience,” “ not  knowledge,”  “ not  action.”  It 
must  not  be  simply  a symbol  of  human  ignorance  and 
incapacity — ^like  the  expression  “ God  knows,”  mean- 
ing that  no  man  knows,  or  “ God  help  us,”  meaning 
that  no  man  can  help  us.  The  words  “ heaven  ” and 
“ earth,”  or  “ this  world  ” and  “ the  next,”  must  not 
be  used  as  terms  of  antithesis  and  total  antagonism. 
They  have,  of  course,  never  in  Catholicism  been 
uniformly  so  used,  but  in  so  far  as  there  has  been 
a tendency  to  place  what  we  call  “ the  supernatural  ” 
and  “ the  natural,”  the  “ Divine  ” and  the  “ human,” 
in  a relation  such  that  the  first  is  regarded  as  a 
mere  negation  of  the  second,  it  has  inevitably 
nullified  Catholicism  as  a Rule  of  Life.  Such  a 
tendency,  as  is  evident,  goes  counter  to  the  Incarna- 
tion, in  which  we  see  Perfection,  the  Divinity, 
clothed  with  flesh,  become  Human  and  Personal,  and 
moving  as  a Model  on  the  earth.  It  goes  counter, 
too,  to  the  organic  Catholic  Church,  which  is  simply 
that  Perfection  realized,  in  degree,  as  a continuous 
individual  and  social  life.  It  goes  counter,  further, 
to  the  Lord’s  Prayer,  for,  unless  the  words  “ Thy 


148  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


will  be  done  on  earth  as  it  is  in  heaven  ” are  to  be 
supposed  devoid  of  all  intelligible  and  practical 
significance,  they  must,  for  man  who  uses  them,  mean 
that  a high  ideal  of  himself  which  he  is,  in  a measure, 
able  to  shape  in  his  mind  is  somehow  to  be  realized 
in  the  world  of  which  he  is  actually  an  inhabitant. 

We  cannot,  therefore,  say  that  Perfection  in  Christ 
consists  in  escaping  the  eternal  punishment  of  sin  in 
a future  “ life,”  or  even  in  being  “ sinless  ” — in  the 
negative  sense  of  never  contravening  certain  elemen- 
tary moral  precepts  ; or  in  entering  finally  into  some 
endless,  inconceivable  “ supernatural  ” felicity,  as  a 
consequence  of  having  thus  refrained  from  “ sin,” 
or  obtained  absolution  for  it.  We  cannot,  again, 
say  that  such  a perfection  consists  simply  in  “ renun- 
ciation,” or  in  taking  up  the  Cross,  leaving  all  things 
and  following  Christ.  These  are  all  great  and  beautiful 
poetic  words,  which  are  not  likely  to  lose  their 
spiritual  meaning  and  value  so  long  as  man,  being 
what  he  is,  proposes  to  himself  a high  and  difficult 
end  to  which  certain  impulses  within  him  urge  him 
forward,  and  from  which  certain  others  hold  him 
back.  When  he  has  advanced  only  so  high  in  the 
scale  of  humanity  as  never  to  be  a liar,  a thief,  or  a 
murderer  he  may  begin  to  talk  of  dispensing  with  the 
Ten  Commandments  ; and  when  he  has  cast  the 
words  “ love  ” and  “ selfishness,”  “ passion  ” and 
“ purity,”  out  of  his  vocabulary  because,  in  his 
accomplished  and  undisturbed  perfection,  he  no 
longer  needs  them,  then,  perhaps — provided  he  con- 
sents to  forget  the  price  that  has  been  paid  for  his 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  149 


elevation  in  the  ages  of  sacrifice — he  may  be  free  to 
take  down  the  Crucifix  from  its  place. 

We  are  not,  at  present,  called  upon  to  discuss  such 
a state  of  things,  in  which  “ joy  will  be  its  own 
security  ” and  Eden  will  have  come  again.  We  are, 
for  the  purposes  of  this  treatise,  concerned  with  only 
such  an  elementary  and  preliminary  good  as  that  men 
should  refrain  from  killing  one  another.  It  is,  from 
this  point  of  view,  essential  that  the  Crucifix,  which 
is  the  symbolic  summary  of  Catholicism,  should  be, 
as  we  have  elsewhere  said,*  regarded,  not  as  the  sign 
of  a negative,  repressive,  or  punitive  process,  but  as 
an  Image  of  spiritual  conquest — of  a Victorious 
Humanity,  subjecting  the  lower,  indeed,  but  also 
liberating  and  fulfilling  the  higher.  It  must  be  held 
to  be,  what  by  the  principle  and  intention  of  Catholi- 
cism it  has  always  been,  a symbol,  not  of  death,  but 
of  life,  of  a transcendent  Perfection,  in  which  the 
New  Adam  restores  the  Old.  In  other  words,  it 
must  cease  to  be  a negative  symbol  and  become  a 
positive  symbol,  denoting,  not  merely  feelings  to  be 
suppressed  and  thoughts  to  be  rejected  and  actions 
to  be  avoided,  but  a many-sided  humanity,  indi- 
vidual and  social,  developing  and  accomplishing  itself. 
Further,  it  must  not  represent  despair  as  the  word  for 
“ this  life  ” and  hope  as  the  word  for  “ the  next,” 
or  renunciation  as  the  word  till  death  and  possession 
as  the  word  after  death.  Man  is  called  upon  to 
repress  the  lower,  but  only  as  one  condition  of 
possessing  the  higher.  If  we  are  to  use  the  traditional 
* “Catholicism  and  the  Modern  Mind,”  p.  184. 


150  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


symbolism,  he  renounces  the  devil,  but  only  that  he 
may  embrace  Christ ; and  Christ  is  not  the  absence 
of  evil,  but  the  presence  of  a Beautiful  Good. 

We  must  come  back,  then,  to  this — that  Catholicism 
proposes  to  men,  as  the  End  of  Life,  Perfection  in 
Christ,  and  that  Perfection  in  Christ  means  the  satis- 
faction and  fulfilment  of  man’s  nature  in  its  complete- 
ness, as  it  has  been  given  to  him  by  God,  and  in  a 
situation  in  which  God  has  placed  him.  Man’s  nature 
is  physical,  moral,  intellectual,  practical,  individual, 
and  social.  It  needs  “ bread  ” — food,  clothing,  habi- 
tation, air,  light,  warmth,  health,  the  association  of 
the  sexes,  parentage,  love,  domestic  life,  civic  and 
national  sympathies,  beauty,  knowledge,  the  worship 
and  pursuit  of  things  Divine,  a high  social  activity, 
and  such  an  ordered  mastery  over  itself  and  the 
world  external  to  itself  as  may  make  the  attainment 
of  these  things  possible.  The  possession  of  these 
things,  in  a right  relation  and  harmony — with  what 
is  highest  in  them  controlling  and  animating  all  that 
is  lower — this  is  Perfection  in  Christ.  Its  pursuit 
is  the  pursuit  of  Perfection.  That  pursuit  is  Catholi- 
cism. Christ’s  “ Kingdom  ” is  the  Catholic  Church, 
conceived  of  as  an  ideal  society  of  human  beings. 
Into  this  society,  however,  not  one  man,  but  all 
men,  and  not  one  nation  but  all  nations,  are,  in 
principle,  to  be  brought.  It  is  to  be  social,  inter- 
national, universal,  continuous. 

We  may  dismiss  from  our  minds  the  conception  of 
such  a society  as  a mere  chimera,  but  if  we  do  not 
so  dismiss  it — if  we  hold  it  to  be,  what  it  is,  in  degree 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  15 1 


at  least,  an  attainable  end — then,  in  a scientific  view 
of  it,  we  can  see  that  a Human  Peace  is  an  essential 
condition  of  its  realization.  On  a certain  view  of 
Catholicism,  it  may  be  admitted  that  peace,  in  the 
sense  of  the  mere  absence  of  war,  is  not  for  man  an 
indispensable  good.  If  man  is  to  be  conceived  of 
only  as  a “ sinner  ” — ^who  is  by  nature  bound  to 
break,  and  in  practice  continually  breaks,  certain 
elementary  moral  commandments,  and  who  achieves 
eternal  fehcity  after  death  simply  as  a result  of  the 
“ remission  ” of  sin — then,  it  is  clear,  whether  there 
is  peace  or  war  in  the  world  is  of  comparatively  small 
importance.  Whether  this  “ sinner,”  man,  dies  at 
twenty  or  at  seventy,  in  bed  or  in  the  battlefield, 
slaughtering  or  being  slaughtered — this  does  not 
really  matter  much.  The  essential  thing  is  that  he 
should  profess  repentance  for  his  sins  and  be  absolved. 
If  he  does  this,  he  is  sure  ultimately  of  an  eternal 
heaven  ; and  if  he  is  fortunate  enough  to  be  able  to 
take  advantage  of  a plenary  indulgence,  he  goes 
there  at  once.  This  view  of  man,  moreover,  is  one 
which  concerns  the  individual  only.  Nations  and 
Governments,  as  such,  come  under  no  moral  rule. 
They  are  neither  “ sinners  ” nor  “ saints.”  They 
enter  no  confessional.  They  receive  no  absolution. 
They  do  not,  collectively,  reach  hell  or  heaven.  No 
statesman,  even,  is  supposed  to  be  “ damned  ” by 
his  bad  policy  or  “ saved  ” by  a good  one,  although 
his  bad  policy  may  ruin  a people,  and  his  good  one 
may  protect  and  ennoble  it.  In  the  same  way,  no 
individual  citizen,  as  such,  is  understood  to  be  called 


152  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


to  account  for  the  misgovernment  which  he  has 
sanctioned,  or  for  the  unnecessary  bloodshed  in 
which  he  has  willingly  taken  part.  The  word  “ sin  ” 
in  short,  has  no  political  significance — ^has  no  mean- 
ing for  governing  or  governed,  as  such  ; and  two 
nations  may  decimate  each  other  in  the  battlefield 
without  its  being  possible  for  any  recognized  authority 
to  declare  that  anyone  is  morally  responsible  for 
such  a result.  They  cannot,  as  nations,  be  judged, 
or  judge  one  another.  They  can  only  fight  and 
recriminate. 

We  are,  however,  now  only  concerned  with  a Scien- 
tific Catholicism,  and  with  its  relation  to  a Human 
Peace — a Scientific  Catholicism  being  conceived  of  as 
one  which,  pursuing  its  ancient  aim  of  Perfection 
in  Christ,  understands  this  aim  as  the  positive  and 
religious  fulfilment  of  the  total  nature  of  man, 
physical,  intellectual,  moral,  individual  and  social, 
national  and  international.  Such  a Catholicism  will 
bring  its  central  and  transcendent  aim  to  bear  upon 
the  whole  economy  and  policy  of  human  life.  It  will 
consider  the  problem  of  peace,  therefore,  in  the  light 
of  that  aim.  It  will  become  completely  and  syste- 
matically, what  spontaneously  and  in  a certain  degree 
it  has  always  been,  both  spiritual  and  practical.  It 
wiU  be  a voice  and  law  for  man  the  thinker,  or  man 
the  citizen,  or  man  the  worker,  as  for  man  “ the 
sinner.”  It  will  be  this,  and  do  this,  in  virtue  of  its 
being  scientific  and  “ modern  ” — in  other  words, 
because  of  its  capacity  to  represent  the  developed 
mind  of  man,  resting  on  the  sum  of  human  experiences. 


CATHOLICISM  AND  A HUMAN  PEACE  153 


and  so  able  to  see  himself  and  his  world  in  their 
true  nature  and  relations.  Such  a Catholicism,  in 
its  continuing,  luminous  universality,  will  deliver 
men  from  the  limits  of  individualism,  nationalism, 
party,  class,  and  sect.  It  will  be  an  authority  on 
the  one  hand,  for  all  who  are  Catholics,  pursuing  the 
Perfection  of  Christ  as  a living  and  expanding  ideal, 
and  on  the  other,  for  all  who  acknowledge  the  claims 
of  science,  the  obligation  to  see  things  as  they  are. 
If  we  are  Catholics  we  must  wish  Catholicism  to 
possess  the  light  and  the  power  of  science — man’s 
mind  in  its  fullest  development ; and  if  we  are  scien- 
tific, seeing  man  as  he  is,  in  relation  to  his  world  as  he 
knows  it,  we  must  recognize  that  in  his  confession  of 
Christ  he  confesses  an  indestructible  ideal  of  himself, 
as  an  individual  and  social  being,  which  it  is  the  task 
of  the  Catholic  Church — that  is,  humanity,  ordering 
itself  for  Perfection — to  progressively  realize.  It  is 
from  these  two  standpoints  become  one— the  stand- 
points of  Catholicism  and  science — that  the  right 
conception  and  pursuit  of  a Human  Peace  become 
possible. 


CHAPTER  V 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE 

According  to  the  conceptions  of  a Scientific 
Catholicism,  such  as  we  have  now  attempted  to 
define  it,  the  problem  of  a Human  Peace  becomes  a 
part  of  the  larger  problem  of  bringing  the  Perfection 
of  Christ  into  the  life  of  man.  In  other  words,  it 
ceases  to  be  an  isolated  political  problem,  and 
becomes,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  a religious 
problem.  It  is  a problem  of  the  Catholic  life.  In  its 
general  application  to  the  Catholic  life,  in  the  modern 
world,  the  office  of  science  is  twofold.  First,  it 
indicates  its  actual  nature  in  terms  of  practice ; 
secondly,  it  makes  clear  the  conditions  of  its  realiza- 
tion. It  is  in  this  way  that  science  may  be  said  to 
be,  by  its  own  native  character,  religious  and  Catholic. 
It  is  a form  of  honesty.  It  does  not  permit  us  to 
deceive  ourselves.  It  sees  things  and  shows  things 
as  they  are.  If  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the  language  of 
the  Gospel  poems,  is  the  Spirit  of  Truth,  then  it  is 
this  Spirit  that  has  built  up  all  our  great  positive 
sciences,  from  mathematics  to  morals ; and  the 
scientific  thinker,  patiently  and  exactly  unfolding  to 
us  the  Universal  Order,  which  is  God,  is  more  a voice 
of  the  Holy  Ghost  than  is  an  ordinary  ecclesiastic 
or  theologian,  giving  forth  unsupported  and  indemon- 
strable statements  concerning  things  visible  and 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  155 


invisible.  The  sacrament  of  holy  order,  therefore, 
has  a symbolic  value  in  proportion  as  it  represents  the 
communication  of  this  real  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
the  power  of  truth  or  science — the  power  which 
enables  man  to  see  things  as  they  are,  without 
deceiving  himself,  and  to  order  his  life  accordingly. 

It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  we  are  able  to 
understand — what  in  relation  to  the  Problem  of 
Peace  it  is  most  important  that  we  should  under- 
stand— the  nature  of  prayer,  as  an  instrument  of 
Perfection  in  Christ.  Prayer  is,  in  Catholicism,  a 
thing  of  central  significance.  If  it  is  not  scientific, 
Catholicism  cannot  be  scientific.  Prayer  is,  of  course, 
the  expression  of  a need,  but  it  is  also  a prelude  to 
action.  In  the  Lord’s  Prayer  we  say  “ Give  us  this 
day  our  daily  bread.”  That  is  the  expression  of  a 
need,  but  it  is  also  a prelude  to  action.  We  ask  for 
bread,  but  we  do  not  in  the  least  expect  it  to  be 
“ given  ” to  us.  We  know  that  we  must  work  for 
it.  We  know  also  that  we  must  work  for  it  according 
to  science — that  is  to  say,  according  to  our  experience 
of  natural  operations  and  our  knowledge  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  agriculture.  Lahorare  est  orare.  But  what 
is  true  of  the  petition  for  bread  is  true  also  of  every 
other  petition  in  the  Lord’s  Prayer — as,  for  instance, 
when  we  say  “ Lead  us  not  into  temptation.”  Here 
again  we  have  an  expression  of  need  which  is  also 
a prelude  to  action.  We  are  not  to  place  ourselves  in 
a position  of  temptation,  and  if  we  are  in  it  we  are  to 
withdraw  from  it.  That  is  the  science  of  prayer. 
“ Prayer,”  says  Auguste  Comte,  “ is  the  ideal  of  life. 


156  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


for  it  is  at  once  to  feel,  to  think,  and  to  act.”  “ The 
good  man,”  says  Thomas  a Kempis,  “first  lays  out 
inwardly  the  things  which  he  is  to  do  outwardly.” 
When,  therefore,  we  pray  for  peace  our  prayer  is  of 
no  value  unless  it  is  scientific — or,  to  use  an  equiva- 
lent expression,  unless  we  pray  according  to  a right 
theology.  Peace  is  no  more  “ given  ” to  us,  as 
passive  and  receptive  beings,  than  bread  is  so  given 
to  us.  In  prayer  we  must  not  deceive  ourselves. 
If  we  are  to  pray  effectually  for  peace,  we  must  have 
a sure  conception  and  vision  of  peace  in  our  minds, 
and  be  prepared  to  take  the  steps — a right  ordering 
of  ourselves  and  of  national  policy — ^which  the 
establishment  of  such  a peace  demands.  Our  prayer 
for  peace — and  most  of  all  for  a Human  Peace,  uni- 
versal and  continuous — must  be  a prelude  to  action, 
and  to  action  in  accordance  with  science.  If  it  is 
not,  it  will  be,  what  so  many  prayers  for  peace  are, 
only  a futile  expression  of  a vague  yearning — a mere 
ritualistic  rigmarole — or  an  exercise  in  self-deception, 
compatible  in  practice  with  a recurrent  surrender  to 
all  the  passions  and  illusions  of  war.  It  is  a common 
and  wholesome  saying  of  Catholic  preachers  that 
“ God  alone  cannot  save  men.”  This  is  only  the 
theological  statement  of  the  biological  principle  that 
life  is  the  action  and  reaction  of  organism  and 
environment,  which,  again,  is  equivalent  to  the 
Pauline  sentence  that  “ in  Him  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being.” 

The  master  aim  of  a Scientific  Catholicism,  con- 
sidered as  a living,  shaping,  human  power,  is  to 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  157 

promote  Perfection  in  Christ,  and  this  in  a positive 
and  practical  sense,  as  a fulfilment  of  all  the  sides  of 
human  nature,  in  a harmonious  order,  constituted  by 
the  subordination  of  its  lower  forces  to  the  higher. 
This  aim  is,  in  the  widest  sense,  social.  It  embraces 
all  humanity,  national  and  international.  It  is  true 
that  there  are  now  in  Christendom,  in  “ the  West,” 
a large  number  of  men  and  women  who  are,  by  pro- 
fession, or  by  want  of  profession,  non-Catholic  or 
non-Christian,  and  that  for  such  men  and  women  the 
problem  of  peace  is,  or  may  be,  one  of  importance. 
It  is  true,  too,  that  our  European  statesmanship  is, 
as  we  have  said,  implicitly  atheistic  or  secular,  setting 
aside  Catholicism,  or  Christianity,  in  any  form,  in  its 
common  arguments  and  action.  It  may  seem,  there- 
fore, that  the  standpoint  of  a Scientific  Catholicism, 
Perfection  according  to  Christ,  is  not  one  which  is,  in 
our  modern  world,  sufficiently  representative,  either 
of  the  non-European  or  of  the  European  world,  for 
the  purposes  of  international  action.  First,  however, 
^t  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  by  a principle  which  we 
have  already  established,  it  is  from  Christendom  that 
the  power  of  a Human  Peace  must  proceed  ; secondly, 
that  a Scientific  Catholicism,  in  the  degree  in  which 
it  is  really  scientific,  will,  in  relation  to  actual  social 
and  practical  interests,  be  able  to  appeal  to  a secular 
citizenship  and  statesmanship,  and  even  to  those 
who,  for  want  of  a better  name,  are  classed  as 
agnostics,  or  unbelievers.  It  may  be  admitted  that, 
even  within  the  circle  of  European  civilization, 
Catholicism,  or  Christianity,  does  not  now,  for  the 


158  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


purposes  of  either  thought  or  action,  give  us  a common 
or  social  standpoint.  Science,  however,  does  give 
us  such  a standpoint.  It  has  a sure  universality.  Its 
demonstrated  truths  and  its  methods  of  investigation 
are  accepted  by  Christians  and  non-Christians.  They 
prove  themselves  by  practice.  In  so  far,  therefore, 
as  Catholicism  is  scientific  and  practical,  it  will  be 
representative  even  of  those  who  may  not  call  them- 
selves Catholics. 

The  dominant  aim  of  life  being,  according  to  a 
Scientific  Catholicism,  Perfection  in  Christ  — the 
ordered  fulfilment  of  human  nature — it  is,  in  relation 
to  the  problem  of  peace,  necessary  to  convert  this 
abstract  statement  into  statements  concrete  and 
practical.  The  governing  needs  of  man  we  have 
already,  in  general  terms,  enumerated.  In  deter- 
mining those  needs  we  take,  as  our  type  of  human 
nature,  not  the  lowest  man,  or  even  the  “ average  ” 
man,  but  the  highest  man  given  in  experience — the 
complete,  or  completely-developed  man.  When  we 
speak  of  the  general  and  permanent  needs  of  “ man  ” 
it  is  such  a man  that  we  naturally  have  in  view. 
Now  man,  so  understood,  needs,  as  we  have  said, 
food,  clothing,  habitation,  health,  air,  light,  heat, 
locomotion,  the  association  of  the  sexes,  paternity, 
love,  domestic  and  social  life,  religion,  beauty,  know- 
ledge, and  the  freedom  and  power  to  so  act  that  he 
may  satisfy  these  various  requirements  of  his  nature. 
Let  us,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity  and  convenience, 
express  the  same  truth  in  terms  of  institutions,  and 
say  that  man  for  Perfection  in  Christ,  needs  the  home, 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  159 


the  Church,  the  school,  the  workshop,  the  theatre, 
and  the  State — using  the  word  ‘‘  theatre  ” as  a com- 
prehensive symbol  for  the  various  presentations  of  the 
arts,  and  the  word  “ State,”  similarly,  for  all  forms  of 
political  administration.  These  institutions,  or  instru- 
ments, of  his  many-sided  continuous  nature  man  does 
not  need  casually  or  intermittently.  He  needs  them 
always  and  everywhere  for  the  fulfilment  and  satis- 
faction of  his  total  being.  We  may,  in  the  interest 
of  perfect  accuracy  and  explicitness,  admit,  once 
more,  that  a large  number  of  men  now  profess  to  have 
no  need  of  the  Church.  To  that  extent,  therefore, 
the  Catholic  ideal  of  Perfection — Perfection  in  Christ 
— does  not  represent  them.  In  other  respects,  how- 
ever, it  does,  for  although  they  might  wish  to  strike 
out  the  Church  from  the  list  of  representative  human 
institutions,  they  would,  for  the  most  part,  and  in 
some  form,  retain  all  the  others  which  we  have 
mentioned.  In  regard  to  them,  at  least,  they  would 
have  common  ground  with  a Scientific  Catholicism. 

Putting  ourselves,  however — as  in  this  work  we 
have  throughout  done — at  the  point  of  view  of  such  a 
Catholicism,  we  may  take  the  six  representative 
institutions  which  we  have  specified  as  emanations 
of  the  nature  of  man  and  as  instruments  satisfying 
his  continuous  needs.  They  are,  therefore,  institu- 
tions and  instruments  of  Perfection  in  Christ.  They 
are,  further,  social  in  the  widest  sense,  national  and 
international.  Now,  it  is  plain  that  for  the  main- 
tenance of  these  institutions — that  is  to  say,  for  the 
realization  of  the  Catholic  life — man  is  dependent  on 


i6o  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


what  he  can  get  from  the  earth.  It  is  as  certain 
that  he  gets  the  Church  and  the  State,  the  home  and 
the  theatre,  from  the  earth  as  that  he  gets  his  bread 
from  it.  He  gets  them,  one  and  all,  by  labour. 
The  whole  life  of  man,  in  its  highest  as  in  its  lowest 
forms,  rests,  as  is  obvious,  ultimately  upon  agri- 
culture— using  this  word  for  all  modes  of  industrial 
action,  direct  and  indirect,  upon  the  earth.  That  is 
a truth,  simple  and  palpable  as  it  is,  of  which, 
amidst  the  complexities  of  a developed  civilization, 
we  frequently  lose  sight.  It  is,  nevertheless,  a truth 
basic  and  controlling.  It  is  no  paradox  to  say 
that  Perfection  in  Christ,  the  complete  Catholic 
life,  rests  upon  prayer  and  agriculture — on  prayer 
because  in  prayer  man  renews  in  his  mind  an 
image  of  a Divine  Humanity,  individual  and  social, 
which  it  is  his  will  to  realize  in  himself  ; on  agri- 
culture because  it  is  from  the  earth  that  all  men, 
from  the  savage  to  the  saint,  must  get  the  material 
means  of  life.  Agriculture,  therefore — that  is  to  say, 
the  whole  of  our  industrial  action — gains  meaning  and 
nobility  from  the  fact  that  it  is  an  indispensable 
means  to  an  end — the  highest  that  man,  in  his 
continuous  and  developed  nature,  proposes  to  himself. 

It  is  from  this  standpoint  that  we  are  able,  accord- 
ing to  a Scientific  Catholicism,  to  gain  a right  view 
of  a Human  Peace  and  of  the  policy  to  be  adopted 
for  its  establishment.  Whether  we  consider  a Human 
Peace  to  be  a good  depends,  as  we  have  seen,  on  our 
conception  of  the  End  of  Life,  or  of  the  means  to  be 
adopted  for  its  attainment.  The  End  of  Life,  as  a 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  i6i 


Scientific  Catholicism  understands  it,  is  Perfection 
in  Christ — the  ordered  fulfilment  of  a many-sided 
humanity — a Perfection  demanding,  as  its  institu- 
tions, the  home,  the  Church,  the  school,  the  workshop, 
the  theatre,  and  the  State,  or  Government,  and 
resting  ultimately  upon  the  earth,  and  what  man,  by 
his  industrial  action,  can  obtain  from  it.  Now, 
whether  peace,  regarded  simply  as  the  absence  of 
war,  is,  relatively  to  this  end,  a good  depends,  of 
course,  on  the  nature  of  war,  and  what  it  is  that  it  is 
in  its  power  to  accomplish.  War  is  a good  if  it  can 
be  shown  to  be,  in  some  indispensable  way,  sub- 
servient to  Perfection  in  Christ,  according  to  that 
practical  and  social  conception  of  it  which  we  have 
now  elucidated  ; it  is  an  evil,  and  therefore  a serious 
evil,  if  it  frustrates  or  hinders  that  Perfection. 
When  we  thus  speak  of  war  as  good  or  evil  we  are, 
as  is  obvious,  considering  it  as  a thing  to  be  chosen 
or  rejected  by  deliberate  policy.  Such  a choice  or 
rejection  may  in  part  be  due  to  the  strength  or 
weakness  of  certain  primary  human  passions — as,  for 
instance,  the  instinct  of  destruction  and  the  joy  of 
combat — but,  in  our  modern  world  at  least,  questions 
of  international  action  are  questions  of  statesmanship, 
and  before  the  Government  of  any  country  enters  on 
a war,  or  prosecutes  a policy  carrying  with  it  the 
risks  of  war,  it  has  usually  come  to  the  decision  that 
such  a war,  evil  as  it  may  be  in  certain  respects,  is 
yet,  for  some  definite  purpose,  necessary. 

What  we  have  therefore  to  consider  is  whether  war, 
regarded  as  a definite  mode  of  human  action,  and 


i62  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


being  conceived  of  as  lying  within  the  sphere  of 
deliberate  choice,  is,  in  our  modern  world,  indis- 
pensable to  the  preservation  of  those  high  permanent 
interests  of  man  which  we  have  summed  up  in  the 
words  “ Perfection  in  Christ,”  or  the  Catholic  life. 
This  is,  once  more,  not  a historic  question  ; it  is  a 
question  of  the  present  and  the  future.  It  may  be 
true  that  war,  in  various  periods  of  the  past,  and 
relatively  to  the  then  existing  conditions,  was  some- 
times a good,  and  yet  that,  relatively  to  existing  con- 
ditions, it  is  an  evil.  Again,  we  are  not  concerned  to 
discuss  the  question  of  whether  war,  being  admitted 
to  be  an  evil,  is  yet  an  evil  out  of  which  good  may 
come.  There  is  hardly  any  form  of  evil — a pesti- 
lence, poverty,  a shipwreck,  an  earthquake,  a flood, 
a famine,  a conflagration,  a persecution — ^which  may 
not  afford  occasions  for  the  display  of  some  high 
quality  of  human  nature.  No  sane  man,  however, 
would  propose  that  such  occasions  should  be 
deliberately  created  in  order  to  give  rise  to  such  a 
display.  It  is  the  ultimate  purpose  of  Catholicism, 
stated  in  traditional  and  symbolic  language,  to  enable 
men  to  get  to  “ Heaven,”  where,  as  is  supposed,  they 
will  be  exempt  from  every  form  of  evil  and  suffering, 
and  enjoy  eternal  “ felicity.”  We  are  not,  therefore, 
called  upon  to  consider  whether  evil  is  good  and  good 
evil,  or  whether  war,  being  an  evil,  may  not  give  rise 
to  an  exercise  of  heroic  patriotism,  noble  personal 
devotedness,  and  beautiful  charity.  What  we  are 
concerned  with  is  the  Catholic  ordering  of  human  life 
for  the  ends  of  Perfection — or,  if  such  a statement  be 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  163 


preferred — man,  in  communion  with  Christ,  exercising 
his  spiritual  sovereignty  for  the  fulfilment  of  a positive 
ideal  of  himself.  Relatively  to  such  a purpose,  a 
good  is  only  a good  if  it  is  a means  indispensable  to 
its  accomplishment,  or  such  as,  being  free,  we  should 
deliberately  choose. 

Now,  the  six  representative  institutions  of  the 
Catholic  life  are,  as  we  have  seen,  the  home,  the 
Church,  the  school,  the  theatre,  the  State,  and  the 
workshop,  using  each  of  these  terms  in  a comprehen- 
sive and  symbolic  sense.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity 
and  convenience  we  may  group  together,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  first  four  of  these  institutions,  and  on  the 
other,  the  last  two.  The  first  four  we  may  call 
institutions  of  the  spiritual  and  the  last  two  insti- 
tutions of  the  temporal  life.  Such  an  arrange- 
ment and  terminology  must,  of  course,  in  many 
respects,  be  arbitrary.  The  Catholic  life,  the  life  of 
man,  is  a unity.  All  its  parts,  or  factors,  are  inter- 
dependent. Church  and  State,  workshop  and  home, 
act  and  react  upon  one  another.  This  being  recog- 
nized and  allowed  for,  however,  there  is  still  a certain 
advantage,  for  our  immediate  purpose,  in  the  double 
grouping  which  we  have  suggested.  The  four 
spiritual  institutions,  as  we  have  called  them,  spring 
especially  out  of  four  persisting  moral  and  intellectual 
needs  of  human  nature — ^its  craving  for  social  love, 
its  craving  for  goodness,  its  craving  for  beauty,  its 
craving  for  knowledge  or  “ truth.”  The  two  tem- 
poral institutions  are  more  directly  concerned  with 
man’s  need  for  action,  or  practical  power,  whether 


i64  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


politically,  in  the  organization  of  the  State,  or  indus- 
trially, in  his  operations  upon  the  earth. 

Understanding,  then,  by  the  “ spiritual  life  ” of 
man  the  life  in  which  he  is  more  especially  occupied 
with  the  interests  of  love,  goodness,  beauty  and 
knowledge,  and  by  his  temporal  life,  that  in  which 
he  is  more  directly  concerned  with  action  in  the 
State  and  in  industry,  it  is  possible  to  determine  the 
relation  of  war,  in  the  modern  world,  to  these  two 
chief  ends  of  his  being.  War  is,  of  course,  a perfectly 
definite  mode  of  human  action.  A European  states- 
man or  citizen  in  the  twentieth  century  has,  as  he 
enters  into  war,  a full  consciousness  of  what  it  is  and 
what  it  implies.  It  is  a special  application  of  material 
force,  and  is  comparable,  therefore,  in  certain  respects, 
with  the  processes  of  agriculture  or  shipbuilding.  In 
its  essential  immediate  results  war,  of  course,  does 
not  differ  in  the  twentieth  century  from  what  it  was 
in  the  age  of  Homer.  It  only  differs  in  scale  and 
method — in  being  more  deliberate,  more  systematic, 
and  better  organized,  in  carrying  with  it  a fuller 
human  science  and  prescience,  in  resting  on  a wider 
and  more  adequate  preparation,  in  employing  a more 
effective  apparatus  of  slaughter,  and,  like  industry, 
in  largely  substituting  mechanical  agencies  for  the 
direct  and  individual  action  of  man.  In  other 
respects,  however,  war  is,  at  the  end  of  three  thousand 
years,  substantially  what  it  was  at  the  beginning.  Its 
immediate,  or  purely  military,  purpose  is  to  kill  men 
and  destroy  human  constructions  ; its  ultimate,  or 
political,  purpose  is  to  compel  some  one  people  either 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  165 


to  accept  the  rule  of  another,  or  to  surrender  to  it  a 
part  of  its  territory  and  population,  or  its  material 
wealth,  or  to  act,  or  refrain  from  acting,  in  a certain 
way,  according  to  the  demands  of  the  victor. 

It  is,  then,  for  a Scientific  Catholicism  to  deter- 
mine, in  the  first  place,  how  far  war,  being  what  it  is 
in  its  processes  and  objects,  is  demonstrably  and 
indispensably  subservient  to  the  Catholic  life,  which 
is,  on  its  spiritual  side,  a life  of  love,  goodness,  beauty, 
and  truth.  Now,  it  is  not  necessary,  so  far  as  our 
modern  world  is  concerned,  to  say  much  upon  this 
subject.  Within  the  limits  of  Christendom,  at  least, 
wars  are  not  now  waged,  and  are  not  likely  to  be  waged, 
in  the  immediate  interests  of  the  spiritual  life — the 
interests  of  the  home,  or  of  the  Church,  or  of  the 
school,  or  of  the  arts.  To  a great  extent  the  interests 
of  Christendom  in  these  respects,  allowing  for  sub- 
ordinate differences,  are  common,  as  are  also  the 
conceptions  and  practical  methods  brought  to  bear 
upon  them.  In  so  far  as  disagreement  exists  with 
regard  to  them,  although  it  may  be  a cause  of  dislike 
and  estrangement,  it  is  not  a cause  of  actual  conflict. 
In  other  words,  no  one,  in  our  modern  world,  and  so 
far  as  Christendom  is  concerned,  supposes  that  mere 
differences  in  regard  to  religious  belief,  or  in  regard 
to  education  and  the  arts,  are  likely,  in  themselves, 
to  be  a motive  of  international  war.  There  are 
various  reasons  for  this — one  obvious  reason  being 
that  religious  behef  in  Christendom  is  not  now  settled 
and  serious,  another  that  Governments  are,  as  we 
have  said,  no  longer  organs  of  definite  religious 


i66  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


opinions,  but  of  a sort  of  neutral  secularism.  But 
whatever  its  explanation,  the  fact  itself  is  certain. 

When  we  get  beyond  Christendom — to  the  relations 
of  Western  Powers  with  non-Western  peoples,  or  of 
the  higher  civilizations  with  the  lower — this  is  no 
longer,  to  the  same  extent  and  in  appearance,  true, 
although  even  here  it  remains  true  in  essentials.  A 
Christian  missionary,  going  from  a powerful  country 
to  a non-Christian  people,  may  possibly  bring  about 
war,  if  his  preaching  proves  unpalatable  to  the 
natives,  and  they  actively  molest  him  in  the  exercise 
of  it.  Even  in  such  a case,  however,  the  armed 
support  that  is  given  to  him  by  his  Government  is 
given  not  so  much  on  religious  as  on  political  grounds. 
He  is  supported,  if  at  all,  not  as  an  agent  of  Christ, 
but  because  he  is  a representative  of  his  country,  and 
it  is  held  to  be  necessary  to  enforce  respect  for  him 
as  such.  It  is,  in  fact,  from  the  political  point  of 
view,  often  an  advantage  to  his  Government  to  give 
him  such  support,  as  in  doing  so  it  commonly  gains  an 
opportunity  of  interfering  in  the  internal  afiFairs  of 
the  uncivilized  people,  and  thus  of  creating  for  itself 
a fresh  sphere  of  interest,  imperial  or  commercial, 
and  ultimately,  perhaps,  of  annexing  a new  territory. 
So  far  as  the  missionary  is  concerned,  it  limits  itself 
to  affording  him  personal  protection.  It  has  no 
concern  with  the  special  religious  opinions  which  he 
may  represent.  Missionaries  are,  of  course,  of  all 
creeds  and  schools,  and  wherever  they  go  they  carry 
with  them  the  domestic  conflicts  and  doubts  of 
Christendom.  They  stand,  in  greater  or  less  degree, 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  167 

for  the  European  mind,  in  its  present  state  of  uncer- 
tainty and  disorder.  Consequently,  although,  in  a 
given  situation,  a European  Government  may  wage 
war  against  a non-Christian  people  for  the  support  of 
a missionary,  it  still  acts,  as  it  acts  in  the  sphere  of 
domestic  politics,  rather  as  a secular  than  as  a 
religious  agency. 

There  are  other  obvious  reasons  why,  in  the  future, 
a war  for  the  direct  and  avowed  purpose  of  advancing 
Christianity  is  not  likely  to  be  entered  upon.  One  of 
these  reasons  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  some 
non-Christian  peoples — as,  for  example,  the  Japanese 
— ^have  recently  proved  themselves  to  be  capable  of 
becoming  so  far  “ Western  ” as  to  adopt  the  Western 
methods  and  machinery  of  war.  This  does  not,  as 
we  have  said,  afford  ground  for  the  supposition  that 
the  West  will  lose  its  intellectual  and  practical  lord- 
ship  in  regard  to  the  East,  but  it  certainly  gives  to 
the  East  a greater  power  of  resisting  encroachment. 
Another,  and  perhaps  more  potent,  reason  is  to  be 
seen  in  the  alliances  between  Christian  and  non- 
Christian  peoples  which  have  been  a remarkable 
characteristic  of  later  European  policy.  Such  alliances 
have  gone  far,  in  a most  important  sphere  of  human 
effort,  to  abrogate  the  distinction  between  Christianity 
— ^in  so  far  as  Christianity,  in  any  sense,  now  enters 
into  State  action — and,  for  instance,  Mohammedanism, 
or  what  we  have  hitherto  called  the  “ Pagan,”  beliefs 
of  India  and  Japan.  As  “ misery  makes  men 
acquainted  with  strange  bedfellows,”  so  war,  in  the 
wide  world  of  our  modern  cosmopohtanism,  has  for 


1 68  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


its  own  purposes  reduced  all  the  religions  of  mankind 
to  a common  level,  and  made  Hindus  and  Moham- 
medans the  companions  of  European  Catholics, 
Protestants,  and  atheists  in  Western  battlefields  in 
the  operations  of  slaughter  and  destruction.  It  has 
of  course,  in  the  same  way,  and  within  the  same 
limits,  gone  far  to  abolish  the  difference  between 
what  we  have  been  accustomed  to  call  “ barbarism,” 
on  the  one  hand  and  “ civilization  ” on  the  other.  It 
has  set  up  a sort  of  international  “ secularism,”  in 
which  even  the  profoundest  differences  of  belief  and 
morals  have  apparently  lost  their  importance,  in 
comparison  with  what  are  considered  to  be  the 
exigencies  of  State  and  national  expansion. 

While,  however,  it  is  true,  for  these  and  other 
reasons,  that  war,  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  promot- 
ing Christianity,  or  the  interests  of  the  spiritual  life, 
is  not  now  likely  to  be  waged  by  Western  nations, 
it  is  still  necessary  to  recognize  that  it  cannot,  in  any 
case,  be  regarded  as  directly  and  indispensably 
auxiliary  to  that  life.  There  is  a sense,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  in  which  it  may  be  held  to  be,  in  given 
circumstances,  indirectly  essential  to  its  maintenance 
and  progress,  but  what  we  are  now  concerned  with  is 
its  immediate  bearing  on  Catholicism,  as  a mode  of 
realizing  Perfection  in  Christ— as  a mode  of  exalting 
and  unifying  in  man  the  power  of  social  love,  the 
power  of  goodness,  the  power  of  beauty,  and  the 
power  of  truth.  Now  the  life  in  Christ,  the  Catholic 
life,  is,  as  we  say,  spiritual.  It  is  above  all,  and  in  the 
first  place,  interior.  It  is  a life  of  feeling,  thought, 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  169 


imagination,  finding  its  first  outward  expression  in 
prayer  and  worship,  and  passing  afterwards  into 
action.  In  what  way,  it  may  be  asked,  are  the 
processes  of  war,  as  such~a  special  application  of 
material  force,  directed  to  the  destruction  of  human 
life  and  constructions—directly  and  indispensably 
subservient  to  this  interior  life  ? Whether  what  we 
are  concerned  with  is  the  maintenance  and  reinforce- 
ment of  domestic  love,  or  the  communication  of  the 
Image  and  worship  of  Christ  or  Our  Lady,  or  the 
diffusion  of  ideas  and  principles  in  art  or  science,  or 
the  presentation  of  the  conceptions  and  creations  of 
the  beautiful,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  no  relation 
between  the  operations  of  war  and  the  attainment 
of  these  ends.  We  may  take,  as  a high  typical 
instance  of  aU  spiritual  methods,  the  action  of  a 
missionary  proclaiming  Christianity  in  a non-Christian 
country.  His  task  is  to  communicate  to  another 
mind  a conception,  or  image,  which  is  in  his  own,  and 
so  to  communicate  it  that  it  may  give  rise  to  a new 
love,  a new  insight,  and  a new  life.  This  is  a spiritual 
task.  In  other  words,  it  is  a task  of  mind  operating 
upon  mind—a  task  of  education.  For  the  accom- 
plishment of  such  a task  there  are  no  means  available 
except  sympathy,  intelligence,  a right  use  of  language, 
and  the  testimony  of  personal  conduct,  exemplifying 
the  rehgion  that  is  being  preached.  War,  or  the 
menace  of  war,  has  no  assignable  part  in  such  a 
process.  War  has  its  own  methods,  and  accom- 
plishes its  own  objects.  It  acts  upon  the  body  for 
its  destruction,  not  upon  the  mind  for  its  illumination. 


170  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

The  utmost  that  it  can  do  for  a missionary,  in  such  a case 
as  we  are  now  supposing,  is  to  secure  for  him  freedom 
from  molestation,  and  such  a freedom,  so  secured,  may 
actually  be  a hindrance  to  his  spiritual  task.  As  it 
is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out,  the  noblest  mis- 
sionary achievements  in  the  world — those  of  the  apos- 
toHc  age,  or  of  the  Church  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  or  of  the  early  Jesuits — ^were  those  of  men  who 
enjoyed  no  such  security,  and  had  no  other  resources 
than  those  of  their  own  temper  and  intelligence,  and 
the  beauty  of  the  truth  which  they  had  to  impart. 
Against  the  use  of  arms,  as  a direct  support  to  the 
cause  of  religion,  the  Crucifixion — the  greatest  mis- 
sionary event  the  world  has  ever  known — bears  its 
eternal  testimony. 

So  far,  then,  as  what  we  have  called  the  spiritual 
life  is  concerned — the  life  of  the  home,  the  Church, 
the  school,  or  the  theatre,  as  resting  on  an  inner 
state  of  feeling  and  intelligence — it  cannot  be  shown 
that  war  is  a good,  that  it  is  a means  indispensably 
subservient  to  the  ends  which  this  life  proposes  to 
itself.  It  can  be  shown,  on  the  contrary,  that  war, 
by  its  essential  methods  and  objects — being  methods 
and  objects  of  slaughter  and  destruction — ^is  in  natural 
antagonism  to  the  methods  and  objects  of  the 
spiritual  Hfe.  But  the  Catholic  life — by  which  we 
mean,  once  more,  the  total,  ordered  Hfe  of  man — 
has  also,  as  we  have  seen,  a temporal  side.  It  is 
concerned  with  what  we  call  the  State,  with  the 
organization  and  maintenance  of  the  nation,  as  such ; 
it  is  concerned,  too,  ultimately,  and  fundamentally. 


WAR  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  171 


with  man’s  action  upon  the  earth.  It  is  only  arbi- 
trarily and  provisionally  that  one  of  these  sides  of 
the  Catholic  life  — of  a full  - flowering,  ordered 
humanity — can  be  separated  from  the  other.  They 
are,  in  fact,  indissolubly  connected  and  interdepen- 
dent. Therefore,  if  it  can  be  proved  that  war  is  a 
good,  that  it  is  inevitably  necessary,  relatively  to 
the  temporal  life,  it  must  be  held  to  be  also  necessary, 
and  a good,  relatively  to  the  spiritual  life,  even 
although  it  does  not  directly  enter  into  the  aims  and 
methods  of  that  life.  Stating  the  same  propositions 
in  another  way,  we  may  say  that,  although  war  is 
not  immediately  subservient  to  the  affections  and 
mind  of  the  home,  the  Church,  the  school,  and  the 
theatre,  it  may  still  be  considered  to  be  indispensable 
to  the  security  of  the  political  and  material  foundation 
on  which  they  rest.  A Scientiflc  Catholicism,  pre- 
cisely because  it  is  scientific,  is  bound  to  consider  this 
question. 


CHAPTER  VI 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 

It  is,  as  we  have  said,  the  office  of  science,  in  regard 
to  Catholicism,  to  enable  it  to  see  things  and  represent 
them  as  they  are — the  things  of  man  and  of  the 
Universal  Order,  with  which  he  is  in  dependent  and 
modifying  relation.  This,  up  to  the  present,  Catholi- 
cism, being  an  expression  of  the  mind  of  man,  has  not 
been  able  to  do,  its  conception  of  the  world  and 
humanity,  and  therefore  of  God,  having  been  shaped 
and  symbolized  at  a time  when  human  experience 
and  reason  were  immature.  Catholicism,  however, 
may  now  become  scientific — that  is  to  say,  it  may 
stand  for  the  total,  developed  mind  of  man  become, 
in  its  range  of  observation  and  inference,  complete. 
Catholicism,  so  understood,  while  it  continues  to  use 
its  old  scriptures,  formulas,  images,  and  institutions, 
will  know  how  far  they  are  a right  representation  of 
man  in  his  maturity,  how  far  they  need  to  be 
reinterpreted  and  supplemented.  There  is,  for  ex- 
ample, in  the  Gospel  poems  a magisterial  dictum 
bearing  upon  the  spiritual  life  which  is,  in  a given 
construction  of  it,  profoundly  and  beautifully  true, 
but  which  is,  in  another  sense,  a sentence  of  evident 
impossibility.  That  dictum  is  “ seek  first  the  King- 
dom of  God,  and  His  righteousness.”  We  have,  in 
this  treatise,  conformed  to  the  principle  which  is 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


173 


thus  set  forth  by  first  endeavouring  to  ascertain  the 
End  of  Life,  and  by  then  considering  the  question  of 
peace  in  relation  to  it.  Such  a method  is  plainly 
imposed  upon  us  when  we  are  considering  man  as  a 
being  of  high  intelligence  and  will,  moved  by  an  inner 
vision  of  Perfection,  and  acting  upon  himself  and  his 
environment  with  a view  to  its  realization.  God, 
therefore — God  being  the  Universal  Order,  contained 
and  presented  to  us  symbolically  and  prophetically 
in  the  human  and  personal  Order  of  Christ — must 
be  seen  to  be  the  End  of  our  being  when  we  are  con- 
sciously and  deliberately  marshalling  all  our  forces, 
external  and  internal,  and  stamping  them  with 
purpose. 

In  practice,  however,  we  must  adopt  an  inverse 
method.  The  first  Adam  is  of  the  earth — earthy. 
In  less  parabolical  language,  man  is,  to  begin  with, 
an  animal.  There  is  no  disgrace  in  this — nothing  to 
be  ashamed  of  ; at  any  rate,  it  is  a fact.  According 
to  the  poem  of  Genesis,  man  was  made  an  animal 
and  a companion  of  animals,  but  also  a perfect 
being  and  the  companion  of  God.  Before  the  Fall, 
as  afterwards,  he  had  to  eat  and  drink,  and  he  had 
as  his  associate  a being  of  a different  sex  from  himself. 
Whatever  our  view  of  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments,  however,  it  is  evident  that  man  is 
what  he  is — a being  who  must  eat  and  drink,  and  who, 
for  the  satisfaction  of  his  own  impulses,  or  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  human  race,  must  be  joined  to  a 
being  of  a different  sex  from  himself.  The  religious 
celibate  can  so  far  order  himself  as  to  master  his  own 


174  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


passions,  and  determine  that  no  other  bodily  life 
shall  proceed  from  his  own,  but  even  he  cannot  live 
without  eating  and  drinking,  and  he  also  requires 
clothing  and  habitation,  warmth  and  light.  While, 
therefore,  it  is  true,  as  we  have  said,  that  the  Catholic 
life  may  be  summed  up  as  prayer  and  agriculture — 
an  order  of  Perfection  in  Christ,  individual  and  social, 
dependent  on  what  man  can  get  from  the  earth — 
it  is  also  true  that,  practically  speaking,  agriculture 
must  come  first,  or,  as  Comte  expresses  it,  that  “ the 
higher  order  rests  upon  the  lower.”  To  use  the 
familiar  expression,  while  we  ought  not  to  live  to 
eat,  we  must  eat  to  live.  While,  therefore,  the 
question  of  whether  war  is  or  is  not  a good  depends 
upon  our  conception  of  the  End  of  Life,  it  is  neces- 
sarily also  dependent  on  the  relation  of  what  is  dis- 
tinctively spiritual  in  the  Catholic  Hfe  to  the  material 
foundation  on  which  it  rests. 

The  problem  of  war  is,  as  has  been  seen,  immediately 
connected  with  the  problem  of  nationality,  or  the 
external  relations  of  the  State.  In  a strictly  scientific 
sense,  that  is,  as  we  have  also  seen,  an  insufiicient 
view  to  take  of  it,  for  there  have  been,  and  may  be 
again,  civil  wars,  and  we  may  be  forced  upon  the 
conclusion  that  the  causes  which,  in  our  modern 
world,  are  provocative  of  international  strife  are  in 
intimate  connection  with  those  which  might  con- 
ceivably bring  about  a civil  war,  and  which  do,  in 
fact,  keep  almost  all  European  countries  in  a state 
of  constant  political  unrest  and  conflict.  WTiat  we 
are  immediately  concerned  with,  however,  is  the  war 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


175 


of  States  or  nations.  Now,  whether  war  is,  relatively 
to  the  nation,  a good  is  a question  which  itself  admits 
of  being  considered  from  two  chief  points  of  view. 
One  of  these  is  an  industrial  point  of  view ; the 
other  is,  in  a more  definite  sense,  political.  Again, 
it  is  necessary,  for  an  orderly  discussion  of  the 
question,  to  draw  the  obvious  distinction  between 
offensive  and  defensive  war.  There  can,  of  course, 
be  no  defensive  war  without  offensive  war,  and  a 
war  of  defence  evidently  does  not  raise  the  same 
questions  of  principle  as  a war  of  aggression. 
Unless  a given  people  has  made  up  its  mind  to  submit 
to  the  demands  or  overlordship  of  another  State,  it 
may  be  forced  into  a war,  whatever  its  views  as  to 
the  abstract  value  of  peace.  The  question  of  the 
good  of  war  is,  then,  the  question  of  the  good  of 
aggressive  war — of  a war  deliberately  and  intention- 
ally undertaken  to  promote  some  purpose  of  policy 
which  cannot,  on  the  hypothesis,  be  otherwise 
secured. 

Again,  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  if  a given 
aggressive  war  is,  in  this  sense,  a good — being  the 
indispensable  means  to  a good — it  cannot  be  held  to 
be  an  evil  because  it  is  contrary  to  our  sentiments  of 
humanity.  The  execution  of  a murderer,  or  the 
prolonged  imprisonment  of  a thief,  does  violence  to 
certain  sentiments  of  humanity,  and  yet  we  are 
compelled  to  acquiesce  in  these  evils  for  the  sake  of 
what  seems  to  us  a social  need.  According  to  our 
traditional  conception  of  God,  He  is  an  Omnipotent 
Being  who  permits  the  continuous  misery  of  the 


176  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

human  race  in  this  life  because  He  cannot  abolish  this 
misery  without  destroying  the  good  of  free  will,  and  He 
destines  a large  part  of  it  to  eternal  torment  in  a 
future  state  because  it  is  impossible  for  Him  to  act 
otherwise  without  the  violation  of  His  own  justice. 
In  the  same  way,  we  are  told  that  at  the  battle  of 
Omdurman  in  1898  a British  army,  under  Lord 
Kitchener,  killed  11,000  Arabs  and  wounded  16,000 
others  in  fifteen  minutes.*  Such  a proceeding,  in  an 
age  when  many  persons  protest  even  against  animal 
vivisection,  might  seem  to  be  an  odious  butchery, 
but,  from  another  point  of  view,  it  may  be  regarded 
as  only  an  incident  in  the  reclamation  and  pacification 
of  the  Soudan  ; and  if  the  ascendency  of  England  in 
the  world  is  a good,  then,  on  a principle  which  was 
at  one  time  supposed  to  be  exclusively  Jesuitic,  the 
means  which  are  indispensable  to  it  must  be  held  to 
be  justifiable.  The  lesser  humanity  must  give  way 
to  what  appears  to  us  the  greater.  We  know,  more- 
over, that  when  a battle  is  in  progress  it  is  not  the 
object  of  the  commander  on  either  side  to  kill  as  few 
of  the  enemy  as  possible,  but  to  gain  the  victory — 
a purpose  compared  with  which  all  others  are  then 
insignificant.  He  kills,  therefore,  few  or  many, 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  combat,  and  he 
is  not  in  a position  to  enter  on  any  scrupulous  cal- 
culations as  to  the  amount  of  slaughter  which  may 
be  actually  required.  It  is  true  that  in  our  modern 
world  the  machine-gun  and  the  bayonet  are  com- 

* “ The  Life  of  Spencer  Compton,  Eighth  Duke  of  Devonshire,” 
by  Bernard  Holland,  Vol.  II.,  p.  44. 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


177 


monly  accompanied  by  the  surgeon,  the  nurse,  and 
the  priest,  who  are,  within  certain  limits,  instruments 
of  benevolence  and  reparation  ; but  it  is  none  the 
less  obvious  that  for  the  purposes  of  war,  as  such,  the 
feeling  of  humanity  must  be  held  in  suspense.  The 
soldier,  like  the  butcher  or  the  executioner,  is  the 
minister  of  what  is  believed  to  be  a social  need. 
The  difference  between  his  function  and  theirs  is 
mainly  a difference  of  scale  and  equipment,  although 
it  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  office  of  the  butcher 
is  in  this  sense  more  important  that  he  is  directly 
concerned  with  the  nourishment  of  the  human  race. 

When,  therefore,  we  are  considering  whether  war 
is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  national  life,  an 
indispensable  good,  we  must,  first,  understand  by 
“ war  ” a war  voluntary  and  aggressive,  planned  and 
undertaken  for  the  accomplishment  of  a specific  pur- 
pose ; secondly,  we  must  dismiss  from  our  minds  the 
question  of  the  “ inhumanity  ” of  war.  If  a proposed 
war  is,  on  a total  survey  of  it,  justifiable,  we  are 
entitled  to  bring  it  about,  and  if  we  are  entitled  to 
bring  it  about  we  must  recognize  that  war  is,  by  its 
essential  nature  and  processes,  a suspension  of  the 
law  of  humanity.  It  is  a specific  application  of 
material  force  directed  to  bloodshed  and  destruction. 
It  is  this  most  of  all  in  our  modern  world,  in  which 
a battle  is  carried  on  by  the  use  of  a scientific  mechan- 
ism and  a general  is  only  an  engineer  of  slaughter. 
When  we  have  recognized  this,  however,  we  must 
also  recognize  that  the  question  of  whether  a nation 
is  “ justified  ” in  bringing  about  a war,  or  in  pursuing 


178  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


a policy  such  as  must  render  war  inevitable,  cannot 
be  decided  from  the  standpoint  of  the  nation  alone, 
politically  and  industrially  considered.  It  can  only 
rightly  be  determined,  as  we  are  trying  to  determine 
it  here,  from  the  standpoint  of  a Catholicism  become 
scientific,  and  thus  rendered  capable  of  seeing  the 
relation  of  what  we  have  called  the  temporal  life — 
the  life  of  citizenship  and  industry — to  the  spiritual. 
The  distinctive  institution  of  the  temporal  life  is  the 
State,  using  this,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  as  a 
term  inclusive  of  both  political  and  industrial  govern- 
ment ; the  distinctive  institution  of  the  spiritual  life 
is  the  Church.  Now  the  mind  of  the  Church  is, 
according  to  our  conception  of  it,  science.  It  sees 
and  foresees.  It  is,  in  principle,  universal.  It  is 
international,  as  is  science  in  the  ordinary  and 
accepted  sense  of  the  word — the  science  of  the  natural 
order.  It  is  for  the  Church,  therefore — the  developed 
mind  of  man,  pursuing  Perfection  in  Christ — to  give 
its  law  to  the  nation,  or  State.  It  is  clear  that,  apart 
from  such  a Catholicism,  the  nation  is,  for  inter- 
national purposes,  what  in  fact  we  see  it  at  present 
to  be,  a law  unto  itself,  or  is  without  law.  Its  only 
rule  of  action  is  derived  from  what  it  believes  to  be 
its  own  exclusive  interest,  and  the  power  which  it 
possesses  of  enforcing  it.  If  there  is  to  be  any  other 
rule  of  national  action  than  this — which  is  a rule 
secularistic  and  local — it  must  be  one  carrying  men’s 
minds  beyond  the  limits  of  a particular  country,  and 
enabling  them  to  see  the  temporal  order  of  the  nation 
as  part  of  a spiritual  order  greater  than  itself.  That 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


179 


greater  spiritual  order  is  the  Catholic  Church,  con- 
ceived of  as  representing  and  directing  the  whole  life 
of  humanity,  and  with  its  centre  and  head  in  Rome. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  international  policy — ^the 
only  point  of  view  which  immediately  concerns  us — a 
State  has  been  defined  as  any  people,  or  aggregate  of 
peoples,  however  dissimilar  in  language,  religion,  race, 
or  situation,  having  an  independent  and  sovereign 
character,  and  possessing  a responsible,  co-ordinating 
Government,  for  internal  and  external  purposes.  In 
such  a use  of  it,  the  word  “ State  ” has  a range  of 
meaning  inclusive  at  once  of  the  smallest  of  free 
European  nationalities  and  of  so  vast  a political 
conglomerate  as  the  British  or  Russian  Empire.  The 
question  which  we  have  to  determine  is  how  far  for 
any  such  State  war  may  be  so  indispensable  a good, 
political  or  industrial,  that  it  is  entitled  deliberately 
to  bring  it  about,  or  to  pursue  a policy  which  may 
render  it  inevitable.  This,  of  course,  is  quite  distinct 
from  the  question  of  the  character  and  composition  of 
a particular  State.  From  a certain  point  of  view,  it 
may  be  held  that  the  processes  by  which,  for  example, 
the  British  and  Russian  Empires  have  been  built  up 
and  maintained  are  indefensible,  but  that  is  not  our 
present  subject.  We  are  supposing  ourselves  to  start 
from  a given  international  status  quo,  however  that 
status  quo  may  have  been  created,  and  whether  or 
not  we  consider  it  to  rest  on  ideal  relations,  internal 
or  external.  The  installation  and  maintenance  of  a 
Human  Peace  require  that  this  status  quo  shall  be 
regarded  as  not  to  be  subject  to  forcible  disturbance. 


i8o  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


and  that  there  shall  be  a consequent  disarmament  and 
the  common  adhesion  to  a policy  in  harmony  with 
such  a proceeding.  What  we  have  immediately  to 
decide  is  how  far  for  any  given  State  there  may  be 
some  political  good,  which  it  is  entitled  to  set  against 
the  assumed  good  of  a Human  Peace. 

We  may  simplify  the  discussion  of  this  question  by 
going  back  to  what  we  have  already  said  as  to  the 
one  policy  which  is,  by  its  native  character,  inevitably 
a cause  of  war.  That  policy  we  have  called  the  policy 
of  imperialism.  We  must,  however,  for  the  purposes 
of  a practical  discussion,  understand  the  word 
“ imperialism  ” in  a sense  at  once  comprehensive  and 
specific.  We  shall,  therefore,  define  it  as  a policy  by 
which  any  one  State,  or  combination  of  States,  seeks 
to  forcibly  interfere  with  the  possessions  or  domestic 
action  of  any  other  State,  whatever  may  be  the 
motives  of  this  policy,  and  whether  it  is  directed  to  a 
temporary  or  a permanent  purpose.  The  reason  why 
we  call  such  a policy  a policy  of  imperialism  is  plain. 
It  is,  whatever  its  ultimate  aims  may  be,  a policy  by 
which  one  nation  attempts  to  exercise  a certain  over- 
lordship over  another,  and  it  cannot  be  accomplished 
except  by  arms.  It  is  an  attack  upon  the  freedom 
and  independence  of  one  people  by  another,  and  it  is 
this  whether  it  is  inspired  by  what  may  be  called  a 
high  and  disinterested  intention,  or  by  evident  pur- 
poses of  territorial  acquisition  or  conquest.  We  are, 
to  begin  with,  not  entitled  to  use  the  word  “ impe- 
rialism ” as  necessarily  denoting  what,  from  a certain 
standpoint,  might  be  considered  an  “ evil  ” policy. 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE  i8i 

We  use  it  because  it  is  the  right  word  for  any  policy 
directed  against  the  sovereign  authority  of  an  inde- 
pendent people  and  carrying  with  it  a consequence  of 
war.  Such  a policy  may  vary  greatly  in  its  professed 
intentions  and  in  its  effects,  but  if  it  is  stamped  with 
these  two  characteristics  it  is  imperialism. 

Let  us,  by  way  of  illustration,  take  the  policy 
which  has  from  time  to  time  been  pursued  by  various 
Western  Powers  in  regard  to  the  relations  between 
the  Turkish  Government  and  some  of  its  subjects. 
We  may,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  assume  that  this 
policy  was,  on  the  part  of  all  the  Powers  concerned  in 
it,  entirely  “ disinterested  ” — that  its  only  motives 
were  to  satisfy  a certain  Western  feeling  in  regard  to 
Turkish  misgovernment  and  to  put  an  end  to  its 
abuses.  Even  so,  it  was  a policy  of  imperialism — a 
policy  by  which  an  external  authority  sought  to 
substitute  itself,  in  degree,  and  for  certain  specific 
purposes,  for  the  internal  authority  of  the  Turkish 
Empire.  As  such  it  was  a policy  which  sooner  or 
later,  if  it  was  ever  to  be  effective,  was  bound  to  bring 
about  war.  There  is,  of  course,  in  the  constitution 
of  a sovereign  State,  nothing  more  fundamental  than 
the  relation  between  its  people  and  its  Government. 
It  is  vital.  If  that  relation  is  interfered  with  from 
without,  even  for  temporary  and  limited  purposes,  the 
independence  of  the  State  is  infringed.  No  Govern- 
ment, as  is  obvious,  has  any  responsibility  to  the 
Government  of  other  countries  for  its  action  with 
regard  to  its  own  subjects  ; and  in  the  same  way  no 
people  has  any  responsibility  to  any  external  authority 


1 82  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


for  its  proceedings  with  regard  to  its  own  rulers.  The 
relations  between  the  Government  and  the  governed 
are  organic.  They  are  reciprocal.  They  spring 
from  the  inherent  life  of  a particular  people,  which 
has  its  own  situation,  its  own  standards,  its  own 
needs,  its  own  evils,  and  its  own  natural  remedy 
for  those  evils.  The  Government  of  any  sovereign 
State  ought  to  be  free  to  govern,  well  or  ill, 
and  its  subjects  ought  to  be  free  to  submit  to 
it,  or  to  revolt  against  it  and  change  it,  if  they 
have  the  power.  It  is  clear  that  to  bring  in  an 
exotic  agency,  either  to  enable  a Government  to 
rule,  or  to  enable  a people  to  resist,  is  to  destroy  the 
integrity  of  the  national  life,  and  to  substitute,  in 
greater  or  less  degree,  the  authority  of  another  State 
for  the  authority  of  the  State  which  is  thus  interfered 
with.  This  is  imperialism  ; and  it  is  none  the  less 
imperialism  because  its  professed  and  immediate  pur- 
pose may  not  be  territorial  acquisition  or  the  expan- 
sion of  empire.  It  is  a policy  of  usurpation  and  over- 
lordship, involving  war.  Further,  although  it  may 
not  be  consciously  directed  towards  empire,  such  a 
policy  almost  inevitably  creates  new  imperial  responsi- 
bilities, the  one  act  of  external  intervention  entailing 
others,  and  leading  eventually  to  the  subjugation  of 
the  people  whose  organic  independence  has  thus  been 
impaired. 

We  have  taken  the  case  of  Western  action  in 
Turkey  as  an  example  of  one  form  of  imperialism,  but 
it  is  quite  easy  to  conceive  of  others.  Russia  is,  as 
we  have  already  pointed  out,  for  certain  purposes 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


183 


not  to  be  reckoned  among  Western  States.  She 
represents  a late  and  immature  civilization,  and,  as 
is  well  known,  her  methods  of  domestic  government 
have  often  inspired  disapproval  and  indignation  in 
Western  countries — especially  England.  If,  under 
the  influence  of  such  sentiments,  England  were  to 
interfere  with  the  internal  administration  of  the 
Russian  Government,  that  would  be  an  act  of 
imperiahsm.  There  is  no  probability  of  such  inter- 
ference, not  because  there  may  not  seem  to  be,  from 
a certain  point  of  view,  a moral  or  political  justifica- 
tion for  it,  but  because,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
a successful  imperialism — the  effective  intervention 
of  a foreign  Power  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a sovereign 
State — is  only  possible  when  that  State  is  unable  to 
resist  it.  When  it  is  a powerful  empire,  such  as 
Russia,  or  such  as  Japan  has  now  become,  it  may  be 
subject,  of  course,  to  adverse  external  criticism,  but  is 
exempt  from  actual  interference.  The  same  thing  is 
true  of  England.  British  rule  in  Ireland  and  India 
has  often  been  accused — even  by  some  Englishmen — 
of  being  unjust  and  injurious.  We  need  not  here 
discuss  the  question  of  whether  the  charge  is,  or  is 
not,  well  founded.  All  that  now  concerns  us  is  that 
any  attempt  to  adopt  with  regard  to  England  such  a 
policy  as  England  has  adopted  with  regard  to  Turkey 
would  be  an  act  of  imperialistic  encroachment.  It 
would  be  a policy  involving  war,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  it  could  only  take  effect  by  war.  As  in  the  case 
of  Russia,  there  is  no  probability  that  such  a policy 
will  be  adopted.  England  is  at  present  too  powerful 


1 84  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


a State  for  this  to  be  possible.  Such  a supposition, 
however,  serves,  along  with  the  other  considerations 
which  we  have  adduced,  to  place  the  policy  of 
imperialism  in  a clear  light.  It  is  a policy  directed, 
by  its  essential  nature,  against  the  independence  of  a 
sovereign  State.  It  can  only  take  practical  ejEect  by 
war.  It  can  never  be  prosecuted,  whatever  its  alleged 
justification,  except  by  a more  powerful  country 
against  a less  powerful.  It  brings  about  a disruption 
of  the  organic  relations  between  the  Government 
which  is  interfered  with  and  its  subjects,  and  tends 
to  prevent  their  natural  readjustment.  It  commonly 
renders  necessary  still  further  external  interference, 
and  it  leads  eventually  to  the  open  and  complete 
imperialism  of  territorial  aggrandizement. 

There  is  one  other  important  consequence  of  such 
an  imperialism — whether  directed  against  a country 
like  Turkey,  or  against  some  native  State  in  Asia  or 
Africa — which,  when  what  we  are  concerned  with 
is  a Human  Peace,  it  is  necessary  here  to  recall. 
Given  the  existing  international  relations  of  Christen- 
dom, the  policy  of  imperialism,  whatever  its  professed 
purposes,  cannot  be  adopted  by  any  one  of  the 
Western  Powers  without  endangering  its  good  rela- 
tions with  others.  There  is  no  disposition  anywhere 
to  believe  in  a purely  disinterested  national  action. 
That  is  natural.  The  rule  of  “ interests  ” — British 
interests,  German  interests,  Italian  interests,  French 
interests,  Russian  or  Austrian  interests — is  the  avowed 
and  common  rule  of  international  policy.  Whatever 
may  be  the  other  alleged  motives  of  his  action,  no 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


185 


European  statesman  can  justify  a policy  which  may 
involve  a sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure  except  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  demanded  by  the  security  or 
advantage  of  his  own  country.  Further,  almost  all 
experience  goes  to  show  that  external  interference  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  a country  leads  inevitably  to 
its  further  political  enfeeblement  and  to  its  ultimate 
absorption  by  the  stronger  State.  Consequently  the 
imperialism  of  England  or  Russia  gives  rise  to  a 
competing  imperialism  of  France,  Germany,  and  Italy. 
It  tends  to  bring  about  war,  not  merely  between  an 
aggressive  and  a resisting  nation,  but  between  a 
number  of  rival  Powers,  each  holding  itself  entitled 
to  put  forward  some  plea  of  civilization  or  progress 
as  the  ground  of  its  action,  each  having  its  own 
“ interests  ” to  promote,  each  being  a law  unto  itself} 
and  each  being  suspicious  and  jealous  of  others.  It  is 
obvious  that,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  there 
is  now  no  rule  of  international  action  for  any  of  the 
Great  Powers  of  Christendom  except  one  which  is 
derived  from  its  conception  of  its  own  responsibilities, 
its  own  interests,  and  its  own  resources.  To  the 
hostile  judgment  of  other  countries  it  pays  no  atten- 
tion, unless  this  seems  to  point  to  some  actual  danger 
attending  the  prosecution  of  its  aims.  At  the  time  of 
the  English  war  against  the  South  African  Republics 
there  was  undoubtedly  a considerable  body  of  Euro- 
pean opinion  unfavourable  to  British  policy.  It  is 
not  here  necessary  to  analyse  the  grounds  of  that 
opinion.  The  essential  point  at  present  is  that  it 
was  opinion  only,  and  had,  therefore,  no  effect  on 


1 86  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


English  action.  England  was,  and  claimed  to  be, 
her  own  judge.  She  was  subject  to  no  external 
spiritual  tribunal.  She  made  war  for  her  own  cause 
and  in  her  own  way.  Exactly  the  same  thing,  of 
course,  would  have  been  true  of  any  other  of  the 
European  Powers  in  similar  circumstances.  They 
may  criticize  one  another  and  condemn  one  another, 
but  they  are  not  in  a position  to  judge  one  another. 
For  judgment  there  must  be  a competent,  disinte- 
rested, and  recognized  tribunal.  In  the  case  of  private 
conflicts  such  a tribunal  exists  within  the  limits  of 
the  national  life.  In  the  case  of  international  conflicts 
it  does  not  exist.  Two  hostile  nations,  therefore,  can 
only  abuse  one  another  and  fight. 

We  have  considered  one  particular  type  of  imperial- 
istic action — a type  actually  given  in  experience. 
There  are,  however,  various  other  types  of  the  same 
essential  policy — a policy  of  aggressive  interference, 
involving  war,  and  leading  to  territorial  acquisition. 
The  motives  of  such  a policy,  for  example,  may  be 
aflinities  of  language,  race,  or  religion  between  the 
subjects  of  one  State  and  the  subjects  of  another,  and 
these  motives,  of  course,  become  strengthened  if  the 
inhabitants  of  a given  country  believe  that  those  who 
are  in  any  way  akin  to  them  in  another  are  suffering 
under  injustice  or  oppression.  Conditions  such  as 
these  are  naturally  common.  The  great  States  of  the 
world  have  not  been  built  up  on  what  we  should  now 
call  a sociological  principle — with  an  intention  to 
bring  together  under  a single  rule  peoples  having 
natural  ties  of  speech,  or  faith,  or  race,  or  culture. 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE 


187 


There  has  been  no  “ State  planning  ” comparable 
with  the  “ town  planning  ” which,  after  towns  have 
grown  as  they  could,  has  of  late  been  proposed. 
There  has  been  no  rule  in  the  shaping  of  States 
except  the  rule  of  force  and  conquest.  That  rule 
has  brought  together  a number  of  heterogeneous 
and  unassimilable  elements  in  an  artificial  order, 
which  frequently,  even  after  many  centuries,  has 
remained  unstable  and  insecure.  Everyone  can  see 
instances  of  this  in  the  present  composition  of  Europe. 
In  such  a situation  imperialism  finds  a natural 
opportunity.  It  is,  in  this  relation,  an  attempt  by 
force  of  arms  to  reverse  or  modify  a state  of  things 
which  the  force  of  arms  has  created.  Even  where 
there  is  no  urgent  popular  demand  for  such  an  attempt, 
the  Government  of  one  country,  recognizing  the  affini- 
ties between  some  of  its  subjects  and  the  subjects 
of  another  State,  has  a natural  inducement  to  take 
advantage  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  its 
dominions.  Here  again,  as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say,  we  have  a type  of  imperialism  given  in  experience. 

So  far,  the  imperialism  we  have  considered  has 
been  of  what  may  be  called  a distinctively  political 
character.  The  pretext  of  such  a policy,  of  course,  may 
be  one  thing  ; its  actual  motives  may  be  quite  another. 
In  all  its  forms,  nevertheless,  and  whatever  its  pre- 
texts or  motives,  this  political  imperialism  has  always 
certain  essential  characteristics  and  effects ; it  is 
action  directed  by  one  country  against  the  sovereign 
independence  of  another,  and  it  carries  with  it  war 
as  a necessary  consequence — a war  which,  in  the 


1 88  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


modern  intimacy  and  intricacy  of  international 
relations,  tends  to  become  general.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a kind  of  imperialism  even  more  important  at 
the  present  time  than  what  we  have  called  poHtical 
imperialism.  It  is  more  important  because  it  is  more 
universal  and  because,  by  its  essential  nature,  it 
raises  questions  which  are  fundamental  and  ever- 
lasting in  the  economy  of  human  Hfe.  In  contra- 
distinction to  a purely  political  imperialism,  we  may 
describe  it  as  industrial  imperialism.  A political 
imperialism  is  professedly  inspired  by  what  we  com- 
monly regard  as  political  objects — dynastic  preten- 
sions, the  aggrandizement  of  a State,  the  correction  of 
abuses  in  some  other  country,  the  satisfaction  of 
religious,  racial  or  linguistic  affinities.  Industrial 
imperialism  is  immediately  directed  towards  that 
action  upon  the  earth — that  basic  art  of  agriculture — 
upon  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Catholic  life,  the 
life  of  individual  and  social  Perfection  in  Christ,  in 
the  last  resort  rests.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
while  political  imperialism  has  played,  and  still  plays, 
an  important  part  in  bringing  about  war,  the  imperial- 
ism of  our  modern  world  is  essentially,  and  increas- 
ingly, industrial.  It  is  conceivable  even  that  while 
against  a merely  political  imperialism  a Scientific 
Catholicism  might  create  an  international  under- 
standing, against  industrial  imperialism  it  would  still 
be  powerless. 

The  reason  for  this  is  obvious.  The  motives 
entering  into  a political  imperialism — the  splendour 
and  exaltation  of  a State  or  its  rulers,  or  the  satis- 


WAR  AND  POLITICAL  LIFE  189 


faction  of  national,  religious,  or  linguistic  affinities — 
are  of  unequal  force  at  different  times  and  in  different 
classes  of  the  same  community.  They  are  dependent 
largely  upon  changing  conditions  of  belief  and  culture. 
They  appeal  most  to  the  governing  and  military 
classes  of  a nation,  and  least  to  what  we  call  its 
“ lower  classes.”  To  the  governing  and  mihtary  classes 
a mere  extension  of  empire,  as  such,  means  increased 
opportunities  for  gaining  power  and  distinction — ^not 
wealth  only,  but  social  ascendency  and  command. 
The  motives  inspiring  industrial  imperialism  are,  on 
the  contrary,  universal.  They  are  of  all  classes. 
They  are,  if  we  may  use  the  expression,  biological. 
They  are  connected  with  the  primary  animal  Hfe  of 
man.  They  are  connected,  too,  with  his  highest 
spiritual  life,  which  necessarily  rests  upon  the  lower. 
There  can  be  no  Church  without  the  workshop.  In 
the  Lord’s  Prayer  we  confess  our  need  for  our  daily 
bread,  but  the  prayer  is  only  a prelude  to  action.  It 
is  never  “ granted  ” until  we  grant  it  to  ourselves. 
What  is  granted,  or  given,  is  the  earth,  with  heat  and 
light,  air  and  water,  and  the  mind  and  body  of  man, 
the  worker.  If  man,  who  prays  for  bread,  cannot  win 
his  bread  from  the  earth  he  dies,  just  as  any  animal, 
insect,  or  plant  must  die,  unless  it  can  gain  from  its 
environment  the  means  of  life.  Prayer  is  always, 
in  one  of  its  aspects,  an  expression  of  need — ^whether 
an  immediate  need  of  the  body,  or  a high  spiritual 
need  of  the  soul — and  throughout  the  wide  range  of 
its  meanings  it  has  no  outward  effect  except  where 
it  is  a prelude  to  human  action.  The  need  which  we 


190  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


express  in  the  prayer  for  bread  is  so  basic  and  impera- 
tive that  if  it  could  be  shown  that,  for  its  satisfaction, 
war  is  indispensable,  a Human  Peace  would  be  for 
ever  impossible,  and  a Scientific  Catholicism,  ordering 
the  total  life  of  man  for  an  end  of  Perfection,  would 
have  to  sanction  war  as  one  of  its  means.  As,  there- 
fore, it  is  for  such  a CathoHcism  to  determine  how  far 
the  political  exigencies  of  the  State  demand  war,  so 
it  must  also  consider  whether  it  is  rendered  necessary 
by  man’s  action  upon  the  earth  for  the  purposes  of 
the  Catholic  life. 


CHAPTER  VII 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 

It  is  the  essential  note  of  a Scientific  Catholicism — 
of  a Catholicism  resting  on  the  fully-developed  mind 
of  man,  and  fulfilling  all  the  sides  of  his  nature  for  an 
end  of  Perfection — that  it  is,  as  we  say,  synthetic. 
As  such,  it  does  not  recognize  any  fundamental  separa- 
tion between  man’s  industrial  action  and  the  other 
manifestations  of  his  life.  Into  any  one  of  the  exer- 
cises of  his  will  the  forces  of  his  total  being,  such  as  it 
is,  and  in  degree,  may  be  poured.  Man,  therefore, 
labouring  upon  the  earth,  labours  for  Christ — that  is 
to  say,  for  the  realization  of  an  ideal  humanity. 
Expressing  the  same  principle  in  other  terms,  we  may 
say,  again,  that  from  what  he  gets  from  the  earth  he 
has  to  build  the  workshop,  the  State,  the  theatre — 
considered  as  a temple  and  symbol  of  the  arts — the 
school,  the  Church,  and  the  home.  Now,  in  our 
modern  world — the  world  in  which  a Human  Peace 
is  to  be  wrought,  if  it  is  ever  to  be  wrought — man  is, 
as  he  was  never  before,  an  inhabitant  of  the  whole 
earth.  He  may  be,  from  the  point  of  view  of  national 
classification,  a Frenchman,  an  Englishman,  a German, 
or  a Chinaman,  but  he  is  also  a citizen  of  the  world. 
This  has  ceased  to  be  a figure  of  sentiment ; it  has 
become  a fact  of  experience.  There  was  a time  when 
almost  any  individual  family  could  feed,  clothe,  and 


192  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

house  itself  within  the  limits  in  which  it  found  itself. 
Its  members  could  live  and  die  where  they  were 
born,  without  being  called  upon  to  remove  from  their 
own  district.  There  was  a time  when  what  was 
thus  true  of  the  family  was  also,  in  a great  degree, 
true  of  the  city  and  the  nation — so  far  at  least  as  the 
necessaries  of  life,  as  distinguished  from  luxuries, 
were  concerned.  In  so  far  as  such  conditions 
obtained,  a nation — here  using  the  word  “ nation  ” 
to  denote  an  independent,  organized,  sovereign 
people,  exclusively  occupying  a definite  territory — 
was  not  only  a law  unto  itself,  but  sufficient  unto 
itself.  So  long  as  it  preserved  its  political  freedom 
it  could  live  its  own  life,  in  every  material  and  political 
sense  of  this  word,  in  its  own  way.  Under  such 
circumstances  “ man  ” was  not  an  inhabitant  of 
the  whole  earth.  He  was  an  inhabitant  only  of  his 
own  country.  He  was,  from  a geographical  point  of 
view,  a Frenchman,  an  Englishman,  or  an  Italian,  as 
the  case  might  be. 

It  is  one  of  the  most  obvious  and  elementary  facts 
of  our  modern  experience  that  this  has  long  ceased 
to  be  the  case.  There  is  even  now,  of  course,  a 
certain  difference  in  the  degree  in  which  the  various 
nations  of  the  world  are  able,  within  their  own 
borders,  to  procure  for  themselves  what  we  call  the 
necessaries  of  life.  Some  are  more  dependent  upon 
other  countries,  some  less.  That  is  largely  a question 
of  climate,  soil,  mineral  resources,  extent  of  popula- 
tion, and  industrial  habit.  Allowing  for  all  such 
differences,  however,  it  still  remains  true  that  “ man,” 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


193 


in  our  modern  world,  has  become,  not  in  feeling  only, 
but  in  fact,  ever  less  a merely  national  being,  and 
ever  more  an  international  being.  From  the  stand- 
point of  mind  of  course — of  that  life  of  religion,  art, 
philosophy,  and  science  which  rests  upon  the  lower 
material  life — the  European  man  at  least  has  been 
progressively  an  international  being,  and  not  merely 
a national  being,  from  the  time  of  the  Roman  Empire 
onward.  In  his  spirit  he  is,  in  proportion  to  his 
culture,  universal.  What  we  are  immediately  con- 
cerned with,  however,  is  life  in  the  lower,  or  biological, 
sense  of  the  term — the  relation  of  the  developed 
human  organism  with  its  environment.  Under- 
standing the  word  “ life  ” in  this  sense,  it  is  clear  that 
an  Englishman,  for  example,  no  longer  lives  in 
England.  He  derives  food,  clothing,  and  even,  in 
degree,  the  means  of  habitation,  from  other  countries 
— some  of  them  extremely  distant ; and  he  is  depen- 
dent upon  other  countries  almost  in  proportion  to  the 
range  and  elevation  of  his  life  as  a civilized  being. 
This  is  no  new  truth ; it  is  a truism  ; but  it  is  a 
truth,  or  truism,  the  full  significance  of  which,  so 
far  as  the  constitution  and  policy  of  the  world’s 
nations  are  concerned,  has  hardly  yet  been  sufficiently 
recognized.  We  may  hold,  if  we  please,  that  this 
change,  or  extension,  in  the  habitat  of  the  Englishman, 
Frenchman,  or  German — a change  reconcilable  with 
the  actual  fixity  of  the  mass  of  the  population — is 
not  a good  but  an  evil.  It  is  a change  which  certainly 
involves  an  immense  number  of  human  beings  in  a 
ceaseless  nomad  restlessness,  detrimental  to  their 


194  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


social  and  civic  life ; and  it  has  increased  the  com- 
plexity and  instability  of  all  industrial  and  political 
relations.  Such  as  it  is,  however,  it  is  apparently 
irreversible,  and  one  of  its  effects  is  to  make  man, 
wherever  he  may  happen  to  be  born  and  to  live, 
not  so  much  a Frenchman  or  an  Englishman  as  a 
cosmopolite,  dependent  for  his  material  nourishment, 
as  he  has  long  been  dependent  for  his  intellectual 
nourishment,  on  countries  remote  from  his  actual  habi- 
tation, and  on  the  co-operating  activities  of  mankind. 

It  is  a certain  recognition  of  this  truth  which  has 
no  doubt  been  the  main  cause  of  the  later  industrial 
imperialism  of  various  European  States.  Industrial 
imperialism,  as  distinguished  from  a purely  political 
imperialism,  may  be  defined  as  an  attempt  by  pro- 
cesses of  policy  and  conquest  to  secure  for  a nation 
direct  and  wider  command  over  the  resources  of  the 
earth,  instead  of  the  indirect  command  gained  by 
means  of  commercial  exchange  with  other  nations. 
It  is  an  artificial  extension  of  the  national  environ- 
ment, or,  in  terms  of  trade,  the  creation  of  a larger 
subject  area  of  supply  and  demand.  Imperialism, 
for  such  purposes,  is  of  course  not  the  same  thing  as 
emigration  or  colonization.  An  emigrant  may  go 
to  a foreign  country — as  an  Englishman  or  German 
to  the  United  States,  or  an  Italian  to  Brazil — ^and 
settle  there  as  one  of  its  citizens.  A colonist  may  go — 
as  Europeans  of  all  sorts  have  gone — to  a partially- 
occupied  country,  such  as  Australia  or  New  Zealand, 
and  found  there  a new  citizenship,  superseding  or 
subordinating  the  native,  uncivilized  races.  A colony 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


195 


which  has  been  thus  established  may  come  in  time  to 
be,  especially  for  commercial  purposes,  a self-govern- 
ing and  independent  country,  and  in  this  sense  it 
ceases  to  be  a subject  part  of  the  empire  with  which 
it  is  in  nominal  connection.  It  is  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a new  nation.  These  distinctions,  obvious 
and  important  as  they  are,  are  often  overlooked  in 
political  discussions,  the  word  “ empire,”  for  example, 
being  employed  to  describe  at  once  such  a relation  as 
that  between  England  and  India  and  the  totally 
different  relation  which  exists  between  England  and 
Canada  or  Australia. 

The  chief  type  of  industrial  imperialism — meaning 
by  this,  once  more,  an  imperialism  directed  mainly 
to  industrial  as  distinguished  from  political  ends — is 
to  be  found  in  the  policy  which  England  has,  more 
or  less  consciously  and  systematically,  for  many  years 
pursued.  The  reasons  for  this  are  obvious.  England 
is  a relatively  small  country,  with  a large  and  expand- 
ing population.  She  has  the  advantage,  but  also  the 
disadvantage,  of  an  insular  situation.  She  has  a 
high  degree  of  social  development,  with  a constant 
increase  in  the  range  of  her  social  needs.  She  is,  by 
her  natural  position,  largely  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
Europe.  The  English  people,  therefore,  have  been 
driven  to  look  outside  their  own  shores,  and  even 
beyond  Europe,  for  a wider  environment — for  a 
fuller  command  over  the  resources  of  the  earth.  They 
have  been  great  emigrants,  great  colonists,  but  they 
have  been  also  great  imperialists,  in  the  sense  of  this 
word  which  we  have  now  established  ; and  they  have, 


N 2 


196  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  late  years  especially,  been  influenced  by  the  con- 
ception of  a world-wide  “ empire,”  comprising  both 
colonies  and  conquests,  within  which  they  may 
exercise  the  same  direct  control  over  the  earth  as  is 
naturally  exercised  by  a “ nation,”  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  actually  occupying  and  cultivating  its 
own  territory.  There  is  no  scientific  probability  that 
the  British  Empire,  thus  constituted — the  rule  of  a 
small  island  over  immense  continents  and  hetero- 
geneous populations  thousands  of  miles  remote  from 
it — will  be  permanent.  The  whole  course  of  the 
world’s  development  will  be  against  it.  That,  how- 
ever, is  not  our  present  subject.  What  we  are  now 
concerned  to  recognize  is,  first,  that  British  industrial 
imperialism  is  only  the  chief  type  of  a policy  which 
has  been  of  late  increasingly  pursued  by  various 
European  nations,  great  and  small ; secondly,  that 
this  policy  is,  as  is  a policy  of  political  imperialism,  a 
policy  of  war.  This  policy  may  be,  from  a given 
standpoint,  defensible.  It  may  be  regarded  as  indis- 
pensable. But  it  is,  by  its  essential  character,  a 
mode  of  action  which  needs  the  force  of  arms  to 
give  effect  to  it. 

European  industrial  imperialism,  as  such,  is,  we 
may  say  broadly,  not  directed  immediately  against 
European  territories.  Almost  all  these  territories  are 
now  fully  peopled.  This  has,  for  the  time  being, 
ceased  to  be  true  of  France,  where  there  is  now  a 
declining  population,  but  it  is  sufficiently  true  of  the 
rest  of  Europe.  Except,  therefore,  when  the  indus- 
trial imperialism  of  a European  State  aims  at  access 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


197 


to  the  sea,  its  main  concern  is  to  gain  command  over 
non-European  territories  rather  than  over  contiguous 
countries.  One  reason  for  this  is  to  be  found  in  that 
natural  ascendency  of  “ Christendom  ” over  “ non- 
Christendom  ” to  which  we  have  already  referred. 
Christendom  represents  the  potency  of  a high  civili- 
zation— the  power  of  mind,  the  power  of  capital.  It 
represents,  too,  the  machine-gun — the  immense 
superiority  in  the  weapons  of  destruction  which  is 
possessed  by  a modern  European  State  as  compared 
with  a barbarous  or  backward  people.  The  distinc- 
tion between  an  industrial  imperialism  prosecuted  in 
Europe  and  one  which  seeks  its  fields  in  Africa  or 
Asia  is,  however,  not  vital.  The  essential  thing  to 
be  recognized  in  it  is  that  wherever  it  is  prosecuted  it 
means  war.  It  means  war,  first,  because  no  people, 
however  defenceless  and  backward  it  may  be,  will- 
ingly submits  to  an  alien  rule  within  its  own  territory  ; 
secondly,  because  no  one  country  can  engage  in  such 
a policy — a policy  of  industrial  ascendency  based  on 
constant  territorial  extension — without  provoking 
jealousy  and  competition,  and  without,  therefore, 
incurring  the  danger  of  a war  with  countries  as  power- 
ful as  itself.  Industrial  imperialism,  consequently, 
does  not  merely  mean  war  between  a great  nation 
and  a small,  or  between  a civilized  State  and  a 
barbarous  one,  or  between  Christendom  and  non- 
Christendom  ; it  means  a war  of  empires,  in  which 
civilization  and  Christendom  themselves  become 
involved,  and  it  means  this  naturally  and  inevitably. 
The  competition  in  industrial  imperialism  is,  like  the 


198  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


competition  in  industry  itself,  at  bottom  biological, 
or  animal.  It  is  a part  of  the  struggle  for  human 
existence.  Its  object  is  to  gain  a favoured  place  in 
the  environment — that  basic  command  over  the  earth 
on  which  the  life  of  man  in  all  its  senses,  lower  or 
higher,  his  material  life,  his  Catholic,  or  spiritual,  life, 
in  the  last  resort  rests. 

What  a Scientific  Catholicism  has  to  decide  with 
regard  to  industrial  imperialism,  as  with  regard  to 
political  imperialism,  is  how  far  it  is  indispensable — 
how  far,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  necessary  for  that  com- 
mand over  the  resources  of  the  earth  which  is  requisite 
for  the  ends  of  the  Catholic  life.  This  is,  of  course,  a 
scientific  question,  and  it  can  only  be  determined 
scientifically.  We  cannot  determine  it  simply  by 
reaffirming  the  great  spiritual  purposes  of  Catholicism 
and  insisting  on  their  value  and  beauty.  If  it  is 
true,  as  we  have  said,  that  the  Catholic  life  can  be 
summed  up  as  prayer  and  agriculture,  it  may  be  also 
true  that  the  life  of  agriculture  is  naturally  restrictive 
of  the  life  of  prayer.  If  it  is  true  that  imperialism 
is  impossible  without  war  and  that  war  is  impossible 
without  a suspension  of  the  law  of  humanity,  still  it 
may  be  necessary  for  man,  as  a worker  upon  the 
earth,  to  be  an  imperialist,  to  conquer  his  fellow- 
beings,  that  he  may  live.  We  cannot  solve  this 
problem  any  more  than  we  can  solve  other  problems 
of  human  life,  merely  by  denouncing  what  seems  to 
us  evil  and  extolling  what  seems  to  us  good. 

The  question  of  industrial  imperialism,  as  we  have 
defined  it — the  attempt  of  a given  nation  to  gain 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


199 


for  itself  an  increased  command  over  the  resources 
of  the  earth  by  an  extension  of  territory — is  in  our 
contemporary  world,  as  it  has  been  throughout 
history,  largely  a question  of  the  pressure  of  popula- 
tion upon  the  means  of  subsistence.  This,  even  in 
its  modern,  theoretic  form,  is,  of  course,  no  new 
question.  There  have  been  various  proposals  for 
dealing  with  it— among  others,  the  artificial  limitation 
of  the  family.  This  proposal  has  been  by  some 
denounced,  partly  on  what  are  considered  to  be  moral 
grounds,  but  also  because  they  hold  that  the  alleged 
need  for  the  restriction  of  population  does  not  really 
exist.  It  is  this  latter  view  of  the  matter  which, 
from  the  standpoint  of  a Scientific  Catholicism,  at 
present  chiefly  concerns  us.  The  view  may  be  con- 
veniently expressed  in  the  familiar  formula  that 
“ when  God  sends  mouths  He  sends  bread  to  feed 
them.”  Now  before  we  can  pronounce  on  the  truth 
or  falsity  of  the  assumption  apparently  contained  in 
this  proposition  we  must  do  with  it  as  we  have,  for 
scientific  purposes,  to  do  with  most  other  statements 
in  which  the  word  “ God  ” appears — convert  it  into 
an  intelligible  statement  in  terms  of  experience.  The 
meaning  of  this  word  in  this  particular  sentence  is, 
of  course,  relative  to  the  ideas  expressed.  Let  us, 
for  the  sake  of  convenience,  suppose  that  we  are  con- 
cerned with  the  case  of  an  English  urban  workman 
who  has  at  a given  time  a wife  and  two  children  and 
whose  total  income  is  a pound  a week.  This  income 
represents  the  “ bread  ” of  the  family — the  immediate 
share  of  the  proceeds  of  agriculture  on  which  its 


200  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


Catholic  life,  its  life  of  positive,  many-sided  Perfection 
in  Christ,  has  to  be  based.  It  represents  its  inherit- 
ance in  the  earth ; and  from  this  inheritance  its 
total  human  life — its  hfe  of  industry,  citizenship,  art, 
education,  religion,  and  domestic  responsibility — has 
to  be  fed.  It  is  true  that  in  our  modern  world  what 
we  call  “ the  State  ” is  also  an  instrument,  or  channel, 
by  which  culture  reaches  the  workman,  but  this  does 
not  affect  the  argument,  since  the  State  and  all  its 
institutions  have  to  be  kept  living  by  labour  upon  the 
earth. 

Now,  let  us  further  suppose  that  in  the  course  of  time 
a third  child  is  born  into  the  family.  According  to 
our  proverbial  formula  “ God  sends  ” this  child. 
God,  however,  works  in  definite  ways  and  by  definite 
instruments.  In  this  instance,  and  relatively  to  the 
procreation  of  the  child.  He  works  by  its  parents. 
They  may  or  may  not  wish  for  it,  and  in  our  modern 
world  they  can  decide  whether  or  not  it  shall  be  born. 
They  are,  in  any  case,  if  it  is  born,  the  proximate 
authors  of  its  being.  So  far,  for  practical  purposes, 
we  can  understand  the  immediate  and  relative 
meaning  of  the  word  “ God.”  It  means  the  parents. 
It  may  have,  from  other  points  of  view  and  in  other 
connections  a very  different  meaning,  a meaning 
transcendent  and  universal,  standing  for  things 
visible  and  invisible  ; but  just  as  the  priest  at  the 
altar  represents  the  mind  and  power  of  God  in  the 
consecration  of  the  sacred  elements,  so  the  parent 
represents  His  mind  and  power  in  the  procreation  of 
a child.  This  being  so,  it  remains  to  determine  in 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


201 


what  sense  it  is  that  God  gives  “ bread  ” to  the 
mouth  which  He  has  thus  sent.  Its  bread,  we  say, 
is  its  father’s  income.  Relatively  to  that  bread,  or 
income,  God  presents  Himself  to  the  father  in  the 
person  of  his  employer,  who  conveys  to  him,  as  the 
Divine  instrument  or  channel,  a certain  portion  of  the 
produce  of  the  earth  in  return  for  his  labour.  When 
this  new  child  is  born,  does  the  employer  at  once  and 
voluntarily  offer  to  the  father  an  increase  in  his 
wages  ? Or,  if  the  father  comes  to  the  employer  and 
prays  to  him,  saying,  “ Give  us  this  day  our  daily 
bread,”  does  the  employer,  as  God’s  representative, 
grant  him  his  prayer  ? We  know  that  these  things 
do  not  happen.  We  know  that,  simply  on  the  ground 
that  he  has  another  mouth  to  feed,  the  workman 
never  gets  an  increase  of  wages  ; that  if  he  ever  gets 
it  it  is  on  other  grounds,  and  because,  by  combination 
with  his  fellow-workmen  and  by  the  exercise  of  a 
form  of  compulsion,  he  is  able  to  extort  it  from  his 
employers.  Here  too  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  suffers 
violence.  In  the  absence  of  this  violence,  although 
a new  human  life  has  come  into  the  world,  needing 
food,  clothing,  habitation,  health,  maternal  care,  and 
all  the  other  means  of  the  Catholic  life,  there  is  no 
corresponding  increase  in  the  provision  of  these 
things.  If,  therefore,  the  father  represents  God  as 
“ sending  ” the  child  he  must  also  represent  God  as 
feeding  it. 

We  reach,  as  is  obvious,  a similar  conclusion  if, 
instead  of  supposing  the  father  to  have,  as  is  usual, 
indirect  access  to  the  earth  through  a capitalist  and 


202  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


by  means  of  a complex  of  industrial  processes,  we 
imagine  him  as  having  direct  access  to  it  as  an  inde- 
pendent agriculturist,  cultivating  his  own  portion 
of  land.  The  word  “ God  ” — considered  as  standing 
for  a Power  wholly  external  to  himself — then  no 
longer  represents  an  employer.  It  represents  imme- 
diately the  land  which  he  cultivates.  If  our  proverb 
expresses  a truth,  then  every  time  that  God,  as  a 
power  of  procreation,  acting  through  the  parents, 
sends  a new  child  to  the  family,  this  piece  of  land,  in 
the  absence  of  any  additional  culture,  and  without 
any  new  capital  being  employed  upon  it,  produces  a 
more  abundant  supply  of  the  necessaries  of  life.  We 
know  that  this  does  not  happen.  We  know  that  even 
when  a new  intelligence,  labour,  and  capital  have  been 
brought  to  bear  on  the  land  there  is  no  necessary 
correspondence  between  the  increase  of  its  yield,  if 
there  is  any  such  increase,  and  the  increased  demands 
upon  it.  We  know,  further,  that  although  the  action 
of  the  agriculturist  upon  it  may  be  regular,  patient, 
skilful,  and  hopeful,  God — considered  as  the  stars  in 
their  courses — may  be  fighting  against  him,  and  that 
an  excess  or  defect  of  rain  or  sunshine  may  destroy 
the  results  of  months  of  laborious  toil.  We  know, 
again,  that  in  various  parts  of  the  world  the  land 
itself,  as  the  consequence  of  a volcanic  eruption  or  an 
earthquake,  may  suddenly  disappear  from  beneath  the 
cultivator’s  feet,  and  that  he  and  all  his  family  may 
be  involved  in  a ruin  for  which  he  has  no  personal 
responsibility.  We  know,  also,  that  the  mineral  and 
vegetable  products  of  the  earth  do  not  increase  in 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


203 


proportion  as  they  are  used — that  coal  once  con- 
sumed is  consumed  for  ever,  and  that  a tree  which 
has  taken  fifty  years  to  grow  may  be  cut  down  in 
an  hour. 

We  must,  then,  dismiss  from  a Scientific  Catholi- 
cism the  assumption  that  man,  who  lives  by  prayer 
and  agriculture — by  prayer,  in  which  he  receives  into 
his  mind  a Divine  Image  and  proposes  to  himself  an 
End  of  Perfection  ; by  agriculture,  in  which  he  pro- 
vides the  material  basis  for  the  spiritual  life — ^has  a 
relation  to  the  earth  which  can  be  symbolized  by  the 
formula  that  God,  whenever  He  sends  mouths,  sends 
bread  to  feed  them.  His  relation  to  it  is  such  that  if 
he  increases  his  demands  upon  it  he  must  himself, 
in  some  way,  increase  his  capacity  to  satisfy  those 
demands,  and  that  if  he  is  unable  to  do  this  he  must 
in  some  way  diminish  his  demands.  The  difference 
in  this  respect  between  an  individual  man  or  family 
and  the  company  of  individuals  and  families  consti- 
tuting a nation  is,  of  course,  only  a difference  of  degree. 
There  is,  consequently,  no  necessary  correspondence 
between  the  demands  which  any  European  people 
makes  upon  the  territory  which  it  occupies  and  its 
capacity  to  satisfy  those  demands.  As  a matter  of 
fact,  all  European  peoples  have  long  lived — in  the 
material  sense  of  the  word  “ life,”  no  less  than  in  its 
spiritual  sense — outside  their  own  limits.  England 
is  the  most  conspicuous  example  of  this,  but  is  still 
only  a single  example.  In  degree  all  other  civilized 
countries  are  now  in  a similar  situation.  They  have 
become,  in  varying  measure,  dependent  upon  other 


204  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


nations  for  access  to  the  earth — for  their  command 
over  its  products.  It  may  conceivably  be  true,  of 
course,  that  this  dependence  need  not  in  all  cases 
be  so  great  as  it  actually  is — that  the  full  agricultural 
resources  of  each  of  the  European  countries  have  not 
yet  been  utilized,  and  that  by  the  adoption  of  a 
different  social  and  industrial  system  they  could  all 
gain  a much  greater  support  for  themselves  without 
going  beyond  their  own  borders.  Substantially  the 
same  result  would  be  reached  if  the  population  were 
restricted  throughout  Europe  as  it  now  is  in  France — 
although  this,  unless  a similar  limitation  were  prac- 
tised in  other  parts  of  the  world,  might  have  serious 
consequences  in  the  relations  between  “ Christen- 
dom ” and  “ non-Christendom.” 

It  is  not,  however,  here  necessary  to  enter  into  these 
various  suppositions  and  contingencies.  We  must 
come  back  to  the  elementary  truth  that  man  is  now 
an  inhabitant  of  the  whole  earth,  dependent  on  what 
he  can  get  from  it  for  his  power  to  live  his  life,  lower 
and  higher,  and  that  in  the  actual  situation  of 
European  nations  they  have  ceased,  in  greater  or  less 
degree,  to  be  able  to  nourish  themselves  within  their 
territorial  limits,  and  must  stretch  forth  their  hands 
to  the  ends  of  the  world.  They  have,  as  a conse- 
quence, become  largely  dependent  on  the  peoples  by 
means  of  which  they  gain  access  to  the  earth  and  pro- 
vide themselves  with  the  necessaries  of  life.  Against 
the  possible  political  consequences  of  this  relation 
their  new  resource — ^which,  of  course,  is  at  the  same 
time  a very  ancient  one — is,  as  we  have  said,  indus- 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


205 


trial  imperialism,  such  imperialism,  being  understood 
as  action  directed  to  the  establishment  of  the  political 
supremacy  of  a State  in  a country  upon  which,  in 
whatever  way,  it  is  industrially  dependent.  Now 
imperialism  in  all  its  forms,  and  whatever  its  motives, 
means,  as  we  have  seen,  war — first,  between  the 
imperialist  State  and  the  country  in  which  it  is 
seeking  to  establish  itself ; secondly,  between  this 
imperialist  State  and  others  prosecuting  a similar 
purpose.  If  industrial  imperialism  is  a pohcy  sound 
and  indispensable  for  any  one  of  the  great  nations  of 
Europe,  it  is  sound  and  indispensable  for  others  in 
similar  circumstances.  If  it  is  good  for  England  and 
Italy  it  is  good  also- — or  may  be  held  to  be  good — for 
Russia  and  Germany.  A nation,  as  such,  is,  or  may 
suppose  itself  to  be,  concerned  only  for  its  own 
“ interest.”  It  must  live  or  die.  It  regulates  its 
international  action  exactly  as  an  individual  shop- 
keeper, or  manufacturer,  in  a given  European  town 
regulates  his  commercial  action.  He  does  not  con- 
sider the  good  of  his  rivals  and  competitors  ; he  con- 
siders his  own  good.  He  does  not  always,  perhaps, 
deliberately  plan  their  extinction  or  effacement,  but 
he  plans  his  own  prosperity,  leaving  others  to  do  the 
same,  successfully  or  unsuccessfully.  He  would  not 
deny  that  they  have  the  right,  if  they  can,  to  master 
him  in  the  market,  but  he  claims  an  equal  right 
for  himself.  We  are  not  entitled  to  consider  such 
a man  as  representing  a “ low  morality.”  He 
represents  the  average  morality.  He  is  the  typical 
business  man.  No  other  rule  of  action  is,  in  the 


2o6  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


industrial  world,  recognized  than  that  which  he 
adopts. 

What  we  have  called  industrial  imperialism,  there- 
fore— which  is  only  the  modern  form  of  an  ancient 
and  continuous  struggle  for  the  possession  of  the 
earth — has  its  roots  not  in  international  relations, 
but  in  the  character  and  domestic  relations  of  the 
individuals  and  classes  constituting  a nation.  This 
struggle,  even  when  there  is  no  war  properly  so  called 
— a war  of  nations — is  always  in  progress.  It  is  a 
war  of  industrial  competition  which  is,  amidst  aU  the 
complexities  and  amenities  of  the  social  state,  an 
elemental  conflict  for  the  means  of  subsistence.  In 
the  chief  countries  of  Christendom,  at  the  present  time, 
such  a war,  as  we  all  know,  is  actively  and  incessantly 
waged.  In  its  largest  apparent  forms  it  becomes 
what  we  describe  as  a class  war — a war  between  the 
rich  and  the  poor,  between  capital  and  labour.  There 
are,  to  use  the  words  employed  by  Lord  Beaconsfield 
many  years  ago  in  a memorable  novel,  the  “ two 
nations  ” within  the  nation — two  nations  whose  ever- 
increasing  antagonism  and  conflict  have  recently  more 
than  once  threatened  to  produce  a civil  outbreak  not 
in  its  motives  different  from  the  international  wars 
which  are  due  to  industrial  imperialism.  It  is  essen- 
tial to  recognize  the  connection  between  the  two 
things — to  understand  that  international  policy  is 
prepared  in  the  domestic  life  of  a nation,  and 
that  the  clash  of  empires  in  the  wide  arena  of 
mankind  has  its  sources  and  feeders  in  the  less 
alpable  but  unending  conflict  between  the  in- 


INDUSTRIAL  IMPERIALISM 


207 

dividuals  and  classes  entering  into  the  internal 
economy. 

It  is  necessary  to  recognize  this  for  two  chief 
reasons — first,  because  otherwise  we  can  have  no 
right  measure  of  the  natural  strength  of  the  policy  of 
industrial  imperialism,  and,  therefore,  of  the  forces 
which  move  men  to  war ; secondly,  because  its 
recognition  can  alone  enable  us  to  understand  the 
nature  of  the  influences  which,  if  the  forces  of  war 
are  ever  to  be  overcome,  must  be  brought  to  bear 
against  them.  Just  as  it  is  true  that  the  policy  of 
industrial  imperialism  is  not  the  policy  of  a single 
nation,  but  of  a number  of  competing  nations  through- 
out the  world,  so  it  is  true  that  it  is  not  the  policy  of 
a single  class  within  the  nation,  but  is,  in  its  essential 
motives,  of  aU  its  classes.  The  struggle  between  the 
“ two  nations  ” within  the  nation — between  the  rich 
and  the  poor — arises  because  they  both  aim  at  the 
same  thing,  and  because  the  one  actually  possesses 
what  the  other  wishes  to  gain.  The  desire  for  wealth 
— for  mastery  of  the  products  of  the  earth — is,  as  is 
obvious,  not  confined  to  any  one  order  of  persons. 
It  is  common  to  almost  all  men  and  women,  to  the 
ignorant  and  the  cultivated,  to  those  who  discharge  a 
temporal  function  and  to  those  whose  office  is,  in  one 
way  or  another,  spiritual.  If,  therefore,  the  argu- 
ment for  industrial  imperialism  is  a “ sound  ” one — 
that  is  to  say,  if  this  policy  can  be  shown  actually 
to  give  such  a command  over  the  resources  of  the 
earth  as  could  not  otherwise  be  obtained — it  is  an 
argument  which  makes  an  irresistible  appeal,  not  to 


2o8  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


the  “ capitalist  ” only,  but  to  the  workman,  and  it 
is  as  seductive  to  a religious  minister,  a schoolmaster, 
a professor,  or  an  artist  as  to  those  who  are  directly 
engaged  in  the  production  or  acquisition  of  wealth. 
A war  of  industrial  imperialism,  that  is,  carries  with 
it  almost  the  complete  consent  and  force  of  the  nation 
which  enters  into  it — enlists  substantially  the  same 
motives  on  its  behalf  as  are,  with  a greater  or  less 
degree  of  consciousness,  acknowledged  and  operative 
in  that  daily  struggle  for  wealth  which  constitutes 
the  common  life  of  the  people. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  there  can  be  no  force 
adequate  to  overcome  the  motives  of  war — whether 
drawn  from  political  or  industrial  imperialism — 
except  one  which,  recognizing  the  character  and 
natural  strength  of  those  motives,  is  still  able  to  call 
forth,  and  raise  into  lasting  predominance,  the  motives 
which  make  for  peace.  Such  a force  we  cannot  find 
in  diplomacy  alone,  or  in  statesmanship  alone,  or  in 
mere  political  measures,  of  whatever  kind,  or  simply 
in  the  transfer  of  power  from  the  hands  of  one  par- 
ticular class  and  placing  it  in  the  hands  of  another. 
These  instruments  and  changes  may  be,  on  other 
grounds,  necessary,  but  they  cannot,  by  themselves, 
bring  in  and  maintain  the  Human  Peace.  It  can 
only  be  brought  in  and  maintained  by  a Scientific 
Catholicism. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM 

From  the  point  of  view  of  a Scientific  Catholicism 
the  word  “ policy  ” gains  an  elevation  and  range  of 
meaning  such  as  in  our  ordinary  statesmanship  it 
cannot  possess.  It  means,  first,  the  clear  recog- 
nition of  a supreme,  continuous  End  to  be  reached  ; 
secondly,  the  systematic  employment  of  aU  the 
means,  spiritual  and  temporal,  inner  and  outer, 
which,  in  a synthetic  survey  of  Nature  and  human 
nature,  can  be  shown  to  be  necessary  to  its  attain- 
ment. The  End  which  Catholicism  proposes  to  itself 
is  the  perfection  of  a personal  and  social  humanity — 
a perfection  given  symbolically  and  prophetically  in 
Christ,  and  conceived  of  as  a positive  and  harmonious 
fulfilment  of  all  the  sides  of  human  nature,  in  an 
order  constituted  by  the  subordination  of  the  lower 
to  the  higher.  This  is  the  Catholic  life.  It  is  in 
reference  to  this  great  aim  that  a Human  Peace  is,  or 
is  not,  a good,  and  war  is,  or  is  not,  an  evil.  Now, 
we  have,  in  the  consideration  of  this  question,  pro- 
ceeded, as  we  have  already  said,  by  endeavouring 
to  descend  from  Heaven  to  Earth.  We  have  tried 
to  put  first  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  its  righteous- 
ness, and  have  then  sought  to  ascertain  the  position 
of  man,  as  a dependent  worker  upon  the  earth,  in 


210  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


relation  to  that  Kingdom.  We  have  considered  him 
not  first  as  an  animal  and  then  as  a Catholic,  but  first 
as  a Catholic  and  then  as  an  animal.  There  is  every 
justification  for  such  an  order  of  inquiry,  although 
there  may  be  a provisional  justification  for  a different 
order.  Scientifically  considered — unless  we  are  to 
exclude  from  the  field  of  science  the  social  and  moral 
nature  of  humanity — man  is  not  an  animal ; he  is  a 
Catholic.  He  is  a Catholic,  first,  because  as  we  see 
him  in  history  he  continuously  presents  himself  to  us 
as  a religious  being ; he  is  a Catholic,  secondly, 
because  even  when,  in  our  modern  world,  he  does  not 
propose  to  himself  the  specific  purposes  which  are 
represented  by  the  word  “ Church,”  he  still  commonly 
proposes  to  himself  the  ends  which  are  represented 
by  the  words  “ home,”  “ school,”  “ theatre,”  “ State,” 
and  “ workshop.”  He  is,  that  is  to  say,  never  only 
an  animal,  following  mere  impulses  of  appetite  and 
passion,  but,  completely  or  incompletely,  a Catholic — 
in  some  sense,  and  in  some  degree,  a spiritual  being, 
acting  upon  his  environment  and  upon  himself  for 
the  accomplishment  of  certain  ends  of  beauty,  reason, 
and  power. 

But  having  followed  this  method  of  treatment,  and 
gained  the  standpoint  which  is  proper  to  man  in  the 
full  development  of  his  humanity,  it  is,  we  repeat, 
allowable  to  adopt  the  inverse  method  and  approach 
the  problem  of  peace  rather  from  below  than  from 
above.  Now,  what  we  have  to  determine  is  whether 
there  is  some  reason,  in  the  nature  of  things,  why 
man,  not  being  an  animal  but  containing  an 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  21 1 


animal  within  him,  must,  for  the  satisfaction  of 
his  primary,  imperative  instincts,  go  to  war  with 
his  fellow-beings.  In  other  words,  is  the  policy 
of  industrial  imperialism,  which  proceeds  from  the 
working  of  these  instincts,  within  and  without  the 
nation,  a policy  indispensable  ? If  it  is,  then  war 
may  be,  for  a given  nation  and  in  a given  situation, 
a good  and  peace  an  evil.  In  its  immediate  bearing 
upon  the  spiritual  life,  as  we  have  seen,  war — ^con- 
sidered as  a specific  application  of  material  force, 
directed  to  destruction  and  slaughter — cannot  be 
shown  to  be  a good.  It  visibly  subserves  none  of  the 
purposes  of  that  life.  But  it  is  a good — considered  as 
a means  to  an  end-— if  imperialism  is  a good,  because 
imperialism  demands  war.  Imperialism  has,  as  we 
have  seen,  two  main  related  forms — one  which  we 
have  called  political,  the  other  industrial.  Neither 
of  the  two  forms,  it  is  true,  exists,  as  a rule,  by  itself. 
The  forces  of  war  are,  as  we  have  shown,  connected 
and  interdependent,  and  when  one  of  them  has  been 
called  into  operation  almost  all  the  others  are  also 
summoned  up.  It  is,  however,  possible  and  desirable 
to  distinguish  one  from  the  other,  and  to  determine 
their  relative  degrees  of  power  and  importance.  Of 
the  two  forms  of  imperialism  the  industrial  is  the 
one  upon  which  it  is,  in  our  modern  world,  most  neces- 
sary to  concentrate  our  attention.  It  is  this  because 
it  is  immediately  connected  with  the  question  of  man’s 
command  over  the  earth  and  its  products.  It  is  this 
because  in  it  all  orders  of  men  and  women  within  the 
nation  are  interested.  It  is  this  because  it  is  a policy 


212  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


naturally  connected  with  the  constant  conflict  of 
individuals  and  classes  in  industrial  life.  It  is  this 
because  if  it  is  a policy  for  one  nation  it  is  a policy  for 
all,  in  proportion  to  their  power.  It  is  this  because 
our  modern  world  is  pre-eminently  and  increasingly 
a world  of  industry.  It  is  this  because,  whatever 
may  be  the  other  alleged  motives  of  imperialism, 
its  industrial  motive  is  almost  always  at  last 
appealed  to  to  sanction  or  reinforce  them.  It  is 
this  because  rulers  and  people,  capitalists  and  work- 
men, are  alike  susceptible  to  the  appeal  which  it 
makes  to  them,  and  because  the  Catholic  life  itself — 
the  spiritual  and  social  life  of  religion  or  culture 
— depends  ultimately  on  what  man  gets  from  the 
earth. 

Now,  industrial  imperialism,  according  to  our  con- 
ception and  definition  of  it,  has  a perfectly  plain  and 
distinctive  character  ; it  is  a policy  of  interference  in 
the  internal  concerns  of  a foreign  country,  directed 
to  industrial  ends,  involving  war,  local  and  general, 
as  one  of  its  consequences,  and  commonly  also  leading 
to  conquest.  As  such  it  is,  as  we  have  said,  to  be  care- 
fully distinguished  from  movements  of  emigration 
and  colonization,  which  do  not  necessarily  entail  such 
consequences.  The  question  to  be  considered,  stating 
it  specifically  and  practically,  is  whether  this  policy 
of  industrial  imperialism  is,  for  any  of  the  nations  of 
Christendom  and  in  our  modern  world,  necessary — 
necessary,  that  is  to  say,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
that  command  over  the  resources  of  the  earth  which 
is  imposed  upon  man  as  a condition  of  both  his 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  213 


animal  and  his  spiritual  existence.  We  may,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  inquiry,  assume — ^what,  however, 
strictly  speaking,  has  not  yet  been  demonstrated — 
that  it  is  impossible  for  any  existing  European  people 
to  maintain  itself,  in  a merely  material  sense,  within 
its  own  territorial  limits — that  it  is  called  upon,  in 
varying  degree,  to  live  beyond  those  limits.  We  may 
assume,  too,  that  the  population  of  Europe  will  con- 
tinue to  expand  as,  except  in  France,  it  has  expanded 
hitherto.  We  may  even  assume  that  it  is,  from  various 
points  of  view,  undesirable,  even  if  it  were  possible, 
for  a nation  to  be  so  completely  self-supporting  as 
to  be  under  no  obligation  to  relate  itself  industrially 
to  the  other  nations  of  mankind.  Each  of  these 
assumptions,  of  course,  itself  raises  important  and 
difficult  questions,  but  we  may,  for  our  immediate 
purposes,  disregard  them. 

The  object  of  industrial  imperialism  is  to  enable  a 
European  nation  to  obtain  an  indispensable  command 
over  the  products  of  the  earth  in,  let  us  say,  Asia, 
Africa,  or  America,  which,  on  the  hypothesis,  it  cannot 
obtain  within  its  own  borders.  The  one  question  to 
be  decided,  therefore,  is  whether  such  a policy  is 
necessary  to  secure  the  result — ^whether  it  is  possible 
to  reach  the  same  end  in  any  other  way.  It  is  obvious 
to  begin  with,  that  whatever  may  be  the  methods 
adopted  to  reach  it,  a European  nation  can  only  secure 
the  products  of  any  other  country — whether  in 
Europe  itself  or  in  other  parts  of  the  earth — by  a 
process  of  exchange  or  trade.  This  process  of 
exchange  must,  for  example,  be  carried  on,  within  the 


214  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


limits  of  a world-wide  State,  such  as  the  British 
Empire,  precisely  as  it  is  carried  on  beyond  those 
limits.  England,  when  she  receives  corn  and  cotton 
from  her  own  distant  possessions,  has  to  pay  for  them 
just  as  when  she  receives  them  from  America  or 
Russia.  There  is,  in  this  respect,  no  difference  what- 
ever between  what  may  be  called  Imperial  trade  and 
foreign  trade.  It  is  plain,  too,  that  any  European 
nation  drawing  the  necessaries  of  life  from  some 
extra-European  possession,  is,  in  an  economic  sense, 
as  much  dependent  upon  that  possession  as  if  it  were 
a foreign  country.  Any  results  which  may  follow 
from  such  a dependence  are,  of  course,  not  abrogated 
even  if  there  is,  as  we  say,  “ free  trade  within  the 
Empire.”  The  abolition  of  protective  tariffs,  for 
instance,  as  between  Canada  or  Australia  and  England, 
would  not  diminish  EngHsh  economic  dependence 
upon  those  countries,  or  convert  the  United  Kingdom 
into  a self-sufficing  State.  If  we  suppose  this  change 
to  have  been  brought  about,  it  would  still  remain  true 
that  the  inhabitants  of  the  British  Islands — or  of 
Great  Britain  at  least — could  not  subsist  by  such  a 
direct  command  over  the  earth  as  is  to  be  gained 
within  their  own  limits.  It  is  obvious,  too,  that  the 
economic  needs  of  any  imperial  dependency — and 
therefore  its  demand  for  the  products  of  the  govern- 
ing State — are  determined  by  the  character  of  its 
civilization  and  its  social  customs.  If  it  is  possible 
for  it  to  do  what  the  Imperial  nation  is  unable  to 
do,  subsist  entirely  within  its  own  limits,  it  may 
have  no  such  imperative  needs  as  give  rise  to 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  215 


foreign  trade.  It  may,  further,  have  no  exporting 
power,  either  because  of  the  nature  of  its  material 
resources  or  because  of  the  demands  of  its  own 
population. 

A policy  of  industrial  imperialism,  therefore,  cannot 
abolish  time  and  space,  or  nullify  geographical  conse- 
quences. The  economic  effect  of  English  dependence 
upon  a British  possession  is  substantially  the  same  as 
that  resulting  from  its  dependence  upon  a foreign 
country.  In  either  case  the  material  Hfe  of  the  nation 
is  life  in  relation  to  an  environment  which  is  not  its 
own.  And  what  applies  to  England  applies,  of  course, 
also  to  any  other  European  country  in  similar  circum- 
stances. It  is,  however,  not  enough  to  say  this.  Not 
only  is  it  true  that  industrial  imperialism  does  not 
increase  the  economic  independence  of  the  State 
which  pursues  such  a policy,  but  it  is  also  true  that 
the  total  imperial  trade  of  a country  in  the  position 
of  England — understanding  by  “ trade  ” a command 
of  the  resources  of  the  earth  effected  by  exchange — is 
much  less  than  its  total  trade  with  foreign  countries. 
This  the  statistics  of  British  imports  and  exports  are 
sufficient  to  show.  To  accomplish  its  avowed  or 
imphed  purpose — to  enable  England,  for  example,  as 
a great  imperial  State,  to  be  economically  self- 
sufficing — “ free  trade  within  the  Empire  ” would 
have  to  be  exclusive  of  all  trade  without  the  Empire. 
England,  under  such  circumstances,  would  have  to 
buy  and  sell  only  with  its  own  non-European  posses- 
sions and  to  do  no  business  in  Europe  at  all ; and,  once 
more,  not  only  would  England  have  to  maintain 


2i6  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


itself  in  such  a position,  but  all  other  European 
countries  pursuing  a similar  policy  would  have  to  do 
the  same.  They  would,  that  is  to  say,  have  to  sacri- 
fice their  immense  body  of  trade — their  wide  command 
over  the  resources  of  the  earth- — outside  the  limits 
of  their  own  empire  for  the  sake  of  the  smaller  body, 
the  smaller  command,  within  those  limits.  Further, 
they  would  be  called  upon,  speaking  generally,  to 
give  up  their  trade  with  neighbouring  countries  in 
order  to  trade  exclusively  with  remoter  countries. 
Lastly,  they  would  have  to  limit  themselves  to  trading 
with  uncivilized  or  undeveloped  countries,  making 
comparatively  few  demands  upon  the  higher  industries, 
and  to  sacrifice  their  commerce  with  nations  in  much 
the  same  plane  of  culture  with  themselves,  and  having 
therefore,  a wide  and  increasing  range  of  social  needs. 
In  a word,  if  the  policy  of  industrial  imperialism  were, 
in  its  logical  development,  a possible  policy,  and  were 
consistently  and  systematically  maintained,  it  would 
place  each  of  the  great  “ empires  ” of  the  world, 
within  its  pohtical  limits,  in  much  the  same  position 
as  was  at  one  time,  in  a certain  degree,  occupied  by  an 
isolated  and  independent  people  supporting  an  exclu- 
sive and  rudimentary  civilization  on  the  products  of 
its  own  soil. 

The  policy  of  industrial  imperialism  is,  however, 
ideally  considered  and  in  its  full  development,  an 
impossible  pohcy.  It  is  an  attempt  to  reverse  the 
results  of  the  total  evolution  of  mankind — to  give  to 
England,  France,  Germany,  or  Italy,  as  an  imperial 
State,  a position  of  economic  isolation  and  indepen- 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  217 


dence  such  as,  strictly  speaking,  hardly  any  people 
has  ever  absolutely  maintained,  even  in  the  early 
ages  of  civilization.  It  is  an  attempt,  too,  by  political 
and  mihtary  processes  to  nullify  the  forces  of  Nature 
— to  gain  for  a nation  with  certain  inherent  dis- 
advantages of  position,  climate,  soil,  vegetation,  and 
mineral  resources  the  same  industrial  power  and 
ascendency  as  if,  in  these  respects,  its  situation  were 
entirely  different.  It  is  a policy  which  carries  with 
it  the  consequences  of  war  without  securing  the 
ends  of  industry  to  a greater  extent  than  they  would 
be  secured  by  a policy  of  peace.  The  ends  of  industry 
are  a command  over  the  resources  of  the  earth,  for 
the  purposes  of  human  life,  lower  and  higher,  material 
and  spiritual.  It  is,  as  we  have  said,  conceivable  that 
each  of  the  imperial  nations  of  Europe  has  a much 
greater  capacity  of  directly  supporting  itself  within 
its  own  territorial  limits  than  has  yet  been  developed, 
even  if  we  assume  a certain  continuous  expansion  of 
population.  They  have  doubtless,  in  degree,  been 
driven  beyond  those  limits  not  so  much  by  a perma- 
nent and  absolute  necessity  as  by  a temporary  and 
relative  necessity — not,  for  example,  because  they 
are  wholly  unable  to  procure  food  and  clothing 
within  their  own  borders,  but  because,  at  a given  time, 
they  can  procure  them  more  readily  and  cheaply  else- 
where than  at  home.  Actually,  however,  what  we 
see,  to  fall  back  upon  our  former  expression,  is  that 
“ man  ” — whether  he  is  the  “ man  ” of  England, 
France,  Germany,  or  the  United  States — has,  in  our 
modern  world,  become  an  inhabitant  of  the  whole 


2i8  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


earth,  commanding  its  resources,  not  directly  by  an 
exclusive  and  immediate  action  upon  that  part  of  it 
in  which  he  is  situated,  but  by  means  of  his  wide  and 
complex  relations  with  the  undivided  territory  and 
life  of  mankind. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Catholic  Hfe,  there- 
fore— a life  of  positive  many-sided  perfection,  sym- 
bolized and  inspired  by  the  Perfection  of  Christ — it 
cannot  be  shown  that  imperialism,  the  war  policy,  is 
a good  policy.  To  be  good  it  must  be  indispensable — 
indispensable  for  the  attainment  of  certain  great  and 
specific  ends  which  man,  as  a continuous  being, 
developing  and  harmonizing  the  various  sides  of  his 
nature,  progressively  proposes  to  himself.  But  if  it 
is  not  in  this  sense  good,  it  is  evil,  and  evil  in  a high 
degree.  If  war  is  not  conducive  to  the  Catholic  life — 
the  life  of  religious  exaltation,  the  life  of  spiritual 
culture  and  fulfilment — it  is,  being  what  it  is,  the 
greatest  of  hindrances  to  that  life.  War  is  a special 
apphcation  of  material  force,  directed  to  purposes  of 
destruction  and  slaughter.  If  it  is  indispensable  to 
the  Catholic  life,  either  on  its  higher  side  or  on  its 
lower,  then  against  the  supreme  good  which  it  secures 
we  are  not  entitled  to  set  any  evils  which  are  asso- 
ciated with  it,  great  as  those  evils  in  themselves  may 
be.  That  men — to  employ  our  traditional  concep- 
tions and  symbolism — should,  for  some  few  years  of 
sin  on  earth,  be  condemned  to  eternal  torment  in 
another  world  may  appear  to  us  horrible,  but  if  this 
is  indispensable  to  the  fulfilment  of  Divine  justice, 
we  must  reconcile  ourselves  with  the  horror.  War 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  219 


has  its  own  character,  which  fulfils  itself.  What  is 
essential  in  regard  to  it  is  not  that  its  evils  should  be 
tempered,  but  that  its  objects  should  be  attained.  Its 
evils  are  the  price  which  we  pay  for  the  good  which 
we  wish  to  secure.  The  price  may  be  great,  but  it 
can  never  be  too  great  if  the  good  is  indispensable, 
and  if  we  can  only  secure  it  by  paying  the  price.  In 
practice,  men,  in  making  war,  have  always,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  acted  on  this  principle.  They  have 
known  that  war  was  a process  of  destruction  and 
slaughter — that  it  was  wasteful,  murderous,  and, 
from  our  ordinary  point  of  view,  revolting  and  awful. 
This,  however,  has  not  prevented  them  from  waging 
it.  They  have  refrained  from  entering  into  it  either 
when  they  believed  themselves  unable  to  prosecute  it 
successfully,  or  when  they  had  no  apparent  purpose  to 
gain  by  waging  it,  and  they  have  ended  it  when  they 
have  been  compelled  to  do  so,  or  have  secured  the 
objects  for  which  they  fought.  But  they  have  never 
refused  to  enter  into  war,  and  they  have  never  brought 
war  to  an  end,  merely  because  of  its  waste  or  its 
inhumanity.  They  have  understood  perfectly  well 
that  waste  and  inhumanity  are  as  inevitable  in  war  as 
are  ploughing  the  land  and  sowing  the  seed  in  agri- 
culture— to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that  into  war,  as 
we  have  seen,  enter  the  instinct  of  destruction  and 
the  joy  of  combat. 

This,  in  our  modern  world,  is  even  more  true  than 
in  the  earlier  ages  of  mankind.  The  savage  man,  or 
the  man  of  a low  civilization,  is  a man  largely 
governed  by  immediate  impulses.  He  is  not  a 


220  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


“ being  of  large  discourse,  looking  before  and  after.” 
He  has  a small  command  of  human  experience.  He 
is  heir  to  no  great  conquests  of  order  and  culture.  He 
is  without  a vision  of  the  social  future.  He  is  unedu- 
cated, improvident,  unsystematic.  He  has  com- 
paratively little  to  lose  by  war  ; he  gains  from  it  the 
satisfaction  of  that  fighting  man^ — the  man  of  animal 
antagonism  and  conflict^ — ^who  is  contained  and 
restrained  in  the  Catholic  man.  When  he  chooses 
war,  therefore,  he  chooses  it,  or  is  carried  into  it,  by 
the  full  and  ready  consent  of  all  his  instincts,  and 
with  a limited  consciousness  and  idea  of  responsibility. 
If  war  is  in  any  sense  a sin,  the  savage  man,  the  unde- 
veloped or  ignorant  man,  is  least  of  all  a sinner  when 
he  wages  it.  The  modern  man— the  man  of  Western 
Europe  in  the  twentieth  century— is  in  a very 
different  position.  He  carries  in  his  mind  an  ideal 
of  the  Catholic  life.  The  Divine  Perfection  of 
Christ’s  Humanity,  the  tender  and  immaculate 
maternity  of  Our  Lady,  the  unseen  presences  of  the 
saints,  the  precious  creations  of  the  arts  and  sciences, 
the  slow  and  great  conquests  of  industry,  the  high 
order  of  domestic  and  national  life — -these  things 
shape  him,  sustain  him,  breathe  upon  him  light, 
beauty,  and  power,  give  to  him  an  image  and 
prescience  of  ideal  good;  and  when,  therefore,  he 
enters  into  war  he  steps  from  the  sanctuary  into  a 
slaughter-house,  and  destroys  in  a moment  of 
anarchic  passion  the  temple  which  a thousand 
years  of  genius  and  achievement  have  hardly  sufficed 
to  build.  If  war,  therefore,  is  a sin,  the  modern 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  221 


man  as  he  wages  it  is  a sinner  in  the  highest 
degree.  He  is  as  Satan  descending  from  the  Courts 
of  God  to  kindle  the  fury  and  devastation  of 
HeU.  The  higher  we  rise  the  lower,  if  we  fall, 
we  fall. 

The  recognition  and  consciousness  of  this,  however, 
have  not  prevented  man — the  Western  man  of  the 
twentieth  century — from  entering  into  the  bloodiest 
and  most  wasteful  war  in  history.  Its  bloodshed  and 
waste  were  inevitable,  if  the  war  was  inevitable. 
They  were,  indeed,  planned  and  foreseen.  The  war 
was  an  outcome  of  what  we  call  peace.  It  was  a 
fruit  of  policy.  It  was  a result  of  contrivance  and 
invention.  The  machine-gun,  the  torpedo,  the  sub- 
marine, the  aeroplane,  the  “ Dreadnought,”  the 
long-range  artillery — these  are  not  the  extemporized 
instruments  of  a sudden  and  barbaric  passion, 
hurrying  men  blindly  to  destruction  ; they  are  a high 
product  of  science  and  social  order — the  calm  creation 
of  a vast  intellectual  and  material  capital.  The  men 
who  invented  them,  the  Governments  that  sanctioned 
them,  the  peoples  that  applauded  them  or  acquiesced 
in  them,  the  tax-payers  who  provided  the  means  for 
them,  the  ministers  of  religion  who  prayed  and 
preached  as  usual  while  they  were  being  perfected— 
these  all  understood  why  such  instruments  of  havoc 
were  being  wrought,  and  what  was  the  kind  of  havoc 
which  they  would  necessarily  effect.  Yet,  in  the 
quiet  and  reflection  of  half  a century,  they  witnessed 
their  production  without  a protest.  The  reason  for 
this  is,  as  we  say,  plain.  If  war  is  a good — in  the 


222  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


sense  of  being  indispensable  to  some  side  or  other  of 
the  Catholic  life,  individual  and  national — then  the 
accompanying  evils  of  war  must  be  considered  to  be, 
by  comparison,  insignificant.  If  the  policy  which 
produces  war  is,  on  a total  view  of  it,  sound,  then  it 
is  sound  with  a soundness  which  makes  the  death  of 
a million  men,  or  the  destruction  of  a hundred  archi- 
tectural masterpieces,  or  the  perpetration  of  a 
number  of  “ cruelties  ” or  “ barbarities  ” of  small 
relative  importance.  War  being  what  it  is,  only  an 
indispensable  good  can  justify  it,  and  if  it  is  justified 
by  an  indispensable  good,  any  evils  which  may  attend 
it  are,  real  as  they  may  be,  of  minor  consequence. 
The  fundamental  human  choice  with  regard  to  war 
is  not  the  choice  which  mitigates  its  subsidiary 
horrors,  but  the  exercise  of  reason  and  will  which 
decides  whether  or  not  a policy  shall  be  prosecuted 
which  makes  it  inevitable.  All  else  is  illusory  senti- 
ment, and  is  a sentiment  which  is  so  far  from  being 
beneficent  that  it  is — as  is  all  sentiment  divorced 
from  right  intelligence — a hindrance  to  the  very 
purposes  which  it  seeks  to  attain.  It  is  not  in  regard 
to  the  methods  of  war,  but  in  regard  to  the  policy — 
the  conscious  intentional  shaping  of  a nation’s  life — 
which  produces  or  prevents  war  that  a Scientific 
Catholicism  has,  or  has  not,  its  guidance  to  give  to 
mankind. 

If,  however,  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
— or  the  policy  of  imperialism,  political  and 
industrial,  which  provokes  it — is  not,  from  any  point 
of  view,  indispensable  to  the  Catholic  life,  but  is,  on 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  223 


the  contrary,  a frustration  of  that  life,  then  it  becomes, 
in  a transcendent  sense,  evil,  for  to  the  evil  of  blood- 
shed and  destruction,  it  superadds  the  greatest  of  aU 
evils — that  it  stands  between  man  and  the  Perfection 
of  Christ.  And  this  must  be  the  conclusion  of  a 
Scientific  CathoHcism.  War — meaning  always  by 
war  aggressive  war,  rendered  inevitable  by  a dehberate 
pohcy — is  not,  in  fact,  in  our  modern  world,  indis- 
pensable to  the  attainment  of  the  Catholic  aims, 
higher  and  lower,  which  man  proposes  to  himself. 
The  one  basic,  inevitable  aim  which  might  seem  to 
call  for  it — man’s  command  over  the  earth,  as  a con- 
dition of  his  animal  subsistence — is,  as  is  now  clear, 
an  aim  which  is  so  far  from  justifying  it  that  this  aim 
is  actually  better  fulfilled,  for  every  European  nation, 
outside  the  Hmits  of  empire  than  within  those  limits, 
and  that  the  pohcy  of  industrial  imperiahsm  is,  in 
any  complete  sense,  impossible.  Man  is,  wherever  he 
is,  economically  an  inhabitant  of  the  whole  earth,  and 
he  is  this  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  range  of  his 
needs — to  his  elevation  in  the  scale  of  intelligence, 
culture,  and  social  refinement.  But  of  the  whole  earth 
a modern  European  — a Frenchman,  a German,  an 
Englishman,  a Russian — can  only,  for  industrial  pur- 
poses, gain  a command  in  one  of  two  conceivable  ways 
— either  by  a universal  empire  or  by  universal  ex- 
change. A universal  empire  is  inconceivable.  We  are 
not  called  upon  to  discuss  it.  There  is  only  one  thing  that 
can  be  universal,  and  that  is  exchange — an  exchange 
of  man’s  spiritual  acquisitions,  or  Cathohcism,  the 
Spirit  of  God  moving  over  the  waters  and  lands 


224  the  problem  of  human  peace 

and  making  humanity  one — or  an  exchange  of  his 
material  acquisitions,  rendering  the  Catholic  life 
possible.  This  double  exchange  means  a Human 
Peace. 

It  is  in  the  presence  of  this  conception — a concep- 
tion not  drawn  from  a sentimental  idealism,  but  from 
the  governing  realities  of  man’s  industrial  life,  that 
war — being  not  only  unnecessary,  but  a visible  frus- 
tration of  his  lower  and  higher  aims — becomes  an 
illimitable  evil.  To  not  a single  one  of  man’s  repre- 
sentative and  symbolic  institutions — the  home,  the 
Church,  the  school,  the  theatre,  the  State,  the  work- 
shop— does  it  make  a positive  contribution.  Through- 
out the  whole  range  of  his  hfe  it  is  a form  of  waste 
and  dissipation.  If  the  value  of  life  can  be  expressed 
in  terms  of  love,  goodness,  beauty,  truth,  wisdom, 
and  power — if  man  is,  in  the  conception  of  him  given 
continuously  in  the  ages,  a being  holding  in  his  mind 
a vision  of  his  own  inner  and  outer  perfection,  after 
which  he  always  follows — then  war  is  a mere  anarchy 
in  the  presence  of  a possible  order.  If  the  master 
evils  of  human  life  may  be  summed  up,  as  they  may,  as 
sin,  hatred,  disease,  ugliness,  ignorance,  penury,  then 
there  is  not  a single  one  of  those  evils  which  war, 
instead  of  decreasing,  does  not  increase.  If  the  chief 
forms  of  good  may  be  summed  up,  as  they  may,  as 
goodness,  love,  health,  beauty,  knowledge,  and 
material  sufficiency,  then  there  is  not  a single 
one  of  them  in  relation  to  which  war  — an 
application  of  material  force,  directed  to  slaughter 
and  destruction — is  not  a hindrance.  The  things 


CATHOLICISM  AND  IMPERIALISM  225 


which  man,  in  his  moments  of  choice  and  pre- 
science, would  wish  to  do  it  prevents  him  from 
doing ; the  things  that  he  would  wish  to  avoid 
it  brings  upon  him.  It  is  a mode  of  human  mis- 
carriage. 


CHAPTER  IX 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE 

It  is  now  possible,  going  back  upon  the  principles 
which  we  have  endeavoured  to  establish  in  this  work, 
to  determine  the  attitude  of  a Scientific  Cathohcism — 
that  is  to  say,  of  the  developed,  synthetic  mind  of 
man,  proposing  to  himself  Perfection  in  Christ — 
towards  the  problem  of  Human  Peace.  First,  we 
see  that  such  a peace  would  be  a good — a good  so 
supreme  and  universal  that  against  it  no  good  to  be 
atta  ned  by  war  can  properly  be  pleaded.  It  is  in 
this  sense  a good  because  it  is  indispensable  to  the 
Catholic  life.  The  CathoHc  life  is  a thing  higher  and 
lower.  In  principle  it  begins  with  the  soul ; in 
practice  it  begins  with  the  body.  Before  we  can  hve 
this  life  we  must  have  the  vision  of  it  clear  and  full 
in  our  minds,  so  that  we  may  master  and  order  all 
our  forces  for  its  realization.  When  we  have  gained 
this  vision,  however,  we  see  that  the  life  of  the 
spiritual  man  must  begin  with  the  hfe  of  the  animal 
man — ^with  man’s  action  upon  the  earth  to  secure 
for  himself  a material  subsistence.  It  is  only  in  the 
light  of  this  comprehensive  view  of  human  nature — 
showing  to  us  man  as  a definite  organism,  in  dependent 
yet  modifying  relation  with  a definite  environment — 
that  we  can  decide  how  far  war  is,  or  is  not,  necessary, 
how  far  peace  is,  or  is  not,  a good.  We  are  entitled 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  227 


to  say  that  war  is  not  necessary  because  it  is  not  an 
indispensable  means  to  any  of  man’s  continuous  ends 
— either  those  ends  which  are  represented  by  the 
words  “ home,”  “ Church,”  “ school,”  “ theatre,”  or 
those  which  are  represented  by  the  words  “ State  ” 
and  “ workshop.”  We  are  entitled  to  say  that,  on 
the  contrary,  not  being  necessary,  it  is  a stupendous 
evil,  a process  of  anarchic  destruction  and  waste,  a 
frustration  of  man’s  right  government  and  direction 
of  himself,  in  mind  and  body.  We  are  entitled  to 
say  that  peace  is  a good  because  it  is  naturally  and 
demonstrably  subservient  to  the  ends  of  man — 
because  it  is  a state  of  order,  of  self-possession,  of 
self-direction,  of  organic  constructive  mastery  over 
the  earth,  as  the  basis  of  the  Catholic  life,  and  of  a 
full  command  and  use  of  the  things  of  the  spirit,  as 
its  apex  and  crown. 

For  a Catholic  international  policy,  however,  we 
need  something  more  than  to  be  able  to  show,  in  this 
general  way,  the  evil  of  war,  the  good  of  peace.  A 
Scientific  Catholicism  must  be  both  a principle  and  a 
power  of  peace.  It  has,  finding  for  itself  voices  and 
organs,  to  so  educate  and  transform  the  mind  of  man 
— the  man  not  of  one  country  alone,  but,  in  the  first 
instance,  of  all  Christendom — that  he  may  give  to 
peace  the  same  place  in  his  purposes  as  he  has  in  the 
past  given  to  war,  or  to  modes  of  policy  and  action 
involving  war.  This  it  must  do  by  convincing  men— 
the  citizenship  of  England,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Russia,  and  other  countries — not  only  that  war  is  a 
frustration  of  all  the  high  spiritual  ends  of  life,  but  that 


228  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


it  is  a frustration  also  of  those  lower  material  ends 
on  which  the  spiritual  ends  depend,  and  for  which, 
in  our  modern  world,  it  is  commonly  waged.  In  other 
words,  here,  as  elsewhere,  Catholicism  can  have  no 
capacity  to  shape  the  life  of  mankind  unless  it  becomes 
positive  and  practical — unless  it  can  show  men  not 
merely  what  they  are  to  abstain  from  doing,  but  what 
they  are  to  do.  It  must  cease  to  be,  what  hitherto 
it  has  largely  been,  a mere  voice  of  prohibition  and 
censure,  or  the  proclamation  of  an  abstract  ideal,  and 
become  a voice  of  guidance  and  application.  It  is 
not  enough  to  denounce  war  and  praise  peace.  It 
is  necessary  to  prove  to  man  that  peace  is  indispens- 
able to  the  attainment  of  the  very  objects  for  which 
war  is  now  commonly  waged,  and  that  the  objects 
which  cannot  be  secured  by  peace  are  such  as  man, 
pursuing  the  Catholic  life,  is  not  called  upon  to 
propose  to  himself. 

The  Human  Peace,  as  we  have  defined  it — the 
universal,  continuous  peace  of  man — must,  as  we  have 
said,  be  preceded  by  a Western  Peace,  the  peace  of 
Christendom.  For  the  purposes  of  such  a Western 
Peace — of  a deliberate  and  systematic  policy,  designed 
to  bring  it  in  and  maintain  it — we  may  place  ourselves 
at  the  point  of  view  of  any  one  of  the  Great  European 
Powers — France,  England,  Germany,  or  Italy.  They 
differ,  of  course,  to  some  extent  in  situation, 
character,  and  needs,  but  they  are  at  the  same  time 
sufficiently  similar  for  us  to  be  entitled  to  consider 
any  one  of  them,  for  our  present  purpose,  as  a repre- 
sentative of  all  the  others.  It  is  only  in  so  far  as 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  229 

their  position  and  needs — their  “ interests,”  to  use 
the  diplomatic  expression — are  identical  that  we  can 
expect  them  to  adopt  a common  policy.  It  is,  in 
fact,  because  their  aims  are  substantially  the  same 
that,  in  the  pursuit  of  them,  they  come  into  conflict  ; 
and  an  international  policy  of  peace  can  only  become 
possible  if  they  can  arrive  at  a common  understanding 
that  these  aims,  in  so  far  as  they  are  actually  indis- 
pensable, may  be  accomplished  without  war. 

Such  a policy  begins  with  what  we  call  the  lowest 
need  of  man — his  material  need.  He  lives,  we  say,  in 
the  basic  sense  of  the  word  “ life,”  by  his  command  of 
the  earth.  Any  one  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe, 
considered  as  a continuous,  organized  society  of 
human  beings,  exists  by  virtue  of  this  command — in 
the  first  place,  by  its  command  over  that  portion  of 
the  earth  on  which  it  is  immediately  seated.  Whether 
it  can  gain  sufficient  material  support  from  its  own 
territory  is  a question  of  fact  and  experience.  We 
must,  in  relation  to  this,  dismiss  from  our  minds  the 
superstition  embodied  in  the  formula  that  “ when 
God  sends  mouths  He  sends  bread  to  feed  them.”  It 
can  have  no  place  in  a Scientific  Catholicism,  seeing 
and  representing  things  as  they  are.  It  has,  in  fact, 
never  been  acted  upon  even  by  those  who  professed 
to  accept  it,  and  it  is  contrary  to  all  our  experience  of 
living  things,  vegetable,  animal,  and  human.  It  is 
doubtless  true,  as  we  have  said,  that  every  European 
nation  has  a greater  power  of  existing  within  its  own 
territory  than  it  has  actually  developed,  and  it  may 
well  be  a part  of  Catholic  policy — understanding  by 


230  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


Catholic  policy  the  synthetic  ordering  of  the  whole 
life  of  man  for  the  realization  of  the  ends  of  Per- 
fection— to  call  forth  and  direct  that  power,  indus- 
trially and  politically,  to  a much  greater  extent  than 
has  hitherto  been  done.  Still,  it  remains  true  that 
the  “ man  ” of  any  European  nation  does  not,  in 
fact,  subsist  on  the  produce  of  his  own  soil.  Either, 
therefore,  he  must  increase  its  yield,  or  he  must 
decrease  his  demands  upon  it,  or  he  must,  in  some 
way,  go  beyond  it  and  exercise  a wide  sovereignty  over 
the  resources  of  the  whole  earth. 

He  does,  in  actual  experience,  employ  all  these  three 
processes.  He  increases  the  yield  of  his  territory  by 
progressive  industrial  and  political  action.  He  de- 
creases, or  limits,  his  demands  upon  it,  to  a certain 
extent,  by  emigration — to  say  nothing  of  the  great 
waste  of  human  life  that  follows  from  disease,  poverty, 
and  war.  He  goes  beyond  it  by  means  of  trade — 
either  the  immense  body  of  trade  which  we  may 
describe  as  international,  or  the  smaller  body  which 
we  may  call  imperial,  and  which,  although  it  is 
imperial,  is  still  dependent,  as  is  international  trade, 
on  free  exchange.  Now  the  first  of  these  processes — 
the  increase  of  the  domestic  national  resources  by 
the  development  of  agriculture — does  not,  we  say, 
demand  war.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  emigration 
and  international  trade.  The  same  thing  is  true  even 
of  imperial  trade,  in  so  far  as  it  is  trade  within  the 
limits  of  an  empire  already  established.  If  we  put 
ourselves,  therefore,  at  the  point  of  view  of  any  par- 
ticular status  quo,  the  policy  of  industrial  imperialism. 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  231 


which  is  a war  pohcy,  must  be  understood  as  a policy 
to  extend  an  existing  empire  for  the  sake  of  an 
increase  of  imperial  trade.  It  must  be  recognized, 
also,  that  imperial  trade  does  not  constitute  a 
monopoly.  No  one  of  the  existing  empires  of  the 
world  seeks  to  prevent  its  various  rivals  from  doing 
business  with  its  own  possessions.  It  may  aim  at 
securing  certain  special  advantages  for  itself,  but 
subject  to  these  restrictions  it  acts  on  the  assumption 
that  universality  of  exchange  is  a common  interest  of 
all  nations.  Therefore,  industrial  imperialism  is  for 
any  European  nation  a policy  which,  being  a war 
policy,  endangers  its  international  trade,  its  greater 
trade,  for  the  sake  of  its  imperial,  or  smaller,  trade, 
and  this  without  securing  a monopoly,  even  of  the 
imperial  trade.  In  other  words,  it  is  for  the  sake  of 
the  lesser  command  of  the  earth  that  it  imperils  the 
greater,  and  makes  the  Human  Peace  impossible. 

Let  us  assume  that  a universal  command  of  the 
earth,  as  distinguished  from  a merely  local  command, 
is,  for  any  European  nation,  indispensable.  The 
problem  is  how  to  secure  it  pacifically.  Now,  in 
regard  to  this  need  for  a command  and  use  of  the 
earth,  a broad  and  obvious  distinction  may  be 
drawn  between  those  portions  of  the  earth  which  are 
adequately  peopled  and  those  which  may  be  said  to  be, 
for  industrial  purposes,  unoccupied.  Such  a dis- 
tinction has  its  domestic  importance  even  within  the 
national  hmits  of  an  old  country  like  England, 
where,  as  we  know,  considerable  tracts  of  land  have 
not  yet  been  brought  under  culture.  What  we  are 


232  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


now  concerned  with,  however,  is  the  international 
problem  that  arises  from  the  fact  that  vast  portions 
of  the  earth — as  in  Africa,  North  and  South  America, 
and  Australasia — are  still  manifestly  under-peopled, 
while  others  may  be  said  to  be  relatively  over- 
peopled. Setting  aside  the  question — a question 
which  is  largely  dependent  on  experience — of  how 
far  the  uninhabited,  or  under-inhabited,  parts  of  the 
earth  are,  from  the  character  of  their  climate  and 
soil,  uninhabitable,  we  may  say  broadly  that  they 
constitute  at  present  the  chief  danger-points  of  inter- 
national order.  If  the  policy  of  industrial  imperial- 
ism— ^which  we  have  defined  as  a policy  of  imperial 
expansion  in  the  interests  of  industry — is  still  to  be 
prosecuted,  it  is  towards  such  danger-points  that  it 
will  mainly,  although  not  exclusively,  be  directed. 
A Scientific  Catholicism,  aiming  at  a human  peace, 
will  understand  this.  It  will  know  where  such 
danger-points  exist.  Its  aim,  its  policy,  will  be  to 
guard  against  the  perils  inherent  in  them.  This  it  is 
certainly  not  difficult  to  do.  The  map  of  the  earth  is 
now  familiarly  known.  The  danger-points,  as  we 
have  called  them,  are  visible  and  calculable.  It 
would  be  easily  possible,  in  any  international  council 
of  the  Western  nations,  to  consider  these  specific 
danger-points  and  to  shape  a common  policy  in 
regard  to  them.  Within  certain  limits  such  a policy 
has  already  been  adopted — as,  for  instance,  in  regard 
to  Africa.  We  are  not  now,  of  course,  discussing  the 
question  of  whether  such  a policy  has  been,  or  might 
be,  in  its  actual  application,  ideally  just  or  beneficent 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  233 


to  all  concerned.  We  are  assuming  that  a Human 
Peace  would  be,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  total 
life  of  man,  a good  so  great  that  against  it  any  sub- 
ordinate good  or  evil  ought  not  to  be  pleaded,  real  as 
it  might  conceivably  be. 

The  chief  danger-points  of  the  earth,  in  relation  to 
industrial  imperialism,  are,  we  say,  its  unoccupied 
portions,  using  the  word  “ unoccupied,”  for  the 
sake  of  simplicity,  so  as  to  include  also  such  as  are 
under-occupied.  Now,  we  may  lay  down  the  principle 
that  as  man,  in  our  modern  world,  is  an  inhabitant 
of  the  whole  earth,  it  is,  for  the  purposes  of  the 
Catholic  life,  necessary  that  these  unoccupied  portions 
should  be,  as  far  as  possible,  occupied  and  brought 
under  culture.  What  is  certain  is  that  even  if  we  do 
not  assume  a Scientific  Catholicism  to  be  shaping  the 
policy  of  Christendom,  these  unoccupied  portions  will 
sooner  or  later,  and  in  one  way  or  another,  be  occupied 
and  be  made  to  yield  their  tribute  to  human  life.  The 
aim  of  a Catholic  policy,  pursuing  a Human  Peace,  is 
to  make  it  possible  to  secure  such  a result  without 
war.  From  the  point  of  view  of  such  a policy,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  consider  whether  these  unoccupied 
portions  of  the  earth  are  in  the  nominal  possession  of 
“ Christendom  ” or  “ non-Christendom  ” ; and  it  is, 
in  the  same  way,  undesirable  to  complicate  the  ques- 
tion with  mere  social  considerations.  The  reasons  for 
this  are  obvious.  In  the  first  place,  although,  for 
Europeans,  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  yellow 
and  black  races  are  “ inferior  ” to  the  white,  it  is 
evident  that  these  inferior  races,  even  if  they  con- 


234  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


tinue  to  retain  their  present  physical  and  intellectual 
characteristics,  must  be  reckoned  with  as  integral, 
persisting  factors  in  the  total  life  of  mankind.  They 
may  be  modified,  but  no  one  supposes  that  they  will 
be  extirpated.  In  the  second  place,  we  may  assume 
that  it  will  continue  to  be  the  aim  of  Catholicism,  by 
missionary  action,  to  transform  the  non-Christian 
races,  in  some  sense,  into  Christians,  and,  speaking 
broadly,  to  raise  the  non-Western  peoples,  as  far  as 
possible,  into  the  Western  plane  of  culture  and 
civihzation.  In  a certain  degree,  such  a result  has 
already  been  brought  about,  and  in  proportion  as  it 
is,  by  whatever  agency,  effected,  the  “ non-Western  ” 
demands  upon  the  earth  will  approximate  in  character 
and  amount  to  the  “ Western  demands.”  In  other 
words,  the  Catholic  life,  with  its  lower  and  higher 
needs,  will  tend  to  become  universal.  Lastly,  we 
must  recognize,  once  more,  that  some  at  least  of  the 
Eastern  and  non-Christian  races  are  now  becoming 
in  this  sense  Western  that  they  are  able  to  defend 
themselves  even  against  the  West,  or  “ Christendom.” 

We  may,  therefore,  so  far  as  the  aims  of  industrial 
imperialism  are  concerned — and  that  need  for  the 
command  of  the  earth  which  is  its  principal  motive — 
disregard  mere  differences  of  religion  and  race,  and 
consider  only  the  broad  distinction  between  those 
portions  of  the  earth  which  are  “ occupied  ” and  those 
which  are  unoccupied.  It  is,  as  we  say,  a common 
interest  of  mankind — and  not  of  any  one  nation 
exclusively — that  they  should  be  occupied,  and  made  to 
yield  their  proportion  of  produce  to  the  support  of  the 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  235 


human  family.  For  this,  however,  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  policy  of  imperialism  should  be  adopted  in 
regard  to  them.  There  are  now  hardly  any  portions 
of  the  earth  which  are,  in  a political  sense,  unoccu- 
pied, although  they  may  be  unoccupied  industrially. 
Almost  every  part  of  it  is  under  some  sort  of  rule  or 
government — “ belongs  ” to  some  people  or  nation, 
even  if  it  has  not  been  brought  fully  under  culture. 
The  natural  resource  of  any  European  nation,  in  regard 
to  the  unoccupied  portions,  of  the  earth  is  the  ancient 
resource  of  emigration — the  method  which  has  in  fact 
been  adopted  by  all  European  nations  for  hundreds 
of  years  past.  Such  a method  is  not  necessarily  a 
method  of  war.  The  emigrant  either  goes  to  a country 
which  is  under  the  rule,  if  only  the  nominal  rule,  of  his 
own  Government,  or  to  some  possession  of  a foreign 
power,  European  or  non-European.  An  English 
emigrant,  for  example,  may  go  either  to  Canada, 
Australia,  South  Africa,  or  to  the  United  States,  or  to 
Brazil.  In  either  case,  no  question  of  war  arises.  He 
passes  from  one  dominion  to  another — becomes  sub- 
ject to  the  authority,  such  as  it  may  be,  of  the  place 
in  which  he  settles.  That  authority,  of  course, 
exercises  the  natural  “ right  ” — a “ right  ” which  is 
dependent  on  “ might  ” — of  saying  whether,  or  on 
what  conditions,  it  will  accept  him,  but  when  he  has 
once  been  accepted  he  becomes  amenable  to  its  rule, 
and  at  the  same  time  gains  a certain  power  of  citizen- 
ship and  control  in  regard  to  it.  In  some  “ unoccu- 
pied ” countries — ^where  the  existing  population  is 
relatively  small  and  the  territory  large — the  body  of 


236  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


emigration  may  in  time  become  the  controlling  power, 
and  the  land  may  virtually  change  its  masters.  The 
older  the  world  gets,  of  course,  the  less  are  these  familiar 
results  of  emigration  and  colonization  likely  to  be  re- 
peated. There  are,  however,  as  is  evident,  still  vast 
regions  of  the  earth  which  are,  in  a palpable  sense, 
under-peopled,  and  in  relation  to  which  a true  emigra- 
tion is  possible.  The  essential  thing  to  be  borne  in 
mind  here  is  that  in  our  modern  world  a policy  of 
emigration  need  not  be  the  same  thing  as  a policy 
of  imperialism.  It  increases  the  total  co-operative 
command  of  the  earth,  but  it  does  not  necessarily 
involve  war.  Emigration  throughout  the  greatest  part 
of  the  world,  within  and  without  the  limits  of  Europe, 
now  proceeds  by  acceptance  of  the  local  authority, 
such  as  it  may  be.  In  so  far  as  that  principle  is 
observed  war  is  avoided,  and  the  cases  in  which  it  may 
be  impossible  to  observe  it — cases  in  which  the  local 
authority  is  inherently  and  continuously  incapable  of 
maintaining  social  order — are  now  so  few  that  it  is 
easily  possible  to  provide  for  them  by  an  international 
understanding. 

The  human  command  of  the  earth,  therefore — that 
command  on  which  the  total  edifice  of  the  Catholic 
life,  including  the  life  of  the  nation,  ultimately  depends 
— cannot  be  shown  to  demand  war.  So  far  as  the 
greater  body  of  trade — international  trade — is  con- 
cerned it  is  actually  obtained  by  peaceful  exchange  ; 
so  far  as  its  lesser  body,  imperial  trade,  is  concerned 
it  is  obtained  by  the  same  essential  process,  without 
securing  a monopoly  ; and  so  far  as  the  “ unoccupied  ” 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  237 

or  under-occupied  parts  of  the  earth  are  concerned  it 
may  be  obtained  by  emigration,  recognizing  and 
accepting  any  existing  local  authority.  A Catholic 
policy  directed  towards  the  installation  and  main- 
tenance of  a Human  Peace  would  found  itself  on  these 
considerations.  It  would  prohibit  industrial  im- 
perialism— and  this  not  merely  because  imperialism 
in  all  its  forms  means  war,  but  because  it  is,  in  our 
modern  world,  unnecessary  to  secure  that  command  of 
the  earth  for  which  it  is  prosecuted,  and  which  we  can 
see  to  be  indispensable  to  the  Catholic  life.  It  con- 
demns and  disallows  this  policy  because  by  emigration 
the  two  main  connected  purposes  are  secured  which 
industrial  imperialism,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  seeks 
to  accomplish.  First,  it  relieves  what  we  may  call 
the  European  pressure  upon  the  soil ; secondly,  it 
helps  to  complete  man’s  mastery  over  the  earth,  and 
to  give  to  his  social  and  intellectual  life  the  material 
basis  which  it  needs.  It  must,  however,  be  under- 
stood that  emigration  is  only  thus  an  alternative  to 
industrial  imperialism,  and  a prevention  of  war,  when 
the  emigrant  assumes  his  true  character.  He  cannot 
be  both  a citizen  of  the  country  which  he  leaves  and  of 
the  country  in  which  he  settles.  An  Englishman, 
even  when,  for  example,  he  emigrates  to  Australia  or 
Canada,  ceases  to  be  an  Englishman.  He  becomes  an 
Australian  or  Canadian.  He  is  incorporated  in  a new 
emerging  national  life,  which  in  course  of  time,  as 
cannot  be  doubted,  will  become  in  form,  what  it  already 
largely  is  in  fact,  an  independent  sovereign  State. 
Even  more  is  this  principle  important  when  the 


238  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


British  subject  settles,  as  often  happens,  not  in  a 
British  possession,  but,  for  instance,  in  the  United 
States,  or  in  one  of  the  South  American  republics. 
The  general  principle  must  be  recognized  that  when  a 
European — an  Englishman,  a German,  or  an  Itahan — 
emigrates  from  his  own  country,  and  becomes  the  sub- 
ject of  another  State,  he  passes  wholly  out  of  political 
relation  with  his  native  land,  and  is  then  amenable 
to  the  institutions  of  the  country  to  which  he  goes. 

Industrial  imperialism  we  have  defined  as  a policy 
establishing,  by  force  of  arms,  the  supremacy  of  one 
country  over  another  for  industrial  purposes.  Such  a 
policy  is,  by  its  nature  and  definition,  a war  policy. 
There  is,  however,  one  form  of  industrial  imperialism 
which,  because  of  its  importance  in  the  modern  world, 
needs  to  be  especially  considered.  We  may,  perhaps, 
for  the  sake  of  distinction,  caU  it  the  imperialism  of 
foreign  investments.  So  considering  it,  we  may  dis- 
tinguish between  the  strictly  industrial  character  of 
foreign  investments  and  their  possible  political  conse- 
quences. Further,  we  may,  for  our  present  purpose, 
disregard  the  questions — many  of  them  certainly  of 
high  difficulty  and  importance — of  the  exclusively 
domestic  effect  of  such  investments  either  on  the  nation 
lending  or  the  nation  borrowing.  We  are  now  only 
concerned  with  their  bearing  upon  the  problem  of 
peace — with  their  relation  to  the  policy  of  industrial 
imperialism,  and,  as  a consequence,  to  that  command 
of  the  products  of  the  earth  which  this  policy  is 
designed  to  subserve.  In  principle  the  export  of 
capital  to  a foreign  country  may  be  said  to  be  only  one 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  239 

form  of  international  trade  or  exchange.  It  is  a form 
of  trade,  however,  which  may  easily  give  rise  to  the 
particular  political  relations  which  constitute  industrial 
imperialism.  These  relations  doubtless  are  not  so 
likely  to  arise  when  the  financial  transactions  are 
between  two  nations  of  something  like  equal  standing 
and  power.  In  such  instances,  when  the  capitalists 
of  one  country  lend  money  to  the  inhabitants  of 
another,  they  accept  the  risks  of  the  situation,  as  they 
accept  them  in  ordinary  domestic  business.  They  do 
not  count  on  a sort  of  political  guarantee  from  their 
own  country.  When,  however,  the  transactions  are 
between  a strong  and  a weak  country  the  case  is 
different.  Then  what  appears  to  be  a purely  indus- 
trial enterprise  on  the  part  of  the  stronger  State  may 
become  political,  and  be  the  prelude  to  imperialism. 
Any  inability  on  the  part  of  the  weaker  country  to 
meet  its  obligations  may  be  a pretext  for  some  form  of 
intervention  and  control  in  its  affairs  on  the  part  of  the 
stronger.  By  such  intervention  its  internal  political 
order  is  still  further  disturbed,  its  governing  authority 
is  still  further  weakened,  and  a situation  is  created  in 
which  additional  interference  on  the  part  of  the  ex- 
ternal power  appears  to  be  called  for,  an  interference 
preparing  the  way  for  ultimate  annexation. 

Just,  therefore,  as  we  can  see  that  the  unoccupied 
or  under-occupied  portions  of  the  earth  are,  from  the 
standpoint  of  a policy  of  peace,  international  danger- 
points,  which  must  be  taken  into  account  and  guarded 
against,  so  also  the  financial  transactions  between 
States,  and  especially  between  States  of  unequal  power. 


240  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


are  danger-points,  which  may  easily  become  points  of 
disorder  and  war.  And  here  again  a Catholic  inter- 
national policy  needs  to  be  founded  on  science,  taking 
complete  and  dispassionate  account  of  the  actual 
forces  and  relations  of  man  and  his  environment.  It 
cannot  be  founded  on  sentiment,  however  high.  It 
must  be  based  on  the  principle  that  it  is  necessary  for 
“ man  ” — the  universal  man  of  every  nation — to 
possess  a command  over  the  products  of  the  earth.  If 
for  such  a command  war  is  necessary,  war — horrible 
as  it  may  seem  from  a certain  standpoint — must  be 
accepted,  but  if  it  is  not  thus  necessary,  then,  to  a 
scientific  Catholic,  pursuing  a total  human  Perfection 
according  to  Christ,  it  is  not  only  evil,  but  senseless. 
It  is  a form  of  aberration,  moral,  intellectual,  and 
practical.  Now,  war  is  a special  application  of 
material  force  directed  to  slaughter  and  destruction. 
It  is,  however,  as  is  obvious,  a force  not  immediately 
employed  upon  the  earth.  It  has  no  direct  connection 
with  industry,  which  is  always  ultimately  reducible 
to  agriculture.  War  does  not  plough  the  land,  or  sow 
the  seed,  or  gather  in  the  harvest,  or  grind  the  corn, 
or  make  the  bread,  or  build  the  ships  which  transport 
wheat  from  one  country  to  another.  In  the  same  way, 
it  does  not  clothe  or  house  men,  or  procure  for  them 
heat,  light,  or  locomotion.  It  does  not,  by  its  own 
processes,  enable  them  to  live  the  Catholic  Hfe,  to 
maintain  the  home,  the  Church,  the  school,  the  theatre, 
the  State,  and  the  workshop.  Nevertheless,  war  has 
its  victories  as  well  as  peace.  It  has  no  direct  con- 
nection with  agriculture,  but  it  can,  in  principle  and  in 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  241 


its  extreme  form,  enable  a given  society  of  agricul- 
turists to  entirely  exclude  another  society  from  the 
earth  by  killing  them.  It  could  enable  a society  con- 
sidering itself  “ higher  ” or  “ better  ” to  so  exclude  a 
society  considered  to  be  “ lower  ” or  “ worse.”  It 
could,  for  example,  enable  aU  the  white  races  of  man- 
kind— ^assuming  them  to  be  sufficiently  powerful — to 
kill  off  all  the  yellow  and  black  races.  Then  the  white 
races  would  remain  the  sole  possessors  of  the  earth,  and 
could  proceed  with  its  undisturbed  culture,  for  the 
purposes  of  the  Cathohc  life. 

Such  a supposition  may  seem  in  the  last  degree 
extravagant.  It  is,  however,  not  so  extravagant  as  it 
may  appear.  As  a matter  of  fact,  and  historically 
speaking,  the  relations  between  what  we  may  broadly 
call  Europe  and  non-Europe,  or  between  Christendom 
and  non-Christendom,  have  been  largely  based  on  the 
assumption,  or  implication,  that  what  considered  itself 
to  be  the  higher  humanity  had  no  obligations  towards 
the  lower,  but  was  entitled,  if  it  could,  to  conquer  it, 
take  possession  of  its  territory,  and  rule  it  for  the  advan- 
tage of  its  conquerors.  No  other  principle  than  this, 
for  example,  has,  down  to  the  present  day,  governed 
the  action  of  England  with  regard  to  the  native  races 
of  America,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Australia  ; and  what  is 
true  of  England  is  true  of  almost  every  country  in 
Europe.  But  not  only  is  it  true  of  the  relations  of 
Europe  and  non-Europe,  of  a higher  civilization  in 
contact  with  a lower  ; it  is  true  also  of  the  internal 
relations  of  the  rich  and  the  poor,  of  the  capitalists  and 
the  working  classes,  in  every  European  nation.  What 


242  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


we  call  the  higher,  or  upper,  classes  in  a country  exclude 
from  the  earth — or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing, 
exclude  from  the  adequate  possession  of  its  products 
— the  great  mass  of  the  community.  Such  an  exclu- 
sion is,  in  principle,  not  only  accepted — it  is  upheld 
and  sanctioned  by  the  general  mind  of  the  nation.  It 
is  defended  and  justified  by  “ the  Church.”  In  other 
words,  the  perpetual  existence  of  an  “ aristocracy,”  or 
upper  class,  and  a “ lower  class  ” — of  a comparatively 
small  number  of  men  basing  an  ample  human  life  on  a 
large  command  of  the  earth  and  a vast  number  basing 
a meagre  life  on  a small  command — this  is,  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  held  to  be  both  inevitable  and  beneficent. 

But  if  it  is  true  that  within  the  limits  of  a single 
civilized  nation  the  upper  class,  or  the  higher  social 
life,  is  entitled  to  maintain  itself  at  the  expense  of  the 
lower,  much  more  may  it  seem  to  be  true  that  Western 
civilization  is  entitled  to  maintain  itself  at  the  expense 
of  non-Western  mankind,  or  Christendom  at  the  ex- 
pense of  non-Christendom,  or  the  white  races  at  the 
expense  of  the  yellow  and  black.  We  may  even  hold, 
as  has  been  argued  by  various  eminent  thinkers,  that 
the  best  thing  that  can  happen  to  the  lower  is  to  be 
mastered  and  ruled  by  the  higher,  and  that  there- 
fore, for  example,  no  happier  destiny  could  befall 
the  three  hundred  millions  of  British  India  than  to 
be  under  the  government  of  the  forty-five  millions 
of  the  United  Kingdom.  We  may  formulate  the 
general  principle  that  that  which  conquers  is,  by  the 
mere  fact  that  it  conquers,  proved  to  be  higher — 
higher,  at  least,  in  the  qualities  essential  for  social 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  243 


command  and  co-ordination — and  that  the  conquered 
people  is  the  lower  people,  whether  by  “ the  people  ” 
we  mean  the  working  classes  of  a European  nation,  or 
such  native  races  as  those  of  Africa  and  Asia,  held 
subject  by  British  power.  To  this  principle  of  racial 
or  class  inferiority  what  we  may  call  the  Catholic 
principle  may,  it  is  true,  seem  to  go  counter.  The 
Catholic  principle  is  a principle  of  universal  Perfection 
in  Christ.  Catholicism,  so  understood,  sees  Christ,  the 
ideal  man,  in  the  humblest  of  human  beings — in  the 
black  man  or  the  yellow  man  as  in  the  white  man. 
Its  aim  is  not  to  retain  men  in  their  inferiority,  but 
to  raise  them  in  the  scale  of  being  and  make  them 
heirs  of  a total  humanity.  From  this  point  of  view, 
imperialism,  which  aims  at  the  forcible  subjection  of 
inferiors  by  superiors,  and  thinks  mainly  of  the  good  of 
the  best,  may  seem  to  be  irreconcilable  with  Catholi- 
cism, which  would,  as  far  as  possible,  raise  inferiors 
to  the  level  of  superiors,  and  thinks  of  the  good  of  the 
whole.  Against  this  conception  of  Catholicism  may, 
of  course,  be  urged  the  traditional  view — that  its  Land 
of  Promise  is  heavenly  and  not  earthly.  According  to 
this  view,  the  black  and  the  yellow  races,  although  they 
may  remain  subject  and  inferior  in  this  world,  will 
change  their  colour  and  status  in  “ the  next  ” ; and  in 
the  same  way  the  working  classes  and  the  poor  of 
European  civilization  ought  to  remain  content  with 
their  present  lot  till  after  death,  because  they  may  then 
begin  their  entrance  into  a celestial  kingdom. 

It  is,  however,  not  at  the  standpoint  of  this  tra- 
ditional view — if  it  is  the  traditional  view — of  Catholi- 


244  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


cism,  but  at  the  standpoint  of  Catholicism  become 
scientific,  and  therefore  in  a complete  sense  Catholic, 
that  we  are  placing  ourselves  in  this  work.  Such  a 
Catholicism  sees  things  as  they  are — the  universe  and 
man  as  he  enters,  age  after  age,  into  larger  relation  with 
it  and  becomes  the  right  interpreter  of  it  and  of  himself. 
Such  a Catholicism,  too,  being  in  Christ  both  fixed 
and  progressive — finding  in  Him  a continuing  Abso- 
lute which  is  always  emerging  into  fuller  significance — 
knows  nothing,  in  its  moments  of  vision,  of  Europe 
and  non-Europe,  or  of  white,  yellow  and  black  races. 
It  knows  only  man,  and  has  as  its  first  and  last  aim  to 
make  him  Catholic.  It  is  in  the  light  of  this  aim  that 
it  examines  imperialism,  and  war  as  its  inevitable  con- 
sequence. It  applies  to  war  certain  specific  practical 
tests  which  are  also  Catholic  tests.  War  is  conceivably 
a good  if  it  enables  the  white  races  of  mankind,  as  the 
“ higher,”  to  extirpate  the  yellow  and  black  races,  as 
the  “ lower,”  and  become  the  sole  possessors  of  the 
earth.  Setting  aside  such  a supposition  as  extrava- 
gant and  monstrous,  war,  we  may  say,  is  a good  if  it 
enables  the  higher  races  not  to  extirpate  but  to  sub- 
jugate the  lower,  so  that  as  labourers  upon  the  earth 
the  lower  may  support  their  own  limited  life  and  at  the 
same  time  minister  to  the  richer,  fuller  life  of  the  higher. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  white  races — or  if  not  the 
white  races,  the  races  of  “ Christendom  ” may  be 
regarded  as  the  natural  aristocrats  of  mankind,  and  as 
thus  entitled  to  rule  over  its  other  races  and  to  organize 
inferiority  for  the  advantage  of  both  inferiority  and 
superiority.  It  may  be  argued,  also,  that  imperialism,  in 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  245 


this  sense,  need  not  always  be  a cause  of  war.  We  may 
suppose  the  white  races  of  mankind — the  guardians 
of  what  we  call  “ Christendom,”  or  Western  civiliza- 
tion— to  agree  among  themselves  as  to  a common  line 
of  policy  to  be  adopted  in  regard  to  the  yellow  and 
black  races,  including,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  the 
whole  of  non-Christendom,  Mohammedan  or  other. 
Dividing  mankind,  then,  into  “ Christendom  ” and 
“ non-Christendom,”  and  using  these  terms  as  equiva- 
lent to  a “ higher  ” and  “ lower  ” humanity,  we  may 
consider  it  to  be  possible  for  the  nations  of  Christen- 
dom to  agree  to  portion  out  the  world  of  non-Christen- 
dom among  themselves,  and  to  preserve  a universal 
peace  by  respecting  each  other’s  “ sphere  of  interest.” 
Within  certain  limits,  as  we  know,  this  has  already 
been  attempted,  and  it  may  be  considered  that  if  such  a 
“ world  policy  ” became  complete  and  systematic,  not 
only  would  war  be  avoided,  but  a total  human  com- 
mand of  the  earth  would  be  gained,  by  which  the 
lower  would  live  according  to  the  needs  of  the  lower 
and  the  higher  according  to  the  needs  of  the  higher. 
This  policy,  too,  it  may  be  held,  would  naturally  put 
an  end  to  imperialism.  By  imperialism,  defined  as  we 
have  defined  it,  is  meant,  not  the  preservation  of  exist- 
ing empires,  but  their  further  extension,  whether  for 
political  or  industrial  ends.  Consequently,  if  the 
nations  of  “ Christendom  ” came  to  a pacific  under- 
standing for  a final  partition  of  non-Christendom 
among  themselves,  and  also  to  abstain  from  aggressive 
attacks  upon  each  other,  imperialism,  as  a policy  of 
war,  would  end  itself  by  fulfilling  itself. 


246  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


While,  therefore,  it  is  true  that  war,  considered  as 
a process  of  slaughter  and  destruction,  has  no  direct 
relation  to  the  ends  of  industry,  we  may  argue  that 
it  has  this  important  relation  to  them,  that  it  may 
enable  the  higher  humanity  to  hold  the  lower  in  a 
bondage  which  is  proper  to  its  natural  inferiority,  and 
thus  to  make  it  instrumental  to  the  good  of  the 
higher,  while  gaining  for  itself  all  the  good  of  which 
it  is  capable.  Against  this  conclusion,  however, 
certain  important  considerations  may  be  adduced. 
First,  what  we  have  broadly  called  “ non-Christen- 
dom ” represents  not  a minority,  but  the  great  mass 
of  mankind.  From  the  point  of  view  of  numbers 
alone  “ Christendom  ” is,  relatively  to  that  immense 
mass,  insignificant.  Secondly,  this  non-Christian 
mass  is  not  dead  or  stagnant.  It  is  a living,  moving 
body  of  forces,  which,  as  it  cannot  be  annihilated,  so  it 
cannot  have  arbitrary  limits  assigned  to  it  by  external 
agencies.  On  the  contrary,  the  external  agencies 
playing  upon  it  are  such  as  serve  to  quicken  and 
develop  its  power.  Non-Christendom  is,  in  our 
modern  world,  gaining  from  Christendom  a new 
vitahty — mind,  culture,  a progressive  capacity  to 
shape  itself,  to  organize  itself,  and  defend  itself. 
While  it  is  true  that  Christendom,  as  the  advanced 
guard  of  mankind,  is  not  likely  to  forfeit  its  historic 
pre-eminence,  it  is  yet  more  and  more  tending  to  lose 
its  ability  to  impose  limits  upon  the  expansion  and 
development  of  non-Christendom.  Thirdly,  there  is 
no  probability,  drawn  from  experience,  that  the 
nations  of  Christendom  will  ever  be  able  to  maintain 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  247 


a permanent  peace  among  themselves  based  upon  a 
common  mastery  and  exploitation  of  non-Christen- 
dom. There  is,  for  one  thing,  no  such  unity  of  mind 
and  purpose  in  Christendom  itself  as  would  be  neces- 
sary to  ensure  such  a result.  We  have  used  the 
broad  terms  “ Christendom  ” and  “ non-Christen- 
dom ” as  convenient  expressions  of  sociological  com- 
parison, but  “ Christendom  ” does  not  denote  a 
settled  order  of  thought  and  action.  It  stands, 
among  other  things,  for  a world  of  hostile  Churches 
and  sects,  for  a deep  and  growing  antagonism  of 
belief  and  unbelief,  for  a strife  of  nations,  for  a 
vast  conflict  of  classes,  for  a constant  clash  of  material 
interests,  for  a perpetual,  insatiable  greed  for  wealth. 
History  and  experience  give  no  sanction  to  the  view 
that  such  a Christendom  can  bring  in  and  maintain 
a Human  Peace,  based  on  no  other  principle  than  that 
of  a common  predominance  over  non-Christendom, 
even  assuming  non-Christendom  to  remain  for  ever 
inert  or  incapable.  They  rather  make  it  certain  that 
those  who  can  only  agree  to  pursue  a policy  of  im- 
periaHsm  are  certain  sooner  or  later  to  turn  their 
imperialism  against  one  another,  and  that  a mere 
compact  among  the  States  of  Europe  to  respect  each 
other’s  conquests  beyond  the  limits  of  Europe  is  no 
guarantee  against  war  in  Europe  itself. 

But  if  this  is  true,  then  it  is  plain  that  the  policy 
of  imperialism,  being  a war  policy,  is  from  beginning 
to  end,  and  however  we  test  it,  unsound.  The  one 
justification  that  it  might  seem  to  have  is  that  while 
securing  the  predominance  of  the  higher  humanity 


248  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


over  the  lower,  it  would  end  itself  by  fulfilling  itself, 
and  would  bring  in  the  peace  of  mankind  by  establish- 
ing a sort  of  universal  empire  of  Christendom  over  non- 
Christendom.  But  to  this  justification,  as  we  have 
shown,  it  cannot  lay  claim.  It  is,  however,  not 
enough  even  to  say  this.  Not  only  is  it  true  that 
imperialism,  being  a war  policy,  cannot  bring  in  the 
ascendency  and  reign  of  the  higher  humanity — cannot, 
in  other  words,  subserve  a positive,  many-sided  Per- 
fection in  Christ — but  it  must,  from  the  nature  of 
things,  hinder  and  frustrate  it.  War  is  not  a subor- 
dination of  the  lower  and  fulfilment  of  the  higher  ; it 
is,  on  the  contrary,  a sacrifice  of  the  higher  and  preser- 
vation of  the  lower.  It  takes  what  is  most  perfect  in 
man  and  destroys  it.  It  takes  the  men  who  are  best  in 
body  and  leaves  the  worst.  It  takes  the  men  who 
are  best  in  mind — masters  of  the  spirit,  ministers  of 
goodness,  beauty,  and  truth,  and  reduces  them  to 
the  level  of  mere  physical  fighters,  to  kill  or  be  killed. 
It  brings  into  a companionship  of  slaughter  and 
destruction  the  wise  and  the  foolish,  the  educated  and 
the  uneducated,  the  mediocrity  and  the  man  of  genius, 
the  profligate  and  the  pure,  the  sober  and  the  drunken, 
the  provident  and  the  spendthrift,  the  wife-beater 
and  selfish  son  and  the  devoted  husband  and  father, 
the  man  who  may  carry  in  his  mind  some  high  vision 
and  power  of  human  good  and  the  senseless  sensualist, 
who  has  lived  as  an  animal  lives,  but  who  yet,  on  the 
field  of  battle,  dies  as  an  animal  dies,  with  an  instinc- 
tive unhesitating  ferocity  and  courage.  It  does  this, 
too,  not  necessarily  to  subserve  some  great  interest  of 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  249 


human  life,  spiritual  or  temporal — the  home,  the 
Church,  the  school,  the  theatre,  the  State,  and  the 
workshop — but  perhaps  to  give  effect  to  the  ambition 
of  a monarch,  or  the  mistakes  of  a statesman,  or  the 
blindness  of  a people,  or  the  designs  of  a governing 
caste,  or  a common  exorbitant  desire  for  wealth, 
or  the  mere  suspicion  and  jealousy  of  contending 
nations. 

We  must,  then,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a Scientific 
Catholicism,  come  to  this  conclusion,  not  only  that 
war  is,  in  our  modern  world,  and  relatively  to  the  End 
of  Life,  not  a good,  but  that  it  is  an  immeasurable 
evil — a hindrance  and  frustration  of  the  very  pur- 
poses which  a Catholic  humanity  must  propose  to 
itself,  whether  we  think  of  that  indispensable  com- 
mand of  the  earth  by  which  such  a humanity  must  be 
nourished,  or  of  the  high  aims  of  love,  goodness, 
beauty,  truth,  and  disciplined  power  to  which  it  is 
dedicated.  In  other  words,  war  is  for  Catholic  man — 
the  developed  man  of  the  modern  synthesis,  founding 
a many-sided  perfection  on  the  total  experience  and 
culture  of  the  world — a miscarriage.  It  is  a form  of 
lunacy.  It  is  a mode  of  suicide.  By  it  man,  as  the 
Hving  temple  of  God,  a sanctuary  and  vessel  of  all 
Perfection,  consciously  and  intentionally  destroys 
himself.  War,  in  our  modern  world,  does  not  spring 
from  some  insurgent  impulse  of  passion  in  a barbaric 
being.  It  is  a product  of  foresight  and  system.  It  is 
chosen  and  willed.  It  is  the  result  of  a policy  de- 
liberately pursued  from  year  to  year,  ratified  in  the 
counsels  of  statesmen,  approved  by  the  acquiescence 


250  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


of  citizenship,  sanctioned  by  the  consent  of  religion. 
To  end  war,  if  it  is  ever  to  be  ended,  to  bring  in  the 
Human  Peace,  if  it  is  ever  to  be  brought  in,  we  must 
end  the  policy  which  makes  war  inevitable,  and  bring 
in  the  policy  which  has  peace  as  its  natural  issue. 
The  war  policy  is  imperialism — either  the  political 
imperialism  by  which  one  nation  interferes  with 
another  to  secure  some  alleged  political  end,  or 
industrial  imperialism,  such  as  we  have  now  defined 
it.  If  imperialism  in  either  of  these  forms  is  necessary, 
war  is  justifiable,  and  justifiable  as  aggressive  war, 
which  any  given  nation,  being  a lord  of  its  own  life 
and  a judge  in  its  own  cause,  is,  from  its  own  point 
of  view,  entitled  to  bring  about.  Against  such  an 
imperialism  there  is  only  one  influence,  one  policy,  to 
which  an  effectual  appeal  can  be  made.  International 
law  is,  as  we  have  shown,  an  international  illusion. 
Treaties  have  a validity  and  force  which  cease  with 
the  weakness  of  the  country  upon  which  they  have 
been  imposed,  or  the  needs  of  those  who  have  entered 
into  them.  The  mere  sentiment  of  peace,  the  mere 
sense  of  the  waste  and  inhumanity  of  war,  has  never 
prevented,  and  will  never  prevent,  men  from  entering 
into  it.  A mere  political  change — the  transference 
of  the  governing  power  from  the  “ aristocracy  ” to 
the  “ democracy ; ” a mere  industrial  change,  the 
abolition  of  “ capitalism,”  the  establishment  of 
“ socialism  ” — these,  by  themselves,  inevitable  or 
desirable  as  they  may  otherwise  be,  cannot  bring  in 
the  Human  Peace.  It  can  only  be  brought  in,  if  it  is 
ever  to  be  brought  in,  by  a Scientific  Catholicism, 


A CATHOLIC  POLICY  OF  PEACE  251 


showing  man  to  himself  as  an  interpreting  mind,  as  a 
modifying  will,  in  the  universe  in  which  he  has  been 
set  to  work  out  his  hfe,  and  making  it  clear  to  him 
that  war  is  a frustration  of  the  ends  which  he  con- 
tinuously proposes  to  himself,  and  peace  a condition 
indispensable  to  their  fulfilment. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 

It  is,  as  we  have  now  seen,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a 
Scientific  Catholicism,  possible  to  show,  not  only  that 
war  is,  in  our  modern  world,  a frustration  of  the  Ends 
of  Perfection,  the  high,  continuous  aims  of  human  life, 
but  that  the  ends  which  seem  to  call  for  it  and  justify 
it — and  most  of  all  man’s  industrial  command  of  the 
earth — can  only  be  secured  by  a systematic  policy  of 
peace.  Such  a policy  we  may  call  a Catholic  policy — 
a policy  taking  account  of  the  situation  and  total 
needs  of  man,  as  a many-sided  being,  lower  and  higher, 
pressing  forward  through  the  ages  to  a positive 
fulfilment  of  himself  in  Christ.  While,  however,  we 
may,  in  this  way,  gain  the  conception  of  such  a 
policy — see  how  it  follows  from  the  very  nature  of 
Catholicism,  as  a conscious  and  progressive  move- 
ment of  man  towards  an  ideal  end — this,  by  itself, 
cannot  suffice  to  bring  in  the  Human  Peace.  The 
policy,  in  order  to  prevail,  must  gain  a place  in 
the  mind  of  the  world — find  for  itself  voices,  organs, 
and  methods  of  application.  In  relation  to  this 
subject,  as  in  relation  to  the  whole  problem  of  a 
Human  Peace,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  not 
deceive  ourselves.  A Scientific  Catholicism  must  at 
least  be  scientific.  It  must  recognize  the  character 
of  the  forces — material,  intellectual,  moral — which 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


253 


have  to  be  overcome,  or  controlled,  before  a Human 
Peace  can  be  established.  It  may,  as  we  must  admit, 
be  impossible  ever  to  establish  it.  We  have  said  that 
its  full  command  of  science — that  is  to  say,  of  the 
ordered  experience  and  power  of  a developed  humanity 
— ^will  give  to  Catholicism,  in  the  prosecution  of  its 
unending  aims,  a resource  such  as  it  has  never  yet 
possessed.  That  is  our  new  and  sure  ground  of  hope 
for  the  human  future — a reason  for  believing  that  a 
universal  and  continuous  peace,  which  has  hitherto 
been  impossible,  may  yet  become  possible.  It  is 
obvious,  however,  that,  even  with  this  great  resource 
at  our  command,  the  only  certainty  we  can  have  in 
regard  to  a thing  not  actually  given  in  experience  is  a 
certainty  of  faith.  Such  a certainty,  however,  belongs 
to  the  very  genius  of  Catholicism.  It  is  contrary  to 
its  essential  character  to  despair  of  man.  It  puts 
forward,  and  has  always  put  forward,  the  doctrine 
of  human  responsibility.  Such  a responsibility,  how- 
ever, implies  freedom.  It  implies  power — a power  in 
man,  for  example,  to  order  his  elemental  passions,  and 
make  them  subject  to  a rule  of  perfection.  But  if 
such  a power  exists  in  one  sphere,  it  exists  in  another. 
If  it  exists  in  regard  to  the  instincts  of  nutrition  and 
sex,  it  exists  in  regard  to  the  forces,  working  within 
the  nature  of  man,  which  bring  about  war.  And  such 
a capacity  for  self-control  and  self-direction  we 
affirm  not  merely  in  spite  of  its  failures,  but — if  the 
paradox  may  be  allowed — because  of  them. 

Therefore,  if  we  say  that  the  attainment  of  a Human 
Peace  may  conceivably  be  impossible,  this  does  not 


254  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


mean  that  man  is,  by  any  external  or  internal  con- 
straint, made  necessarily  subject  to  the  forces  of  war, 
or  that  the  science  of  peace  is  not  sure  ; it  means 
only,  what  we  all  know,  that  the  mere  knowledge  of 
a truth  is  not  sufficient  to  bring  about  its  application, 
and  that  men  may  see  the  way  to  peace  as  they  see 
the  way  to  sobriety  and  chastity,  and  yet  not  pursue 
it.  It  is  the  business  of  “ the  Church  ” — that  is  to 
say,  of  man,  as  a mind  and  will,  acting  or  reacting 
upon  himself  for  definite  spiritual  ends  by  means  of 
definite  organs  and  institutions — to  move  them  to 
walk  in  it.  This,  however,  can  only  be  done  by  the 
adoption  of  specific  methods.  The  Catholic  doctrine, 
or  policy,  of  peace  we  have  now,  in  sufficient  degree, 
explained.  This  doctrine  we  have  called  scientific. 
By  this,  however,  we  do  not  mean  that  it  is,  in  its 
essential  spirit  and  purposes,  new.  Science  is  not  an 
invention  of  the  new ; it  is  a revelation,  an  explana- 
tion, of  the  old.  What  we  have  called  the  Catholic 
doctrine  of  a Human  Peace  has  been  present  in 
Catholicism  from  the  first,  although  present  in  spon- 
taneous and  immature  forms — as  “ the  prophetic 
soul  of  the  wide  world,  dreaming  on  things  to  come.” 
But  Catholicism — Christ  organizing  Himself  in  the 
life  of  man — has  never  existed  as  a thing  absolute 
and  external  to  humanity.  It  has  always  existed, 
and  it  still  exists,  as  a part  of  the  life  of  humanity, 
gaining  significance  and  character,  limitation  or 
expansion,  hindrance  or  help,  from  the  nature  of  that 
life,  according  to  its  seasons  of  comparative  torpor  or 
progressive  activity.  Catholicism  is,  for  contemporary 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


255 


practical  purposes,  what  the  great  mass  of  Catholics 
are  at  any  given  time.  Therefore,  a Catholic  doctrine 
of  peace,  scientifically  sure  as  it  is,  and  consonant  with 
the  eternal  spirit  of  Catholicism  as  it  can  be  shown  to 
be,  will  not  necessarily,  at  any  given  moment,  com- 
mand the  immediate  assent  of  “ the  Church  ” — the 
Church  being,  at  a given  moment,  nothing  more  than 
the  vast  majority  of  average  men  and  women,  laity 
and  ecclesiastics,  subject  to  their  own  incapacity, 
their  own  ignorance,  their  own  inertia,  and  to  the 
active  prejudices  of  nation,  class,  party,  and  material 
self-interest. 

Such  a doctrine,  such  a policy,  must,  consequently, 
first  find  for  itself  a place  and  instruments  in  the  mind 
of  the  Church.  The  Church,  as  such,  is  a spiritual 
power — a power  operating  upon  the  affections,  intelli- 
gence, and  will.  It  does  not,  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word,  compel.  It  educates.  It  persuades,  and 
it  prays.  It  helps  men  to  worship.  It  governs  that 
which  is  without  by  means  of  that  which  is  within. 
The  Catholic  doctrine  of  peace  must  in  this  way  reach 
the  life  of  the  world — through  the  teaching  Church. 
By  the  teaching  Church,  of  course,  we  do  not  mean 
merely  its  priests  as  such.  The  Church  teaches  by  its 
doctors — philosophers,  scientific  men,  historians,  men 
of  letters,  and  even  its  poets  and  artists,  as  well  as 
by  its  priesthood  ; and  when  it  is  a question  of  bring- 
ing into  it  a new  impulse,  a new  vision,  a new  power 
of  progressive  life,  it  is  to  the  genius  of  the  prophet, 
in  the  large  sense,  that  we  must  look,  rather  than  to 
the  average  priest,  working  within  the  limits  of  tra- 


256  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


ditional  conceptions,  and  concerned  with  a routine 
functional  task.  Nevertheless,  the  Church  is  a unity. 
What  is  given  to  it  from  the  mind  of  the  prophet,  the 
scientific  discoverer,  the  philosopher,  the  man  of 
genius,  the  poet,  the  musician,  the  painter,  must,  in 
some  measure  at  least,  eventually  be  given  forth  again 
by  the  mind  of  the  priest.  If  there  is  a Catholic 
science  or  policy  of  peace — ^as  distinguished  from  a 
merely  sentimental  confession  of  it  as  a good,  or 
platonic  acknowledgment  of  it  as  an  ideal — it  must 
breathe  its  spirit  into  worship  and  make  itself  felt 
as  a force  of  teaching.  Every  Catholic  Church 
must  become,  in  a perfectly  definite  sense,  a school  of 
peace — not  leaving  so  great  a cause  to  the  chance 
guardianship  of  itinerant  orators,  or  individual  pub- 
licists, or  political  parties,  but  showing  that  it  is  the 
cause  of  Catholicism  itself,  and  that  Catholicism 
knows  how  to  uphold  and  promote  it.  Such  an 
advocacy  of  peace  needs,  of  course,  not  only  know- 
ledge, but  courage.  The  Catholic  priest,  being  a 
teacher  of  social  truth,  must  not  be  the  Don  Abbondio 
of  I Promessi  Sposi,  but  its  Cardinal  Borromeo.  If 
the  blind  cannot  lead  the  blind,  still  less  can  the 
cowardly  lead  the  courageous.  It  is  as  necessary  for 
a teacher  in  the  modern  world  to  be  faithful  to  his 
charge  against  the  mere  ascendency  of  wealth,  or  the 
clamour  of  an  angry  mob,  as  it  was  for  a priest  of  the 
seventeenth  century  to  withstand  the  brutality  of 
some  petty  tyrant.  It  is,  of  course,  not  his  business 
to  denounce  men,  or  inflame  their  resentment.  The 
office  of  a teacher  is  to  teach  ; but  as  he  cannot  teach 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


257 


without  sympathy,  tact,  and  knowledge,  so  also  there 
are  occasions  when  he  cannot  teach  without  the 
courage  to  proclaim  unpopular  or  unacceptable  truths. 

We  may,  however,  suppose  that  the  Catholic  doc- 
trine of  peace  has  established  itself  in  the  teaching 
mind  of  the  Church,  as  a thing  congruous  with  its 
persistent  aims  and  essential  to  their  complete  ful- 
filment. By  “ the  Church,”  of  course,  we  here  mean, 
in  the  first  instance,  the  Church  of  Rome,  the  Church 
which  has  the  inestimable  advantage  of  possessing 
the  Papacy  as  its  head.  This  Church  is  an  inter- 
national Church — the  only  one  that  exists.  It  is,  as 
such,  an  independent  Spiritual  Power.  It  is  a mind 
capable  of  penetrating  and  regulating  the  whole  body 
of  humanity.  It  is  of  East  and  West,  of  North  and 
South,  of  the  Old  World  and  the  New.  It  has  ad- 
herents and  voices  in  all  the  great  races  of  mankind. 
It  is  the  one  Church  which  is  in  a position  to  give 
forth  a universal  religious  message  to  men.  We  shall 
suppose  this  Church — that  is  to  say,  its  leading  minds, 
its  thinkers  and  priests — to  give  forth  such  a message, 
to  proclaim  a universal  policy  of  peace — a policy,  not 
a sentiment  only,  not  a Utopia,  not  an  ideal,  but  a 
definite,  reasoned  and  practicable  policy,  such  as  a 
responsible  statesmanship  may,  if  it  is  willing,  adopt, 
and  such  as  an  active  citizenship  may  impose  upon 
it,  if  it  should  prove  unwilling.  Such  a policy,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  cannot  be  brought  in  by  any 
one  nation  alone,  although  any  one  nation,  by  its 
own  independent  influence  and  action,  may  certainly 
do  much  to  promote  it.  It  demands  the  consent  and 


258  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


co-operation  of  all  the  predominant  countries  of  the 
world,  and  especially,  of  course,  of  Christendom. 
The  policy,  being  such  as  we  have  here  defined  it — ■ 
depending,  first,  on  the  common  acceptance  of  an 
actual  status  quo,  as  not  to  be  subject  to  forcible 
disturbance  ; secondly,  on  a consequent  disarmament 
by  land  and  sea  ; thirdly,  on  the  general  abstinence 
from  an  aggressive  imperialism,  political  or  industrial ; 
fourthly,  on  the  realization  of  man’s  command  of  the 
earth  by  free  international  exchange  and  pacific 
emigration ; fifthly,  on  the  adoption  of  common 
measures  relatively  to  the  “ danger-points  ” of  inter- 
national order,  of  whatever  kind — this  policy,  being 
Catholic  in  its  governing  ends,  and  Catholic  also  in 
the  wide  human  agreement  which  it  requires,  needs  to 
be  promoted  in  the  various  nations  of  Christendom 
by  an  authority  which,  in  degree  at  least,  springs  from 
their  common  life  and  represents  them  all.  Such  an 
authority  is  the  Catholic  Church,  centred  and  directed 
at  Rome. 

Even,  however,  if  we  suppose  the  international 
mind  of  the  Church,  its  teaching,  or  directing,  mind, 
to  be  penetrated  by  the  conception  of  such  a policy, 
it  still  remains  clear  that  great  and  continuous  diffi- 
culties must  attend  its  common  acceptance  and 
maintenance.  Those  difficulties  arise  from  the  essen- 
tial character  of  the  policy  itself,  and  from  its  relation 
to  the  nature  of  man,  politically  and  morally  con- 
sidered. The  war  policy  is,  as  we  have  seen,  im- 
perialism. The  peace  policy  is  the  abandonment  of 
imperialism,  and  the  attainment  of  its  Catholic  aims 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


259 

by  pacific  measures.  But  imperialism  springs  from 
two  main  motives— one  distinctively  political,  the 
other  distinctively  industrial.  We  may,  for  purposes 
of  comparison,  call  its  political  motive  nationalism, 
understanding  by  nationalism  the  disposition  to  in- 
terfere with  the  domestic  freedom  and  possessions  of 
another  country  for  the  aggrandizement  of  one’s  own. 
So  defining  nationalism,  we  are  able  to  distinguish 
between  it  and  patriotism.  Patriotism  we  may  con- 
sider to  be  a disinterested  and  active  love  of  one’s 
own  country.  Such  a feeling  is  not  necessarily 
exclusive.  It  is  not,  by  its  own  nature,  a source  of 
hostihty  to  other  nations.  It  may  be  without 
jealousy  or  suspicion.  It  does  not  demand  war  for 
its  satisfaction  or  manifestation.  It  may  be  noblest 
and  most  beneficent  in  peace.  It  may  uphold  peace 
as  a high  national  good.  It  may  condemn  and  resist 
war  as  a supreme  national  evil.  It  may,  when  a war 
has  been  brought  about  by  a mistaken  and  short- 
sighted policy,  refuse  to  sanction  it,  and  abstain  from 
all  voluntary  concurrence  in  it.  It  may  represent  the 
sane,  continuous  mind  of  a nation,  looking  to  its 
permanent  good,  and  continuing  loyal  to  that  good 
amidst  the  passing  passions  of  a given  time,  or  the 
misconceptions  of  party  and  class. 

Of  such  a patriotism,  in  natural  opposition  to  an 
aggressive  nationalism,  a Scientific  Catholicism — 
being  here,  as  elsewhere,  only  scientific  in  its  right 
discernment  and  expression  of  a principle  which 
Catholicism  has  always  proclaimed — must  be  the 
voice  and  organ.  So  long  as  an  aggressive  nationalism 


26o  the  problem  of  HUMAN  PEACE 


exists  war  must  exist ; and  Catholicism,  in  its  pursuit 
of  a Human  Peace,  has  to  lift  men’s  minds  above  it 
and  maintain  them  in  a higher  plane  of  vision  and 
effort.  It  is,  as  is  clear,  only  the  Catholic  Church,  the 
international  Church,  that  can  do  this,  and  it  is  also 
clear  that  it  cannot  do  it  by  a s.udden  summons — by 
the  denunciation  of  an  evil  policy,  or  the  proclamation 
of  a wise  policy,  in  a time  of  crisis  ; it  can  only  do  it 
by  education,  by  a prescient,  constant  direction  of 
the  human  mind  to  the  ends,  whether  of  the  personal 
or  the  civic  Hfe,  which  Catholicism  proposes  to  it. 
In  a time  of  crisis,  and  stiff  more  in  a time  of  actual 
hostilities,  Catholicism,  the  Spiritual  Power,  is,  as  a 
directing  agency,  almost  effaced.  That  is  the  hour  of 
the  statesman  or  the  soldier — the  hour  when  the 
priest  and  the  teacher,  relatively  to  the  causes  and 
issues  of  war,  become  nullities.  It  is  in  peace,  and 
by  the  methods  of  peace,  that  the  peace  of  the  world 
is  to  be  prepared.  It  is  then  only  that  the  voice  of 
the  Church  can  be  heard.  If,  then,  a Scientific 
Catholicism  is  to  overcome  a restless  and  aggressive 
nationalism,  it  must  be  by  a continuous  spiritual 
process,  the  process  of  the  teacher — exactly  the  same 
process  as  that  which  is  adopted  by  the  scientific 
thinker  when  he  educates  men  to  act  upon  the  forces 
of  Nature,  or  as  is  employed  by  a professor  when  he 
is  seeking  to  give  to  his  students  the  perceptions  and 
the  capacity  of  a definite  art.  This,  indeed,  has 
always  been  the  characteristic  method  of  the  Church. 
It  does  not  wait  until  sin  is  committed  before  ex- 
plaining its  nature,  or  arousing  men  against  it.  Its 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


261 


provision  against  sin  begins  with  life,  and  con- 
tinues throughout  life.  In  the  same  way,  having 
a doctrine  of  peace,  it  will  educate  men  in  peace  for 
the  ends  of  peace,  and  overcome  the  spirit  of  an 
aggressive  nationalism  by  the  spirit  of  Catholicism. 
Recognizing  that  war  is  a sin  against  Catholicism,  a 
frustration  of  its  purposes— that  it  is  for  man,  pur- 
suing the  Perfection  of  Christ,  a form  of  aberration 
and  suicide — ^it  will  not  wait  till  it  has  actually 
broken  out  before  condemning  it,  but  will  aim  at  so 
shaping  the  mind  and  conduct  of  men  that  it  may  be 
possible  for  them  to  avoid  it. 

If  it  is  evident  that  only  by  the  action  of  the 
international  Church  can  an  aggressive  nationalism  be 
overcome,  it  is  still  more  clear  that  only  by  such  a 
Spiritual  Power  can  an  aggressive  industrialism,  or 
industrial  imperialism,  be  transformed  into  a pacific 
and  world-wide  human  co-operation.  The  roots  of 
international  policy,  as  we  have  already  said,  must 
be  sought  in  the  national  life,  and  the  national  life  is 
only  a collective  expression  of  the  life  of  the  soul.  The 
connection  between  public  life  and  private  life  is, 
indeed,  so  deep  and  indissoluble  that  we  may  seem  to 
be  imprisoned  in  a vicious  circle  when  we  say  that 
it  is  from  “ the  Church  ” alone — the  Church  being 
simply  human  nature  considered  in  a special  relation 
— that  we  can  expect  the  direction  of  the  mind  of 
man  to  the  ends  of  peace.  Quis  custodict  tpsos 
custodes  ? “ If  the  salt  hath  lost  its  savour,  where- 
with shall  it  be  salted  ? ” What  we  have  called 
industrial  imperialism  in  the  international  sphere  has, 


262  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


as  we  have  shown,  its  foundation  in  the  conflict  of 
classes  and  individuals  in  the  national  sphere. 
Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  springs  from  the  need 
merely  for  such  a right  command  of  the  earth  as  is 
indispensable  for  the  Catholic  life.  They  spring 
from  a desire  for  monopoly,  or  ascendency,  having 
no  necessary  relation  to  that  life.  Stating  the  same 
truth  in  other  words,  we  may  say  that  they  spring 
from  an  individual  craving  for  material  wealth  irre- 
spective of  any  spiritual  and  social  use  which  is  to 
be  made  of  it.  The  existence  of  such  a craving,  pro- 
ducing such  results,  is,  of  course,  one  proof  that 
Catholicism,  considered  as  a doctrine  and  organization 
of  the  spiritual  life,  is  unable  to  counteract  the 
pressure  of  what,  from  its  own  standpoint,  we  call 
the  lower  instincts.  And  this  again,  in  a last  analysis, 
means  exactly  what  St.  Paul  means  when  he  says  : 
“ The  good  which  I would  I do  not ; but  the  evil 
which  I would  not  that  I practise.”  The  inordinate 
personal  desire  for  wealth — apart  from  what  we  may 
now  call  its  Catholic  uses — is  not  the  characteristic 
of  any  one  nation,  or  of  any  one  class,  or  of  any  one 
individual ; it  is  to  be  found  in  every  nation  and 
class  and  amongst  almost  all  individuals.  It  is  so 
constant  and  potent  a factor  in  the  life  of  man  that 
in  our  so-called  science  of  economics  we  assume  its 
inevitable  and  regular  action,  as  in  physics  we  assume 
the  action  of  gravity.  Being  such  a factor,  it  works 
in  “ the  Church  ” — that  is  to  say,  among  men  and 
women  associated  for  certain  spiritual  ends — as  it 
works  in  “ the  world,”  and  it  works  in  the  priest  who 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE  263 

proclaims  the  ideals  of  Catholic  Perfection  as  it 
works  in  the  people  to  whom  he  proclaims  them. 

We  may  seem,  therefore,  in  our  reliance  upon  the 
Church  to  deliver  us  from  the  craving  for  wealth,  to 
be  involved  in  the  dilemma  of  expecting  grapes  from 
thorns,  or  figs  from  thistles — of  being  dependent  on  an 
imperfect  human  nature,  as  it  shows  itself  in  both  the 
temporal  and  the  spiritual  spheres,  for  the  very  power 
which  is  to  save  us  from  that  nature.  This  dilemma, 
too,  may  appear  to  be  the  greater  in  proportion  as  the 
area  of  what  we  caU  the  Church  is  extended.  An  indi- 
vidual man  may  be  a “ saint  ” — ^that  is  to  say,  he  may 
live  an  ordered,  holy,  beautiful  life  by  a strong  and 
persistent  resistance  to  an  adverse  social  pressure.  In 
a monastery,  or  a religious  order,  or  even  in  a restricted 
and  restrictive  sect,  men  and  women  may,  for  a time 
at  least,  continue  in  a high  plane  of  spiritual  being 
without  compromising  their  religious  fidelity.  But 
when  “ the  Church  ” is  as  wide  as  the  world  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  Church  and  “the  world” — in  other 
words,  between  a disciplined  and  an  undisciplined 
life — becomes,  to  a great  extent,  abrogated.  The 
Catholic  Church,  which  reprobates  “ the  world,”  is 
itself  the  world.  We  can  only  escape  from  this 
dilemma  by  recognizing  the  two  meanings — a lower 
and  a higher  meaning — which  naturally  attach  to 
the  word  “ Church.”  It  represents,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  whole  continuous  body  of  the  faithful  such  as 
they,  in  disposition  and  practice,  actually  are, 
including  the  priesthood  ; it  represents,  on  the  other, 
the  high  spiritual  mind  of  this  society,  expressed  in 


264  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


Scripture,  creeds,  sacraments,  doctrines,  and  above 
all  in  forms  of  prayer  and  worship.  This  mind  is  the 
mind  of  the  aristocracy,  of  the  best,  or  it  is  the  mind 
of  the  many  in  their  best  moments.  The  progressive 
life  of  man,  as  a Catholic,  depends  on  the  constant 
reassertion  and  development  of  this  nobler  mind,  in 
opposition  to  the  mind  of  the  inert  or  resistant  social 
man,  whether  in  the  laity  or  in  the  priesthood.  This 
is  a truth  of  aU  religious  experience,  from  the  time  of 
Our  Lord  to  the  present  day.  The  mere  craving  for 
wealth,  therefore,  which  is,  as  Our  Lord  Himself 
said,  in  natural  antagonism  to  the  life  of  Perfection 
— this  craving  which  is  in  the  Church,  considered 
as  the  whole  body  of  the  faithful,  can  only  be 
overcome  by  the  Church,  considered  as  the  Spirit 
of  our  Lord,  living  and  working  in  the  mind  of 
man. 

This  higher,  or  true  Church,  the  Church  of  vision 
and  the  ideal,  will,  as  we  here  conceive  it,  have  the 
greater  capacity  to  overcome  this  craving  because  it 
will  be  the  Church  of  a Scientific  Catholicism,  the 
Church  of  developed  man,  resting  on  the  total 
experiences  and  acquisitions  of  the  past,  and  moving 
towards  a complete  humanity.  As  such  it  will  not 
use  the  language  of  mere  censure  or  prohibition.  In 
its  teaching  the  negative  will  be  swallowed  up  in  the 
affirmative.  It  will  no  longer  consider  man,  even  in 
his  sins,  simply  as  “ a sinner  ” ; it  will  consider  him 
as  a being  called  to  Perfection— -to  a many-sided 
personal  and  social  Perfection  of  love,  goodness, 
beauty,  truth,  and  power.  It  will  cease  simply  to 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


265 


denounce  Mammon.  It  will  aim  at  mastering  Mam- 
mon, recognizing  that  for  man,  as  he  is  and  where  he 
is,  the  command  of  the  earth  is  a condition  precedent 
of  the  Catholic  life,  and  that,  eternal  as  is  the  truth 
of  renunciation,  the  common  Catholic  life  cannot  be 
expressed  merely  in  terms  of  renunciation,  but  must 
be  expressed  in  terms  of  possession  and  fulfilment. 
Such  a Catholicism,  holding  the  old  in  the  new  and  the 
new  in  the  old,  will,  in  its  opposition  to  imperialism, 
have  a power  of  appeal  to  those  even  who  may  seem 
to  be  beyond  its  borders.  It  will  be  a scientific  argu- 
ment for  an  ideal  human  life.  In  principle,  therefore 
— allowing  for  the  inevitable  apathy  or  resistant 
passions  of  man — its  only  real  opponents  will  be  the 
“ sinners  against  the  Holy  Spirit.”  In  other  words, 
they  will  be  the  conscious  and  avowed  opponents  of 
science  and  the  ideal.  The  Catholic  Church,  as  a 
true  teaching  Church,  will  be  in  natural  alliance  with 
all  teachers  of  positive  truth — even  with  such  as  may 
appear  at  present  to  be  out  of  relation  with  it.  Its 
international  plea  for  peace,  being  not  the  abstract 
proclamation  of  a vague  sentiment,  but  a reasoned, 
practical  doctrine  of  man’s  nature  and  needs,  lower 
and  higher,  will,  in  degree,  appeal  even  to  those  who 
are  now  classed  as  “ agnostics  ” or  “ unbelievers,” 
They  may  not  admit  that  the  Church,  as  such,  or  as 
they  conceive  it,  is  a need,  but  they  will,  as  a rule, 
recognize  a lower  and  a higher  life  in  man — a life  of 
mere  animalism  and  a life  of  human  aims  and  culture 
— and  they  will  acknowledge  that  this  higher  life 
cannot  be  made  secure  and  common  so  long  as  man 


266  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


wastes  what  is  best  in  himself,  physically  and  intel- 
lectually, in  war. 

By  virtue  of  its  command  of  science,  therefore,  the 
Catholic  Church,  in  its  teaching  mind,  will,  as  an 
organ  of  peace,  be  able  to  give  unity  and  guidance  to 
the  life  of  Christendom — the  Christendom  of  the 
Roman  communion,  of  the  Greek  Church,  of  the 
Protestant  Churches,  and  even  of  the  agnostic  world. 
This,  however,  it  will  do  not  only  positively  by 
becoming,  in  every  country,  a stimulating  and  co- 
ordinating influence  in  social  teaching,  but  negatively 
by  helping  to  discredit  the  incompetent  and  mischie- 
vous teaching  to  which  men  are  at  present  commonly 
subject.  So  far  as  social  action  and  citizenship  are 
concerned,  the  teacher  in  the  modern  world  is  for 
the  most  part  represented  by  the  party  politician  and 
the  journalist.  They  are,  of  course,  not,  in  any 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  teachers  at  all.  They  are 
to  some  extent  creators  of  public  opinion,  good  or 
bad,  and  to  some  extent  also  the  exponents  and 
instruments  of  an  opinion  which  has,  by  other 
agencies,  already  been  generated.  They  are,  speak- 
ing generally,  the  representatives  and  organs  of  some 
of  the  very  evils  to  which  a Scientific  Catholicism,  if 
it  is  ever  to  arise  in  the  world,  must  put  an  end — of 
an  aggressive  nationalism,  of  industrial  imperialism, 
of  the  gross  greed  for  wealth,  of  sectarian  narrowness 
and  strife,  of  class  pretension  and  conflict,  of  party 
antagonism.  Their  temper  and  methods  are  the 
antithesis  of  the  temper  and  methods  required  in 
anything  that  deserves  to  be  called  teaching.  They 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


267 


work  in  an  atmosphere  of  perpetual  controversy,  ill- 
will,  abuse,  and  reciprocal  misrepresentation.  They 
have  arisen  out  of  the  disorder,  spiritual  and  temporal, 
of  the  modern  world,  and  they  tend  to  perpetuate  and 
increase  it.  The  fundamental  need  of  man,  as  a 
terrestrial  spectator  and  inhabitant  of  the  Universal 
Order  in  which  he  is  placed,  is  that  he  should,  as  far 
as  possible,  understand  that  Order,  and  himself  in 
relation  to  it,  for  the  purposes  of  his  own  spiritual 
and  practical  life.  To  the  right  satisfaction  of  this 
need  the  party  poHtician  and  the  journalist  con- 
tribute nothing.  They  are  partly  the  victims  and 
partly  the  exponents  and  ministers  of  a vast  con- 
fusion of  mind.  They  stand  neither  for  Catholicism, 
in  its  historic  and  symbolic  presentation  of  truth,  nor 
for  science  in  the  analytic  discernment  and  ordered 
application  of  it.  They  have,  therefore,  no  concep- 
tion of  the  human  past  from  which  man  is  travelling, 
nor  of  the  human  future  towards  which  he  is  moving. 
They  are  not  even  in  any  true  relation  with  what 
is  best  in  contemporary  life.  They  represent  its 
obtrusive  and  noisy  mediocrity,  its  vulgarity,  its 
superficiality,  its  untested  assumptions,  its  impatience, 
the  passions  and  conflicts  of  nation  and  class,  the 
narrowness  and  illusions  of  sect,  the  restlessness  and 
disorder  begotten  of  the  pursuit  of  wealth.  Above 
all  is  this  true  of  the  journalist.  The  responsible 
statesman  has,  in  the  modern  world,  a task  of  peculiar 
difficulty,  even  when  he  happens  to  be  a man  of  high 
personal  competence  and  impersonal  sincerity.  He 
works  in  a situation  of  unstable  opinions,  conflicting 


268  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


interests,  and  antagonistic  sects  and  classes.  He  has 
to  maintain  some  degree  of  order  and  development 
tinder  conditions  of  anarchy  and  antagonism.  He 
gains  power,  commonly,  only  after  many  years  spent 
in  opposition  and  vituperation,  and  holds  it  precari- 
ously for  a short  time,  during  which  he  is,  in  his  turn, 
subject  to  the  opposition  and  vituperation  of  others. 
The  very  nature  of  his  task,  however,  as  the  cus- 
todian, if  only  the  temporary  custodian,  of  vast  and 
complex  social  interests  begets  in  him  a sense  of 
responsibility  and  gives  him  a certain  breadth  of 
outlook.  He  is,  for  the  time  being,  at  least  an  over- 
seer of  the  republic,  and  not  the  mere  representative  of 
some  exclusive  sect  or  class. 

The  journalist — using  this  word  in  a comprehensive 
sense — is  in  a different  position.  He  is  supposed  to 
be,  on  the  one  hand,  an  organ  of  opinion  ; on  the 
other,  a contemporary  historian.  In  both  respects 
his  office,  such  as  it  is,  has  suffered  a progressive 
degradation.  As  an  organ  of  opinion  he  is,  of  course, 
the  mere  agent  of  a sect,  party,  or  class,  or  perhaps 
only  of  some  sordid  commercial  enterprise.  He  is 
dependent,  irresponsible,  and  frequently  anonymous, 
and  whatever  his  personal  capacity  and  qualifications 
may  be,  the  conditions  of  every  kind  under  which  his 
work  is  done  are  in  the  last  degree  unfavourable  to 
the  formation  and  expression  of  disinterested  and 
competent  judgments.  They  render  such  judgments, 
in  fact,  impossible.  As  a contemporary  historian, 
exhibiting  the  life  of  the  world  as  it  is,  the  journalist 
discharges  a function  which  might  conceivably  be  of 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


269 


high  value,  but  which — largely  owing  to  circumstances 
for  which  he  has  no  personal  responsibility — is  now 
actually  performed  with  less  intelligence,  order, 
and  good  faith  than  in  the  early  days  of  the  Press. 
Nothing  is  more  necessary  for  a capable  and  effective 
citizenship  than  an  honest  and  intelligent  record  of 
contemporary  life,  national  and  international,  given 
with  the  same  exactness  and  veracity  as  are  now 
expected  from  every  historian  of  the  past.  This  does 
not  at  present  exist.  The  daily  Press  especially  has 
become  increasingly  the  vehicle  of  a stupid  and  stupe- 
fying sensationalism,  dictated  by  the  lowest  needs  of 
commercial  competition  ; and  the  thing  which  is  of 
most  consequence  to  the  human  mind — a right, 
orderly  understanding  of  itself  and  of  the  world  in 
which  it  works — has  been  rendered  almost  impossible 
by  the  very  instrument  which  apparently  exists  to 
meet  this  need. 

It  will  be  one  of  the  chief  tasks  of  the  teaching 
Church,  promoting  the  cause  of  a Human  Peace  by 
the  power  of  a Scientific  Catholicism,  to  rescue  the 
great  things  of  man’s  mind  and  life  from  the  hands 
of  the  party  politician  and  the  journalist,  and  to 
bring  them  within  the  domain  of  the  thinker  and 
teacher,  appealing  to  a common  citizenship.  While, 
however,  the  Church — in  that  high  conception  of  it 
which  distinguishes  it  from  “ the  world  ” — is  a 
teaching  mind,  a Spiritual  Power,  acting  upon  the 
forces  of  the  spirit,  it  is  not  merely  by  formal  and 
abstract  teaching  that,  in  its  scientific  completeness, 
it  wiU  create  the  power  of  peace.  Catholicism,  too, 


270  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


represents  an  “ interest  ” as  well  as  a doctrine.  It 
represents  the  interest  of  the  Catholic  life.  The 
Catholic  life  is,  in  its  full  and  ideal  extension,  a life 
universal.  It  is  not  a negative  life  of  prohibition  and 
renunciation  ; it  is  a positive  life  of  many-sided 
possession  and  fulfilment,  in  which  the  lower  is  made 
subject  to  the  higher.  It  is  a life  of  progressive  Per- 
fection in  Christ,  and  in  terms  of  institutions  it  is 
expressed  by  the  home,  the  Church,  the  school,  the 
theatre,  the  State,  and  the  workshop.  It  is  a life  also 
dependent  for  its  realization  upon  man’s  common 
command  of  the  earth,  national  and  international. 
At  present,  so  far  as  the  great  mass  of  the  people  in 
Christendom  are  concerned,  this  command  does  not 
exist.  They  are  shut  out  from  it.  They  cannot, 
even  if  they  wish  to  do  so,  live  the  Catholic  life.  They 
can,  indeed,  live  the  negative  Catholic  life  of  pro- 
hibition and  renunciation.  A dependent  and  home- 
less pauper  can  be  a good  man  in  the  sense  of  not 
being  a “ sinner,”  and  his  poverty,  of  course,  does  not 
exempt  him  from  moral  responsibility.  But  the 
Catholic  life  of  possession  and  use — the  life  of  a full- 
flowering humanity,  in  which  the  lower  serves  as  a 
foundation  for  the  higher — this  only  becomes  possible 
by  means  of  a command  of  the  earth. 

The  Catholic  Church — meaning  by  this  expression, 
in  this  connection,  especially  its  spiritual  aristocracy, 
concerned  with  the  realization  of  its  highest  ideals — 
will,  in  its  promotion  of  peace,  be  able  to  appeal  to 
the  interest  of  that  vast  social  mass  which  at  present 
possesses  only  a limited  and  precarious  command  of 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


271 


the  earth,  and  for  which  the  Catholic  life  is  therefore 
impossible.  This  interest  cannot  be  said  to  be  an 
exclusive  and  material  interest ; it  is  an  interest 
social  and  spiritual.  It  is,  in  a full  sense,  human. 
It  is  true  that  a workman,  like  a capitalist,  may- 
desire  wealth  for  merely  ignoble  ends,  but  it  is  also 
true  that,  like  the  capitalist,  he  may  desire  it  as  the 
condition  precedent  of  a life  of  perfection.  Further, 
it  is  plain  that  in  the  absence  of  a certain  command 
of  the  earth,  direct  or  indirect,  this  life  is  impos- 
sible. As,  therefore,  it  is  the  task  of  a Scientific 
Catholicism  to  realize  this  life  practically  and  uni- 
versally, it  must  give  its  sanction  to  the  just  claim  of 
“ the  people  ” of  Christendom — the  great  body  of 
those  whom  we  call  the  workers — to  possess  their 
due  share  of  the  proceeds  of  the  earth.  But  it  must 
do  more  than  this.  The  Church — the  true  Church, 
the  aristocracy  of  Catholicism,  the  mind  of  the  Spirit 
and  the  ideal — ^has  to-day,  in  a time  of  science,  the 
same  task  to  accomplish  as  in  the  first  centuries  of 
Christianity,  the  time  of  intuition  and  vision  : its 
task  is  to  raise  human  nature  and  keep  it  progressing 
in  a high  plane.  Its  morality  is,  as  we  have  said,  a 
“ slave  morality  ” — a morality  which  transforms  the 
slave  into  a master,  giving  him  a command  of  himself 
and  of  the  earth,  as  the  material  basis  of  his  being. 
This  morality,  this  high  purpose,  is  none  the  less  the 
note  of  the  Church  because  in  practice  it  has  not  been 
fulfilled.  It  has  ever  been  professed ; it  has  never 
been  repudiated.  It  remains  to  be  accomplished,  and 
it  is  the  office  of  science,  as  a complete  expression  and 


272  THE  PROBLEM  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 


direction  of  the  human  mind,  to  point  the  way  to  its 
accomplishment. 

The  Church,  therefore,  in  this  conception  of  it,  will 
not  be  satisfied  with  sanctioning  the  claim  of  the 
people  to  a right  possession  of  the  earth  ; it  will 
direct  them  to  such  a possession ; it  will  inspire  in 
them  a Divine  discontent — a discontent  with  all  that 
stands  between  them  and  the  attainment  of  Divine 
things.  It  will  bless  and  encourage  them  in  their 
movement  towards  a total  humanity.  It  is  true — 
whether  in  the  case  of  a people,  yearning  to  throw 
ofi[  a foreign  yoke,  or  of  a class,  seeking  social  emanci- 
pation— that  “ who  will  be  free,  themselves  must 
strike  the  blow.”  It  is  a Catholic  principle  that 
“ God  alone  cannot  save  men,”  and  that  prayer,  to 
become  efficacious,  must  be  transformed  into  a force 
of  action.  “ The  people,”  therefore,  must  save  them- 
selves, and  this  not  merely  by  desiring  the  command  of 
the  earth,  but  by  desiring  that  Catholic  life  for  which 
the  command  of  the  earth  is  alone  really  valuable. 
But  it  is  the  business  of  the  Church,  the  true  Church 
of  worship  and  science,  to  quicken  in  them  these 
desires,  and  to  point  the  way  to  their  fulfilment.  It 
will  show  that  the  Catholic  life  is  impossible  without 
a Human  Peace,  and  that  the  cause  of  a Human 
Peace  is,  therefore,  in  a special  sense  the  cause  of  the 
people.  It  will  show  that  we  cannot  have  both  war, 
with  its  lunatic  destruction  and  waste,  and  the  social 
realization  of  a positive  Catholicism.  It  wiU  show 
that  international  policy  has  its  roots  in  national 
life — that  imperialism  in  the  one  sphere  has  as  its 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


m 


counterpart  competition  in  the  other.  Under  im- 
perialism, in  all  its  forms,  we  may  have,  indeed-— 
what  we  have  now-— a small  social  class,  inordinately 
possessed  of  wealth  and  political  supremacy,  with 
an  immense  social  body  restlessly  struggling  for  the 
possession  of  these  things.  But  under  imperialism 
we  cannot  have  the  Catholic  life — the  life  of  a fuU- 
flowering  humanity — for  the  whole  republic.  Im- 
perialism means  the  ascendency  of  the  few — the 
ascendency  of  a governing  class  within  the  nation, 
the  ascendency  of  a governing  State  beyond  the 
nation.  It  means  war  because  it  means  international 
competition.  One  country  striving  for  domination 
beyond  its  own  borders  provokes  and  justifies  the 
rivalry  of  other  countries  striving  for  a similar 
domination.  And  war  is  waste.  It  is  a hindrance  to 
the  higher  things  ; it  is  a fulfilment  of  the  lower.  It 
is  the  suicide  of  humanity-— a destruction  of  its  best 
physical  life,  a recurrent  frustration  of  its  best 
intellectual  and  moral  life. 

The  Catholic  Church,  therefore,  in  its  scientific 
appeal  for  peace,  will  be  able  to  awaken  and  direct 
a force  greater  than  any  mere  force  of  the  schools— 
the  force  to  which  Our  Lord  appealed,  the  force  to 
which  Catholicism  in  its  best  moments  has  always 
appealed,  the  force  of  the  people,  as  distinguished 
from  the  force  of  any  special  and  exclusive  class.  The 
cause  of  the  people  is  the  cause  of  the  whole  social 
order.  It  is,  therefore,  not  rightly  represented  by 
the  unfortunate  and  misleading  word  “ democracy.” 
That  word,  historically,  has  arisen  out  of  a continuous 


274  the  problem  OF  HUMAN  PEACE 

class  struggle,  and  it  may  stand,  in  practice,  for  a 
disastrous  attempt  to  make  inferiors  the  lords  of 
superiors,  or  to  give  the  mere  power  of  numbers  pre- 
dominance over  the  power  of  mind.  A Scientific  and 
teaching  Catholicism  cannot  sanction  “ democracy  ” in 
this  sense.  The  ascendency  of  the  best,  in  every  sphere, 
is  for  the  good  of  the  commonwealth.  It  is  the  word 
“ republic,”  and  not  the  word  “ democracy,”  which  is 
the  right  expression  of  this  principle.  It  is  to  the 
Human  Republic,  national  and  international,  that  a 
Scientific  Catholicism  will  lead  us — a Republic  in 
which  there  will  no  longer  be  any  special  hereditary 
classes,  land-owning  or  capital-owning,  but  in  which 
there  will  necessarily  be  special  functionaries,  pos- 
sessing, for  the  advantage  of  the  Republic,  the  free- 
dom and  power  which  all  responsibility  demands. 
The  Republic,  in  this  conception  of  it,  is  only  the 
same  thing  as  the  living  social  Catholic  Church.  It  is, 
too,  the  same  thing  as  the  Human  Peace,  for,  as  we 
have  shown,  without  the  Human  Peace  the  Catholic 
life,  as  a life  common,  in  degree,  to  all  men  and 
women,  is  for  ever  impossible.  This  Republic  of 
Peace — a free  concert  of  independent,  self-governing 
nationalities — must,  as  we  have  also  shown,  be  first 
established  in  Christendom.  When  it  has  been  estab- 
lished in  Christendom — in  simpler  terms,  when  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  have  given  effect  to  an  inter- 
national policy  such  as  we  have  here  unfolded — it 
will,  for  all  practical  purposes,  have  been  established 
in  the  rest  of  the  world.  Christendom  is  the  war 
centre.  It  is  only  necessary  for  it  to  become  the 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PEACE 


275 


peace  centre  in  order  to  secure  the  concord  of  man- 
kind. It  is  for  the  Catholic  Church,  the  international 
Church,  the  Church  of  the  Papacy,  the  Church  of  the 
Republic,  the  Church  of  Human  Perfection,  positive 
and  many-sided,  the  Church  of  the  people — it  is  for 
this  Church,  in  its  full  command  of  science  and  in  the 
exercise  of  its  high  teaching  authority,  to  bring  in  and 
maintain  this  Human  Peace — first,  by  fully  confessing 
it  as  its  own  cause,  its  own  ideal,  the  natural  realiza- 
tion of  the  Kingdom  of  Christ ; and,  secondly,  by  so 
acting  on  the  mind  of  the  outside  world  that  it  may 
be  seen  by  every  sect  and  school  to  be  the  ideal  and 
the  cause  of  man. 


BRADBURY,  AONEW,  & CO.  LD.,  PRINTERS,  LONDON  AND  TONBRIDGE. 


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